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Domicile (law)

In law and conflict of laws, domicile is relevant to an individual's "personal law", which includes the law that governs a person's status and their property. It is independent of a person's nationality. Although a domicile may change from time to time, a person has only one domicile, or residence, at any point in their life, no matter what their circumstances. Domicile is distinct from habitual residence, where there is less focus on future intent.

As domicile is one of the connecting factors ordinarily used in common law legal systems, a person can never be left without a domicile and a domicile is acquired by everyone at birth. Generally domicile can be divided into domicile of origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law (also known as domicile of dependency). When determining the domicile of an individual, a court applies its own law and understanding of what domicile is.

In some common-law countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, the concept of domicile has been subject to statutory reform. Further, under Canada's Divorce Act, domicile has been replaced as the basis for which a provincial court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce proceeding. Instead, "A court in a province has jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been habitually resident in the province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding". Although domicile was traditionally known as the most appropriate connecting factor to establish an individual's personal law, its significance has declined over the years in common law systems.

Description
In early societies, there was little mobility but, as travel from one state to another developed, problems emerged: what should happen if different forms of marriage exist, if children became adults at different ages, etc.? One answer is that people must be given a connection to a legal jurisdiction, like a passport, that they carry with them wherever they go.

Domicile is governed by lex domicilii, as opposed to lex patriae which depends upon nationality, which is the relationship between an individual and a country. Where the state and the country are co-extensive, the two may be the same. However:

 * Where the country is federated into separate legal systems, citizenship and domicile will be different. For example, one might have United States citizenship and a domicile in Kentucky, Canadian citizenship and a domicile in Quebec, or Australian citizenship and a domicile in Tasmania.
 * One can have dual nationality but not more than one domicile at a time. A person may have a domicile in one state while maintaining nationality in another country.
 * Unlike nationality, no person can be without a domicile even if stateless.

Domicile is distinct from habitual residence where there is much less focus on future intent. Domicile is being supplanted by habitual residence in international conventions dealing with conflict of laws and other private law matters.

General principles
 Domicile of Origin

Domicile of origin is established by law at birth to every individual. It refers to the domicile of the person's parent, and is hard for the person to lose. This means that it is not necessarily established based on where an individual was born or where their parents live. An example of domicile of origin was explained in Udny v Udny, where Udny's domicile of origin at birth was that of Scotland, even though he was born and lived in Tuscany and his father lived in England. The court made this determination based on the fact that Udny's father's domicile of origin was that of Scotland. This means that even if a person leaves his or her country of origin with no intention to return to it, the person will still be domiciled there until they obtain a new domicile of choice.

However, a child without parents will have a domicile of the place of which they were found. Further, a minor's domicile of origin will be based on the particular common-law country and its rules (see Domicile of Dependency (Minors) below).

 Domicile of Choice

When a person is legally allowed to change their domicile of origin, they can acquire a domicile of choice. However, until an individual obtains a new domicile of choice, their domicile of origin remains. Domicile of choice can be achieved by intention and residence. This means that if an individual is living in a country and leaves it with the intention to return, then they will not have a domicile in the country they went to; instead, their domicile of origin will remain. As stated in the Foote v Foote case, a domicile of choice can be lost or abandoned if certain factors are met.

 Domicile of Dependency (also known as domicile by operation of law)

Minors

At common law, the domicile attributed to a child at birth depends on the domicile of the relevant parent. In Canada, the domicile of children generally depends and changes with the domicile of the parent(s) with whom the child habitually resides. There are certain Acts within Canadian provinces for example to help determine what the domicile of a minor is, for example, section 67 of the Family Law Act of Ontario.

"Domicile of Minor

67 The domicile of a person who is a minor is,

(a) if the minor habitually resides with both parents and the parents have a common domicile, that domicile;

(b) if the minor habitually resides with one parent only, that parent's domicile;

(c) if the minor resides with another person who has lawful custody of him or her, that person's domicile; or

(d) if the minor's domicile cannot be determined under clause (a), (b) or (c), the jurisdiction with which the minor has the closest connection."

However, depending on the country, the common-law approach might remain in place. For example, in England, the domicile of origin of a child is determined at birth by the domicile of the father if the child is legitimate or by the domicile of the mother if the child is illegitimate.

Married Women

At common law, a married woman suffered a legal incapacity to acquire her own domicile and thus retained the domicile of her husband. In Canada, some provinces, such as Ontario, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, domicile of dependency has been abolished.

An example of Prince Edward Island's Family Law Act is reproduced below:

"59(1) For all purposes of the law of Prince Edward Island, a married person has a legal personality that is independent, separate and distinct from that of his or her spouse"

Even in the absence of statute, it is unlikely that Canadian courts would now refuse to recognize the capacity of married women to establish their own domicile. In other common-law countries, such as Ireland, the Supreme Court has held that this concept is inconsistent with the country's Constitution. Further, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia have abolished this concept.

Mentally Incapable

It is generally accepted that a person who becomes mentally incapacitated in adult life is no longer capable of forming the intent to acquire a domicile of choice and retains whichever domicile they held prior to becoming incapable. If an individual is born mentally incapable at birth or becomes so before reaching the age of majority, their domicile of dependency may continue to depend on the change with their parents, even after they reach the age of majority. There is also a "recommendation of the English and Scottish Law Commissions under which an adult who lacks mental capacity to acquire a domicile would be considered domiciled in the country with which he or she is for the time being most closely connected."

Application
A person's domicile can have important personal consequences:

 * A marriage is valid only where properly performed under the law of the jurisdiction in which it takes place, as well as under the law applicable to each of the participants in effect in their respective domiciles.
 * If someone is an infant and therefore has reduced contractual capacity, that reduced capacity will tend to apply wherever they go.
 * When a person dies, it is the law of their domicile that determines how their will is interpreted, or if the person has no valid will, how their property will pass by intestate succession.
 * Historically, divorce could only take place in the domicile of the parties concerned.

There is tension between "domicile of origin" and "domicile of choice" which arises out of the fact that the latter can only be acquired through fulfilling both:

 * the ability to settle permanently in another place, and
 * the intention to remain there permanently.

The ability to settle permanently has been held to arise only when one can become a permanent resident of the jurisdiction for immigration purposes. For example, suppose that A came from England to Canada on a visa to work for an employer in Ontario. While there, their son B is born. A likes Canada enough to have their status changed to that of landed immigrant. When B comes of age, they decide to leave Ontario for good, but dies before settling permanently elsewhere. B's domicile of origin is England, because of A's initial inability to settle permanently in Ontario. When A obtains permission to land, Ontario becomes their domicile of choice, and B (provided they are still a minor) automatically acquires it as a domicile of dependency. When B attains the age of majority, Ontario becomes their domicile of choice until they decide to leave for good, at which time it reverts to the domicile of origin. Their new domicile of choice would only occur once they had been able to settle permanently in a new jurisdiction.

However, it is more difficult to abandon a domicile of choice than to acquire it. In the case of abandonment, both the above conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously as they are interrelated, whereas they are discrete in the latter case of acquisition.

The lack of intention to remain permanently can lead to unexpected results:

"A, whose domicile of origin was England, went to India where he had a legitimate son B. B, while resident in India, had a legitimate son C who also, while resident in India, had a legitimate son D. A, B and C intended to return to England when they retired at sixty years of age, but they all died in India before reaching that age. D's domicile of origin remains England, even though he has never lived there."

In extraterritorial jurisdiction
Certain anomalous jurisprudence occurred where persons lived abroad in cases relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The East India Company was declared to be equivalent to a foreign government, and persons engaged in service to it for an indefinite period were deemed to have acquired Anglo-Indian domicile. Persons in the service of the Crown, as well as independent traders, could not acquire this status. As a consequence of the Indian Mutiny, the Company ceased to function as a government upon the passage of the Government of India Act 1858, and such domicile was not capable of being acquired thereafter.

Unsuccessful attempts were made to adapt that case law to other circumstances. In 1844, Stephen Lushington of the Consistory Court observed in dicta that, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, "every presumption is against the intention of British Christian subjects voluntarily becoming domiciled in the dominions of the Porte." Similar statements were expressed by the Court of Chancery in 1883 in rejecting the concept of an Anglo-Chinese domicile, where Chitty J of the Court of Chancery stated that "There is no authority that I am aware of in English law that an individual can become domiciled as a member of a community which is not the community possessing the supreme or sovereign territorial power." This was later endorsed by Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1888, in holding that "residence in a foreign country, without subjection to its municipal laws and customs, is therefore ineffectual to create a new domicile."

The reasoning behind such decisions was never satisfactorily explained, and the House of Lords later held in 1918 that these rulings built on dicta were wrongly decided and were thus swept aside. In holding that domicile in a foreign State could be properly acquired in such circumstances, Lord Finlay LC declared:

Before special provision was made in the case of foreigners resident in such countries for application to their property of their own law of succession, for their trial on criminal charges by Courts which will command their confidence, and for the settlement of disputes between them and others of the same nationality by such Courts, the presumption against the acquisition of a domicile in such a country might be regarded as overwhelming, unless under very special circumstances. But since special provision for the protection of foreigners in such countries has been made, the strength of the presumption against the acquisition of a domicile there is very much diminished.

Commercial domicile and prize law
The rules governing civil domicile have on occasion been confused with those governing commercial domicile that appear in public international law which come into play in time of war, with emphasis on the area of prize law, where a merchant's status as an enemy or neutral come to be determined in the courts of a belligerent state. The two sets of rules are fundamentally different. The basic principles that apply are:

 * Commercial domicile is acquired whenever a person resides and carries on business in a country in time of war without any intention of bringing their business to an immediate end.
 * It is possible to have more than one commercial domicile at the same time and be engaged in business in each of them, but enemy or neutral character is characterized only in the transactions that originate in the belligerent or neutral country concerned.
 * Commercial domicile is acquired when a person acts as a merchant, even when they also act as a consular representative of a state.
 * In acting as a merchant, the activity must be extensive enough that the country is said to derive an advantage from the trade they carry on there.
 * Commercial domicile is lost at the moment a person puts himself in motion to quit the country of domicile with no intention of returning.
 * Any person is an enemy with respect to a ship or cargo who resides and carries on a trade in an enemy territory, and has not divested himself of this hostile character by bona fide putting himself in motion to quit the enemy territory.
 * If a person carries on business in both enemy and British territory, any property belonging to him as a merchant of the belligerent state is liable to be captured at sea. Neutral ships may be captured if they break, or attempt to break, a blockade.

The law in specific jurisdictions
The rules determining domicile in common law jurisdictions are based on case law. Most jurisdictions have altered some aspects of the common-law rules by statute, the details of which vary from one jurisdiction to another. The general framework of the common-law rules has however survived in most jurisdictions and is in outline as follows:

Canada
Canada is a bijural country, but the common-law provinces follow the rules of domicile unless there is statutory authority to state otherwise. This means that within Canada a person has a domicile of origin which can be displaced by a domicile of choice. To obtain a domicile of choice two factors have to be met, "the acquisition of residence in fact in a new place and the intention of permanently settling there ... in the sense of making that place [one's] principal residence indefinitely".

An individual who successfully obtains a domicile of choice they can still abandon it. A person abandons a domicile of choice in a country, "by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently or indefinitely, and not otherwise." Loss of domicile "requires an intention to cease to reside in a place coupled with acts that end one's residence".

Overall, the concept of domicile and its importance has declined over the years, in relation to a connecting factor for choice of law, as a basis of jurisdiction, and as a basis for recognizing foreign divorces. However, this concept and the tests explained were discussed in an Alberta case, Foote v Foote Estate, below.

 Alberta

An Alberta case, Foote v Foote Estate, provides a comprehensive overview of the law of domicile.

The late Eldon Douglas Foote lived in Alberta for the first 43 years of his life and in 1970 he purchased property in Norfolk Island, and built a residence. He and his second wife acquired permanent residence status in Norfolk Island in 1977. In 1981 they divorced, and he then married Anne, an Australian citizen, in 1984, who was granted permanent resident status in Norfolk Island in 1966. In 1999, the Footes purchased an unfinished condominium property in Victoria, British Columbia, and construction was complete in 2001. They then spent three summers there. Around the same time, they made plans to sell their residence on Norfolk Island, but it was not advertised for sale. In 2004 Mr. Foote died.

The issue in this case was, what was the domicile of the late Mr. Foote when he died?

The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that any plans for Mr. Foote to leave Norfolk Island to take up residence in Victoria and live there indefinitely were undeveloped and the intention was ambiguous. Thus, the court upheld the decision and stated that evidence supported that Mr. Foote's domicile changed from Alberta to Norfolk Island in 1972 and that he had not acquired a new domicile of choice in British Columbia or Alberta. Nor did he abandon Norfolk and not adopt a new domicile, which would revert his domicile to Alberta. His domicile at his death was in Norfolk Island.

 Manitoba

At common law, if a domicile of choice is abandoned by an individual and they do not acquire a new domicile of choice, their domicile of origin revives, so that they are never left without a domicile. However, this means that a person can be linked to the laws of a particular country even if they have terminated their connection with it a long time ago.

Manitoba's The Domicile and Habitual Residence Act (Act) has repealed the common law concept of domicile. An important aspect of the repeal includes abolishing the doctrine of revival and the rule where a woman's domicile was that of her husband, which can be found under section 3 of the Act.

As noted above, instead of following this doctrine, s 3 of The Domicile and Habitual Residence Act (which is produced below) states that this doctrine is no longer law in the province of Manitoba.

Common law of domicile abolished

" 3   The common law rules respecting domicile, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

(a) the rule known as the revival of domicile of origin whereby the domicile of origin of a person revives upon the abandonment of a domicile of choice; and

(b) the rule of law whereby a married woman has the domicile of her husband;

are no longer law in Manitoba."

The Act has other important provisions to aid in determining one's domicile too, for example section 10.

Divorce and other provinces

Until the passage of the Divorce Act in 1968, divorce could only be obtained in the province of domicile, which effectively required those domiciled in Quebec and Newfoundland to obtain divorce only through an Act of the Parliament of Canada. The 1968 Act required that "the domicile of a married woman shall be determined as if she were unmarried, and, if she is a minor, as if she had attained her majority", with one year's residence in the province where the divorce order was sought. The later 1986 Act removed the domicile requirement completely. As of March 2021, "A court in a province has jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been habitually resident in the province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding".

When later court proceedings revealed complications arising from the impact of domicile on the validity of same-sex marriages solemnized in Canada, the Civil Marriage Act was amended in 2013 to provide for divorce to be available to nonresident spouses in the province where the marriage took place.

Outside of marriage and divorce, rules relating to domicile generally fall under provincial jurisdiction. The Civil Code of Quebec standardizes rules for that province, while Manitoba is the only common-law province to attempt to completely revise and simplify the rules within its scope. Other provinces have modified their rules as the need arose.

Ontario has modified the following rules relating to domicile:

 * Effective 1 January 1959, the domicile of origin for an adopted child was declared to be that of its adoptive parents, "as if the adopted child had been born in lawful wedlock to the adopting parent."
 * On 31 March 1978, the doctrine of illegitimacy was abolished, as well as the rule deeming a married woman's domicile to be that of her husband's, and the rules governing the domicile of minors were simplified.
 * Effective 1 March 1986, the rules governing the domicile of minors were simplified further.

China
A domiciled individual is defined as one who, by reason of the individual's permanent registered address, family, and/or economic interests, habitually resides in China. A PRC national with a Chinese passport or a domicile registration is likely to be deemed as domiciled in China–whether resident in China or not–and therefore attract liability for individual income tax on worldwide income.

India
A domicile of origin is the one with which a person is born. It can be changed as a result of adoption and marriage.

Under the common law, a married woman was deemed to have the same domicile as her husband, so the domicile of origin of the children of the marriage was the same as that of their father and the time of birth. Children gained their mother's domicile if their father was predeceased or they were born outside marriage. An orphan has the jurisdiction over the original domicile where they were found.

Every adult (other than married women) can change their domicile by leaving the jurisdiction of the prior domicile with an intention of permanently residing somewhere else. This is referred to as a domicile of choice. A domicile of choice can be abandoned if a new domicile of choice is acquired or if the domicile of origin revives.

A married woman can only get domicile and other caste certificates from her husband's jurisdiction.

A child's domicile is dependent and, therefore the same, as the adult on whom he or she is dependent.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom contains three jurisdictions: England and Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland. The law in Scotland is similar to England and Wales, but not identical. All UK jurisdictions distinguish between domicile of origin (decided by the domicile of their father, or if parents unmarried their mother), domicile of choice (when a person has exercised a legal option to change their domicile as can be done when attaining majority) and domicile of dependence (applicable to those legally dependent on another such as some incapable persons, children, or women married before 1974). Only one place can be a person's domicile at any one time thus preventing the creation of differing simultaneous domiciles for different purposes; the three types of domicile can enable a voluntary change when a person reaches a relevant age. If a domicile of choice lapses and is not replaced the domicile of origin reasserts itself. The concept of domicile is rooted in case law, though amended on some points by statutes.

 * England and Wales:

The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 abolished the rule that a married woman had the domicile of her husband (with transitional rules for those married before 1 January 1974), as well as reforming the rules dealing with the domicile of minors.

The rules for domicile of persons under 16 for the particular purposes of some Scottish family law are dealt with in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.
 * Scotland:

The law in Northern Ireland is the same as England and Wales.
 * Northern Ireland:

Domicile for UK taxation purposes
A person who is no longer domiciled in the UK is nevertheless still deemed to be domiciled in the UK for tax purposes if they meet one of the following rules:

 * 15-year rule
 * Formerly domiciled resident
 * 3-year rule

The discussion below is just an outline of these three rules.

15-year rule
Section 267(1)(b) of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984  provides:

 * A person not domiciled in the UK at any time (in this section referred to as "the relevant time") shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as domiciled in the UK (and not elsewhere) at the relevant time if...

 * (b) he was resident in the UK—

 * (i) for at least fifteen of the twenty tax years immediately preceding the relevant tax year, and

 * (ii) for at least one of the four tax years ending with the relevant tax year.

The start date for acquisition of 15-year deemed domicile is 6 April in the tax year after the 15/20 year test is satisfied. It does not matter whether a person is resident in that tax year. The deemed domicile under this rule ends when either of the two conditions under s.267(1)(b) set out above are not met.

Formerly domiciled resident rule
Section 267(1)(aa) of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984  provides:

 * A person not domiciled in the UK at any time (in this section referred to as "the relevant time") shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as domiciled in the UK (and not elsewhere) at the relevant time if...

 * (aa) he is a formerly domiciled resident for the tax year in which the relevant time falls ("the relevant tax year")

"Formerly-domiciled resident" is a label for a set of four rules. Section 272  provides:

 * "formerly domiciled resident", in relation to a tax year, means a person—

 * (a) who was born in the UK,

 * (b) whose domicile of origin was in the UK,

 * (c) who was resident in the UK for that tax year, and

 * (d) who was resident in the UK for at least one of the two tax years immediately preceding that tax year.

The domicile start date for formerly-domiciled residents under the IHT deemed domicile rule is 6 April in the 2nd year of residence. The domicile end date for formerly-domiciled residents is 6 April in the first year of non-residence. The same rule applies for income tax and capital gains tax but without the one-year grace period in condition (d).

3-year rule
The 3-year rule concerns the person who is actually UK domiciled and who loses their UK domicile. The domicile start date for this rule is the date of change of domicile, and the domicile end date is 3 years after that date.

Section 267(1)(a) of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984  provides:

 * A person not domiciled in the UK at any time (in this section referred to as "the relevant time") shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as domiciled in the UK (and not elsewhere) at the relevant time if—

 * (a) he was domiciled in the UK within the three years immediately preceding the relevant time.

United States
Each state of the United States is considered a separate sovereign within the U.S. federal system, and each therefore has its own laws on questions of marriage, inheritance, and liability for tort and contract actions.

Persons who reside in the U.S. must have a state domicile for various purposes. For example, a person can always be sued in their state of domicile. Furthermore, in order for individual parties (that is, natural persons) to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of a United States district court (a federal trial court), all the plaintiffs must have a different state of domicile from all the defendants (so-called "complete diversity").

In 2010, the United States Supreme Court case of Hertz Corp. v. Friend concluded that the "principal place of business refers to the place where corporations' high level officers direct, control and coordinate the corporations' activities." A corporation's state of incorporation and principal place of business each count for (or against) diversity jurisdiction.

Political office
It is important in terms of politics, as in many jurisdictions candidates must maintain residency within the district in which they intend to run. Requirements vary by jurisdiction, and sometimes by the political office for which a person runs. The cutoff may be as little as a month or as much as several years. Once elected, the office-holder must remain resident in the appropriate district, or may usually be forced to resign.

Canada
To run as a candidate for election to the House of Commons of Canada, a candidate must have established residency in Canada — however, a person does not need to have established residency in the specific district where they are running. In most elections, in fact, virtually all of the major political parties run at least a few paper candidates in districts where they do not have a strong organization or a viable local candidate; a paper candidate may be from almost anywhere in the country.

As well, when a political party with representation in the House of Commons selects a new leader who is not a sitting Member of Parliament, it is common for a member of that party's caucus to resign his or her seat so that the leader can run in the resulting by-election. The leader may, at their own discretion, continue to represent that district for the duration of their career in politics, or may run in a district closer to their home in the next election. As of 2012, for instance, Stockwell Day continued to represent the same district in British Columbia to which he was elected in 2000 when he first entered the House of Commons as leader of the Canadian Alliance, even though he was a resident of Alberta at the time of his initial election. Conversely, Joe Clark was elected in a by-election in Nova Scotia on the very same date as Day, following his reelection to his second stint as leader of the Progressive Conservatives, but held that seat only until the 2000 election and then stood in the Alberta riding of Calgary Centre.

In still other cases, a politician may run in a district other than the one they live in for personal reasons — such as having an established power base in that area from a prior political office, or simply not wanting to get drawn into a nomination contest with an existing incumbent. For instance, Jack Layton represented the electoral district of Toronto—Danforth for the entirety of his term as a member of the House of Commons, even though his personal residence was in the nearby district of Trinity—Spadina. Trinity—Spadina was concurrently represented by Layton's wife, Olivia Chow, and both districts corresponded to the areas that Chow and Layton had previously represented on Toronto City Council.

However, a non-resident candidate may sometimes face accusations of being a parachute candidate, which may or may not compromise their ability to win the election depending on the circumstances. In recent federal elections, some non-resident candidates have won election while others have lost. A non-resident candidate who does win election is generally expected to establish a residence in or near the district soon afterward, although this is by public expectation rather than legal requirement.

To be eligible for appointment to the Senate, a person must officially reside in the province which they are being appointed to represent. However, this criterion has historically been interpreted quite liberally, with virtually any form of property holding — including primary residences, second residences, summer homes, rental or retail holdings or even lots of undeveloped land — having been deemed to meet the requirement, as long as the senator listed it as their primary residence on paper regardless of whether they actually resided there in any meaningful way. Again, however, controversy may result among the general public around the definition of residency — for instance, Senator Pamela Wallin faced some controversy in 2008 around whether she was truly a resident of Saskatchewan, although she does own property in the province. In 2013, however, a Senate committee launched a review, ordering all senators to provide documentation confirming their residency status following allegations of irregularities in some senators' housing expense claims, including those of Wallin, Patrick Brazeau, Mac Harb and Mike Duffy.

All provinces and territories have a similar requirement by which a person must be a resident of that province or territory to be eligible for election to the provincial or territorial legislative assembly. Depending on the province or territory, however, there may or may not be a legal requirement to be a resident of the specific district where one is standing as a candidate.

United States
As a general principle, in the United States residency for federal politicians is defined as the intent to return to the particular district or state they represent following their term in office. For example, the purchase or occupancy of a home in the DC metro area, for proximity to the Capitol and the Congressional offices, does not change an Iowa congressman's or congresswoman's legal residency in his or her state.

Conversely, to be eligible for election to a state-level office, such as a state assembly or a governorship, a person must be resident within the state where they are running for office; however, states vary in whether or not an assembly candidate is required to reside in the specific district where they are running. In one noted recent case, Nevada Assembly candidate Andrew Martin's eligibility for office was called into question due to ambiguity regarding his residency status. Martin owned two properties, a condominium in the district where he was running for office and a house in a neighboring district, and his campaign was affected by conflicting claims about which property should be regarded as his primary residence. A judge ruled Martin ineligible to run on November 5, 2012, just one day before the election — but as the decision came too late for Clark County officials to reprint the ballots, Martin's name remained on the ballot and he won the election. Martin was allowed to take his seat in the legislature without a formal challenge being filed against him.

Latvia
Permanent residents of Latvia, a participant of the Schengen Agreement and like all countries within the Schengen zone, are able to visit any other country within the zone for up to 90 days a year, without any kind of administrative or legal procedures.

However, there is a difference between a citizen and a holder of a residence permit in Latvia:
 * A residence permit holder is not entitled to hold governmental office or to vote in any elections.
 * The person cannot join the army or a police force.

Malaysia
The Malaysia My Second Home program (commonly abbreviated "MM2H") is an international residency scheme enacted by the Government of Malaysia to allow foreigners to live in the country on a long-stay travel visa of up to 10 years. To qualify for the program, applicants must meet certain financial and medical criteria. Successful applicants are then entitled to enter and leave the country on a largely unrestricted basis, and also benefit from other incentives aimed at making their stay in Malaysia more convenient. Certain restrictions may apply.

Malta
In Malta, residency has been interpreted to include not only the physical presence in the country, but includes and allows periodic absence from the country. A person who is temporarily absent from Malta because of work, study, illness or mission, must not and cannot be considered as not resident in Malta. A person who goes abroad to study or for work purposes is still 'directly and continuously concerned' with the political activity of the country of residence and therefore has the right to vote.

United States
Voting by the general public (the electorate) is also defined by residency, with most people being prohibited from doing so except at the precinct for their primary residence. There are exceptions for this such that expatriates can vote in the country where they maintain their original citizenship.

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) provides specific protections to military service members who are domiciled outside their home states.

It is also important in terms of other law, such as requirements that vehicles and other things which must be licensed in the place which the owner resides. There is a grace period normally around 30 days for persons moving into the area.

In addition to such responsibilities, certain benefits also come from residency. Discounts on tuition usually are allowed for students who are resident within the state or province (or country) for a year or more, if it is a public university or the like. Other forms of public assistance such as welfare may also have a waiting period, to prevent abuse.

Residency in any given U.S. state is recognized by the United States Constitution as "citizenship" of that state, a somewhat unusual arrangement known as "dual citizenship" (though not in the original multi-national context).

title: Domicile (law)


text: User talk:212.100.250.209

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title: User talk:212.100.250.209


text: User talk:69.138.224.120

title: User talk:69.138.224.120


text:
1700 in music

The year 1700 in music involved some significant events.

Events

 * John Eccles is appointed Master of the King's Musick.
 * William Croft returns to the Chapel Royal, where he had been educated, as a "gentleman organist".
 * William Corbett becomes director of the New Theatre at Lincoln's Inn Fields.
 * Johann Sebastian Bach becomes a chorister at St. Michael's Church, Lüneburg.
 * Tomaso Albinoni is employed as a violinist by Fernando Carlo, Duke of Mantua.
 * An inventory of musical instruments kept by Prince Ferdinando de Medici provides the first evidence for the existence of the pianoforte.

Classical music

 * Tomaso Giovanni Albinoni – Sinfonie e concerti op. 2
 * Johann Sebastian Bach
 * Prelude and Fugue in D minor, BWV 549a
 * Christ, der du bist der helle Tag, BWV 766
 * John Blow – Amphion Anglicus
 * Jacques Boyvin – Livre d'orgue II
 * Sébastien de Brossard – O miraculum!, SdB.006
 * Antonio Caldara
 * La frode della castità
 * Il trionfo dell'innocenza
 * Choice Collection of Ayres for the Harpsichord or Spinnet by John Blow, Jeremiah Clarke, Francis Piggott, John Barrett and William Croft
 * Jeremiah Clarke – Prince of Denmark's March (approximate date)
 * Arcangelo Corelli – XII Suonati a violino e violone o cimbalo (Op. 5), published in Rome
 * John Eccles – The Mad Lover
 * Johann Caspar Ferdinand Fischer – Musicalischer Parnassus
 * Godfrey Keller
 * The Royal Trumpett-Suite
 * 8 Trio Sonatas
 * Johann Kuhnau – Musicalische Vorstellung einiger biblischer Historien (Biblical sonatas), published in Leipzig
 * Johann Sigismund Kusser
 * 6 Overture Suites 'Apollon Enjoué'
 * 6 Overture Suites 'Festin des Muses'
 * Isabella Leonarda – Motetti a voce sola con istromenti, Op.20
 * Alessandro Scarlatti – Il rosignolo se scioglie il volo, H.318

Opera

 * Carlo Agostino Badia – La costanza d'Ulisse
 * André Campra – Hésione
 * John Eccles – The Judgment of Paris
 * Alessandro Scarlatti – Eracles

Publications

 * Jacques Boyvin – Traité abrégé de l'accompagnement
 * Johann Kuhnau – Der musicalische Quack-Salber
 * Friedrich Erhardt Niedt – Musicalische Handleitung

Births

 * January 14 – Picander, librettist for Johann Sebastian Bach (died 1764)
 * March 13 – Michel Blavet, flautist (died 1768)
 * April 2 – Francesca Cuzzoni, opera singer (died 1770)
 * probable
 * Sebastian Bodinus, composer (d. 1759)
 * Jean-Baptiste Masse, cellist and composer (died c.1757)

Deaths

 * January 16 – Antonio Draghi, opera composer (born c.1634)
 * February 8 – Filippo Acciaiuoli, opera composer, librettist and manager (born 1637)
 * June 6 – Wespazjan Kochowski, historian, poet and writer (born 1633)
 * probable
 * August Kühnel, viola da gamba player and composer (b. 1645)
 * Monsieur de Sainte-Colombe, violist and composer (born c.1640)

title: 1700 in music


text:
Talk:History of the United States Constitution

'''

Archive
Started since most discussion from 2006 and prior.  Gtstricky Talk or C

The sentence "Congress then called the convention at Philadelphia" is incorrect - needs cite or deletion.
The sentence "Congress then called the convention at Philadelphia" is incorrect and should either get a citation or be removed. The convention was called by Virginia on December 1, 1786 as a result of the report from the Annapolis Convention (also called by the states, and not Congress). Seven states already had agreed to participate under terms granting the convention wide powers before the resolution in Congress on Feb. 21, 1787. Indeed, the Confederation Congress had no authority to call a convention of the states, and as was the common practice in the 18th century (and consistent with the Annapolis Convention and over 2 dozen other conventions among the states in that time frame) the states made the calls for the conventions. PubliusSpiritus (talk) 03:45, 23 December 2016 (UTC)
 * Congress did indeed call it,et time and place, and set the rules. see text at footnotes 20-21. also "Congress promptly called a convention in Philadelphia “to revise and enlarge” the Articles of Confederation"  Rjensen (talk) 03:52, 23 December 2016 (UTC)
 * That illustrates a core problem with this article. Spence Tucker is a great military historian, but not a constitutional scholar.  That line is his book is a throwawy, without citation, that merely repeats a popular myth.  See, e.g., Natelson, State Initiation of Constitutional Amendments: A Guide for Lawyers and Legislative Drafters (4th ed, 2016) at pp.19-20 that notes "There is an oft-repeated claim that Congress called the 1787 Constitutional Convention. . . That claim is erroneous."  Since a full quorum of states (7) had already agreed to meet and appointed delegates before the Confederation Congress did anything, the Philadelphia convention was already going forward without any action by Congress so obviously Congress could not "call" it.  In fact, the resolution in Congress 3 months before the convention was to start was actually an attempt by New York to stop it. The place and date was actually set by the Annapolis Convention (1786) in September 1786 "to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next [year]." PubliusSpiritus (talk) 15:34, 23 December 2016 (UTC)
 * The Confederation gave it imprimatur and sanction to the call of a rump convocation of state delegates at the Annapolis Convention, which addressed their proposal for another more comprehensive convention contemporaneously to Congress and to the State legislatures as a matter of expeditious communication, not as a denial of the national government in Congress. Since Natelson failed to take into account both correspondence to states AND Congress, looks as though he may have cherry picked his history.

 * The Philadelphia Convention did not address its proposed Constitution to the delegates of the Annapolis Convention, nor to the state legislatures individually, nor as a fait accompli to Rhode Island. Rather it submitted its proposed Constitution to Congress to endorse the proposed adoption proceedings which led to the peaceable dissolution of the Continental Congress on its own authority in deference to the new United States Congress of eleven states, with North Carolina and Rhode Island joining the Union three times faster than it took to attain a unanimous thirteen for the Articles of Confederation.

 * We would want to avoid any anachronistic states rights POV colored by Lost Cause historiography, however recently it has been re-issued. But perhaps we could say, “Congress then issued its own call for a convention at Philadelphia subsequent to the Annapolis Convention.”, if Natelson proves out as a reliable source to be incorporated into the article. TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 16:23, 23 December 2016 (UTC)

 * No one suggested a denial of national government, but the states were free to invite and engage in conventions and agreements among themselves. The Articles created a form of treaty organization similar to NATO, where the states were fully empowered (and did) enter binding agreements between themselves (some of those that predate the Constitution are still in effect today). The Philadelphia convention was not held under any provision of the Articles or under any Authority of Congress, but was outside the Articles.  The Virginia law appointing the delegates in December 1786 required the "Governor is requested to transmit forthwith a Copy of this Act to the United States in Congress and to the Executives of each of the States in the Union."  That was SOP and done by the other states. How could seven states do that before Congress said anything about it?  Also note it was Madison, not Congress, that devised the plan for ratification, and that was then agreed to by the convention.  None of it came from Congress.

 * What you call a "rump conclave" was the standard in that period. The Philadelphia Convention was the 11th held since Independence had been declared in 1776.  All were called by the states.  The Confederation Congress was a late-comer, that was dragged into the pot by the vortex, not a driving or even motivating force.  BY its own words, the February resolution of Congress was not a call, but an expression of the "opinion" of the Congress (pushed by New York) that the already-gonna-happen convention be limited to proposing amendments to the Articles (and this after stronger language was defeated).  Congress later supported the Convention happening, such as it gave free postage (franking privilege) to the state's delegates and facilitated its ratification.

 * There are some other problems with this section and the following two paragraphs, that I will create separate talk-page entries for, and propose a rewrite of these 3 paragraphs.PubliusSpiritus (talk) 19:24, 23 December 2016 (UTC)
 * PubliusSpiritus wants RS only -- but the Natelson pamphlet he uses is self published and does not count as a RS. Here's a recent standard Constitutional Law textbook: "Congress On 21 February, 1787, issued a call for a federal convention to meet in Philadelphia." Rjensen (talk) 07:25, 24 December 2016 (UTC)

So we need to find a reliable source to say something like, “Congress initially expressed its opinion that the upcoming convention at Philadelphia should be limited to proposing amendments to the Articles, though it would subsequently forward the proposed Constitution to the states for ratification.” ??? TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 11:12, 24 December 2016 (UTC)
 * I think that's a step in the right direction. As Madison himself described it in Federalist 40, the February resolution in Congress was a "recommendatory act of Congress." That's historically accurate, as would be saying Congress "endorsed" the convention and expressed the opinion of Congress that the Convention be limited to proposing amendments to the Articles.  The point I wanted to make was that there is a lot of intellectual inertia about Congress making the "call" but when you look at the sources, the ones that say that just repeat it as ipsi dixit without citation or discussion, while the sources that actually look at the text of the February resolution and its legislative history, the fact 7 states had already appointed their delegations using the language from the Annapolis Convention, the regular practice of the states in that century in doing their own calls for conventions, it seems the latter sources that actually do the analysis are the reliable ones.
 * W/R/T Natelson being RS, I cited that particular document because I had it handy and it's well footnoted and includes excerpts from several relevant primary sources included. There are other academic published sources that it draws from such as Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments,” 65 Fla. L. Rev. 615 (2013).
 * As for the Convention forwarding the result to Congress, that was a plan that Madison came up with during the prep time he spent in Philadelphia the week before the Convention started, and was adopted by the convention.PubliusSpiritus (talk) 15:41, 24 December 2016 (UTC)
 * I’ve wondered exactly where the provision for states to call a convention apart from Congress originated. If there are eleven precedents in the Articles era, that would be good enough for me. I just learned from Mapp’s “Virginia Experiment” that MA innovated committees of correspondence colony wide, and the Revolution’s Second? Virginia Convention expanded the concept to comprehensively establish a committee of correspondence to other North American British legislatures, including Bermuda which had once been a part of Virginia.
 * Note in Maier's "Ratification", p. 3-4, she records that the delegates at Annapolis were not authorized to call a convention, but the Virginia Assembly took up the measure and invited the other twelve, and the Pennsylvania Assembly referenced Virginia's motion in its appointment of delegates to Philadelphia. Virginia forwarded the "irregular" consideration to revise the Articles of Confederation precisely to avoid the obstacles in Congress where proceedings might be too much interrupted by the regular business before them. The Philadelphia Convention was not a creature of Congress, which is your point. --- I would be interested in your trial language for the article with a source other than Natelson. TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 17:09, 24 December 2016 (UTC)
 * It will be sometime late next week before I can get it together. Please note Natelson certainly qualifies as RS.  While I cited a treatise for legislators he put together drawing from other works, he has multiple academically published works and has been cited in SCOTUS opinions.  A.E. Dick Howard has one work that states the 1787 Convention was "called" by the Annapolis Convention, but again, it is ipsie dixit, no citation or analysis is presented (although one could say it is plain language reading of the Annapolis Convention report). And that's what makes this important -- few people research or footnote a statement that they believe is common knowledge that they have never questioned. Even from a RS, if there is no discussion or analysis, is it really reliable, or just repeating bad data?
 * In the mean time, if you want to review some research about the conventions held before the Philadelphia Convention (and some before independence) this law review article discusses most of them, starting on page 624 up to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention discussion starting on page 674. Also note that some conventions were clearly called by Congress, such as the November 22, 1777 resolution.  But if you compare that resolution to the Feb 1787 resolution, the latter is clearly does not call a convention.PubliusSpiritus (talk) 18:32, 24 December 2016 (UTC)

Need cite to support claim "George Washington was unwilling to attend an irregular convention like failed Annapolis Convention."
I can find no support for the claim that "George Washington was unwilling to attend an irregular convention like failed Annapolis Convention." I can only find that claim on some unauthenticated places and fringe websites (also worded nearly identically across multiple sites). I suggest a credible citation be found or else it should be deleted.PubliusSpiritus (talk) 15:45, 24 December 2016 (UTC)

Need cite to support claim "New York and others hesitated thinking that only the Continental Congress could propose amendments to the Articles"
I can find no reference for the claim "New York and others hesitated thinking that only the Continental Congress could propose amendments to the Articles." I suggest a credible citation be found or else it should be deleted.PubliusSpiritus (talk) 18:40, 24 December 2016 (UTC)

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Domicile (astrology)

In astrology, a planet's domicile (less commonly home, not to be confused with the astrological house system) is the zodiacal sign over which it has rulership. This is a separate concept from the houses of the horoscope. A planetary ruler is given to each sign, over which the planet is said to have a more powerful influence when positioned therein. The ruling planet associated with a sign is also used as an implied focus of interpretation for the signs on house cusps in a chart. A planet is considered to be in domal dignity when it is positioned in the sign it rules. This is the strongest of the five essential dignities of a planet. Domicile is an archaic term in infrequent, specialist uses today; most astrologers use the simpler term "sign".

Overview
The assignments of the ruling planets appear to be based upon the Northern Hemisphere seasons, as the sun (Sol) and the moon, the principal bearers of light and heat, were awarded to Leo and Cancer, respectively, since the months the sun passed through these signs (in ancient times) were the warmest and had the longest days.

Conversely, Saturn, the most distant (and hence the "coldest") of the planets known to ancients, was accorded the rulership of Aquarius and Capricorn, the signs opposite Leo and Cancer, respectively.

Jupiter, being next farthest away, was given the signs on either side of Aquarius and Capricorn (Pisces and Sagittarius), and Mars, next in order, received the next two (Aries and Scorpio).

Since Mercury never appears more than one sign from the sun in either direction, it was deemed to rule the two signs on either side of Leo and Cancer (Virgo and Gemini), and since Venus can never be found more than two signs from the Sun, it obtained the rulership of Libra and Taurus.

The discovery of planets outside of the geocentric field of vision in modern times provided a dilemma for astrologers, which most eventually resolved by a consensus declaring Uranus to be Aquarius' ruling planet while assigning Neptune to Pisces and later, Pluto, considered the higher octave of Mars, was given to Scorpio.

Some modern authorities use the concept of "night rulerships" to find room for additional dignities. Uranus was designated the day ruler of Aquarius while Saturn was to be its night ruler. Similarly, Neptune was the day ruler of Pisces, leaving Jupiter as the night ruler, and Pluto was the day ruler of Scorpio with Mars as the night ruler.

The use of dual rulerships in a manner such as this was also known as "co-rulership". Some astrologers believed that the new co-rulers were primary rulers of the signs with which they were associated and might have been sole rulers of those signs, and if that was the case, two other planets, one linked to Libra or Taurus, and the other to Virgo or Gemini, may await discovery, thus eliminating the need for dual rulership of a sign. Although the status of Ceres has not been conclusively decided at the moment in astrology, it has been suggested as the ruler of Virgo or Taurus. For some modern astrologers including many European astrologers, it is the ruling planet of Virgo based upon observation of its role in synastric charts. Significantly, the generation of astrologers who first encountered Ceres in the early 19th century after its discovery, before its demotion to an asteroid in the middle of the 19th century, assigned it rulership of Virgo. For a minority of astrologers, it is the ruling planet of Taurus along with Venus.

Rulership of houses
Some modern astrologers assign what is called "natural" rulership of each house of the horoscope to a different planet, in the same way as the zodiac signs are said to have rulers. Traditionally, however, the rulership of houses was understood to apply only in the individual birth-chart, in what is called "accidental" rulership. This understanding is followed by most astrologers. In this case, the rulership of a house in the "native's" horoscope is associated with the planets that rule the sign on the cusp of the house and with any planets found on or near the house cusp. The ruling planet guides the expression of the planets occupying that house, similar to the way a planet on the ASC expresses and mediates the expression of planets throughout the chart as they filter through one's personality (symbolized by the ASC and 1st house.)

There are several different scenarios that one can use to determine the rulership of a house:

 * If the first house cusp is, say, 0 degrees Aries and the second house cusp is 0 degrees Taurus, the house will be ruled solely by Aries.
 * If, for example, the second house cusp is 25 degrees Taurus and the third house cusp is 22 degrees Gemini then the 2nd house will have Venus as its primary ruler and Mercury as its secondary ruler since the majority of the house falls in Gemini. The closer the beginning of a sign is to a house cusp, the more power its planetary ruler has in that house. Some astrologers do not consider secondary rulers of houses in this type of scenario but only rulers of house cusps which are primary.
 * If, as an example, the fourth house cusp is 25 degrees Capricorn and the fifth house cusp is 8 degrees Pisces then the house will have Aquarius intercepted. It will have Saturn as its primary ruler, but in addition to Saturn, Uranus, will play a role in the matters of the house though in a more hidden and less obvious way. Neptune will also play a role if any planets are in Pisces between 0-7 degrees.
 * If a house cusp or angle is at 29 degrees of any sign, the following sign's ruler will be the house's co-ruler. Some apply this rule of shared rulership for angles that are 25-29 degrees of a mutable sign, within 5 degrees of a cardinal solstice or equinox point.

When a person attempts to determine the rulership of a house, the more planets or bodies that rule the house, the more complex the matters of that house will be. Especially when aspects to the rulers are considered. Generally, the sign on the cusp will be the outward representation of the rulership. The ruler of the sign inside the house will not be readily apparent but will manifest itself at critical points in a person's life and in deciding life directions. Meaning, the ruler of the sign inside the house imparts its values and shares 'executive decision' making but is not involved in the actions taken or the outward expression of matters of that house.

As in the case of intercepted houses, the sign that is in the middle of the house is the sign that the native must transcend before he can progress to the next phase of the house's rulership. Therefore, as in the previous example, if a house is intercepted with the sign of Capricorn then the native must will initially present with many Capricorn qualities and will have to work somewhat behind the scenes to get the Aquarian qualities to express. Ultimately, intercepted Aquarius and Uranus will express itself but be mediated strongly through Capricorn and its ruler, Saturn.

Rulerships of signs

 * Many modern astrologers still use Mars as a primary ruler of Scorpio with Pluto as a secondary ruler. A distinction must be made between 'ancient', traditional, and modern rulerships, particularly in light of the fact that ancient astrology is not known to have assigned what we commonly think of as sign rulerships. It isn't until Hellenistic astrology and afterwards that you begin to see sign rulers, let alone sign rulers of houses which is used by a minority of astrologers.

Furthermore, the ancients assigned domal dignity to the North and South nodes of the Moon, although these do not qualify as rulerships since the nodes do not have governance over any signs.

Significant disagreement exists within the Western astrological community about some of the signs that are often still said to share rulers which is a problem that is taking time to resolve. Many suggestions have been made, but consensus could take decades, as it did in the cases of Uranus and Neptune..

Dispositors
A dispositor is a delineation of planetary rulership to the signs. For instance, if Mercury is in Libra, its disposition is Venus, if Venus is in turn in Sagittarius, its disposition is Jupiter, and if Jupiter is Cancer its disposition is the Moon. This process continues until there is a final disposition (sign in its rulership) or it circles in a never-ending chain of command.

Usage
Classical astrologers whose methods are rooted in traditional methods do not use any of the outer planets not recognized by the ancients as the rulers of any of the 12 signs, preferring the traditional rulership scheme.

On the other hand, most modern, psychologically-oriented astrologers do use the outer planets as ruling planets of those particular three signs listed above. Others also use ancient rulers while using modern planets as the co-ruler of those signs.

Other astrologers do not use any of the planets as sign rulers (Cosmobiologists, Uranian astrologers, Hamburg School of Astrology, other groups/individuals), preferring to focus more on the astrological aspects and other portions of the horoscope instead that lend themselves more easily to empirical study.

Most astrologers practicing Vedic astrology (Jyotish) only use the traditional rulership system.

title: Domicile (astrology)


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Natalia Potocka

Natalia Potocka Sanguszkowa (19 March 1807 – 17 November 1830) was a member of the prominent Polish noble Potocki family and the daughter of Anna Tyszkiewicz and Aleksander Stanisław Potocki. Natolin Park and Palace in Warsaw were named after her.

On 14 May 1829, in Warsaw, Natalia married Prince Roman Sanguszko, the son of the vice-brigadier of the National Cavalry from Sławuta. They had a daughter, Maria Klementyna Sanguszko (1830-1903), who married Count Alfred Józef Potocki on 18 March 1851 in Sławuta.

Potocka was awarded the Order of the Starry Cross. Shortly after Natalia's birth, the Potocki family renamed their estate (Bażantarnia) to Natolin in her honor, which today is a residential neighborhood in Warsaw's Ursynów. Natalia died a year after her marriage and a few months after giving birth to her daughter. Her monument-sarcophagus, created by Ludwik Kauffmann and funded by Natalia's father, Aleksander Stanisław Potocki, between 1834 and 1838, is located in the Natolin Park.

title: Natalia Potocka


text: User talk:194.129.67.171

title: User talk:194.129.67.171


text:
Talk:William Prescott

Place of Birth
Just noticed the article mentions he was born in Prescott, Arizona. This is clearly wrong. Can someone fix it? 165.83.133.248 (talk) 20:13, 22 September 2022 (UTC)

title: Talk:William Prescott


text:
Yoanna House

Yoanna House (born April 9, 1980) is an American fashion model and television host, best known as the winner of Cycle 2 of America's Next Top Model.

Biography
House was born and raised in Jacksonville, Florida. House's father, a medical doctor, is from Canada and her mother is from Mexico. From early childhood, House showed great interest in fashion, which she claims was spurred by her grandmother, saying:

"I was always in her closet. We would watch TV, read magazines, go to the mall. She taught me about couture and how important it was. A lot of my appreciation came from her."

After graduating from Bishop Kenny High School in 1998, House attended the University of North Florida, majoring in international relations and Asian studies. House speaks fluent Japanese as well as Spanish (which she spoke from a young age). Around this time, House also began to pursue a career in fashion modeling, but claimed she found her options limited because she was overweight. She says she eventually lost 45 pounds after changing her diet and adopting an exercise plan.

She lives in Jacksonville with her son.

Career
House was the winner of Cycle 2 of America's Next Top Model. After Top Model, she signed with IMG Models. House made her debut as a runway model at the Mercedes-Benz Fashion Week in 2004, walking for fashion designers Petro Zillia, Custo Barcelona, Sue Wong, and John Sakalis. She took part in a promotional runway show for America's Next Top Model Obsessed which premiered on Oxygen. Her most visible modeling assignments immediately after her win include a commercial for the Declare Yourself voting campaign, a cover story for Psychology Today magazine., spread in Hannah Anderson, Jane, Look for Less Ads, Metro Style, Careline, Jacksonville magazine (cover and spread), and Sue Wong (2005 line). She became host of The Look for Less in 2005, replacing Elisabeth Hasselbeck.

The following year, she was named "the face" of The CW network and appeared in commercials and web advertisements for the fledgling network. In overseas projects, she signed with Danish modeling agency 1st Opinion Model Management and won a contract with Careline, an Israeli cosmetics company. She appeared in a commercial for make-up brand Sheer Cover, Leeza Gibbons's make-up line, along with Cycle 4 winner of America's Next Top Model Naima Mora.

In the summer of 2008, House hosted The N's reality series Queen Bees, which attempts to reform mean girls. She filmed a PSA for Declare Yourself, parodying a lipstick commercial.

title: Yoanna House


text:
User:Crooow

Pages started: Batman serials

Please join WikiProject Comics.

More later.

title: User:Crooow


text:
User talk:199.247.128.250

September 2018
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October 2021
Hello, I'm Materialscientist. I wanted to let you know that I reverted one of your recent contributions—specifically this edit to Longship—because it did not appear constructive. If you would like to experiment, please use the sandbox. If you have any questions, you can ask for assistance at the Help desk. Thanks. Materialscientist (talk) 16:53, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

November 2021
Hello, I'm Materialscientist. I wanted to let you know that I reverted one of your recent contributions—specifically this edit to Québécois nation motion—because it did not appear constructive. If you would like to experiment, please use the sandbox. If you have any questions, you can ask for assistance at the Help desk. Thanks. Materialscientist (talk) 16:22, 3 November 2021 (UTC)

title: User talk:199.247.128.250


text:
Embedded liberalism

Embedded liberalism is a term in international political economy for the global economic system and the associated international political orientation as they existed from the end of World War II to the 1970s. The system was set up to support a combination of free trade with the freedom for states to enhance their provision of welfare and to regulate their economies to reduce unemployment. The term was first used by the American political scientist John Ruggie in 1982.

Mainstream scholars generally describe embedded liberalism as involving a compromise between two desirable but partially conflicting objectives. The first objective was to revive free trade. Before World War I, international trade formed a large portion of global GDP, but the classical liberal order which supported it had been damaged by war and by the Great Depression of the 1930s. The second objective was to allow national governments the freedom to provide generous welfare programmes and to intervene in their economies to maintain full employment. This second objective was considered to be incompatible with a full return to the free market system as it had existed in the late 19th century—mainly because with a free market in international capital, investors could easily withdraw money from nations that tried to implement interventionist and redistributive policies.

The resulting compromise was embodied in the Bretton Woods system, which was launched at the end of World War II. The system was liberal in that it aimed to set up an open system of international trade in goods and services, facilitated by semi-fixed exchange rates. Yet it also aimed to embed market forces into a framework where they could be regulated by national governments, with states able to control international capital flows by means of capital controls, as well as engage in state-led development strategies, short-term IMF borrowing, and exchange rate adjustments. New global multilateral institutions were created to support the new framework, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

When Ruggie coined the phrase embedded liberalism, he was building on earlier work by Karl Polanyi, who had introduced the concept of markets becoming disembedded from society during the 19th century. Polanyi went on to propose that the reembedding of markets would be a central task for the architects of the post war world order and this was largely enacted as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference. In the 1950s and 1960s, the global economy prospered under embedded liberalism, with growth more rapid than before or since, yet the system was to break down in the 1970s. Ruggie's work on embedded liberalism rebutted hegemonic stability theory (the notion that a hegemon is necessary to sustain multilateral cooperation) by arguing that the international order was not just maintained through material power, but "with legitimate social purpose."

Embedded markets: all periods up to 1834
Karl Polanyi argues that until the rise of 19th-century liberalism markets, where they had existed at all, were always and everywhere embedded in society, subject to various social, religious and political controls. The forms of these controls varied widely, for example in India occupations were for centuries determined by caste, rather than market forces. During the Middle Ages, physical markets in Europe were generally heavily regulated, with many towns only permitting larger markets (then known as fayres) to open once or twice a year.

Polanyi explicitly refutes Adam Smith's statement that natural man has a "propensity to barter, truck and exchange", arguing that anthropology and economic history shows that until the 19th century markets had only a marginal role in the economy, with by far the most important methods governing the distribution of resources being reciprocal gift giving, centralised redistribution and autarky (self-sufficient households). While Polanyi concedes that European society was beginning to develop towards modern capitalism from as early as the 14th century, especially after the Glorious Revolution and the commencement of the Industrial Revolution, he contends that it was not until 1834 that the establishment of truly free markets became possible. Polanyi calls this disembedding of markets from society a "singular departure" from anything that had happened before in human history. Prior to the 19th century, international trade was very low in proportion to global GDP.

Classical liberalism: disembedded markets, 1834–1930s
According to Polanyi, a key event of 1834 which allowed the formation of free markets to take place in Great Britain (the worlds foremost economy at the time) was the abolition of outdoor relief which followed the seizure of political power by the middle classes in 1832. With the unemployed poor unable to get any form of financial help except by entering workhouses and with workhouses made much more oppressive than they had been before, the unemployed would tend to go to any lengths to obtain work, which established a free market in labour. Polanyi concedes that during the 19th century the free market helped deliver unprecedented material progress. He also contends it caused enormous hardship to wide sections of the population as seemingly paradoxically a rapid general increase in prosperity was accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of paupers. To some extent, this phenomenon had been under way in both Europe and Great Britain from the dawn of the Agricultural Revolution, accelerating with the Industrial Revolution in mid-18th century, but it became more acute after 1834.

In both Britain and Europe, labour movements and other forms of resistance arose almost immediately, though they had little sustained effect on mainstream politics until the 1880s. In Britain, although tens of thousands starved to death or were forced into workhouses and prostitution, social unrest was relatively low as on the whole even the working class were quick to benefit from the increasing prosperity. In part, this was due to Britain's early adoption of the free market and her lead in the Industrial Revolution. On continental Europe, unrest erupted in the Protests of 1848, after which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels launched their Communist Manifesto, although this did not have any great immediate effect. For the most part, from 1834 until the 1870s free market ideology enjoyed almost unchallenged ascendancy in Great Britain and was expanding its influence abroad. In 1848, Lord Macaulay published his The History of England. Though Macaulay was mainly looking back at the 17th century, he also anticipated the enduring triumph of free market liberalism.

By the 1880s, various labour market protections had been enacted, causing Herbert Spencer, at the time perhaps the world's most prominent advocate of economic liberalism, to raise the alarm at the rising power of socialism. Polanyi explained this in terms of a double movement for the dialectical process of marketization along with an opposing push for social protection against that marketization. During the late 19th and early 20th century, in the field of politics, labour relations and trade free market supporters suffered further set backs with intellectual and the moral attacks from an informal networks of progressive reformers. This included groups like the Fabians; individuals such as Keir Hardie and Pope Leo XIII with his social encyclical Rerum novarum; and national leaders like Otto von Bismarck and David Lloyd George, who both introduced early precursors of the welfare state. In the United States, this period has been labelled the Progressive Era. Other developments not necessarily associated with the progressive movement yet still opposed to the free market, included various countries such as the United States significantly increasing their trade tariffs. In contrast, within mainstream academia and the practice of international finance free market thinking remained largely ascendant until the 1930s. Although the gold standard had been suspended by World War I, international financiers were largely successful in re-establishing it in the 1920s. It was not until the crisis of 1931 that Britain decided to leave the gold standard, with the United States following in 1933. By the mid-1930s, the global liberal economic order had collapsed, with the old, highly integrated trading system replaced by a number of closed economic blocks. Similarly, in mainstream economics free market thinking was undermined in the 1930s by the success of the New Deal and by the Keynesian Revolution. After a transition period and World War II, embedded liberalism emerged as the dominant economic system.

Embedded liberalism: 1945–1970s
Mainstream scholars such as John Ruggie tend to see embedded liberalism as a compromise between the desire to retain as many as possible of the advantages from the previous era's free market system while also allowing states to have the autonomy to pursue interventionist and welfare based domestic policies. Anticipating the trilemma that would later be formulated as the impossible trinity, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White argued that freedom of movement for capital conflicted both with nation state's freedom to pursue economic policies based on their domestic circumstances and also with the semi-fixed exchange rate system that was widely agreed to be important to maximise international trade in goods and services. As such, it was widely agreed that states would be free to enact capital controls, which would help them simultaneously maintain both fixed exchange rates and, if desired, expansionary domestic policies. During the 1950s and 1960s, embedded liberalism and Keynesian economics were so popular that conservative politicians found they had to largely adopt them if they were to have a chance of getting elected. This was especially the case in Britain and was called the post-war consensus, with a similar though somewhat less Keynesian consensus existing elsewhere, including in the United States.

Marxist scholars tend to broadly agree with the mainstream view, though they emphasise embedded liberalism as a compromise between class interests, rather than between different desirable yet partially incompatible objectives. David Harvey argues that at the end of World War II the primary objective was to develop an economic plan that would not lead to a repeat of the Great Depression during the 1930s. Harvey states:

To ensure domestic peace and tranquility, some sort of class compromise between capital and labor had to be constructed. The thinking at the time is perhaps best represented by an influential text by two eminent social scientists, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, published in 1953. Both capitalism and communism in their raw forms had failed, they argued. The only way ahead was to construct the right blend of state, market, and democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-being, and stability.

Harvey notes that under this new system free trade was regulated "under a system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the US dollar's convertibility into gold at a fixed price. Fixed exchange rates were incompatible with free flows of capital". In addition, there was a worldwide acceptance that "the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends". He also states that this new system came to be referred to as embedded liberalism in order to "signal how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy".

In 1960, Daniel Bell published The End of Ideology, where he celebrated what he anticipated to be an enduring change, with extreme free market thinking permanently relegated to the fringe. However, Harvey argues that while embedded liberalism led to the surge of economic prosperity which came to define the 1950s and 1960s, the system began to crack beginning in the late 1960s. The 1970s were defined by an increased accumulation of capital, unemployment, inflation (or stagflation as it was dubbed) and a variety of fiscal crises. He notes that "the embedded liberalism that had delivered high rates of growth to at least the advanced capitalist countries after 1945 was clearly exhausted and no longer working". A number of theories concerning new systems began to develop, which led to extensive debate between those who advocated "social democracy and central planning on the one hand" and those "concerned with liberating corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms on the other". Harvey notes that by 1980 the latter group had emerged as the leader, advocating and creating a global economic system that would become known as neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism: redisembedded markets, 1981–2009
After the transition period of the 1970s, the neoliberal era is commonly said to have begun at about 1980. Also referred to by economic historians as the Washington Consensus era, its emergence was marked by the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States. While there was no attempt to revive the previous system of fixed exchange rates on a global scale, neoliberalism upheld a similar commitment to free trade as had the previous era. Similar to the era of classical economic liberalism, neoliberalism involved the disembedding of markets. At a policy level, some of the main changes involved pressure for governments to abolish their capital controls and to refrain from economic interventions. However, many of the institutions established in the previous era remained in place and free market ideology never became as influential as it had been during the peak years of classical liberalism. In a 1997 paper, Ruggie himself discussed how some of the protection gained for workers with the embedded liberal compromise still lived on, though he warned it was being eroded by the advance of market forces.

In Britain and the United States, domestic free market reforms were pursued most aggressively from about 1980–1985. Yet from a global perspective, the peak years of neoliberal influence were the 1990s. After the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was an acceleration of the pace at which countries throughout the world chose or were coerced into implementing free market reforms. In 1992, political scientist Francis Fukuyama suggested that free-market capitalism coupled with liberal democracy may be a stable end point in human social evolution in the End of History and the Last Man. Yet by 1999, various adverse economic events, most especially the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the harsh response by the International Monetary Fund had already caused free-market policies to be at least partially discredited in the eyes of developing world policy makers, especially in Asia and South America.

Post-Washington Consensus: mixed liberalisms, 2009–present
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, several journalists, politicians and senior officials from global institutions such as the World Bank began saying that the Washington Consensus was over. As part of the 2008–2009 Keynesian resurgence, it briefly appeared that there might be a prospect of a return to embedded liberalism—there had been an upsurge in global collaboration by the world's policy makers, with several heads of state calling for a "New Bretton Woods". Yet by 2010, the short lived consensus for a return to Keynesian policy had fractured. Economic historian Robert Skidelsky suggested it was too soon to identify the characteristics of the new global economic order and it may be that no single order will emerge. For instance, with the rise of the BRICs and other emerging economies, there is less scope for a single power to effectively set the rules for the rest of the world.

As of late 2011, there had been some trends consistent with a move away from economic liberalism, including a growing acceptance for a return to the use of capital controls, macroprudential regulation and state capitalism. On the other hand, China has been progressively liberating its capital account well into 2012 while in the United States the Tea Party movement emerged as a powerful political force, with members who appear to be committed to a purer vision of the free market than has existed since the peak of classical liberalism in the 1840s. In 2011, professor Kevin Gallagher suggested that rather than being largely governed by a single ideology as had been the case for the previous eras, the newly emerging global order is influenced by "varieties of liberalism". However, George Monbiot said in 2013 that neoliberalism remained an influential ideology.

According to Edward Mansfield and Nita Rudra, the digital revolution has undermined embedded liberalism by facilitating a spread in global supply chains, facilitating automation, connecting capital in the developed world with labor in the developing world, and strengthening multinational corporations.

title: Embedded liberalism


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Grandma (disambiguation)

A grandma is a female grandparent.

Grandma may also refer to:

 * Grandma (album), by Unique, 2018
 * Grandma (comic strip), a 1947–1969 strip by Charles Kuhn
 * Grandma (1979 film) or La Nona, an Argentine comedy drama film
 * Grandma (2015 film), a comedy-drama film by Paul Weitz
 * Grandma (2022 film), an Indian Tamil-language thriller film
 * Khonnor or Grandma (born 1986), American electronic musician
 * "Grandma", a song by ASAP Ferg from Always Strive and Prosper, 2016

title: Grandma (disambiguation)


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Honda Z

The Honda Z (marketed also as the Z600) is a two-door hatchback kei car/city car manufactured and marketed by the Honda Motor Company, from 1970 until 1974. Exports mostly ended after 1972, when the domestic market models received redesigned pillarless bodywork.

Honda subsequently marketed a kei-class SUV from 1998 to 2003, bearing no relation to the first 'Z', but bearing the same nameplate.

1970–1974
The two-door Honda Z debuted in October 1970 and was marketed until 1973 in most countries. American sales (only with the larger 598 cc engine) lasted for model years 1970 through 1972, ending prior to the 1973 introduction of the Civic. Marketed as the "sport coupé" version of the N600, the two were sold side by side at American motorcycle dealerships until the first stand-alone automobile dealers opened to market the Civic. Total production was 40,586 units.

In certain countries, such as the US, the Z600 name simply reflected the engine's size of 598 cc. The smaller-engined Honda Z360 was available in Japan (and other markets, such as Australia) with a 354 cc twin. In the UK they came only in 600 cc form and were called simply "Honda Z" with no mention of the engine size in the name.

As with all cars in the kei class, the Z360's specifications were tightly governed. The Z360 originally featured an air-cooled, 354 cc, two-cylinder SOHC engine with a four- or five-speed transmission driving the front wheels. Outputs were 31 PS at 8,500 rpm for the Act and Pro versions, and 36 PS at 9,000 rpm for the sportier TS and GS models. The Z600 model's 598 cc SOHC engine was rated at 36 PS. In December 1971, the Z360 received a facelift and a water-cooled engine, it also produced 36 PS at 9,000 rpm. Only a month later, the 31 PS engine used in the lower spec variants (Standard, Deluxe, Automatic, Custom) also became water-cooled. The engine's technical achievements reflected influences from Honda's larger, 1.3 L, air-cooled four-cylinder used in the Honda 1300 coupe and sedan.

The Z featured coil sprung and independent front suspension and leaf springs on a beam axle rear suspension. The interior accommodated two adults, with a very small rear seat. A rear glass hatch with a black plastic surround opened to a shallow cargo area. Below the cargo area a compartment, accessible via a lid beneath the number plate, held the spare wheel and tools. Later versions, after a November 1972 facelift, deleted the extra lid and also moved the license plate down to the position it vacated. These also received the new EA engine of 356 cc, now only available in a more powerful, 36 PS version. Production ended in 1974, after the new Civic had arrived and the oil crisis had diminished the market for "fun" cars.

Europe
In Europe only the Z600 was marketed, as the Z360 had been considered underpowered. 918 cars were sold in Europe, most of them in France and Switzerland. A large number of these cars found their way to Germany (where it had not been marketed), where the engines were downsleeved to 242 cc in order to fit a particular "Class IV" category of driver's licenses which did not require an exam. These models first appeared in 1969 after the last 250 cc car in regular production, the Goggomobil 250, had been discontinued. The engine offered from 12.5 to 14 PS and provided a top speed of 85 km/h.

1998–2002
The Honda Z was a retro-styled subcompact (656 cc) SUV by Honda Motor Company, introduced in 1998 at Honda Primo Japanese dealerships, and discontinued in autumn 2002. It was a two-door version of the Honda Life with the engine installed in the center of the vehicle.

Launched on October 9, 1998, the PA1 Honda Z was manufactured for Honda by Yachiyo Industry Co, a Honda subsidiary manufacturing light trucks. The basic structure of the Z, including its midship-mounted engine placement and 4WD drivetrain was shared with its Honda Acty sibling. Unlike the Acty though, it was a four-seater passenger car which also meant that it had to pass passenger car safety standards. The 656 cc E07Z three-cylinder engine was available in a naturally aspirated as well as in a turbocharged variant. The Z was only ever available with a four-speed automatic transmission, the same that was used on the EF Honda Civics. The centrally mounted engine was placed in an upright position underneath the rear seat, a layout called "UM-4" (stands for Under Midship 4WD) by Honda. Engine oil changes and minor maintenance work is done through an interior door. As with other mid-engined, four-wheel-drive vehicles, such as the Lamborghini Diablo VT, a viscous center differential was used. Some noteworthy and unusual design features of the Z included the comparatively large-diameter tires, chunky "grip-style" door handles, and the adoption of perspex double-cover headlights.

While the Honda Capa was the first car in the "J-Mover" series, the third generation Life and new Honda Z made up the "K-Mover" series. Famous rock group ZZ Top made the introductory commercial, including a song and video ("ZZ Top on the Z"). Since the car's name has always been pronounced "zed" (ゼット) by Honda, in the British fashion, the Americans in ZZ Top had to follow suit.

In June 2000 a special "Super Emotion" package appeared, with body-colored bumpers, CD player with speakers and tinted glass for a small extra cost. This proved so popular that body-colored bumpers were soon made standard on turbo models. In August 2002, with stricter exhaust emission about to take effect, Honda ended production of the Z. This was to be Honda's first and last SUV Kei-car. Honda also sold a side-mounted step and wheel-arch protector, but these were only for after-market fitment as they made the car too wide for kei regulations and were not crash tested. The naturally aspirated version had 52 PS at 7,000 rpm, while the turbocharged and intercooled version pushed out 64 PS at 6,000 rpm. The engine had four valves per cylinder, Honda's PGM-FI fuel injection system, and were classified as LEVs.

Land speed record
On August 19, 2008, a 1971 Z600 coupe named Evil Tweety set a new speed record for stock body production cars with 750 cc engines at 167.336 km/h, with a stock 600 engine bored to 700 cc. The record was set by Eric Burns at the Bonneville Salt Flats. The next day Chris Clay took "Evil Tweety" to a new record for altered gas cars with 750 cc engines at 171.445 km/h These records were beaten three years later, the production car record by a Saab 96.

title: Honda Z


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Category:Heirs apparent

People who held the title or position of an heir apparent, a person who is first in a line of succession and cannot be displaced from inheriting by the birth of another person.

title: Category:Heirs apparent