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Talk:Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Garden

Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment
This article is or was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Sikkemjs, Heckerea.

Above undated message substituted from Template:Dashboard.wikiedu.org assignment by PrimeBOT (talk) 17:42, 16 January 2022 (UTC)

2016 Gorilla Incident?
This seems misleading at a glance given the scope of the response to this incident. I think it should read "2016 Harambe Incident" or "2016 Harambe the Gorilla Incident" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Somewordswrittendown (talk • contribs) 20:21, 4 June 2020 (UTC)

Moved Susie
In order to better organize the history section, I moved the paragraph about Susie into an entire new subsection about Susie. It just seemed like the paragraph was substantial enough to stand on its own and didnt really seem to fit in the history section. Sikkemjs (talk) 16:43, 7 November 2018 (UTC)

Lead and possible changes
Hello all, I recently rewrote the lead section. I tried to reorganize the basic info and decided to remove some of the facts that did not seem to belong in the lead section (also because none of them had any sources). I am new to wikipedia, so please revise or change it back if needed.

In regards to the rest of the article, I think the history section could be better organized. I think we could take many of the facts (either about conservation or specific exhibits) that are miscellaneously throughout the section and move them into specific sub-sections under the animals and exhibits section or the CREW section.

I agree with Heckerea in saying that I think the Animals and exhibits sections needs to be reorganized. Possibly take the long list of animals, put it in a separate page and add a link at the bottom of the article. I was looking at the Phoenix Zoo wiki article page (which is rated Good-Article) and I think it might be helpful to take the basic model of that article and use it for this one (especially in regards to the animals and exhibits section). But all in all I do not think having a large list of every animal in the zoo is the best way to organize the information.

Sikkemjs (talk) 18:06, 30 October 2018 (UTC)

update: I just rewrote and reorganized the first half of the history section. I removed some random facts that seems out of place. If you read it and think that the old version does a better job, feel free to change it back. I think for the rest of the history section, maybe the paragraph about Susie can be removed and placed somewhere else, I just do not know if it belongs there. I still think the second half of the section needs to be reorganized and added to, especially concerning a general look at the modern history. Thanks Sikkemjs (talk) 20:34, 4 November 2018 (UTC)

Expansion plans - "More Home To Roam" campaign
The Cincinnati Zoo and Botanical Garden currently have a campaign running called the "More Home to Roam" campaign that has an end goal of expanding the zoo's size with the addition of new exhibits. I feel like this could warrant a new section outlining their plan. As a Wikipedia novice, I figured it best to suggest it first before making any edits. The entire campaign is estimated to cost 150 million, and the zoo recently received a 50 million dollar donation towards their goal.

The new additions that are planned include Roo Valley and a beer garden in 2020, Rhino Reserve and a new parking garage in 2023, and Elephant Trek in 2025. In addition to these new attractions, the campaign is also designed to help the zoo become net zero in regards to waste, water, and energy, a goal that they have had for a long time.

Heckerea (talk) 19:44, 7 October 2018 (UTC)

Reverted change by Animalparty
If you look at other Wikipedia pages for zoos across the United States, a large majority of them have a detailed list of their exhibits and the animals within them. I would argue that this is relevant information, as potential patrons of the zoo may want to know what they can look forward to. Additionally, someone doing research may want to know that information.

Overall, I do not think that the information itself is an issue. I do, however, think that it could be organized better to make it easier to read.

Heckerea (talk) 19:05, 28 October 2018 (UTC)

Recent Changes
Unfortunately, I forgot to attach a comment to my recent edits. I will not forget in again in the future. As such, I would like to explain my changes.

I added a new section covering the Zoo's planned expansion in the coming years. I kept it short and to the point, hopefully covering all that needs covered.

Additionally, I tried to clean up how the animal list was presented to save space. I am not fully satisfied with how it looks. I feel like the scientific names of each animal could be dropped in favor of a cleaner look, and limiting the list to three or four columns of equal width seems much cleaner as well. I will attempt to make these changes soo.

Please let me know if anything looks off. Thanks!

Heckerea (talk) 00:37, 6 November 2018 (UTC)

Murderous Elephant "exiled" to Cincinnati Zoo -- kills several more trainers -- before receiving death penalty
Well, I just made up that sensationalist headline to catch your attention. However, it's basically true according to this article. Where should we put the non-sensationalist WP:NPOV version of the events? --David Tornheim (talk) 17:24, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Errors with the Africa exhibit section?
I do not feel confident enough in my skills as a researcher and writer to fix what i believe to be errors with the Africa section. It claims that painted dogs were added in phase I and II, yet the source that talks about phase III includes the painted dogs and bat eared foxes. in fact its states that phase I and II included "an expanded yard for the Maasai giraffe, a new greater flamingo exhibit, and a new and improved Cheetah Encounter" and thats it? can someone possibly look into this more? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Bellescc (talk • contribs) 15:06, 21 January 2020 (UTC)

"The Sexiest Zoo in America" listed at Redirects for discussion
An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect The Sexiest Zoo in America and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. Integer Sequences (talk | contribs) 04:54, 25 January 2023 (UTC)

Ranking among the oldest zoos in the United States
No way this is the second oldest; Central Park and Lincoln Park are both older. –Skywatcher68 (talk) 20:28, 7 April 2023 (UTC)


text:
Talk:Ford Escape

Forums
I'm buying a 2003 Ford Escape and wonder whether someone can point me to exising Internet forums or bulletin boards used by Escape owners. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 205.145.64.64 (talk) 13:20, 22 April 2005
 * I do not know of any internet forums for the conventional Ford Escape, but for the Hybrid try the yahoo group Ford Escape Hybrid. mattmccool 01:54, 12 October 2005 (CST)
 * On the contrary, check Escape Central's forums. raekwon 19:08, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

Expand
This article is almost entirely about the Escape Hybrid. Anyone able to expand this to include the main line? raekwon 00:53, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

De-merged
I've un-merged this article from Ford Escape Hybrid. The articles were merged only three days after the merger was first proposed, and with no discussion. raekwon 23:35, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

"Similar" vehicles
i think the "similar vehicles" section could be fixed...there is a glorified minivan and a 7 seat midsize crossover listed...only the chevrolet seems to be an actual "similar vehicle" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.173.74.195 (talk) 05:22, 6 November 2005

Popularity
Not popular in all markets. I am changing this as the Escape has not proved popular in all markets it is sold in. In the UK it sold so poorly that it was taken off the market a few years ago. Here in Australia, the Escape is 8th place in the compact SUV segment. Davez621 09:59, 25 June 2006 (UTC)

Crossover?
Is this a crossover or a compact SUV? Since the Escape is not derived from an existing sedan, per crossover (automobile) it is not a crossover. Further thoughts, anyone? --Sable232 (talk) 16:21, 7 June 2009 (UTC)
 * The article says crossover, as does the article for its platform. IMO it's a regular SUV, but then, it's not based off any existing truck platform either.  Personally, I think the term "crossover" is overused, and that many new unibody models can be considered just SUVs. --Vossanova o< 18:16, 21 July 2009 (UTC)
 * It's a crossover SUV, not a real SUV. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.65.224.246 (talk) 20:55, 28 July 2009 (UTC)
 * Real. It's a compact SUV. --Tomcha (talk) 21:02, 28 July 2009 (UTC)
 * Says which reliable source? Ford has referred to it as an SUV since its inception - check http://www.fordvehicles.com/suvs/escape/features/, for example. --Vossanova o< 21:07, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

just a few, what Ford's marketing department wants to call it isn't relevant to wikipedia, especially considering all other crossovers on wikipedia are referred to as crossovers
 * Intellichoice: http://media.ford.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=29872
 * Nada Guides: http://www.nadaguides.com/default.aspx?l=1&w=20&p=37&f=5634&m=1065&c=24&y=2009&d=18330&vt=new
 * Consumer Reports: http://blogs.consumerreports.org/cars/2007/07/ford-escape.html
 * AOL: http://autos.aol.com/gallery/fuel-saving-suv-alternatives#
 * JD Power: http://www.jdpower.com/autos/articles/Multi-activity-Vehicles-%28MAVs%29-on-the-2007-AEI
 * Kelly Blue Book: http://www.kbb.com/kbb/green-cars/Crossover.aspx
 * Edmunds: http://www.edmunds.com/ford/escape/2009/review.html

69.65.224.246 (talk) 21:21, 28 July 2009 (UTC)
 * Google delivery referred to as the Ford Escape compact SUV... --Tomcha (talk) 22:06, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

It is marketed by Ford as a traditional compact SUV, but it is technically a compact to mid-size crossover SUV because it is car-based. It is derived from the old mid-sized Mazda 626, which still makes it a crossover even though it is on a dated platform. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.28.48.35 (talk) 07:02, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

Funny, the Wikipedia article on crossovers refers to the Ford Escape as a Compact SUV specifically different from crossovers... Until recently, I've always seen it refered to as a Compact SUV and unlike most crossovers, it looks like an SUV and nothing like an SUV body on a car's frame. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.190.228.253 (talk) 22:08, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

MPG for FWD or 4WD?
I'm frustrated about determining the MPG for this vehicle (and for all vehicles with articles on the Wikipedia in general-- its something that should be in the specifications box).

In the case of the Escape, I cannot seem to find mileage numbers that show the mpg of each version of the car:

 * Conventional Front Wheel Drive
 * Conventional Four Wheel Drive
 * Hybrid Front Wheel Drive
 * Hybrid Four Wheel Drive

Does anyone know where I can find this information? I was tempted to call up a dealer but 1) they don't know anything and 2) I can't exactly create a tag around a conversation I took part in over the telephone. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Refractionsofthedawn (talk • contribs) 21:38, 5 August 2009 (UTC)

 * Try the EPA. --Sable232 (talk) 00:27, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

Environmental performance table
I have once again removed the crufty environmental performance table from this article. We have already had the same discussion at Talk:Toyota Camry Hybrid last year and the overriding consensus was not to include it. When this was brought up at WP:CARS, the consensus again was for this detailed fancruft to be excluded, as documented at WikiProject Automobiles/Conventions. If any editor(s) feel that this consensus is misguided, please bring this up at the WP:CARS talk page so it can be settled.

In this Escape article, the EPA figures are already mentioned in the text (for both the hybrid and non-hybrid). By including the table as well, all you have done is duplicated the exact same information, albeit twice, because the "annual fuel cost" figures are nothing more than a translated way of expressing miles per gallon. Also, there is a clear bias made when this table in included because it only takes the United States into consideration, excluding Canada (as usual) and all other markets that the Escape is sold in. Basically, it's all or none, and listing them all would be simply not be feasible. OSX (talk • contributions) 00:17, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

 * FYI this information is different from the Camry Hybrid (check the archive discussion) and the source is US DoE. I will be more than willing to open the discussion on WP:AUTOS, so if you agree, let's continue over there in order to have a broader participation. Since your rationale is wrong, I am reverting again, and waiting to see where do you want to continue the discussion to reach consensus.--Mariordo (talk) 06:08, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

 * FYI this information is almost the same as the Camry Hybrid (check the discussion). Both list MPG, annual fuel cost, and carbon footprint per ton. Okay, so they are not exact clones, but they are pretty similar. Since, WP:CARS has agreed by consensus that only government fuel economy figures should be included. Likewise, just about everyone except you attacked this type of tabular cruft at Talk:Toyota Camry Hybrid, so stop going against community consensus to fuel your crufty and point-of-view pushing edits. OSX (talk • contributions) 06:33, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Why are the main factors influencing city and highway driving not mentioned?
I notice in the article that the explanation for better city mileage vs. highway leaves out the most important factor, which is the influence of fluid friction (square law) on energy loss. In city driving, your average speed is less than highway. Fluid friction power losses are proportional to velocity squared. This means that fluid energy losses per mile are proportional to velocity. The primary fluid losses are to air resistance, tire resistance, and lubricant friction. 208.72.134.40 (talk) 21:42, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Is the "2nd generation" Escape really new?
I'm dubious as to whether one could call the 2nd generation Escape a truly new vehicle. The platform, wheelbase, and all external glass/windows, roof, and some panels are the same as the first generation model. Basically, only the sheetmetal (but not the roof or glass), and engines and transmissions are new. In my books, this is a major facelift, and not a new generation.Davez621 (talk) 13:13, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
 * Shouldn't a "Major Facelift" qualify as a new generation? To the average reader, the amount of cosmetic and mechanical changes completely changes the resemblance of the vehicle, and most people don't even know that the second generation even has anything to do with the first.  A vehicle doesn't have ti be completely overhauled to get a new generation.  Bookster451 (talk) 17:57, 8 October 2012 (UTC)

As an owner of a 2006 "first generation" Escape, I have to agree with Dave. I wouldn't even call the changes of the "second generation" a "major" facelift. I'll admit to not having looked at the interior, but I've commented numerous times (in private conversation, that is) on how LITTLE the newer Escapes differ from mine. I would think a "generational" change would at least include a new platform, not just SOME new sheet metal. MHO, for what it's worth. Jororo05 (talk) 22:10, 17 December 2013 (UTC)

Contested deletion
This page should not be speedily deleted because... (Long existing article, reason given is untrue) -- Sea photo Talk 03:05, 16 May 2014 (UTC)
 * Ignore the CSD, it is a sockpuppet of User:Altimgamr and the CSD now gone. Bahooka (talk) 03:07, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

Mariner Merger proposal
I, propose the Mercury Mariner article be merged with Ford Escape. The Mariner is a rebadged Ford Escape. VX1NG (talk) 15:51, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

 * Support merger as per VX1NG. There is no significant difference between the two car except the different front styling and different trimmings. OSX (talk • contributions) 00:48, 20 June 2014 (UTC)

 * Support merger. I agree with OSX. The Mariner is a rebadged Ford Escape and they are very similar except for styling.--67.54.191.225 (talk) 15:44, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

 * Merge completed. OSX (talk • contributions) 04:14, 26 June 2014 (UTC)

Maverick or Escape?
In the first picture on the Escape page, since that is a Euro-market Escape, I believe it to be a Maverick. Someone may want to double-check that and edit it, as I'm not sure how to edit it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 100.16.21.81 (talk • contribs) 02:53, 5 January 2016 (UTC)

 * The first image is Australian specification, and is correctly labelled as "Escape". OSX (talk • contributions) 04:08, 5 January 2016 (UTC)

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Proposed merge with Mazda Tribute
These two articles were merged a long time ago but Mazda Tribute was recently restored. Does it merit its own article or should it be left as a redirect to Ford Escape? Fyddlestix (talk) 14:37, 26 November 2017 (UTC)
 * Merge. Both the Mercury Mariner and Tribute articles should be merged into here. They are just rebadged variants of the Escape and are not notable enough on their own to have separate articles. Reattacollector (talk) 19:40, 8 April 2018 (UTC)
 * Keep. Though mechanically similar, its distinct history (marketing and other business decisions) qualifies it to merit its own article. Dh2 (talk) 02:34, 6 August 2018 (UTC)

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Where do we list the $100 million in damages?
Which section does this go under?

https://jalopnik.com/how-one-suv-fire-destroyed-45-million-in-cars-damaged-1826086012

Hcobb (talk) 14:41, 29 May 2018 (UTC)

I3??
Does the 2020 escape really have a 1.5 i3 or is it a 1.5 i4? As the 2019 model uses a 1.5 i4 Cvxs (talk) 15:33, 9 April 2019 (UTC)

 * The 2020+ models indeed use a 1.5L 3-cylinder as the base model engine in the US. 69.14.23.138 (talk) 09:05, 5 December 2023 (UTC)

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:Ford Escape


text:
Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency (COIN, or NATO spelling counter-insurgency ) is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history. However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization.

During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win the hearts and minds of populations supporting the insurgency. Alternatively, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence.

Models
Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda, Psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.

To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate.

In The Insurgent Archipelago, John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency.

Santa Cruz de Marcenado
The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love".

B. H. Liddell Hart
Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as a prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time.

However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's army had no means of effectively combating the rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation.

Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been the sites of failed insurgencies.

Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off.

In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier.

According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces.

David Galula
David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War. His theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority.

Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency:

 * 1) The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
 * 2) Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
 * 3) Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.
 * 4) Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining the support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighboring area.

Galula contends that: "A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population."

With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:

"In a Selected Area

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.

2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.

3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.

4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.

5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.

7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants."

According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward."

Robert Thompson
Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for a successful counterinsurgency:

 * 1) The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable;
 * 2) The government must function in accordance with the law;
 * 3) The government must have an overall plan;
 * 4) The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrilla fighters;
 * 5) In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.

David Kilcullen

In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information:

"This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment."

Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because "unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest)."

The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions."

Martin van Creveld
Military historian Martin van Creveld, noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises:

"The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value."

In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether the child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary.

Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone the civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice." Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being a reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primer for Revolt:

"The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory."

Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from the few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods.

The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know the natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying the time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized.

General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures, the struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one.

If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use the second method exemplified by the Hama massacre. In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama, known to be the center of the resistance.

Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish the city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey the regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war.

Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli:
 * 1) There are situations in which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayal of the people who put you into power. When pressed to cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguise your intention and feign weakness until you strike.
 * 2) Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeated strikes will also endanger the morale of the counterinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit repeated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alcohol or drugs to force themselves to carry out orders and will inevitably lose their military edge, eventually turning into a danger to their commanders.
 * 3) Act as soon as possible. More lives will be saved by decisive action early, than by prolonging the insurgency. The longer you wait, the more inured the population will be to bloodshed, and the more barbaric your action will have to be to make an impression.
 * 4) Strike openly. Do not apologize, make excuses about "collateral damage", express regret, or promise investigations. Afterwards, make sure that as many people as possible know of your strike; the media is useful for this purpose, but be careful not to let them interview survivors and arouse sympathy.
 * 5) Do not command the strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to disown your commander and try another strategy. If it does work, present your commander to the world, explain what you have done and make certain that everyone understands that you are ready to strike again.

Lorenzo Zambernardi
In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice, a counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory, this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents.

According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing the third objective.

Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support.

Akali Omeni
Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at the margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria, Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain the institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield.

According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes,

"Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along the line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally, the military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from the military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested."

Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that the Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over the decades have tried a range of tactics.

Information-centric theory
Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University, and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at the University of Michigan. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT), or through signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Jeffrey Treistman
Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with the US Department of State as the Policy Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Salam al-Zaubai. In his book, When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy, he found little evidence to support the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency. “There is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective,” he argued.

In contrast to other COIN theorists, Treistman examined how the gross violation of international law and human rights affected war outcomes. He developed a theory of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy — the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians to defeat insurgents. He proposed that under certain conditions, genocide, rape, torture, repression, and other human rights violations could succeed in suppressing a rebellion. Treistman theorized that moderate levels of violence against civilians would not be effective in dissuading insurgents. But if counterinsurgents increased their lethality, cruelty, and violence against civilians it would successfully deter insurgents. “The overwhelming and brutal application of force against civilians,” he argued, “will squash domestic opposition.” Treistman thus proposed a convex function to model the relationship between barbarism and counterinsurgency outcomes. Moderate levels of repression are insufficient and counterproductive, but as a counterinsurgent increases the degree of lethality and repression it is more likely to defeat insurgents. “Widespread indiscriminate violence and political repression increase the odds of a government victory. As a result, bad states may sometimes defeat insurgencies.”

"Drain the sea" tactic

With regard to tactics, the terms "drain the sea" or "drain the water" involves the forced relocation or elimination of the civilian population ("water") to expose the rebels or insurgents ("fish"). In other words, relocation deprives the aforementioned of the support, cover, and resources of the local population. This is typically targeted in that it specifically targets the demographic that supports the insurgency in a limited area where insurgency is taking place, but is indiscriminate from an individual perspective. Examples of use of this technique in counterinsurgency include Bar Kokhba revolt, Second Anglo-Boer War, Greek Civil War, General Order No. 11 (1863) in the American Civil War, Rohingya conflict, and Xinjiang conflict.

"Draining the sea" can also be accomplished through genocide by killing the population blamed for the insurgency. During World War II, Nazi Germany's counterinsurgency (Bandenbekämpfung, lit. 'bandit fighting') became intertwined with the Final Solution. Indiscriminate violence also has a deterrent effect. Edward Luttwak stated, "A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades."

A downside of such methods of counterinsurgency is their severity may provoke increased resistance from the targeted population. In contemporary times, concerns about public opinion and international law can rule out counterinsurgency campaigns using indiscriminate violence.

Assassination of leaders
Assassination of leaders can be a successful counterinsurgency tactic.

Oil spot
The oil spot approach is the concentration of counterinsurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French colonial warfare and counterinsurgency strategy. The oil spot approach was later one of the justifications given in the Pentagon Papers for the Strategic Hamlet Program.

Cordon and search
Cordon and search is a military tactic, one of the basic counterinsurgency operations in which an area is cordoned off and premises are searched for weapons or insurgents. Other related operations are "Cordon and knock" and "Cordon and kick". "Cordon and search" is part of a new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible.

Air operations
Air power can play an important role in counterinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations:
 * Transportation in support of combatants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations;
 * Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
 * Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts;
 * Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets.

Public diplomacy
In General David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency Field Manual, one of the many tactics described to help win in counterinsurgency warfare involves the use of public diplomacy through military means. Counterinsurgency is effective when it is integrated "into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power," including public diplomacy. The goal of COIN operations is to render the insurgents as ineffective and non-influential, by having strong and secure relations with the population of the host nation.

An understanding of the host nation and the environment that the COIN operations will take place in is essential. Public diplomacy in COIN warfare is only effective when there is a clear understanding of the culture and population at hand. One of the largest factors needed for defeating an insurgency involves understanding the populace, how they interact with the insurgents, how they interact with non-government organizations in the area, and how they view the counterinsurgency operations themselves.

Ethics is a common public diplomacy aspect that is emphasized in COIN warfare. Insurgents win their war by attacking internal will and the international opposition. To combat these tactics, the counterinsurgency operations need to treat their prisoners and detainees humanely and according to American values and principles. By doing this, COIN operations show the host nation's population that they can be trusted and that they are concerned about the well-being of the population to be successful in warfare.

A population that expects the incumbent government to deliver public goods, services, and security frequently supports the counterinsurgency, and a major event that increases popular expectations of future public goods and service delivery can trigger a shift in public attitudes away from the insurgency and toward the counterinsurgency. "Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict and undermining the insurgency." These programs are essential in order to gain the support of the population. These programs are designed to make the local population feel secure, safe, and more aligned with the counterinsurgency efforts; this enables the citizens of the host nation to trust the goals and purposes of the counterinsurgency efforts, as opposed to the insurgents'. A counterinsurgency is a battle of ideas and the implementation and integration of these programs is important for success. Social, political and economic programs should be coordinated and administered by the host nation's leaders, as well. Successful COIN warfare allows the population to see that the counterinsurgency efforts are including the host nation in their re-building programs. The war is fought among the people and for the people between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.

A counterinsurgency is won by utilizing strategic communications and information operations successfully. A counterinsurgency is a competition of ideas, ideologies, and socio-political movements. In order to combat insurgent ideologies one must understand the values and characteristics of the ideology or religion. Additionally, counterinsurgency efforts need to understand the culture of which the insurgency resides, in order to strategically launch information and communication operations against the insurgent ideology or religion. Counterinsurgency information operatives need to also identify key audiences, communicators, and public leaders to know whom to influence and reach out to with their information.

Information operations
Public diplomacy in information operations can only be achieved by a complete understanding of the culture it is operating in. Counterinsurgency operations must be able to perceive the world from the locals' perspective. To develop a comprehensive cultural picture counterinsurgency efforts should invest in employing "media consultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, organizational network analysts, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines." Most importantly, counterinsurgency efforts need to be able to understand why the local population is drawn into the insurgent ideology, like what aspects are appealing and how insurgents use the information to draw their followers into the ideology. Counterinsurgency communication efforts need a baseline understanding of values, attitudes, and perceptions of the people in the area of operations to conduct successful public diplomacy to defeat the enemy.

Developing information and communication strategies involve providing a legitimate alternate ideology, improving security and economic opportunity, and strengthening family ties outside of the insurgency. In order to conduct public diplomacy through these means, counterinsurgency communication needs to match its deeds with its words. Information provided through public diplomacy during a counterinsurgency cannot lie, the information and communication to the people always have to be truthful and trustworthy in order to be effective at countering the insurgents. Public diplomacy in counterinsurgency to influence the public thoughts and ideas is a long time engagement and should not be done through negative campaigning about the enemy.

Conducting public diplomacy through relaying information and communicating with the public in a counterinsurgency is most successful when a conversation can happen between the counterinsurgency team and the local population of the area of operation. Building rapport with the public involves "listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive" which is sufficient for the local population to understand and trust the counterinsurgency efforts and vice versa. This relationship is stringent upon the counterinsurgents keeping their promises, providing security to the locals, and communicating their message directly and quickly in times of need.

Understanding and influencing the cognitive dimension of the local population is essential to winning counterinsurgency warfare. The people's perception of legitimacy about the host nation and the foreign country's counterinsurgency efforts is where success is determined. "The free flow of information present in all theaters via television, telephone, and Internet, can present conflicting messages and quickly defeat the intended effects." Coordination between the counterinsurgency operations, the host nation, and the local media in the information presented to the public is essential to showing and influencing how the local population perceives the counterinsurgency efforts and the host nation.

Public opinion, the media, and rumors influence how the people view counterinsurgency, the government hosting their efforts, and the host nation legitimacy. The use of public diplomacy to strategically relay the correct messages and information to the public is essential to success in a counterinsurgency operation. For example, close relationships with media members in the area is essential to ensure that the locals understand the counterinsurgency objectives and feel secure with the host nation government and the counterinsurgency efforts. If the local media is not in sync with the counterinsurgency operatives then they could spread incomplete or false information about the counterinsurgency campaign to the public.

"Given Al Qaeda's global reach, the United States must develop a more integrated strategic communication strategy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish violent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter, and defeat this social movement at its many levels." Information operations and communicative abilities are one of the largest and most influential aspects of public diplomacy within a counterinsurgency.

Public diplomacy is especially important as modern insurgents are more easily able to gain support through a variety of sources, both local and transnational, thanks to advances in increased communication and globalization. Consequently, modern counter-insurgency requires attention to be focused on an insurgency's ecosystem from the national to the local level, in order to deprive the insurgency of support and prevent future insurgent groups from forming.

Vietnam War
During the Vietnam War, counterinsurgency initially formed part of the earlier war as Diem had implemented the poorly-conceived Strategic Hamlet Program, a similar model to the Malayan Emergency that had the opposite effect by leading to increased recruitment to the Viet Cong. Similarly economic and rural development formed a key strategy as part of Rural Affairs development. While the earlier war was marked by considerable emphasis on counterinsurgency programs, the US Armed Forces initially relied on very little, if any, theoretical doctrine of counterinsurgency during the Ground-Intervention phase. Conventional warfare using massive firepower and the failure to implement adequate counterinsurgency had extremely negative effects, which was the strategy that the NVA adeptly used to countering by the protracted political and military warfare model. After the replacement of General William Westmoreland, newer concepts were tried including a revival of earlier COIN strategies including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The US and its allies later implemented the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong political infrastructure through capture, defection or assassination of Viet Cong members. The program was very successful at suppressing Viet Cong political and revolutionary activities.

Malaya
British forces used the relocation method with considerable success during the Malayan Emergency. The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications. Of that population, the British forces formed a "Home Guard", an armed resistance against the Malayan Communist Party, an implementation that was later mirrored by the Strategic Hamlet Program, which used by US forces in South Vietnam. Despite British claims of a victory in the Malayan Emergency, the military historian Martin van Creveld noted that the results of the counterinsurgency, the withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of an independent state, are identical to those of Aden, Kenya and Cyprus, which are not considered victories.

Dutch Empire
The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counterinsurgency warfare during the Aceh War by deploying light-armed Marechaussee units and using scorched-earth tactics.

In 1898 Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh, and with his lieutenant, who later became Dutch Prime Minister, Hendrikus Colijn, they finally conquered most of Aceh. They followed Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's suggestions of finding cooperative uleebalang or secular chiefs to support them in the countryside and to isolate the resistance from its rural support base.

During the South Sulawesi Campaign, Captain Raymond Westerling of the KST, Special Forces of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army used the Westerling Method. Westerling ordered the registration of all Javanese arriving in Makassar because of the large numbers of Javanese participating in the Sulawesi resistance. He also used scouts to infiltrate local villages and to identify members of the resistance.

Based on their information and that of the Dutch military intelligence service, the DST surrounded one of more suspected villages during night and drove the population to a central location. At daybreak, the operation began, often led by Westerling. Men would be separated from women and children. From the information gathered, Westerling exposed certain people as terrorists and murderers, who were shot without any further investigation. Afterwards, Westerling forced local communities to refrain from supporting guerillas by swearing on the Quran, and it established local self-defence units with some members recruited from former guerrillas deemed as "redeemable".

Westerling directed eleven operations throughout the campaign. He succeeded in eliminating the insurgency and undermining local support for the Republicans. His actions restored Dutch rule in southern Sulawesi. However, the Netherlands East Indies government and the Dutch Army command soon realised that Westerling's notoriety led to growing public criticism. In April 1947, the Dutch government instituted an official inquiry of his controversial methods. Westerling was put on the sidelines and was relieved of his duties in November 1948.

France
France had major counterinsurgency wars in its colonies in Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basic points of French doctrine as:
 * Quadrillage (an administrative grid of population and territory)
 * Ratissage (cordoning and "raking")
 * Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling a suspect population)
 * 'Tache d'huile' – The 'oil spot' strategy
 * Recruitment of local leaders and forces
 * Paramilitary organization and militias

Much of the thinking was informed by the work of earlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfare and counterinsurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni and Lyautey.

WMcClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor, Jules Cambon, as saying, "By destroying the administration and local government we were also suppressing our means of action.... The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no influence and in which movements take place which are unknown to us". Cambon's philosophy, however, did not seem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence(1954–1962).

Indochina
Post-war doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more drastic view of "Guerre Révolutionnaire", which presented an ideological and global war with a commitment to total war. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be both political and military: "No measure was too drastic to meet the new threat of revolution". French forces taking control from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate seriously with nationalist elements in what was to become Vietnam, which reaped the consequences of overconfidence at Điện Biên Phủ.

It occurred to various commanders that soldiers who were trained to operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense of how to fight guerrillas. Before the partition of French Indochina, French Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier, took on this role, drawing on French experience with the Jedburgh teams. GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laos under French intelligence, was complemented by Commandos Nord Viêt-Nam in the North. In those missions, the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Laotian, who became an officer, was Vang Pao, who was to become a general in Hmong and Laotian operations in Southeast Asia while the US forces increased their role.

Algeria
The French counterinsurgency in colonial Algeria was a savage one. The 1957 Battle of Algiers resulted in 24,000 detentions, with most tortured and an estimated 3,000 killed. It may have broken the National Liberation Front infrastructure in Algiers, but it also killed off French legitimacy as far as "hearts and minds" went.

Counterinsurgency requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure that is endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge. That contributes to the difficulty of foreign, as opposed to indigenous, powers in counterinsurgency operations.

One of France's most influential theorists was Roger Trinquier. The Modern Warfare counterinsurgency strategy, described by Trinquier, who had led anti-communist guerrillas in Indochina, was a strong influence on French efforts in Algeria.

Trinquier suggested three principles:
 * 1) separate the guerrilla from the population that supports it;
 * 2) occupy the zones from which the guerrillas previously operated, make the area dangerous for the insurgents and turn the people against the guerrilla movement; and
 * 3) co-ordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centres that could support him.

Trinquier's view was that torture had to be extremely focused and limited, but many French officers considered its use to be corrosive to their own side. There were strong protests among French leaders: the Army's most decorated officer, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, confronted General Jacques Massu, the commander of French forces in the Battle of Algiers, over orders institutionalizing torture, as "an unleashing of deplorable instincts which no longer knew any limits". He issued an open letter condemning the danger to the army of the loss of its moral values "under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency" and was imprisoned for sixty days.

As some of the French Army protested, others increased the intensity of their approach, which led to an attempted military coup against the French Fourth Republic itself. Massu and General Raoul Salan led a 1958 coup in Algiers to demand a new republic under Charles de Gaulle. When de Gaulle's policies toward Algeria, such as a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination, did not meet the expectations of the colonial officers, Salan formed the underground Organisation armée secrète (OAS), a right-wing terrorist group, whose actions included a 1962 assassination attempt against de Gaulle himself.

West Africa
France has had taken Barnett's Leviathan role in Chad and Ivory Coast, the latter on two occasions, most significantly in 2002–2003. The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had provoked UN peacekeepers.

Another noteworthy instance of counterinsurgency in West Africa is the Nigerian Armed Forces experience against the Boko Haram insurgency. Military operations against Boko Haram occur predominantly in the far northeast areas of Nigeria. The operations have been ongoing since June 2011 and have greatly expanded within the Lake Chad Basin sub-region of West Africa.

India
There have been many insurgencies in India since its independence in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, was brought under control by the Indian government and violence has been reduced. A branch of the Indian Army, known as the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), was created for the sole purpose of destroying the insurgency in Kashmir, and it has played a major role in doing so. The RR was well supported by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and state government police.

The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) is located in the northeastern town of Vairengte in the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam have attended this school.

Portugal
Portugal's experience in counterinsurgency resulted from the "pacification" campaigns conducted in the Portuguese African and Asian colonies in the late 19th century and the early 20th century.

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, Portugal conducted large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique against independentist guerrillas supported by the Eastern Bloc and China, as well by some Western countries. Although the campaigns are collectively known as the "Portuguese Colonial War", there were in fact three different ones: the Angolan Independence War, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence and the Mozambican War of Independence. The situation was unique in that small armed forces, those of Portugal, conducted three counterinsurgency wars at the same time in three different theatres of operations separated by thousands of kilometres. For those operations, Portugal developed its own counterinsurgency doctrine.

Russia and Soviet Union
The most familiar Russian counterinsurgency is the War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. However, throughout the history of the Russian Empire, the Russians fought many counterinsurgencies as new Caucasian and Central Asian territory were occupied. It was in those conflicts that the Russians developed the following counterinsurgency tactics:

 * 1) Deploy a significant number of troops
 * 2) Isolate the area from outside assistance
 * 3) Establish tight control of major cities and towns
 * 4) Build lines of forts to restrict insurgent movement
 * 5) Destroy the springs of resistance through destruction of settlements, livestock, crops etc.

Those tactics, generally speaking, were carried over into Soviet use following the 1917 revolution for the most part except for the integration of political-military command. This tactical blueprint saw use following the First and Second World Wars in Dagestan, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Lithuania and Ukraine. That doctrine was ultimately shown to be inadequate in the Soviet War in Afghanistan, mostly because of insufficient troop commitment, and in the Wars in Chechnya.

United States
The United States has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns during the Philippine–American War, the Vietnam War, the post-2001 War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in increased interest in counterinsurgency within the American military, which was exemplified by the 2006 publication of a new joint Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, which replaced the documents separately published by the Army and Marine Corps 20–25 years prior. Views of the doctrine contained in the manual have been mixed. The 2014 version of FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 acquired a new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, it consists of three main parts, "Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions."

William B. Caldwell IV wrote: "The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, 'combatants' must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends on our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity, even as we remain ready to immediately defend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threat is detected."

In the recent conflicts the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has been increasingly involved conducting special operations especially the training and development of other states' military and security forces. This is known in the special operations community as foreign internal defense. It was announced 14 January 2016 that 1,800 soldiers from the 101st's Headquarters and its 2nd Brigade Combat Team will deploy soon on regular rotations to Baghdad and Erbil to train and advise Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces who are expected in the coming months to move toward Mosul, the Islamic State's de facto headquarters in Iraq.

The 101st Airborne Division will serve an integral role in preparing Iraqi ground troops to expel the Islamic State group from Mosul, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the division's soldiers during a January 2016 visit to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the 101st Airborne Division that "The Iraqi and Peshmerga forces you will train, advise and assist have proven their determination, their resiliency, and increasingly, their capability, but they need you to continue building on that success, preparing them for the fight today and the long hard fight for their future. They need your skill. They need your experience."

Foreign internal defense policymaking has subsequently aided in Iraqi successes in reclaiming Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Recent evaluations of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have yielded mixed results. A comprehensive study by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that "the U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability" to use COIN and stabilization tactics for long-term success. The report found that "successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians." These findings are corroborated by scholarly studies of U.S. counterinsurgency activities in Afghanistan, which determined that backlashes by insurgents and the local population were common.

title: Counterinsurgency


text:
Alexander Radwan

Alexander Gamal Radwan (born 30 August 1964) is a German politician.

Education

 * 1987: Graduated in aeronautical engineering
 * 1992: First state law examination
 * 1995: second state law examination

Early career

 * Since 1995: Lawyer
 * Since 1996: Employed in industry
 * Since 1998: Departmental manager of a company in the information and telecommunications sector

Career in local politics

 * 1989–1994: District Chairman of the Junge Union in Miesbach
 * 1994–1999: District Chairman of the Junge Union of Upper Bavaria
 * Member of local, district and regional executives of the CSU
 * District Chairman of the Upper Bavaria Small Business Union and Vice-Chairman for Bavaria
 * Member of the Miesbach District Council

Member of the European Parliament, 1999–2008
Between 1999 and 2008, Radwan was a Member of the European Parliament for Bavaria with the Christian Social Union in Bavaria, Member of the Bureau of the European People's Party and sat on the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

He was a substitute for the Committee on Legal Affairs and a vice-chair of the Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries. Between 2004 and 2008, he was the EPP parliamentary group’s spokesperson on economic affairs.

Member of the Bavarian State Parliament, 2008–2013
In the 2008 Bavarian state elections, Radwan was elected to the Landtag of Bavaria. During his term in office, he served on the Committee on Budgetary and Finance Affairs as well as on the Committee on Federal and European Affairs. Within his parliamentary group, he was a member of the working group on defence policy.

In late 2012, Radwan and Ilse Aigner, who was about to leave national politics to run for state office, announced that they would switch electoral districts. As a consequence, Radwan took over Aigner’s district and ran for a seat in the Bundestag.

Member of the German Bundestag, 2013–present
Radwan has been a member of the German Bundestag since the 2013 federal elections. He has since been serving on the Finance Committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on the United Nations, International Organizations and Globalization. In addition, he is a member of the parliament’s delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean.

As member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Radwan serves as his parliamentary group’s rapporteur on relations with the Middle East, the Maghreb and Sudan. On the Finance Committee, he is the group’s rapporteur on the Euro and the banking union.

In the negotiations to form a coalition government under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel following the 2017 federal elections, Radwan was part of the working group on foreign policy, led by Ursula von der Leyen, Gerd Müller and Sigmar Gabriel.

Other activities
After serving as Of counsel with the Munich office of law firm GSK Stockmann + Kollegen until 2015, Radwan and former finance minister Theo Waigel joined Waigel Rechtsanwälte in 2016.

In addition to his legal practice, Radwan holds the following positions:
 * Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), Member of the Administrative Council (since 2018)
 * German-Arab Friendship Association (DAFG), Member of the Board
 * German-Mozambican Society, Member of the Advisory Board
 * Kangaroo Group, Member
 * Young Egyptian Economic Leaders (YEEL), Member of the Board of Trustees
 * German Red Cross (DRK), Member of the Presidium (until 2014)
 * University of Applied Sciences Rosenheim, Member of the Board of Trustees

title: Alexander Radwan


text:
Exarchate of Africa

The Exarchate of Africa was a division of the Byzantine Empire around Carthage that encompassed its possessions on the Western Mediterranean. Ruled by an exarch (viceroy), it was established by the Emperor Maurice in 591 and survived until the Muslim conquest of the Maghreb in the late 7th century. It was, along with the Exarchate of Ravenna, one of two exarchates established following the western reconquests under Emperor Justinian I to administer the territories more effectively.

Background
In the Vandalic War of 533, Byzantine forces under Belisarius reconquered the Maghreb along with Corsica and Sardinia and the Balearic Islands. Emperor Justinian I ((r. 527 – 565)) organized the recovered territories as the Praetorian prefecture of Africa, which included the provinces of Africa Proconsularis, Byzacena, Tripolitania, Numidia, Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania Sitifensis, and was centered at Carthage. In the 550s, a Roman expedition succeeded in regaining parts of southern Spain, which were administered as the new province of Spania.

After the death of Justinian in 565, the Eastern Roman Empire came increasingly under attack on all fronts, and emperors often left the more remote provinces to themselves to cope as best they could for extended periods, although military officers, such as Heraclius the Elder (Exarch c. 598–610), continued to rotate between the eastern provinces and Africa. By the 640s and 650s, Byzantium had lost its province of Mesopotamia to the Muslims, who also extinguished the Byzantines' rival, the Sassanian Empire (651). Constantinople thereby lost an important source of experienced officers seasoned by constant border warfare with the Persians. The Heraclian dynasty (610-711) did continue to appoint some competent eastern officers to African posts, such as the Armenian Narseh, who commanded Tripoli, and John, the dux of Tigisis. Walter Kaegi speculates that some Armenian officers might have asked to transfer back to the east to defend their homes as the Muslims advanced into Armenia, but the sources are silent. Yet the officers who continued to arrive from the east after the loss of Mesopotamia would have been more accustomed to defeats like the Battle of Yarmouk (636) than the previously winning strategies used against the Sassanians, and new tactics and strategies developed slowly.

Establishment of the Exarchate
The late Roman administrative system, as established by Diocletian, provided for a clear distinction between civil and military offices, primarily to lessen the possibility of rebellion by over-powerful provincial governors. Under Justinian I, the process was partially reversed for provinces that were judged to be especially vulnerable or in internal disorder. Capitalizing upon this precedent and taking it one step further, the emperor Maurice sometime between 585 and 590 created the office of exarch, which combined the supreme civil authority of a praetorian prefect and the military authority of a magister militum, and enjoyed considerable autonomy from Constantinople. Two exarchates were established, one in Italy, with its seat at Ravenna (hence known as the Exarchate of Ravenna), and one in Africa, based in Carthage and including all imperial possessions in the western Mediterranean. The first African exarch was the patricius Gennadius.

Among the provincial changes, Tripolitania was detached from the province of Africa and placed under the province of Egypt, Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania Sitifensis were merged to form the new province of "Mauretania Prima", while Mauretania Tingitana, effectively reduced to the city of Septum (Ceuta), was combined with the citadels of the Spanish coast (Spania) and the Balearic Islands to form "Mauretania Secunda".

The Visigothic Kingdom was a continuous threat to the exarchate. The African exarch was in possession of Mauretania II, which was little more than a tiny outpost in southern Spain. The conflict continued until the final conquest of the last Spanish strongholds in c. 624 by the Visigoths. The Byzantines retained only the fort of Septum (modern Ceuta), across the Strait of Gibraltar.

During the successful revolt of the exarch of Carthage, Heraclius the Elder, and his namesake son Heraclius in 608, the Berbers comprised a large portion of the fleet that transported Heraclius to Constantinople. Due to religious and political ambitions, the Exarch Gregory the Patrician (who was related by blood to the imperial family, through the emperor's cousin Nicetas) declared himself independent of Constantinople in 647. At this time the influence and power of the exarchate was exemplified in the forces gathered by Gregory in the battle of Sufetula also in that year where more than 100,000 men of Amazigh origin fought for Gregory.

The Arab Muslim conquest
In 647, the first Islamic expeditions began with an initiative from Egypt under the emir Amr ibn al-As and his nephew Uqba ibn Nafi. Sensing Roman weakness they conquered Barca, in Cyrenaica, then moved on to Tripolitania, where they encountered resistance.

Due to the unrest caused by theological disputes concerning Monothelitism and Monoenergism, the exarchate under Gregory the Patrician distanced itself from the empire in open revolt. The flood of refugees from Egypt (especially Melkites), Palestine, and Syria exacerbated religious tensions in Carthage and further raised the alarm to Gregory of the approaching Arab threat.

Sensing that the more immediate danger came from the Muslim forces, Gregory gathered his allies and confronted the Muslims, but was defeated at the Battle of Sufetula, the new capital of the exarchate, since Gregory had moved to the interior for a better defense against Roman attacks from the sea.

Afterwards, the exarchate became a semi-client state under a new exarch called Gennadius. Attempting to maintain tributary status with Constantinople and Damascus strained the resources of the exarchate and caused unrest amongst the population.

The exarchate scored a major victory over the forces of Uqba ibn Nafi at the Battle of Vescera in 682, aided by the Berber king, Kusaila. This victory forced the Muslim forces to retreat to Egypt, giving the exarchate a decade's respite. However, the repeated confrontations took their toll on the dwindling and ever-divided resources of the exarchate.

In 698, the Muslim commander Hasan ibn al-Nu'man and a force of 40,000 men crushed Carthage. Many of its defenders were Visigoths sent to defend the exarchate by Wittiza, who also feared Muslim expansion. Many Visigoths fought to the death; in the ensuing battle Carthage was again reduced to rubble, as it had been centuries earlier by the Romans.

The loss of the mainland African exarchate was an enormous blow to the Byzantine Empire in the Western Mediterranean, because Carthage and Egypt were Constantinople's main sources of manpower and grain. The Byzantines never recovered their territories in Africa.

title: Exarchate of Africa


text: Category:Former federal electoral districts of British Columbia