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Ilya Glazunov

Ilya Sergeyevich Glazunov (Илья́ Серге́евич Глазуно́в; 10 June 1930 – 9 July 2017) was a Soviet and Russian artist from Saint Petersburg. He was the founder of the Russian Academy of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture where he also served as a rector up until his death. He held the title of People's Artist of the RSFSR.

Ilya Glazunov's paintings primarily feature historic or religious themes. His works include Russia the Eternal, The 20th Century Mystery, The Ruining of the Temple on Easter Night, and illustrations to the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

Biography
Ilya Glazunov was born in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) to Sergey Fyodorovich Glazunov and Olga Konstantinovna Glazunova (née Flug). Both of his parents originally belonged to Russian nobility. His father was a historian. As a child, Glazunov attended a children's school of arts, and later a secondary art school in the historical district of Petrogradskaya Storona.

During World War II, he survived the Siege of Leningrad. His father, mother and other relatives died in it. In 1942, the then-eleven-year-old was transported from besieged Leningrad along the Road of Life. He stayed in the village of Greblo in the Novgorod region. In 1944, he returned to Leningrad and studied in the Leningrad Secondary Art School. From 1951 to 1957, he studied art at the Leningrad Repin Institute of Arts under the direction of Professor Boris Ioganson.

In 1956, he married Nina Vinogradova-Benois. He painted the image of Nina in many of his works. Nina Aleksandrovna was a descendant of the Benois family, a familiar name in art history. Her uncle was the artistic director of the La Scala Opera for 30 years. On 24 May 1986, Nina Vinogradova-Benois committed suicide, just a few days before the opening of the exhibition of her husband in Manege. Their children, Ivan and Vera, have both become artists. Glazunov's success at the International Competition of Young Artists in Prague prompted the opening of his first single exhibition in Moscow in 1957. Soon after in the 1960s, he traveled to Italy for the first time to paint the portraits of many famous actors and actress, including Gina Lollobrigida and Anita Ekberg. He also painted portraits of many political leaders, including Indira Gandhi, Leonid Brezhnev, Urho Kekkonen, Yury Luzhkov and Andrei Gromyko. In 1978, Glazunov started teaching in the Moscow University of Art. In 1987 he founded the Russian Academy of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture.

During the 1970s, he stood against the general plan for restoration of Moscow that threatened to ruin part of the historic centre of Moscow. Together with Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov he gathered signatures of prominent scientific and cultural figures under a letter of protest that was sent to the Politburo. The project was made public, then heavily criticized and, as a result, was cancelled. This also led to the creation of the civil committee that monitored other reconstruction plans. Glazunov was one of the main advocates behind the restoration of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour and one of the co-founders of the All-Russian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIiK).

Glazunov died from heart failure on 9 July 2017 at the age of 87. He was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery on July 11.

Works
Illustrations for F. Dostoyevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov:
 * The Great Experiment. Glazunov's epic canvas on Russia in the 20th century.
 *  "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" Triptych
 * Grand Inquisitor. Left portion of the Triptych.
 * Golgotha. Central portion of the Triptych.
 * Dostoyevsky. Night. Right portion of the Triptych.

Honors
A minor planet, 3616 Glazunov, discovered by Soviet astronomer Lyudmila Zhuravleva in 1984, is named after him.
 * Order "For Merit to the Fatherland";
 * 1st class (10 June 2010) - for outstanding contribution to the development of national art, many years of creative and educational activities
 * 2nd class (11 October 2005) - for outstanding achievements in the field of domestic art and education
 * 3rd class (9 June 2000) - for outstanding contribution to the development of national art
 * 4th class (29 May 1995) - for services to the state, achievements in work and significant contribution to strengthening friendship and cooperation between nations
 * Order of the Red Banner of Labour (1985)
 * People's Artist of the USSR (1980)
 * Honoured Artist of the RSFSR (1973)
 * State Prize of the Russian Federation (1997) - for the restoration of the Moscow Kremlin
 * "For Service to Moscow" insignia - for his great services in the arts and arts education
 * Order of St. Andrei Rublev, 1st class (Russian Orthodox Church, 4 December 2010) - for outstanding contribution to the development of Russian art in the 80th anniversary of his birth
 * Honorary member of the Historical and Patriotic Association "Russian Banner" (1989)
 * Perpetual rector of the Russian Academy of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture
 * Member of the Academy of Management in Education and Culture (1997)
 * "The most outstanding artist of the 20th century" in a poll of polls (1999)
 * UNESCO Gold Medal - for "outstanding contribution to world culture"
 * Member of the Russian Academy of Arts (2000)

title: Ilya Glazunov


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James W. Gibson

James William Gibson (21 October 1877 – September 1951) was a British businessman who was the owner of the English football club Manchester United from December 1931 until his death in September 1951.

Early life
The son of a successful uniform manufacturer, Gibson was born in Salford but brought up in central Manchester with his younger brother, John, and their sister, Florence, who died at a very early age. Tragedy befell the family again when Gibson was 14, as both his parents contracted fatal illnesses and the children went to live with their paternal grandparents. The grandparents died soon after, and the children were taken in by their uncle, their mother's only brother, William Fell. Fell was himself a successful businessman, like the boys' father, and had become a famous corn merchant on the outskirts of the city. Gibson began working with Fell in the corn business, immersing himself in all aspects of the company, but excelling in sales.

Into the clothing industry
Just after the start of the 20th century, after 15 years working for his uncle, Gibson decided to set up his own company. The textiles industry in and around Manchester was booming at the time, so Gibson followed his father into the uniform business, and since his father's name was still fairly well known in the city, he quickly built up a portfolio of contacts. The business grew steadily for several years, before the outbreak of the First World War earned Gibson his first major contract; the company began manufacturing uniforms for the British Armed Forces on a daily basis. This deal forged Gibson's reputation and by the end of the war he had become a well-respected entrepreneur.

However, the end of the war also meant that the company was now selling less uniforms and needed a new source of revenue. Not content with anything small-scale, Gibson approached the city corporations with an offer to provide uniforms for the tram drivers and conductors, selling the idea that they would be proud to wear such a uniform. The idea proved a success, and Gibson was able to diversify into other fields outside clothing. Nevertheless, he continued to concentrate on the uniform business and, in 1924, he entered into a partnership with Messrs F. Jones and R. H. H. Briggs, forming Briggs, Jones and Gibson. They relocated the business to larger premises on Lostock Street, near Oldham Road in Collyhurst, and the combined talents of the three men meant further expansion, both in Manchester and in other cities. However, in 1926, Jones died, putting the business under pressure. For reasons thought to be related to his age, Briggs also decided to sell his share in the business, and Gibson took sole control of the company. This coincided with the onset of the Great Depression, which meant a massive downturn in trade. Gibson's interests in other fields meant that the business was able to survive the Depression.

Manchester United
A Salfordian by birth, Gibson was living in Old Trafford by 1911 and was aware of his 'local' football team, who had just moved into their new stadium in the district, although whether he was an active supporter at this time is not known.

Unlike the wealthy Gibson, Manchester United F.C. was being affected greatly by the Great Depression around the start of the 1930s. Their previous owner, John Henry Davies had died in 1927 after 25 years at the club. They had won the FA Cup and two league titles during the first 10 years of his chairmanship, but were less successful during the 1920s, enduring a spell in the Second Division, and were thousands of pounds in debt. In 1931, just before Gibson took over, United were relegated to the Second Division again.

Gibson injected around £40,000 more funds into the team during the Great Depression, and after five seasons in the Second Division, they were promoted as champions. Despite being relegated straight back from the First Division, they returned at the first attempt.

When Old Trafford was wrecked by German air raids on 11 March 1941, he also funded the rebuilding of the stadium, which was completed in 1949, and started the United Youth Academy that produced the great Busby Babes side of the mid-to-late 1950s. He also oversaw the arrival of players including Johnny Carey and Jack Rowley, who played a crucial part in the club’s successes of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

At the end of the Second World War, he appointed Matt Busby as manager, but only lived to see Busby guide the club to one major trophy – the 1948 FA Cup – as he died in 1951, a year before they won their first top division title since 1911. He did not live to see the revolution of the Busby Babes later in the decade.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: James W. Gibson


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Wikipedia:Wikipedia Signpost/2005-05-02/In the news

Wikipedia predicts the end of the world
Wikipedia's coverage of the death of Pope John Paul II and the election of Pope Benedict XVI has been much praised by the media (see archived story). This week, however, a darker side to the articles on the papacy was uncovered by Reuters.

In the 12th Century, Saint Malachy allegedly predicted the subsequent 112 popes, after which time Judgement Day would arrive. Believers in the prophecies of the saint have claimed that the election of the former Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger fulfils the prophecy for the 111th pope, which mentioned the 'glory of the olive'. Ratzinger's choice of the name Benedict could be seen as an allusion to a branch of the Order of Saint Benedict known as the Olivetans.

This might sound far fetched to a cynical reader, but the Wikipedia article on the Prophecy of the Popes was quoted in a Reuters article about the prophecy, with the news provider saying "'When (he) chose the name Benedict XVI, this was seen as fulfilling the prophecy for this pope,' wrote one entry on www.wikipedia.org".

However, this strongly-worded sentence, which is not terribly neutral as quoted, was toned down considerably just after (although apparently unrelated to) the publication of the Reuters article. The article, created on 12 October 2004, received only 12 edits before the death of John Paul II on 2 April; it has since been in a state of active flux, receiving over 500 edits last month.

Online trust
Search engine industry magazine SearchViews this week looked at the problems inherent in online review systems. The article considered the power of a negative or inaccurate review to influence decisions and cost companies millions, and said that Wikipedia, Amazon.com and others have "lately gotten more active about building in functionality that allows for community-style policing of reviews", although the very essence of Wikipedia, of course, is that anyone can edit almost any article at any time.

The example the article cited of community policing on Wikipedia was the debate on the deletion of the entry for blogger Robert Scoble, which ultimately concluded that the article should be kept. Scoble himself noticed the debate about his entry, but seemed somewhat underwhelmed by the situation, saying "They kept me. Interesting."

Wikipedia in the developing world
Plans for the development of a print edition of Wikipedia (see Wikipedia 1.0 and this week's related story) have been inspired in part to assist the spread of free knowledge to parts of the world where computers are uncommon. Wikipedians have recently had a little outside help in reaching that goal in Namibia from SchoolNet, a non-profit organization focusing on education, whose slogan is "youth empowerment through internet." According to a story in KDE News, the organisation aims to provide computers to all schools in Namibia, and has already installed machines in 340 schools, mostly in remote areas. The computers run a distribution of Linux, and are also provided with snapshots of Project Gutenberg and Wikipedia, among other educational content.

The Hitchhiker's Guide
Many news outlets mentioned Wikipedia in comparison with the fictional reference work The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, a central galactic reference work in the film by the same name which opened last weekend. The film was based on a seminal book by British author Douglas Adams, who also inspired the creation of the site h2g2.com, an explicit attempt to create the Guide from his books; it is now maintained by the BBC.

A live CNN broadcast recommended looking to Wikipedia to find The Answer to Life, the Universe, and Everything, the Financial Post described the Hitchhiker's Guide reference work as "Wikipedia.org but with more advice on pubs" (for a similar work with more on pubs, see the current-era version of the Guide), and the Alberta Calgary Sun mentioned that Adams' idea predated Wikipedia.


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Imparted righteousness

Imparted righteousness, in Methodist theology, is that gracious gift of God given at the moment of the new birth which enables a Christian disciple to strive for holiness and sanctification. John Wesley believed that imparted righteousness worked in tandem with imputed righteousness. Imputed righteousness is the righteousness of Jesus credited to the Christian, enabling the Christian to be justified; imparted righteousness is what God does in Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit after justification, working in the Christian to enable and empower the process of sanctification (and, in Wesleyan thought, Christian perfection).

Scriptural support

 * Jeremiah 31:33-34 "But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the Lord. For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.”" (ESV)
 * 2 Corinthians 3:18 "And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another. For this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit." (ESV)

John Wesley

 * Sermon #4: "Scriptural Christianity"
 * Sermon #14: "The Repentance of Believers"
 * Sermon #17: "The Circumcision of the Heart"
 * Sermon #20: "The Lord Our Righteousness"
 * Sermon #45: "The New Birth"

Hymnody and other sources
Charles Wesley believed in imparted righteousness. This comes through in the Wesleyan hymnody such as his famous hymn "And can it be". The last verse reads:

No condemnation now I dread; Jesus, and all in Him, is mine ! Alive in Him, my living Head, And clothed in righteousness divine, Bold I approach the eternal throne, And claim the crown, through Christ my own.

Clothed in righteousness divine. Ephesians 6:14 [TNIV] says "Stand firm then with the belt of truth buckled around your waist, with the breastplate of righteousness in place...."

Protestant distinctive in imparted righteousness
Preachers and theologians from various Protestant traditions (not only Wesleyan) use the term "imparted righteousness" to identify the righteous principle imparted by God to believers when He regenerates them. Believers thereby become "partakers of the divine nature" (cf. 2 Peter 1:4). It is this principle of righteousness imparted to men in regeneration which is ever in conflict with the old Adamic nature. Protestants, however, maintain the distinction between the "imputed righteousness" of Christ which is the basis for justification and the "imparted righteousness" which is the basis for subsequent sanctification.

It is somewhat problematic for some Christians (notably Calvinists) to call the doctrine "imparted righteousness," for that which is imparted is a righteous principle into man's nature, not righteousness per se. Care must be taken in using the term imparted righteousness because it is sometimes confused with and sometimes intentionally used to refer to the Roman Catholic doctrine of infused righteousness, which in Catholicism is the basis for justification.

The "NPP" case against both Imputed and Infused Righteousness
This section is a precis of N. T. Wright's work in "What Saint Paul Really Said".

N. T. Wright, who is one of the best-known advocates of the New Perspective on Paul, explains that although the "righteousness of God" and "righteousness from God" have been confused and conflated in the past, they are distinct concepts. He relates the court-room metaphor, pointing out that there are three parties in the Hebrew court - two parties in disagreement and one judge (there is no "Prosecuting Attorney"). The judge decides the outcome of the dispute between the parties, declaring one to be correct and the other incorrect. The one who is declared "correct" in court is called "righteous" in the matter that was judged.

The "righteousness of God", referring to God's (the judge's) faithfulness to the covenant relationship, can be neither imputed nor imparted to anybody but refers only to His role as judge.

"Righteousness from God" is roughly equivalent to "vindication", meaning that God is pronouncing that particular party to be correct/vindicated/righteous/acquitted in their dispute with the other party.

The dispute in question in Christian theology is between those of faith (in God's promises: the covenant, the Messiah), and "the wicked", meaning everybody opposed to those of faith. Paul was positing that the people of such faith are vindicated when Messiah returns, being declared "righteous" (or in other words, vindicated for their stance), which is exactly the meaning of the Biblical term "justified" in N. T. Wright's view.

This means that we do not "receive" the righteousness of God (or as often expressed, "of Jesus") as in the classical Evangelical vernacular, nor is it "infused" as stated in the classical Roman Catholic vernacular. The "righteousness of God" remains His alone, and our "righteousness from God" means that we are found to be "of" the people of God. Paul's argument is that it has always been so, but what has changed is that the Messiah, in Jesus of Nazareth, has now appeared.

An important verse to note is 2 Cor 5:21, "For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God." (ESV), which has traditionally been interpreted to mean that the Christian has, in some way, become righteous (by infusion or imputation), in exchange for Jesus' sinlessness. In fact, N. T. Wright says, Paul is speaking here of the apostles, and pointing out that in their role as apostles, their activity is effectively God's righteousness (covenant faithfulness) in action ("we are ambassadors for Christ, God making his appeal through us. We implore you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God" - vv 20–21). This meaning is natural when taken in context from verse 11 through 21.

title: Imparted righteousness


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USS Sentry (MCM-3)

USS Sentry (MCM-3), an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship mine countermeasures ship, is the second U.S. Navy ship of that name. Sentry was laid down on 8 October 1984 by Peterson Builders in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin; launched on 20 September 1986 and commissioned on 2 September 1989.

In 1993, Sentry made a 6-month cruise to Europe, joining the Standing Naval Force Channel and participating in exercise Blue Harrier, in the Baltic Sea. The ship visited Key West, Norfolk, Bermuda, Azores, Oostende, Kiel, Aarhus, Brest, St Malo, La Rochelle, Vigo, Cadiz, Porto, Lisbon, and Gibraltar during this deployment.

In 2009, Sentry changed her homeport to Naval Base San Diego.

On 15 March 2012, the U.S. Navy announced USS Sentry would be one of four minesweepers moved to the Persian Gulf region. Sentry arrived at Bahrain in June 2012.

title: USS Sentry (MCM-3)


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Boat people (disambiguation)

Boat people are the Vietnamese who fled South Vietnam.

Boat people may also refer to:

People

 * Boat people (Hong Kong) or Tanka people
 * Boat people, Rohingya people fleeing Burma by sea during the 2015 refugee crisis
 * Người Tàu, an alternative name for Hoa people
 * Balseros, the name given to boat people who fled Cuba in self-constructed or precarious vessels.
 * Haitian boat people, refugees who ride boats from Haiti to the United States or the Bahamas.

Other uses

 * Boat People (film), a 1982 Hong Kong film about Vietnamese refugees in the territory
 * The Boat People (band), an indie pop band from Australia

title: Boat people (disambiguation)


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Drum beat

A drum beat or drum pattern is a rhythmic pattern, or repeated rhythm establishing the meter and groove through the pulse and subdivision, played on drum kits and other percussion instruments. As such a "beat" consists of multiple drum strokes occurring over multiple musical beats while the term "drum beat" may also refer to a single drum stroke which may occupy more or less time than the current pulse. Many drum beats define or are characteristic of specific music genres.

Many basic drum beats establish the pulse through alternating bass (on the on-beats) and snare drums (on the off-beats) strokes while establishing the subdivision on the ride cymbal (thus its name) or hi-hat:

This establishes a quarter note pulse in (quad)duple time: each measure is formed from (two groups of) two quarter note pulses, each pulse divided into two eighth notes.

This establishes a quarter note pulse in triple time: each measure is formed from three quarter note pulses, each divided into two eighth notes.

This establishes a dotted-quarter note pulse in duple time: each measure is formed from two dotted-quarter note pulses, each pulse divided into three eighth notes.

Compound triple meter is equivalent to simple duple meter with triplets on every beat.

This establishes a dotted-quarter note pulse in triple time: each measure is formed from three dotted-quarter note pulses, each pulse divided into three eighth notes.

A "fill" is played in between the regular strokes of a pattern and/or signals the end of a phrase:

Since a phrase is multiple measures long, a fill signaling the end of one would come at the end of the last in a series of repeated measures.

In double and half-time patterns the pulse and ride are either doubled or halved, respectively, occurring twice or half as often:

A blast beat drum pattern features all drums on the eighth note subdivision or variants with one or more drum's pattern displaced by a sixteenth note:

This resembles a combination of double-time (bass-snare pattern) and original time (ride pattern).

Despite the difference in notation, there is no difference in interonset intervals and this pattern is nearly identical to the first simple duple pattern except for the second onbeat being divided into two eighth notes and the second backbeat being delayed an eighth note.

The heavy metal gallop, named for a horse's canter, is based on a bass drum pattern of one eighth followed by two sixteenths.

This resembles a combination of double-time (bass-snare pattern) and original time (ride pattern).

title: Drum beat


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Campeonato Goiano

The Campeonato Goiano is the football league of the state of Goiás, Brazil.

First stage

 * Teams are divided in two groups of six teams.
 * Double round-robin, in which all teams home-and-away games against the team from other group.
 * Standard round-robin, in which all teams play each other once within the group.

Second stage

 * Home-and-away playoffs with the top 2 teams of each group.

The winner of the second stage is crowned the champion.

The two teams last placed overall in the first stage are relegated to the second division.

As in any other Brazilian soccer championship, the format can change every year.

Titles by team
Teams in bold still active.

title: Campeonato Goiano


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Jimmy Delaney

James Delaney (3 September 1914 – 26 September 1989) was a Scottish footballer who played as an outside right. He had a 24-year playing career interrupted by World War II, his longest spells at club level were spent with Celtic in Scotland and Manchester United in England. He was capped 15 times for the Scotland national team, scoring six goals.

Celtic
Delaney joined Celtic on provisional forms in 1933 from Stoneyburn Juniors, signing a permanent contract the following year. Delaney suffered the misfortune of a badly broken arm in a home game against Arbroath in April 1939. The injury sustained being further exacerbated by the opposition player Attilio Becchi (who was apparently a Celtic fan) accidentally stepping on Delaney's arm. Delaney's torn football shirt was sold at auction for £564 in 2002. He spent 13 years with the Glasgow club, making 327 appearances in all competitions including wartime tournaments.

Manchester United
Delaney was held in high regard as a player by Matt Busby who, when the war ended in 1946, signed him for Manchester United in a £4,000 deal. Delaney helped United win the 1948 FA Cup Final and finished his United career with 28 goals from 184 total appearances.

Late career in Scotland and Ireland
He moved back to Scotland at the age of 36, joining Aberdeen in November 1950 and made his Dons debut in a 5–1 defeat of Falkirk. A year later he joined the Bairns, where he spent three seasons. In January 1954, Derry City paid £1,500 to sign him, a record fee for the Irish Football League, remarkable in that he was by this stage 39 years old. Two years later he joined Cork Athletic as player-manager before eventually retiring after a season with Highland League Elgin City in 1957.

Delaney has the distinction of having won the Scottish Cup with Celtic in 1937, the English FA Cup with Manchester United in 1948, and the Irish Cup with Derry City in 1954. He also came close to a fourth different national trophy in the Republic of Ireland, earning a FAI Cup runners-up medal with Cork Athletic in 1956.

International
Delaney won 15 caps for Scotland and scored six goals. He also represented the Scottish League XI six times. On 15 November 2009, he was inducted into the Scottish Football Hall of Fame.

Personal life
Son of Patrick Delaney and Bridget Nash from Crettyard, Queen's County (now County Laois) in Ireland, Jimmy was born in Cleland, North Lanarkshire. His son Pat Delaney was also a footballer whose longest spell was with Motherwell, and his grandson John Kennedy played as a defender for Celtic, Norwich City and Scotland.

Delaney died in September 1989.

Honours
Celtic
 * Scottish Division One: 1935–36, 1937–38
 * Scottish Cup: 1936–37
 * Empire Exhibition Trophy: 1938
 * Glasgow Cup: 1938–39

Manchester United
 * FA Cup: 1947–48

Falkirk
 * Scottish Division Two promotion: 1951–52

Derry City
 * IFA Cup: 1953–54
 * North West Senior Cup: 1953–54

Scotland
 * British Home Championship: 1935–36, 1938–39 (shared)

Individual
 * Ulster Footballer of the Year: 1953–54
 * Scottish Football Hall of Fame: 2009

title: Jimmy Delaney


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Talk:Coral sand

[Untitled]
Most of this is either untrue, imprecise, or not very interesting. I'll wait to see if you can make this into an article. Otherwise, it should be merged with sand - Marshman 18:36, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)
 * What exactly is untrue? I just pulled it all in from university websites on the subject ... Ungtss 19:37, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Does it really strike you as worth an article separate from sand at this point? I will edit out the errors. - Marshman
 * Well, maybe you're right. but there are unique characteristics and environmental issues involved ... maybe we could develop those?  Ungtss 20:09, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I've paired it down to the essential facts as given. I'm sure you are right that more can be said. If you want to expand it, I won't merge it as long as it seems to be going somewhere. - Marshman
 * Thanks for your help. I'll see if i can make this into an article:).  Ungtss 20:15, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)
 * Um, it didn't say that there were no currents or waves. it said it protected the beach, which it does, to some extent.  I read this several places, including geology class.  Where did i go wrong?  Ungtss 02:46, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I tried to edit that second paragraph to bring it into accuracy, but just about none of it was true. Beaches do not form where there are no waves or currents, or are very small where protected by an offshore reef. Any large build up of sand on the shore comes from currents and large waves bringing sand to that shore. Thus, just the opposite of what you wrote is true. Coral reefs do contribute material to the beach, but that is said in the first paragraph. I know of no instance where damage or loss of vigor of a coral reef has caused a problem with beach nourishment. - Marshman 02:49, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)
 * My bad:). you obviously know your stuff, so i'll go with your judgment instead of the books:).  goes to show you you can't trust what you read:).  i'll revert:).  Ungtss 02:50, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

It is true that a coral reef protects a shore from erosion, but that is different than protecting the beach. In fact, beaches behind coral reefs are typically rather puny (low in profile), unless the reef is not fully developed (i.e., offers less protection from waves). - I'd want to see what book you are referring to, but it coulds be just a misinterpretation of terminology Marshman 02:49, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)
 * well, here's an article that says basically the same stuff. are they stretching the truth to make an environmental point, or am i misunderstanding them?  Ungtss 02:58, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I think it is just that beaches are far more complex formations than most people realize. Obviously a coral bottom breaks the force of in-coming waves, and affects their angle of attack. Thus, a shore without a coral reef might well have no beach at all as all the sand-sized particles are washed away by the heavy surf. At some point, the reef will encourage beach formation by its upward growth changing the bottom profile (even this is an over-simplification because beaches obviously form on shores with no coral bottom offshore) and its rich biota contributing sand particles. As the reef provides more and more protection, it reduces the size of the waves reaching the shore to those too small to build much of a beach. The reef can also redirect sand movements away from the shore, reducing sand nourishment. In most cases, you have to look at a beach as simply an extension inward of an offshore sand body, and go from there. Beaches are seldom just a pile of sand at the shoreline. I will read the arrticle and let you know what I think (after I feed my dogs) - Marshman 03:03, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Well, the authors are well known in the field of coral biology, but the article is a little short of factual information. I'll investigate further with some coral biologists I know, but the parts about the beach are just window dressing and to my m ind plain misleading as trhe "technology" described" only indirectly relates to beaches. Also, on low coral islands, the entire land is a sort of beach in most cases, so that may be where they are really meaning to go, without being too technical in ther description. Now my dogs must eat!- Marshman 03:11, 26 Apr 2005 (UTC)

title: Talk:Coral sand


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F. C. S. Schiller

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, FBA (16 August 1864 – 6 August 1937), usually cited as F. C. S. Schiller, was a German-British philosopher. Born in Altona, Holstein (at that time member of the German Confederation, but under Danish administration), Schiller studied at the University of Oxford, later was a professor there, after being invited back after a brief time at Cornell University. Later in his life he taught at the University of Southern California. In his lifetime he was well known as a philosopher; after his death, his work was largely forgotten.

Schiller's philosophy was very similar to and often aligned with the pragmatism of William James, although Schiller referred to it as "humanism". He argued vigorously against both logical positivism and associated philosophers (for example, Bertrand Russell) as well as absolute idealism (such as F. H. Bradley).

Life
Born in 1864, one of three brothers and the son of Ferdinand Schiller (a Calcutta merchant), Schiller's family home was in Switzerland. Schiller grew up in Rugby. He was educated at Rugby School and Balliol College, and graduated in the first class of Literae Humaniores, winning later the Taylorian scholarship for German in 1887. Schiller's first book, Riddles of the Sphinx (1891), was an immediate success despite his use of a pseudonym because of his fears concerning how the book would be received. Between the years 1893 and 1897 he was an instructor in philosophy at Cornell University. In 1897 he returned to Oxford and became fellow and tutor of Corpus Christi for more than thirty years. Schiller was president of the Aristotelian Society in 1921, and was for many years treasurer of the Mind Association. In 1926 he was elected a fellow of the British Academy. In 1929 he was appointed visiting professor in the University of Southern California, and spent half of each year in the United States and half in England. Schiller died in Los Angeles either 6, 7 or 9 August 1937 after a long and lingering illness.

Schiller also published three books on the subject of eugenics; Tantalus or the Future of Man (1924), Eugenics and Politics (1926), and Social Decay and Eugenic Reform (1932).

Philosophy
In 1891, F.C.S. Schiller made his first contribution to philosophy anonymously. Schiller feared that in his time of high naturalism, the metaphysical speculations of his Riddles of the Sphinx were likely to hurt his professional prospects (p. xi, Riddles). However, Schiller's fear of reprisal from his anti-metaphysical colleagues should not suggest that Schiller was a friend of metaphysics. Like his fellow pragmatists across the ocean, Schiller was attempting to stake out an intermediate position between both the spartan landscape of naturalism and the speculative excesses of the metaphysics of his time. In Riddles Schiller both,
 * (1) accuses naturalism (which he also sometimes calls "pseudometaphysics" or "positivism") of ignoring the fact that metaphysics is required to justify our natural description of the world, and
 * (2) accuses "abstract metaphysics" of losing sight of the world we actually live in and constructing grand, disconnected imaginary worlds.

The result, Schiller contends, is that naturalism cannot make sense of the "higher" aspects of our world (freewill, consciousness, God, purpose, universals), while abstract metaphysics cannot make sense of the "lower" aspects of our world (the imperfect, change, physicality). In each case we are unable to guide our moral and epistemological "lower" lives to the achievement of life's "higher" ends, ultimately leading to scepticism on both fronts. For knowledge and morality to be possible, both the world's lower and higher elements must be real; e.g. we need universals (a higher) to make knowledge of particulars (a lower) possible. This would lead Schiller to argue for what he at the time called a "concrete metaphysics", but would later call "humanism".

Shortly after publishing Riddles of the Sphinx, Schiller became acquainted with the work of pragmatist philosopher William James and this changed the course of his career. For a time, Schiller's work became focused on extending and developing James' pragmatism (under Schiller's preferred title, "humanism"). Schiller even revised his earlier work Riddles of the Sphinx to make the nascent pragmatism implicit in that work more explicit. In one of Schiller's most prominent works during this phase of his career, "Axioms as Postulates" (1903), Schiller extended James' will to believe doctrine to show how it could be used to justify not only an acceptance of God, but also our acceptance of causality, of the uniformity of nature, of our concept of identity, of contradiction, of the law of excluded middle, of space and time, of the goodness of God, and more.

Towards the end of his career, Schiller's pragmatism began to take on a character more distinct from the pragmatism of William James. Schiller's focus became his opposition to formal logic. To understand Schiller's opposition to formal logic, consider the following inference:
 * (1) All salt is soluble in water;
 * (2) Cerebos is not soluble in water;
 * (3) Therefore, Cerebos is not a salt.

From the formal characteristics of this inference alone (All As are Bs; c is not a B; Therefore, c is not an A), formal logic would judge this to be a valid inference. Schiller, however, refused to evaluate the validity of this inference merely on its formal characteristics. Schiller argued that unless we look to the contextual fact regarding what specific problem first prompted this inference to actually occur, we can not determine whether the inference was successful (i.e. pragmatically successful). In the case of this inference, since "Cerebos is 'salt' for culinary, but not for chemical purposes", without knowing whether the purpose for this piece of reasoning was culinary or chemical we cannot determine whether this is valid or not. In another example, Schiller discusses the truth of formal mathematics "1+1=2" and points out that this equation does not hold if one is discussing drops of water. Schiller's attack on formal logic and formal mathematics never gained much attention from philosophers, however it does share some weak similarities to the contextualist view in contemporary epistemology as well as the views of ordinary language philosophers.

Opposition to naturalism and metaphysics
In Riddles, Schiller gives historical examples of the dangers of abstract metaphysics in the philosophies of Plato, Zeno, and Hegel, portraying Hegel as the worst offender: "Hegelianism never anywhere gets within sight of a fact, or within touch of reality. And the reason is simple: you cannot, without paying the penalty, substitute abstractions for realities; the thought-symbol cannot do duty for the thing symbolized".

Schiller argued that the flaw in Hegel's system, as with all systems of abstract metaphysics, is that the world it constructs always proves to be unhelpful in guiding our imperfect, changing, particular, and physical lives to the achievement of the "higher" universal Ideals and Ends. For example, Schiller argues that the reality of time and change is intrinsically opposed to the very modus operandi of all systems of abstract metaphysics. He says that the possibility to change is a precondition of any moral action (or action generally), and so any system of abstract metaphysics is bound to lead us into a moral scepticism. The problem lies in the aim of abstract metaphysics for "interpreting the world in terms of conceptions, which should be true not here and now, but "eternally" and independently of Time and Change." The result is that metaphysics must use conceptions that have the "time-aspect of Reality" abstracted away. Of course, "[o]nce abstracted from,"

"the reference to Time could not, of course, be recovered, any more than the individuality of Reality can be deduced, when once ignored. The assumption is made that, to express the 'truth' about Reality, its 'thisness,' individuality, change and its immersion in a certain temporal and spatial environment may be neglected, and the timeless validity of a conception is thus substituted for the living, changing and perishing existence we contemplate. ... What I wish here to point out is merely that it is unreasonable to expect from such premises to arrive at a deductive justification of the very characteristics of Reality that have been excluded.

The true reason, then, why Hegelism can give no reason for the Time-process, i.e. for the fact that the world is 'in time,' and changes continuously, is that it was constructed to give an account of the world irrespective of time and change. If you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable 'truth,' you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And it is part of the price that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which you dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation."

While abstract metaphysics provides us with a world of beauty and purpose and various other "highers", it condemns other key aspects of the world we live in as imaginary. The world of abstract metaphysics has no place for imperfect moral agents who (1) strive to learn about the world and then (2) act upon the world to change it for the better. Consequently, abstract metaphysics condemns us as illusionary, and declares our place in the world as unimportant and purposeless. Where abstractions take priority, our concrete lives collapse into scepticism and pessimism.

He also makes a case against the alternative naturalist method, saying that this too results in an epistemological and moral scepticism. Schiller looks to show this method's inadequacy at moving from the cold, lifeless lower world of atoms to the higher world of ethics, meanings, and minds. As with abstract metaphysics, Schiller attacks naturalism on many fronts: (1) the naturalist method is unable to reduce universals to particulars, (2) the naturalist method is unable to reduce freewill to determinist movements, (3) the naturalist method is unable to reduce emergent properties like consciousness to brain activity, (4) the naturalist method is unable to reduce God into a pantheism, and so on. Just as the abstract method cannot find a place for the lower elements of our world inside the higher, the naturalist method cannot find a place for the higher elements of our world inside the lower. In a reversal of abstract metaphysics, naturalism denies the reality of the higher elements to save the lower. Schiller uses the term "pseudo-metaphysical" here instead of naturalism—as he sometimes does—because he is accusing these naturalist philosophers of trying to solve metaphysical problems while sticking to the non-metaphysical "lower" aspects of the world (i.e. without engaging in real metaphysics):

"The pseudo-metaphysical method puts forward the method of science as the method of philosophy. But it is doomed to perpetual failure. ... [T]he data supplied by the physical sciences are intractable, because they are data of a lower sort than the facts they are to explain.

The objects of the physical sciences form the lower orders in the hierarchy of existence, more extensive but less significant. Thus the atoms of the physicist may indeed be found in the organisation of conscious beings, but they are subordinate: a living organism exhibits actions which cannot be formulated by the laws of physics alone; man is material, but he is also a great deal more."

To show that the world's higher elements do not reduce to the lower is not yet to show that naturalism must condemn the world's higher elements as illusionary. A second component to Schiller's attack is showing that naturalism cannot escape its inability to reduce the higher to the lower by asserting that these higher elements evolve from the lower. However, Schiller does not see naturalism as any more capable of explaining the evolution of the higher from the lower than it is capable of reducing the higher to the lower. While evolution does begin with something lower that in turn evolves into something higher, the problem for naturalism is that whatever the starting point for evolution is, it must first be something with the potential to evolve into a higher. For example, the world cannot come into existence from nothing because the potential or "germ" of the world is not "in" nothing (nothing has no potential, it has nothing; after all, it is nothing). Likewise, biological evolution cannot begin from inanimate matter, because the potential for life is not "in" inanimate matter. The following passage shows Schiller applying the same sort of reasoning to the evolution of consciousness:

"Taken as the type of the pseudo-metaphysical method, which explains the higher by the lower ... it does not explain the genesis of consciousness out of unconscious matter, because we cannot, or do not, attribute potential consciousness to matter. ... the theory of Evolution derives the [end result] from its germ, i.e., from that which was, what it became, potentially."

Unable to either reduce or explain the evolution of the higher elements of our world, naturalism is left to explain away the higher elements as mere illusions. In doing this, naturalism condemns us to scepticism in both epistemology and ethics. It is worth noting, that while Schiller's work has been largely neglected since his death, Schiller's arguments against a naturalistic account of evolution have been recently cited by advocates of intelligent design to establish the existence of a longer history for the view due to legal concerns in the United States (See: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District).

Humanist alternative to metaphysics and naturalism
Schiller argued that both abstract metaphysics and naturalism portray man as holding an intolerable position in the world. He proposed a method that not only recognises the lower world we interact with, but takes into account the higher world of purposes, ideals and abstractions. Schiller:

"We require, then, a method which combines the excellencies of both the pseudo-metaphysical and the abstract metaphysical, if philosophy is to be possible at all."

Schiller was demanding a course correction in field of metaphysics, putting it at the service of science. For example, to explain the creation of the world out of nothing, or to explain the emergence or evolution of the "higher" parts of the world, Schiller introduces a divine being who might generate the end (i.e. Final Cause) which gives nothingness, lifelessness, and unconscious matter the purpose (and thus potential) of evolving into higher forms:

"And thus, so far from dispensing with the need for a Divine First Cause, the theory of evolution, if only we have the faith in science to carry it to its conclusion, and the courage to interpret it, proves irrefragably that no evolution was possible without a pre-existent Deity, and a Deity, moreover, transcendent, non-material and non-phenomenal. ... [T]he world process is the working out of an anterior purpose or idea in the divine consciousness."

This re-introduction of teleology (which Schiller sometimes calls a re-anthropomorphizing of the world) is what Schiller says the naturalist has become afraid to do. Schiller's method of concrete metaphysics (i.e. his humanism) allows for an appeal to metaphysics when science demands it. However:

"[T]he new teleology would not be capricious or random in its application, but firmly rooted in the conclusions of the sciences ... The process which the theory of Evolution divined the history of the world to be, must have content and meaning determined from the basis of the scientific data; it is only by a careful study of the history of a thing that we can determine the direction of its development, [and only then] that we can be said to have made the first approximation to the knowledge of the End of the world process.

[This] is teleology of a totally different kind to that which is so vehemently, and on the whole so justly dreaded by the modern exponents of natural science. It does not attempt to explain things anthropocentrically, or regard all creation as existing for the use and benefit of man; it is as far as the scientist from supposing that cork-trees grow to supply us with champagne corks. The end to which it supposes all things to subserve is ... the universal End of the world-process, to which all things tend[.]"

Schiller finally reveals what this "End" is which "all things tend":

"If our speculations have not entirely missed their mark, the world-process will come to an end when all the spirits whom it is designed to harmonise [by its Divine Creator] have been united in a perfect society."

Now, while by today's philosophic standards Schiller's speculations would be considered wildly metaphysical and disconnected from the sciences, compared with the metaphysicians of his day (Hegel, McTaggart, etc.), Schiller saw himself as radically scientific. Schiller gave his philosophy a number of labels during his career. Early on he used the names "Concrete Metaphysics" and "Anthropomorphism", while later in life tending towards "Pragmatism" and particularly "Humanism".

The Will to Believe
Schiller also developed a method of philosophy intended to mix elements of both naturalism and abstract metaphysics in a way that allows us to avoid the twin scepticisms each method collapses into when followed on its own. However, Schiller does not assume that this is enough to justify his humanism over the other two methods. He accepts the possibility that both scepticism and pessimism are true.

To justify his attempt to occupy the middle ground between naturalism and abstract metaphysics, Schiller makes a move that anticipates James' The Will to Believe:

"And in action especially we are often forced to act upon slight possibilities. Hence, if it can be shown that our solution is a possible answer, and the only possible alternative to pessimism, to a complete despair of life, it would deserve acceptance, even though it were but a bare possibility."

Schiller contends that in light of the other methods' failure to provide humans with a role and place in the universe, we ought avoid the adoption of these methods. By the end of Riddles, Schiller offers his method of humanism as the only possible method that results in a world where we can navigate our lower existence to the achievement of our higher purpose. He asserts that it is the method we ought to adopt regardless of the evidence against it ("even though it were but a bare possibility").

While Schiller's will to believe is a central theme of Riddle of the Sphinx (appearing mainly in the introduction and conclusion of his text), in 1891 the doctrine held a limited role in Schiller's philosophy. In Riddles, Schiller only employs his version of the will to believe doctrine when he is faced with overcoming sceptic and pessimistic methods of philosophy. In 1897, William James published his essay "The Will to Believe" and this influenced Schiller to drastically expand his application of the doctrine. For a 1903 volume titled Personal Idealism, Schiller contributed a widely read essay titled "Axioms as Postulates" in which he sets out to justify the "axioms of logic" as postulates adopted on the basis of the will to believe doctrine. In this essay Schiller extends the will to believe doctrine to be the basis of our acceptance of causality, of the uniformity of nature, of our concept of identity, of contradiction, of the law of excluded middle, of space and time, of the goodness of God, and more. He notes that we postulate that nature is uniform because we need nature to be uniform:

"[O]ut of the hurly-burly of events in time and space [we] extract[ ] changeless formulas whose chaste abstraction soars above all reference to any 'where' or 'when,' and thereby renders them blank cheques to be filled up at our pleasure with any figures of the sort. The only question is—Will Nature honour the cheque? Audentes Natura juvat—let us take our life in our hands and try! If we fail, our blood will be on our own hands (or, more probably, in some one else's stomach), but though we fail, we are in no worse case than those who dared not postulate ... Our assumption, therefore, is at least a methodological necessity; it may turn out to be (or be near) a fundamental fact in nature [an axiom]." Schiller stresses that doctrines like the uniformity of nature must first be postulated on the basis of need (not evidence) and only then "justified by the evidence of their practical working." He attacks both empiricists like John Stuart Mill, who try to conclude that nature is uniform from previous experience, as well as Kantians who conclude that nature is uniform from the preconditions on our understanding. Schiller argues that preconditions are not conclusions, but demands made on our experience that may or may not work. On this success hinges our continued acceptance of the postulate and its eventual promotion to axiom status.

In "Axioms and Postulates" Schiller vindicates the postulation by its success in practice, marking an important shift from Riddles of a Sphinx. In Riddles, Schiller is concerned with the vague aim of connecting the "higher" to the "lower" so he can avoid scepticism, but by 1903 he has clarified the connection he sees between these two elements. The "higher" abstract elements are connected to the lower because they are our inventions for dealing with the lower; their truth depends on their success as tools. Schiller dates the entry of this element into his thinking in his 1892 essay "Reality and 'Idealism'" (a mere year after his 1891 Riddles). ">The plain man's 'things,' the physicist's 'atoms,' and Mr. Ritchie's 'Absolute,' are all of them more or less preserving and well-considered schemes to interpret the primary reality of phenomena, and in this sense Mr. Ritchie is entitled to call the 'sunrise' a theory. But the chaos of presentations, out of which we have (by criteria ultimately practical) isolated the phenomena we subsequently call sunrise, is not a theory, but the fact which has called all theories into being.

In addition to generating hypothetical objects to explain phenomena, the interpretation of reality by our thought also bestows a derivative reality on the abstractions with which thought works. If they are the instruments wherewith thought accomplishes such effects upon reality, they must surely be themselves real."

The shift in Schiller's thinking continues in his next published work, The Metaphysics of the Time-Process (1895): The abstractions of metaphysics, then, exist as explanations of the concrete facts of life, and not the latter as illustrations of the former ... Science [along with humanism] does not refuse to interpret the symbols with which it operates; on the contrary, it is only their applicability to the concrete facts originally abstracted from that is held to justify their use and to establish their 'truth.'

Schiller's accusations against the metaphysician in Riddles now appear in a more pragmatic light. His objection is similar to one we might make against a worker who constructs a flat-head screwdriver to help him build a home, and who then accuses a screw of unreality when he comes upon a Phillips-screw that his flat-head screwdriver won't fit. In his works after Riddles, Schiller's attack takes the form of reminding the abstract metaphysician that abstractions are meant as tools for dealing with the "lower" world of particulars and physicality, and that after constructing abstractions we cannot simply drop the un-abstracted world out of our account. The un-abstracted world is the entire reason for making abstractions in the first place. We did not abstract to reach the unchanging and eternal truths; we abstract to construct an imperfect and rough tool for dealing with life in our particular and concrete world. It is the working of the higher in "making predictions about the future behavior of things for the purpose of shaping the future behavior of things for the purpose of shaping our own conduct accordingly" that justifies the higher.

"To assert this methodological character of eternal truths is not, of course, to deny their validity ... To say that we assume the truth of abstraction because we wish to attain certain ends, is to subordinate theoretic 'truth' to a teleological implication; to say that, the assumption once made, its truth is 'proved' by its practical working ... For the question of the 'practical' working of a truth will always ultimately be found to resolve itself into the question whether we can live by it."

A few lines down from this passage Schiller adds the following footnote in a 1903 reprint of the essay: "All this seems a very fairly definite anticipation of modern pragmatism." Indeed, it resembles the pragmatist theory of truth. However, Schiller's pragmatism was still very different from both that of William James and that of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Opposition to logic
As early as 1891 Schiller had independently reached a doctrine very similar to William James' Will to Believe. As early as 1892 Schiller had independently developed his own pragmatist theory of truth. However, Schiller's concern with meaning was one he entirely imports from the pragmatisms of James and Peirce. Later in life Schiller musters all of these elements of his pragmatism to make a concerted attack on formal logic. Concerned with bringing down the timeless, perfect worlds of abstract metaphysics early in life, the central target of Schiller's developed pragmatism is the abstract rules of formal logic. Statements, Schiller contends, cannot possess meaning or truth abstracted away from their actual use. Therefore, examining their formal features instead of their function in an actual situation is to make the same mistake the abstract metaphysician makes. Symbols are meaningless scratches on paper unless they are given a life in a situation, and meant by someone to accomplish some task. They are tools for dealing with concrete situations, and not the proper subjects of study themselves.

Both Schiller's theory of truth and meaning (i.e. Schiller's pragmatism) derive their justification from an examination of thought from what he calls his humanist viewpoint (his new name for concrete metaphysics). He informs us that to answer "what precisely is meant by having a meaning" will require us to "raise the prior question of why we think at all.". A question Schiller of course looks to evolution to provide.

Schiller provides a detailed defence of his pragmatist theories of truth and meaning in a chapter titled "The Biologic of Judgment" in Logic for Use (1929). The account Schiller lays out in many ways resembles some of what Peirce asserts in his "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) essay:

"Our account of the function of Judgment in our mental life will, however, have to start a long way back. For there is much thinking before there is any judging, and much living before there is any thinking. Even in highly developed minds judging is a relatively rare incident in thinking, and thinking in living, an exception rather than the rule, and a relatively recent acquisition.

...

For the most part the living organism adapts itself to it conditions of life by earlier, easier, and quicker expedients. Its actions or reactions are mostly 'reflex actions' determined by inherited habits which largely function automatically ... It follows from this elaborate and admirable organisation of adaptive responses to stimulation that organic life might proceed without thinking altogether. ... This is, in fact, the way in which most living being carry on their life, and the plane on which man also lives most of the time.

Thought, therefore, is an abnormality which springs from a disturbance. Its genesis is connected with a peculiar deficiency in the life of habit. ... Whenever ... it becomes biologically important to notice differences in roughly similar situations, and to adjust action more closely to the peculiarities of a particular case, the guidance of life by habit, instinct, and impulse breaks down. A new expedient has somehow to be devised for effecting such exact and delicate adjustments. This is the raison d'etre of what is variously denominated 'thought,' 'reason,' 'reflection,' 'reasoning,' and 'judgment[.]'

...

Thinking, however, is not so much a substitute for the earlier processes as a subsidiary addition to them. It only pays in certain cases, and intelligence may be shown also by discerning what they are and when it is wiser to act without thinking. ... Philosophers, however, have very mistaken ideas about rational action. They tend to think that men ought to think all the time, and about all things. But if they did this they would get nothing done, and shorten their lives without enhancing their merriment. Also they utterly misconceive the nature of rational action. They represent it as consisting in the perpetual use of universal rules, whereas it consists rather in perceiving when a general rule must be set aside in order that conduct may be adapted to a particular case."

This passage of Schiller was worth quoting at length because of the insight this chapter offers into Schiller's philosophy. In the passage, Schiller makes the claim that thought only occurs when our unthinking habits prove themselves inadequate for handling a particular situation. Schiller's stressing of the genesis of limited occurrences of thought sets Schiller up for his account of meaning and truth.

Schiller asserts that when a person utters a statement in a situation they are doing so for a specific purpose: to solve the problem that habit could not handle alone. The meaning of such a statement is whatever contribution it makes to accomplishing the purpose of this particular occurrence of thought. The truth of the statement will be if it helps accomplishes that purpose. No utterance or thought can be given a meaning or a truth valuation outside the context of one of these particular occurrences of thought. This account of Schiller's is a much more extreme view than even James took.

At first glance, Schiller appears very similar to James. However, Schiller's more stringent requirement that meaningful statements have consequences "to some one for some purpose" makes Schiller's position more extreme than James'. For Schiller, it is not a sufficient condition for meaningfulness that a statement entail experiential consequences (as it is for both Peirce and James). Schiller requires that the consequences of a statement make the statement relevant to some particular person's goals at a specific moment in time if it is to be meaningful. Therefore, it is not simply enough that the statement "diamonds are hard" and the statement "diamonds are soft" entail different experiential consequences, it is also required that the experiential difference makes a difference to someone's purposes. Only then, and only to that person, do the two statements state something different. If the experiential difference between hard and soft diamonds did not connect up with my purpose for entering into thought, the two statements would possess the same meaning. For example, if I were to randomly blurt out "diamonds are hard" and then "diamonds are soft" to everyone in a coffee shop one day, my words would mean nothing. Words can only mean something if they are stated with a specific purpose.

Consequently, Schiller rejects the idea that statements can have meaning or truth when they are looked upon in the abstract, away from a particular context. "Diamonds are hard" only possesses meaning when stated (or believed) at some specific situation, by some specific person, uttered (or believed) for some specific aim. It is the consequences the statement holds for that person's purposes which constitute its meaning, and its usefulness in accomplishing that person's purposes that constitutes the statement's truth or falsity. After all, when we look at the sentence "diamonds are hard" in a particular situation we may find it actually has nothing to say about diamonds. A speaker may very well be using the sentence as a joke, as a codephrase, or even simply as an example of a sentence with 15 letters. Which the sentence really means cannot be determined without the specific purpose a person might be using the statement for in a specific context.

In an article titled "Pragmatism and Pseudo-pragmatism" Schiller defends his pragmatism against a particular counterexample in a way that sheds considerable light on his pragmatism:

"The impossibility of answering truly the question whether the 100th (or 10,000th) decimal in the evaluation of Pi is or is not a 9, splendidly illustrates how impossible it is to predicate truth in abstraction from actual knowing and actual purpose. For the question cannot be answered until the decimal is calculated. Until then no one knows what it is, or rather will turn out to be. And no one will calculate it, until it serves some purpose to do so, and some one therefore interests himself in the calculation. And so until then the truth remains uncertain: there is no 'true' answer, because there is no actual context in which the question has really been raised. We have merely a number of conflicting possibilities, not even claims to truth, and there is no decision. Yet a decision is possible if an experiment is performed. But his experiment presupposes a desire to know. It will only be made if the point becomes one which it is practically important to decide. Normally no doubt it does not become such, because for the actual purposes of the sciences it makes no difference whether we suppose the figure to be 9 or something else. I.e. the truth to, say, the 99th decimal, is ' true enough ' for our purposes, and the 100th is a matter of indifference. But let that indifference cease, and the question become important, and the ' truth ' will at once become ' useful '. Prof. Taylor's illustration therefore conclusively proves that in an actual context and as an actual question there is no true answer to be got until the truth has become useful. This point is illustrated also by the context Prof. Taylor has himself suggested. For he has made the question about the 100th decimal important by making the refutation of the whole pragmatist theory of knowledge depend on it. And what nobler use could the 100th decimal have in his eyes? If in consequence of this interest he will set himself to work it out, he will discover this once useless, but now most useful, truth, and—triumphantly refute his own contention!"

We might recognise this claim as the sort of absurdity many philosophers try to read into the pragmatism of William James. James, however, would not agree that the meaning of "the 100th decimal of Pi is 9" and "the 100th decimal of Pi is 6" mean the same thing until someone has a reason to care about any possible difference. Schiller, in constast, does mean to say this. James and Schiller both treat truth as something that happens to a statement, and so James would agree that it only becomes true that the 100th decimal of Pi is 9 when someone in fact believes that statement and it leads them to their goals, but nowhere does James imply that meaning is something that happens to a statement. That is a unique element of Schiller's pragmatism.

Humanist theory of meaning and truth
While Schiller felt greatly indebted to the pragmatism of William James, Schiller was outright hostile to the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce. Both Schiller and James struggled with what Peirce intended with his pragmatism, and both were often baffled by Peirce's insistent rebuffing of what they both saw as the natural elaboration of the pragmatist cornerstone he himself first laid down. On the basis of his misunderstandings, Schiller complains that for Peirce to merely say "'truths should have practical consequences'" is to be "very vague, and hints at no reason for the curious connexion it asserts." Schiller goes on to denigrate Peirce's principle as nothing more than a simple truism "which hardly deserves a permanent place and name in philosophic usage". After all, Schiller points out, "[i]t is hard ... to see why even the extremest intellectualism should deny that the difference between the truth and the falsehood of an assertion must show itself in some visible way."

With Peirce's attempts to restrict the use of pragmatism set aside, Schiller unpacks the term "consequences" to provide what he considers as a more substantial restatement of Peirce's pragmatism:

"For to say that a [statement] has consequences and that what has none is meaningless, must surely mean that it has a bearing upon some human interest; they must be consequences to some one for some purpose."

Schiller believes his pragmatism to be more developed because of its attention to the fact that the "consequences" which make up the meaning and truth of a statement, must always be consequences for someone's particular purposes at some particular time. Continuing his condemnation of the abstract, Schiller contends that the meaning of a concept is not the consequences of some abstract proposition, but what consequences an actual thinker hopes its use will bring about in an actual situation. The meaning of a thought is what consequences one means to bring about when they employ the thought. To Schiller, this is what a more sophisticated pragmatist understands by the term meaning.

If we are to understand the pragmatic theory of meaning in Schiller's way, he is right to claim that James' theory of truth is a mere corollary of the pragmatist theory of meaning:

"But now, we may ask, how are these 'consequences' to test the 'truth' claimed by the assertion? Only by satisfying or thwarting that purpose, by forwarding or baffling that interest. If they do the one, the assertion is 'good' and pro tanto 'true'; if they do the other, 'bad' and 'false'. Its 'consequences,' therefore, when investigated, always turn out to involve the 'practical' predicates 'good ' or 'bad,' and to contain a reference to ' practice' in the sense in which we have used that term. So soon as therefore we go beyond an abstract statement of the narrower pragmatism, and ask what in the concrete, and in actual knowing, 'having consequences ' may mean, we develop inevitably the fullblown pragmatism in the wider sense."

Given Schiller's view that the meaning of a thought amounts to the consequences one means to bring about by the thought, Schiller further concluded that the truth of a thought depends on whether it actually brings about the consequences one intended. For example, if while following a cooking recipe that called for salt I were to think to myself, "Cerebos is salt", my thought will be true if it consequently leads me to add Cerebos and produce a dish with the intended taste. However, if while working in a chemistry lab to produce a certain mixture I were to think to myself, "Cerebos is salt", my thought would both have a different meaning than before (since my intent now differs) and be false (since Cerebos is only equivalent to salt for culinary purposes). According to Schiller, the question of what a thought like "Cerebos is salt" means or whether it is true can only be answered if the specific circumstances with which the thought arose are taken into consideration. While there is some similarity here between Schiller's view of meaning and the later ordinary language philosophers, Schiller's account ties meaning and truth more closely to individuals and their intent with a specific use rather than whole linguistic communities.

Selected works

 * Riddles of the Sphinx (1891)
 * "Axioms as Postulates" (published in the collection Personal Idealism, 1902)
 * "Useless 'Knowledge': A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism", January 1902)
 * Humanism (1903)
 * "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics" (July 1903)
 * "The Definition of 'Pragmatism' and 'Humanism'" (January 1905)
 * Studies in Humanism (1907)
 * Plato or Protagoras? (1908)
 * Riddles of the Sphinx (1910, revised edition)
 * Humanism (1912, second edition)
 * Formal Logic (1912)
 * Problems of Belief (1924, second edition)
 * Logic for Use (1929)
 * Our Human Truths (1939, published posthumously)

title: F. C. S. Schiller


text:
WTN

WTN may refer to:

 * W Network, a Canadian cable channel from 1995 to about 2001
 * Whitton railway station, London, National Rail station code
 * World Tibet News, created in 1992
 * Worldwide TV News, which in 1998 merged into Associated Press Television News
 * WWTN, an FM radio station in Nashville, Tennessee, USA, known as "99.7 WTN"
 * Williston, North Dakota (Amtrak station code: WTN)
 * RAF Waddington, England (IATA airport code: WTN)

title: WTN


text:
Erastus Brigham Bigelow

Erastus Brigham Bigelow (April 2, 1814 – December 6, 1879) was an American inventor of weaving machines.

Beginnings
Erastus Bigelow was born in West Boylston, Massachusetts. He was the son of a cotton weaver, and it was his parents' desire that he should become a physician, but, his father's business not being successful, he was unable to continue his studies, and so turned his attention to inventing. He showed an inventive genius at the early age of 14, when he invented a machine to manufacture piping cord, for which he received $100. Before he had reached the age of 18, he had devised a handloom for suspender webbing. His work on Stenography, a short manual on shorthand writing, was written and published about this time. In 1838, he invented a power loom for weaving knotted counterpanes, and later a power loom to weave coach lace and took his brother, Horatio, in with him.

Carpets
In 1839 he contracted to produce a power-loom capable of weaving two-ply ingrain carpets, such as had been hitherto woven exclusively by the handloom, which only produced eight yards a day. With his first loom he succeeded in obtaining ten or twelve yards daily, which he increased by improvements until a product of twenty-five yards was regularly obtained. Afterward he invented a power loom for weaving "Brussels" (i.e. pictorial tapestry) and velvet tapestry carpets, his most important invention, which attracted much attention at the World's Fair in London in 1851. The town of Clinton, Massachusetts, owed its growth and manufacturing importance to him, as it contained the coach-lace works, the Lancaster Quilt Company, and the Bigelow Carpet Company, all of which were direct results of his inventive ability. The carpet loom made his name widely known.

Bigelow and his brother Horatio are credited with founding the town of Clinton, which was originally part of the town of Lancaster. Bigelow was elected a member of the Boston Historical Society in April 1864, and in 1869 presented to that society six large volumes entitled Inventions of Erastus Brigham Bigelow patented in England from 1837 to 1868 in which were gathered the printed specifications of eighteen patents granted to him in England. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1866.

In 1862 Bigelow formulated a scheme of uniform taxation for the United States by means of stamps, and he published The Tariff Question, considered in regard to the Policy of England and the Interests of the United States (Boston, 1863).

Legacy and descendants
Bigelow founded the Bigelow Mechanics Institute in 1846, which is today known as the Bigelow Free Public Library located in Clinton, Massachusetts. He was also an original incorporator of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, founded in 1861.

Bigelow's only child, Helen Bigelow Merriman, became an artist and art collector and one of the founders of the Worcester Art Museum, and his grandson Roger Merriman became a noted historian.

title: Erastus Brigham Bigelow


text:
Record chart

A record chart, in the music industry, also called a music chart, is a ranking of recorded music according to certain criteria during a given period. Many different criteria are used in worldwide charts, often in combination. These include record sales, the amount of radio airplay, the number of downloads, and the amount of streaming activity.

Some charts are specific to a particular musical genre and most to a particular geographical location. The most common period covered by a chart is one week with the chart being printed or broadcast at the end of this time. Summary charts for years and decades are then calculated from their component weekly charts. Component charts have become an increasingly important way to measure the commercial success of individual songs.

A common format of radio and television programmes is to run down a music chart.

Chart hit
A chart hit is a recording, identified by its inclusion in a chart that uses sales or other criteria to rank popular releases, that ranks highly in popularity compared to other songs in the same timeframe. Chart-topper and related terms (like number one, No. 1 hit, top of the charts, chart hit, and so forth) are widely used in common conversation and in marketing, and are loosely defined. Because of its value in promoting recording artists and releases, both directly to the consumer, and by encouraging exposure on radio, TV, and other media, chart positioning has long been a subject of scrutiny and controversy. Chart compilation methodology and data sources vary, ranging from "buzz charts" (based on opinions of various experts and tastemakers), to charts that reflect empirical data such as retail sales. Therefore, a chart-topper may be anything from an "insiders' pick" to a runaway seller. Most charts that are used to determine extant mainstream popularity rely on measurable data.

Record chart performance is inherently relative, as they rank songs, albums, and records in comparison to each other at the same time, as opposed to music recording sales certification methods, which are measured in absolute numbers. Comparing the chart positions of songs at different times thus does not provide an accurate comparison of a song's overall impact. The nature of most charts, particularly weekly charts, also favors songs that sell very well for a brief period; thus, a song that is only briefly popular may chart higher than a song that sells more copies in the long range, but more slowly. As a result, a band's biggest hit single may not be its best-selling single.

According to Joel Whitburn, the American trade publication Billboard introduced the Hot 100 on August 4, 1958. It was the first chart in the US to "fully integrate the hottest-selling and most-played pop singles." From 1958 until 1991, Billboard compiled the chart from playlists reported by radio stations, and surveys of retail sales outlets. Before 1958, several charts were published, including "Best Sellers in Stores", "Most Played by Jockeys" (later revived under the name Hot 100 Airplay), and "Most Played in Juke Boxes", and, in later collations of chart hits, the record's highest placing in any of those charts was usually reported. On November 30, 1991, Billboard introduced a new method of determining the Hot 100: "by a combination of actual radio airplay monitored electronically by Nielsen Broadcast Data Systems (BDS), additional playlists from small-market stations, and actual point-of-sale information provided by Nielsen SoundScan." Until 1998, any songs placed on the chart had to be physically available as a single.

Terminologies
There are several commonly used terms when referring to a music/entertainment chart or the performance of a release thereon.

A new entry is a title which is making its début in that chart. It is applied to all charts, for instance a track which is outside the Top 40 but which later climbs into that level of the chart is considered to be a 'new entry' to the Top 40 that week. In most official charts, tracks have to have been on sale for a period of time in order to enter the chart; however, in some retailers' charts, new releases are included in charts as 'new entries' without a sales history in order to make them more visible to purchasers. In the UK, the official published chart is a Top 100, although a new entry can take place between positions 101–200 (also true of the Billboard Hot 100, which has a "Bubbling Under" addendum for new songs that have not yet made the Hot 100). A "Top 40" is used by radio to shorten playlists.

A re-entry is a track which has previously entered a chart and fallen off of that chart, and then later re-appears in it; it may come about if a release is reissued or if there is a re-surge of interest in the track. Generally, any repeat entry of a track into a chart is considered a re-entry, unless the later version of the track is a materially different recording or is significantly repackaged (such as Michael Jackson's "Thriller 25"), where the release would normally be considered separate and thus a "new" entry.

A climber is a release which is going higher in the chart week-on-week. Because chart positions are generally relative to each other on a week-to-week basis, a release does not necessarily have to increase sales week-to-week to be a climber, as if releases ahead of it decline in sales sufficiently, they may slip below it. By the same metric, not all week-to-week sales increases result in a climber, if other releases improve by a sufficient amount to keep it from climbing. The term highest climber is used to denote the release making the biggest leap upwards in the chart that week. There is generally not an equivalent phrase for tracks going down the chart; the term "faller" is occasionally used, but not as widely as 'climber'.

A one-hit wonder is an act that appears on the chart just once, or has one song that peaks exceptionally higher, or charts for exceptionally longer than other chart entries by the act. The term true one-hit wonder was the term given by the Guinness Book of British Hit Singles & Albums (and also the Billboard book Top Pop Singles) for an act that has one top 40 hit and nothing else on the chart ever. If an act appears in some other form (for example, a solo act that appears with a band or with other act), then they are taken separately.

title: Record chart


text:
Emilio Castelar

Emilio Castelar y Ripoll (7 September 1832 – 25 May 1899) was a Spanish republican politician, and a president of the First Spanish Republic.

Castelar was born in Cádiz. He was an eloquent orator and a writer. Appointed as Head of State in 1873 in the midst of the Third Carlist War and having been given full powers by the Parliament, he ruled by decree. He left office after a coup led by General Pavía the following year.

He wrote a history of the Republican Movement in Europe among other works of political interest.

Early life
At the age of seven he lost his father, who had taken an active part in the progressive agitations during the reign of Ferdinand VII, and had spent several years as an exile in England. He attended a grammar school at Sax. In 1848 he began to study law in Madrid, but soon elected to compete for admission to the School of Philosophy and Letters, where he earned a doctorate in 1853. He was an obscure republican student during the Spanish revolutionary movement of 1854, and the young liberals and democrats of that era decided to hold a meeting in the largest theatre of the capital. On that occasion Castelar delivered his maiden speech, which at once placed him in the political vanguard of the reign of Queen Isabella II.

Start of political life
From that moment on, he took an active part in politics, radical journalism, and literary and historical pursuits. Castelar was involved in the First Uprising of June 1866, which was organized by Marshal Prim, and crushed, after much bloodshed, in the streets by Marshals O'Donnell and Serrano. A court martial condemned him in contumaciam to death by garrote, and he had to hide at a friend's house until he could escape to France. There he lived two years until the successful Revolution of 1868 allowed him to return and take a seat in the Cortes for the first time as deputy for Zaragoza. At the same time he resumed the professorship of history at the Complutense University of Madrid. Castelar soon became famous for his speeches in the Constituent Cortes of 1869, where he led the republican minority in advocating a federal republic as the logical outcome of the recent revolution. He thus gave much trouble to men like Serrano, Topete and Prim, who had never cherished the idea of establishing an advanced democracy, and who each had his own scheme for re-establishing the monarchy with certain constitutional restrictions. Hence arose Castelar's constant and vigorous criticisms of the successive plans mooted to place a Hohenzollern, a Portuguese, the Duke of Montpensier, Espartero and finally Amadeus of Savoy on the throne. He attacked with relentless vigour the short-lived monarchy of Amadeus, and contributed to its downfall.

The Federal Republic
Amadeus' abdication led to the proclamation of the Federal Republic. The Senate and Congress, very largely composed of monarchists, permitted themselves to be dragged along into democracy by the republican minority headed by Salmerón, Figueras, Francesc Pi i Margall, and Castelar. The short-lived federal republic from 11 February 1873 to 3 January 1874 was the culmination of the career of Castelar, and his conduct during those eleven months was much praised by the wiser part of his countrymen, though it alienated from him the sympathies of the majority of his sometime friends in the republican ranks.

Before the Revolution of 1868, Castelar had begun to dissent from the doctrines of the more advanced republicans, and particularly as to the means to be employed for their success. He abhorred bloodshed, disliked mob rule, and did not approve of military pronunciamientos. His idea would have been a parliamentary republic on American lines, with some traits of the Swiss constitution to keep in touch with the regionalist and provincialist inclinations of many parts of the Peninsula. He would have placed at the head of his commonwealth a president and Cortes freely elected by the people, ruling the country in a liberal spirit and with due respect for conservative principles, religious traditions, and national unity.

First Federal Republic Government
At first Castelar did his best to work with the other republican members of the first government of the federal republic. He accepted the post of minister for foreign affairs. Castelar even went so far as to side with his colleagues, when serious difficulties arose between the new government and the president of the Cortes, Señor Martos, who was backed by a very imposing commission composed of the most influential conservative members of the last parliament of the Savoyard king, which had suspended its sittings shortly after proclaiming the federal republic. A sharp struggle was carried on for weeks between the executive and this commission, at first presided over by Martos, and, when he resigned, by Salmeron. In the background Serrano and many politicians and military men steadily advocated a coup d'etat in order to avert the triumph of the republicans. The adversaries of the executive were prompted by the captain-general of Madrid, Pavia, who promised the co-operation of the garrison of the capital. The president, Salmeron, and Marshal Serrano himself lacked decision at the last moment, and lost time and many opportunities by which the republican ministers profited. The federal republicans became masters of the situation in the last fortnight of April 1873, and turned the tables on their adversaries by making a peaceful bloodless pronunciamiento.

The battalions and the militia that had assembled in the bullring near Marshal Serrano's house to assist the anti-democratic movement were disarmed, and their leaders, the politicians and generals, were allowed to escape to France or Portugal. The Cortes were dissolved, and the federal and constituent Cortes of the republic convened, but they only sat during the summer of 1873, long enough to show their absolute incapacity, and to convince the executive that the safest policy was to suspend the session for several months.

This was the darkest period of the annals of the Spanish revolution of 1873–1874. Matters got to such a climax of disorder, disturbance and confusion from the highest to the lowest strata of Spanish society, that the president of the executive, Figueras, deserted his post and fled the country. Pi y Margall and Salmeron, in successive attempts to govern, found no support in the really important and influential elements of Spanish society. Salmeron had even to appeal to such well-known reactionary generals as Pavia, Sanchez, Bregna, and Moriones, to assume the command of the armies in the south and in the north of Spain. Fortunately these officers responded to the call of the executive. In less than five weeks a few thousand men properly handled sufficed to quell the cantonal risings in Cordoba, Seville, Cádiz and Málaga, and the whole of the south might have been soon pacified, if the federal republican ministers had not once more given way to the pressure of the majority of the Cortes, composed of Intransigentes and radical republicans. The president, Salmeron, after showing much indecision, resigned, but not until he had recalled the general in command in Andalusia, Pavia. This resignation was not an unfortunate event for the country, as the federal Cortes not only made Castelar chief of the executive, though his partisans were in a minority in the Parliament, but they gave him much liberty to act, as they decided to suspend the sittings of the house until 2 January 1874. This was the turning-point of the Spanish revolution, as from that day the tide set in towards the successive developments that led to the restoration of the Bourbons.

Ruler of Spain, 1873
On becoming the ruler of Spain at the beginning of September 1873, Castelar at once devoted his attention to the reorganization of the army, whose numbers had dwindled down to about 70,000 men. This force, though aided by considerable bodies of local militia and volunteers in the northern and western provinces, was insufficient to cope with the 60,000 Carlists in arms, and with the still formidable nucleus of cantonalists around Alcoy and Cartagena. To supply the deficiencies Castelar called out more than 100,000 conscripts, who joined the colors in less than six weeks. He selected his generals without respect of politics, sending Moriones to the Basque provinces and Navarre at the head of 20,000 men, Martinez Campos to Catalonia with several thousand, and Lopez Dominguez, the nephew of Marshal Serrano, to begin the land blockade of the last stronghold of the cantonal insurgents, the Canton of Cartagena, where the crews of Spain's only fleet had joined the revolt.

Castelar and the Church
Castelar next turned his attention to the Church. He renewed direct relations with the Vatican, and at last induced Pope Pius IX to approve his selection of two dignitaries to occupy vacant sees as well as his nominee for the vacant archbishopric of Valencia, a prelate who afterwards became archbishop of Toledo, and remained to the end a close friend of Castelar. He put a stop to all persecutions of the Church and religious orders, and enforced respect of Church property. He attempted to restore some order in the treasury and administration of finance, with a view to obtain ways and means to cover the expense of the three civil wars, Carlist, cantonal and Cuban. The Cuban insurgents gave him much trouble and anxiety, the famous Virginius Incident nearly leading to a rupture between Spain and the United States. Castelar sent out to Cuba all the reinforcements he could spare, and a new governor-general, Jovellar, whom he peremptorily instructed to crush the mutinous spirit of the Cuban militia, and not allow them to drag Spain into a conflict with the U.S. Acting upon the instructions of Castelar, Jovellar gave up the filibuster vessels, and those of the crew and passengers who had not been summarily shot by General Burriel. Castelar always prided himself on having terminated this incident without too much damage to the prestige of Spain.

At the end of 1873 Castelar had reason to be satisfied with the results of his efforts, with the military operations in the peninsula, with the assistance he was getting from the middle classes and even from many of the political elements of the Spanish revolution that were not republican. On the other hand, on the eve of the meeting of the federal Cortes, he could indulge in no illusions as to what he had to expect from the bulk of the republicans, who openly dissented from his conservative and conciliatory policy, and announced that they would reverse it on the very day the Cortes met. Warnings came in plenty, and no less a personage than the man he had made captain-general of Madrid, General Pavia, suggested that, if a conflict arose between Castelar and the majority of the Cortes, not only the garrison of Madrid and its chief, but all the armies in the field and their generals, were disposed to stand by the president. Castelar knew too well what such offers meant in the classic land of pronunciamientos, and he refused so flatly that Pavia did not renew his advice. The Cortes met on 2 January 1874. The intransigent majority refused to listen to a last eloquent appeal that Castelar made to their patriotism and common sense, and they passed a vote of censure. Castelar resigned. The Cortes went on wrangling for a day and night until, at daybreak on 3 January 1874, General Pavia forcibly ejected the deputies, closed and dissolved the Cortes, and called up Marshal Serrano to form a provisional government. Castelar kept apart from active politics during the twelve months that Serrano acted as president of the republic. Another pronunciamiento finally put an end to it in the last week of December 1874, when Generals Campos at Sagunto, Jovellar at Valencia, Primo de Rivera at Madrid, and Laserna at Logrono, proclaimed Alphonso XII king of Spain. Castelar then went into voluntary exile for fifteen months, at the end of which he was elected deputy for Barcelona. He sat in all subsequent parliaments, and just a month before his death he was elected as representative of Murcia. During that period he became even more estranged from the majority of the republicans. Bitter experience had shown him that their federal doctrines and revolutionary methods could lead to nothing in harmony with the aspirations of the majority of Spaniards. He was elected, to use his own words, "to defend and to seek the realization of the substance of the program of the Spanish revolution of 1868 by evolution, and legal, peaceful means." Hence the contrast between his attitude from 1876 to 1886, during the reign of Alphonso, when he stood in the front rank of the opposition, to defend the reforms of that revolution against Señor Canovas, and his attitude from 1886 to 1891. In this latter period Castelar acted as a sort of independent auxiliary of Sagasta and of the Liberal party. As soon as Castelar saw universal suffrage re-established he solemnly declared in the Cortes that his task was accomplished, his political mission at an end, and that he proposed to devote the remainder of his life to those literary, historical, philosophical, and economic studies which he had never neglected even in the busiest days of his political career. Indeed, it was his extraordinary activity and power of assimilation in such directions that allowed him to keep his fellow-countrymen so well informed of what was going on in the outer world.

Work
His literary and journalistic labors occupied much of his time, and were his chief means of subsistence. He established a daily newspaper, El Globo, in Madrid in 1875. He left unfinished a history of Europe in the 19th century. The most conspicuous of his earlier works were: A History of Civilization in the First Five Centuries of Christianity, Recollections of Italy, Life of Lord Byron, The History of the Republican Movement in Europe, The Redemption of Slaves, The Religious Revolution, Historical Essays on the Middle Ages, The Eastern Question, Fra Filippo Lippi, History of the Discovery of America, and some historical novels. Castelar died near Murcia on 25 May 1899, at the age of sixty-six. His funeral at Madrid was an imposing demonstration of the sympathy and respect of all classes and parties.

title: Emilio Castelar