text:
Propaganda in China

Propaganda in China is used by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and historically by the Kuomintang (KMT), to sway domestic and international opinion in favor of its policies. Domestically, this includes censorship of proscribed views and an active promotion of views that favor the government. Propaganda is considered central to the operation of the CCP and the Chinese government, with propaganda operations in the country being directed by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department.

Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest periods of Chinese history, but propaganda has been most effective in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries owing to mass media and an authoritarian government. The earliest Chinese propaganda tool also was an important tool in legitimizing the Kuomintang controlled Republic of China government that retreated from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949.

Propaganda during the Mao era was known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimize the party and the policies of leaders. It was the first time the CCP successfully made use of modern mass propaganda techniques, adapting them to the needs of a country which had a largely rural and illiterate population. Today, propaganda in China is usually depicted through cultivation of the economy and Chinese nationalism.

Terminology
While the English word usually has a pejorative connotation, the Chinese word xuānchuán (宣传 "propaganda; publicity", composed of xuan "declare; proclaim; announce" and chuan  or  "pass; hand down; impart; teach; spread; infect; be contagious" ) The term can have either a neutral connotation in official government contexts or a pejorative one in informal contexts. The term is not used for censorship, as it might connote in other parts of the world.

Xuānchuán first appeared in the 3rd-century historical text Records of the Three Kingdoms where its usage referred to the dissemination of military skills. In pre-modern times, the term was used to refer to dissemination of ideas and information by ruling elites. The meaning of "to explain something to someone, or to conduct education" might first appeared in Ge Hong's (c. 320) Baopuzi criticism of effete scholars who Emperor Zhang of Han (r. 75–88) extravagantly rewarded. "These various gentlemen were heaped with honors, but not because they could breach walls or fight in the fields, break through an enemy's lines and extend frontiers, fall ill and resign office, pray for a plan of confederation and give the credit to others, or possess a zeal transcending all bounds. Merely because they expounded an interpretation [xuanchuan] of one solitary classic, such were the honors lavished upon them. And they were only lecturing upon words bequeathed by the dead. Despite their own high positions, emperors and kings deigned to serve these teachers."

It was chosen to translate the Marxist-Leninist concept of Russian propagánda in the early 20th-century China. Some xuanchuan collocations usually refer to "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn 宣传战 "propaganda war"), others to "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè 宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán 宣传员 "propagandist; publicist"). The term xuanchuan also conveys the meaning of education, whereas the English word propaganda does not.

During the 20th century, use of the term propaganda in China approximated its meaning in early modern Europe, "to propagate what one believes to be true." Operating according to this terminology, the CCP is open about the importance of its propaganda work, which it views as having a positive impact on informing the Chinese people and promoting social harmony. David Shambaugh, the scholar of Chinese politics and foreign policy, describes "proactive propaganda" in which the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department writes and disseminates information that it believes "should be used in educating and shaping society". In this particular context, xuanchuan "does not carry negative connotations for the CCP, nor, for that matter, for most Chinese citizens." The sinologist and anthropologist Andrew B. Kipnis says unlike English propaganda, Chinese xuanchuan is officially represented as language that is good for the nation as a whole. However, the CCP is also sensitive to the negative connotations of the English word propaganda, and the commonly used Chinese term xuanchuan acquired pejorative connotations. In 1992, Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin asked one of the CCP's most senior translators to come up with a better English alternative to propaganda as the translation of xuanchuan for propaganda targeting foreign audiences. Replacement English translations include publicity, information, and political communication domestically, or media diplomacy and cultural exchange internationally.

Republican era
Because the national government of this time was weak, it was difficult for any censorship or propagandistic measures to be carried out effectively. However, a bureau was set up to control the production and release of film in China. Also, newspapers unfavorable to the central government could be harassed at will. After the Northern Expedition, the power of the central government increased significantly, and propaganda campaigns became more effective.

Lai Manwai's film documenting the Northern Expedition and Chiang Kai-shek's consolidation of power, produced by Lai's production company Minxin, was approved by the Nationalist Party branch in Shanghai as the only long-format film for party propaganda. This made it one of the first party films in China.

Zheng Junli's 1941 film Long Live the Nations (Minzu wansui) was the first Chinese propaganda film aimed at developing solidarity among the ethnic minorities living in China's border regions. The film was produced through the Nationalist-controlled China Motion Picture Studio.

Propaganda during the Chinese Civil War was directed against the CCP and the Japanese. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalists had mobile projectionists travel in rural China to play anti-Japanese propaganda films. Occupying Japanese authorities likewise had mobile projectionists show propaganda films in the areas of China under their control.

Mao era

The origins of the CCP propaganda system can be traced to Yan'an Rectification Movement and the rectification movements carried out there. Following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns. Mao explicitly laid out the political role of culture in his 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature". The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP's "control system", drew much from Soviet, Nazi, imperial China, Nationalist China, and other totalitarian states' propaganda methods. It represented a quintessential Leninist "transmission belt" for indoctrination and mass mobilization. David Shambaugh observes that propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a hallmark of the Maoist China; the CCP employed a variety of "thought control" techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform," construction of role models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods. While ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."

Chinese authorities sought to promote model workers and soldiers whose productive examples were promoted to the public via radio, radio, and other media.

In 1951, a directive to develop a nationwide propaganda network designated individuals in each school, factory, and work unit as propaganda workers.

In the 1960s, Chinese propaganda sought to portray contrasting images of the United States government and the United States public. Propaganda sought to criticize the government for its war in Vietnam while praising the public for anti-war protests. As part of propaganda efforts during the 1965 Resist America, Aid Vietnam Campaign, the CCP organized street demonstrations and marches and promoted campaign messages using cultural media like film and photography exhibitions, chorus contests, and street performance.

According to academic Anne-Marie Brady, CCP propaganda and thought work (sīxiǎng gōngzuò 思想工作) traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined by media specialists. Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought reform and political study classes. In rural China, traveling drama troupes did propaganda work and were particularly important during land reform and other mass campaigns. In 1955, the Ministry of Culture sought to develop rural cultural networks to distribute media like other performances, lantern slides, books, cinema, radio, books, and to establish newspaper reading groups. Salaried workers at rural cultural centers toured the countryside distributing propaganda materials, teaching revolutionary songs, and the like.

China Central Television (CCTV) has traditionally served as a major national conduit for televised propaganda, while the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, has served as a medium for print propaganda. During the Mao era, a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's Daily, which would be followed by other papers. Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these articles as a source for political study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.

During the Cultural Revolution, CCP propaganda was crucial to intensification of Mao Zedong's cult of personality, as well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns. Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model workers and soldiers, such as Lei Feng, Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui, Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who assisted the CCP Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the American "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism–Leninism following the Sino-Soviet split).

According to Barbara Mittler, Mao propaganda left memories of violence and slander upon many Chinese, and their psychological strains drove many to madness and death. Today, Mao propaganda is no longer used by the CCP, and are largely commercialized for the purposes of nostalgia.

Modern era

Following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, propaganda was used to blacken the character of the Gang of Four, which was blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. During the era of economic reform and modernization that was initiated by Deng Xiaoping, propaganda promoting socialism with Chinese characteristics was distributed. The first post-Mao campaign was in 1983 which saw the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign.

In 1977, Deng initiated a propaganda campaign to promote science as the cornerstone of China's modernization, in advance of the 1978 National Science Conference. The campaign helped advanced Deng's efforts to improve the quality of science in China, particularly basic research, following the Cultural Revolution. Chinese Academy of Sciences vice president Fang Yi led the campaign in having schools, factories, and communes organize youth-focused events to celebrate science and technology.

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre were an indication to many elders in the CCP that liberalization in the propaganda sector had gone too far, and that the Party must re-establish its control over ideology and the propaganda system.

Brady writes that propaganda and thought work have become the "life blood" of the Party-State since the post-1989 period, and one of the key means for guaranteeing the CCP's continued legitimacy and hold on power.

In the 1990s, propaganda theorists described the challenges to China's propaganda and thought work as "blind spots"; mass communication was advocated as the antidote. From the early 1990s, selective concepts from mass communications theory, public relations, advertising, social psychology, patriotic education and other areas of modern mass persuasion were introduced into China's propaganda system for the purpose of creating a modern propaganda model.

Particularly since the 1990s, China has engaged in propaganda seeking to eliminate the traditional son preference.

Recent developments

The 2008 Summer Olympics were portrayed by the Chinese government as a symbol of China's pride and place in the world, and seem to have bolstered some domestic support for the Chinese government, and support for the policies of the CCP, giving rise to concerns that the state will possibly have more leverage to disperse dissent. In the lead-up to the Olympics, the government allegedly issued guidelines to the local media for their reporting during the Games: most political issues not directly related to the games were to be downplayed; topics such as pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkestan movements were not to be reported on, as were food safety issues such as "cancer-causing mineral water." As the 2008 Chinese milk scandal broke in September 2008, there was widespread speculation that China's desire for a perfect Games may have been a factor contributing towards the delayed recall of contaminated infant formula.

In early 2009, the CCP embarked on a multibillion-dollar global media expansion, including the 24-hour English-language news channel China Global Television Network (CGTN) in the style of Western news agencies. According to Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, it was part of CCP general secretary Hu Jintao's plan to "go global" and make "the voice of China better heard in international affairs", by strengthening their foreign-language services, and being less political in their broadcasting. Bequelin notes that their function is to channel a specific view of China to an international audience, and their fundamental premise remains the same; that all information broadcast must reflect the government's views. The Chinese government encouraged the adaption of Western style media marketing in their news agencies due to internal competition with national commercial media.

In 2011, then Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai and the city's Propaganda Department initiated a 'Red Songs campaign' that demanded every district, government departments and commercial corporations, universities and schools, state radio and TV stations to begin singing "red songs", praising the achievements of the CCP and PRC. Bo said the aim was "to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals of his father's comrade-in-arms Mao Zedong"; although academic Ding Xueliang of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.

Since Xi Jinping became in 2012 the CCP general secretary, censorship and propaganda have been significantly stepped up. During a visit to Chinese state media, Xi stated that "party-owned media must hold the family name of the party" and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority". In 2018, as part of an overhaul of CCP and government bodies, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) was renamed into the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) with its film, news media and publications being transferred to the Central Propaganda Department. Additionally, the control of China Central Television (CCTV, including its international edition, China Global Television), China National Radio (CNR) and China Radio International (CRI) were transferred to the newly established China Media Group (CMG) under the control of the Central Propaganda Department.

Starting in June 2021 and continuing through at least 2024, China's judicial system has engaged in a propaganda campaign to promote court cases decided in favor of platform economy workers against the companies for which they did work. The judicial system's newspapers and magazines have promoted coverage of typical cases and relevant studies. Academic Angela Huyue Zhang writes that because court rulings in China do not create precedent, the campaign is a mechanism for guiding courts to tighten regulation in this area, particularly where platform workers lack contracts or have been characterized as independent contractors but are in fact subject to tight monitoring by the platform companies that dispatch them.

Xinjiang
During the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, CCP officials moved swiftly in a public relations campaign. According to Newsweek, CCP officials felt that the recent riots risked tarnishing China's global image, and underwent a public relations program involving quickly getting out the government's official version of the events, as well as transporting foreign journalists to riot affected areas. The growth in new technologies, such as email and SMS, forced the CCP's hand into taking up spin.

Since 2017, the Chinese government has engaged in a propaganda campaign to defend its actions in Xinjiang. China initially denied the existence of the Xinjiang internment camps and attempted to cover-up their existence. In 2018, after being forced to admit by widespread reporting that the Xinjiang internment camps exist, the Chinese government initiated a propaganda campaign to portray the camps as humane and to deny human rights abuses occur in Xinjiang. In 2020 and 2021 they expanded the propaganda campaign due to international backlash against government policies in Xinjiang and worries that the Chinese government no longer had control of the narrative.

The Chinese government has used social media as a part of its extensive propaganda campaign. Douyin, the mainland Chinese sister app to ByteDance-owned social media app TikTok, presents users with significant amounts of Chinese state propaganda pertaining to the human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

Chinese government propaganda attacks have targeted international journalists covering human rights abuses in Xinjiang. After providing coverage critical of Chinese government abuses in Xinjiang, BBC News reporter John Sudworth was subjected to a campaign of propaganda and harassment by Chinese state-affiliated and CCP-affiliated media. The public attacks resulted in Sudworth and his wife Yvonne Murray, who reports for Raidió Teilifís Éireann, fleeing China for Taiwan for fear of their safety.

Between July 2019 and early August 2019, the CCP-owned tabloid Global Times paid Twitter to promote tweets that deny that the Chinese government is committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang; Twitter later banned advertising from state-controlled media outlets on 19 August after removing large numbers of pro-Beijing bots from the social network. China has spent heavily to purchase Facebook advertisements in order to spread propaganda designed to incite doubt on the existence and scope of human rights violations occurring within Xinjiang.

In April 2021, the Chinese government released propaganda videos titled, "Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land", and produced a musical titled "The Wings of Songs" in order to portray Xinjiang as harmonious and peaceful. The Wings of Songs portrays an idyllic rural landscape with a cohesive ethnic population notably devoid of repression, surveillance, and Islam. It is near impossible to get accurate information about the situation in Xinjiang domestically in China, concerns within the domestic audience are also downplayed because many aspects of the abuse such as forced labor are seen as commonplace by many Chinese citizens. In 2021, Chinese officials ordered videos of Uyghur men and women saying that they deny the U.S. charges that China that is committing human rights violations.

Critics have said that government propaganda plays into existing colonial and racist tropes about the Uyghurs by depicting them as dangerous or backwards. Domestic propaganda has increased since the international community began considering designating the abuses against the Uyghurs as a genocide. Domestic pushback against the genocide label is also emotional and follows a similar pattern of denial to the genocide committed against the Native Americans.

COVID-19 pandemic
In 2020, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping and the rest of the CCP began propagating the idea of "winning a battle against America" in containing the coronavirus pandemic. The numbers are notably misrepresented by Chinese authorities, but the CCP has continued to take to the media, pointing out "the failures of America", even though the numbers are manipulated. The now former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused the CCP of spreading disinformation on 17 March. Chinese officials in Japan have referred to the disease as the "Japanese coronavirus", even though there is no such evidence it originated there. The CCP has also used transmitting "positive energy" to promote itself. After Mike Pompeo's accusation that the virus originated in a lab in Wuhan, which Anthony Fauci denied on 5 May, Chinese officials launched a smear campaign on the same day against him with multiple propaganda outlets calling him a liar. During the George Floyd protests, the CCP criticized the US for failing to address racial equality. On 30 May 2020, Morgan Ortagus urged on Twitter for "freedom loving people" to hold the CCP to impose plans on Hong Kong for national security legislation. Her counterpart, Hua Chunying, responded back with "I can't breathe", obviously a reference to Floyd's last words. Some people responded with "I can't tweet" and some have accused the government of using the same police brutality tactics that killed Floyd, with Chinese censors simply deleting the complaints. In Wuhan, where the outbreak first emerged, television shows and documentaries portrayed the response positively, as a heroic success taken care of by "warriors in white coats". Alexander Kekulé's theory of coronavirus-disease 2019 coming from Italy instead of Wuhan which was taken out of context has sparked Chinese propaganda newspapers following the narrative, with even one headline saying, "China is Innocent!" Kekulé himself says it is pure propaganda. State-owned outlets such as Xinhua and the People's Daily have blamed elderly deaths in Norway and Germany on COVID-19 vaccines, even though there is no scientific evidence, and have accused English media of downplaying it.

In 2020, propaganda from China has been controlled by state media and CCP-run outlets such as the nationalistic tabloid Global Times, which portray the handling of COVID-19 as a success. On 11 June 2020, Twitter announced that they deleted over 170,000 accounts tied to a Chinese-state linked operation because they were spreading false information about the COVID-19 pandemic. On 22 June 2020, the United States Department of State designated several Chinese state media outlets as foreign missions. In December 2020, an investigation by The New York Times and ProPublica revealed leaked internal documents showing the state's instructions to local media regarding the death of Li Wenliang. The documents address news organizations and social media platforms, ordering them to stop using push notifications, make no comment on the situation and control any discussion of the event happening in online spaces. The documents also address "local propaganda workers", demanding they steer online discussions away from anything that "seriously damages party and government credibility and attacks the political system". Pro-Chinese government spam networks also attempted to discredit U.S. vaccines.

On the 29th of April 2020, an animated video was posted on Twitter and YouTube, called Once Upon a Virus, used Lego figures to represent China through hospital workers and Lady Liberty representing America, was posted by Xinhua News Agency. The Lego Group, for their part, said they had nothing to do with the video in question. In the video, the hospital worker repeatedly warns the US about the outbreak, but they dismiss them, talking about lockdowns being a violation of human rights, or paywalls. By that point, Lady Liberty is hooked up to an IV and looks severely ill, and at the end, the US says "We are always correct, even when we contradict ourselves", and China responds with "That's what I love best about you Americans, your consistency". The Chinese government delayed warning the public about the outbreak, even as doctors tried to warn people via social media. The Associated Press reports "China's rigid controls on information, bureaucratic hurdles and a reluctance to send bad news up the chain of command muffled early warnings".

100th Anniversary of CCP
In 2021 the state orchestrated a propaganda and information control campaign to bolster the 100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese state owned media claimed without evidence that the CIA was recruiting Chinese-speaking spies, an assertion which went viral in the Chinese internet. In 2021, the Ministry of Education of China announced that CCP general secretary Xi Jinping's socio-political policies and ideas would be included in the curriculum from primary school up to university level. The 4-volume Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era textbooks for primary, secondary and tertiary school students were subsequently introduced in the new school year in 2021, educators were instructed to "plant the seeds of loving the party, the country and socialism in young hearts". This has led to comparisons of the cults of personality cultivated by Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong.

Russian invasion of Ukraine
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chinese diplomats, government agencies, and state-controlled media in China have adopted a sympathetic view of Russia, while emphasizing that the war was caused by the United States and NATO.

On the eve of the attack, Shimian, a digital outlet owned by newspaper Beijing News, accidentally posted an internal memo of the Chinese Cybersecurity Agency to media outlets. The outlets were told to "publish neither information favorable to the United States nor critiques of Russia", the media were also tasked to censor user comments and trend hashtags released by the three state-owned media, Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV) and the People's Daily.

Xinhua, CCTV and Global Times often posted unverified news from Russian state-controlled network RT, that were later proven to be erroneous; examples of which were when Global Times posted a video saying that a large number of Ukrainian soldiers had surrendered, or when CCTV reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had fled Kyiv during the initial stages of the war. In the midst of the invasion, China Global Television Network (CGTN) interviewed Denis Pushilin, a Ukrainian separatist leader, who claimed that the "vast majority of citizens want to be as close to Russia as possible". CCTV also censored the live speech of Andrew Parsons, president of the International Paralympic Committee, during the opening ceremony of the 2022 Winter Paralympics held in Beijing, as he condemned the war and called for diplomacy.

Besides official state media channels, private Chinese tech giants such as Tencent, Sina Weibo and ByteDance also amplified conspiracy theories created by Russian state media, such as the false claims of nefarious US biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine and propagating the notion that Ukrainian government consists of neo-Nazis and that the Ukrainian army were sabotaging their own nuclear plant. Chinese streaming platform iQiyi also cancelled the broadcast of the English Premiere League to avoid showing the football teams' support for Ukraine.

There were also numerous reports of censorship of anti-war comments by Chinese academics, celebrities and micro-influencers on social media.

Mechanics
Propaganda and censorship in China are centrally directed by CCP's Central Propaganda Department (CPD). David Shambaugh, American professor and sinologist, wrote in 2007 that the CCP's propaganda system extends itself as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information. Shambaugh noted that according to the CCP publication Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian. numerous public places, such as media and news organizations, educational institutions, literature and art centers, and cultural exhibitions come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believed that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the CPD. Shambaugh stated that the writ of the CPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, although the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution.

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were "local"), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses, in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview.

According to Brady, propaganda work by the CCP has been historically divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or duinei) and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or duiwai) as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social. The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and, the closely linked bureaucracy, The Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda.

Shambaugh stated that the propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, are highly secret and does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages. The Office of External Propaganda (OEP) itself is more commonly known as 'State Council Information Office' (SCIO), under the one institution with two names system, according to Brady.

The Central Propaganda Department has direct control over the National Radio and Television Administration. It additionally manages the China Media Group, which controls several of China's largest news agencies. In 2014, the OEP was absorbed into the larger Central Propaganda Department, turning the SCIO into an external nameplate of the department.

Control of media
Media operations and content are tightly controlled, and the CCP, primarily through its Central Propaganda Department, determines what appears in news reports. Controlling media content allows the CCP to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies, censor controversial news stories, and have reports published criticizing political adversaries of the CCP. In 2005, Reporters Without Borders published a report about China's official news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, calling it "the world's biggest propaganda agency", and said that it was "at the heart of censorship and disinformation put in place" by the government.

The CPD weekly sends censorship guidelines to prominent editors and media providers and Chinese state media generally employ their own monitors for censorship. While in the past the Central Propaganda Department and its local branches sent faxes to all media throughout the country with instructions indicating subjects that the media should stress or avoid entirely, directives are now imparted to ranking media managers or editors during phone conversations—a move designed to reduce the paper trail. Media in China faces few restrictions on content that is not deemed to be politically damaging.

Wu Xuecan, a former editor of the People's Daily overseas edition, reports that through control of the "ideological domain, material means and living necessities," editors and reporters are conditioned to keep news and reports aligned with the interests of the CCP. Wu further reports that, political study sessions ensures that editors first practice self-censorship. He Qinglian writes that long years of media control have bred in Chinese journalists a habit of "self-discipline," and that most Chinese journalists resign themselves to playing the role of "Party mouthpieces." Control is also directed at sources of information, as ordinary people are restricted from providing news to Chinese media, and more so to foreign media.

Thought reform
Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform", ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological opponents, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated.

The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era CCP leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of 4 June 1989.

Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note the presence of such techniques in Maoist political campaigns, such as daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to find and correct deficiencies in personal conducts. In the military, political leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political conviction, thus exploiting social pressures and personal anxieties to build a sense of conformity.

In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP's rule, and has become a basic feature of citizens' daily life, according to Victor Shaw. To an extent, the "freedom of silence" cherished by some older Chinese scholars was not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda.

According to Shaw, the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs. Ideological tensions result in mass movements, and the resulting spiritual control legitimizes the political establishment. "Political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behaviour, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps."

Kurlantzick and Link stated that the CCP uses the technique of "thoughtwork" (sixiang gongzuo) to maintain popular obedience, dating back to the Mao Zedong era. They noted that while Mao-era campaigns are aimed at transforming the Chinese society and people's natures, the modern approach to thoughtwork are more subtle and only focuses on issues important to the CCP's rule. According to Kurlantzick and Link, it consists largely of cultivating pro-government views in the media and other influential people in Chinese society, and as such complaints against the government becomes distracted with pro-government propaganda. The government also attempts to distance itself from local issues by blaming them on corrupt local officials, says Kurlantzick and Link.

Spin doctors
According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid-1990s. China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realised that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars.

Brady writes that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the Blair government's spin doctoring during the mad cow disease crisis of 2000–2001, and the Bush government's use of the U.S. media after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005. According to Brady, trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises; these spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda, externally named the State Council Information Office.

Instead of attempting a media blackout as with the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the CCP has adopted a series of more advanced techniques to influence the information leaving China. The day after violence in Ürümqi, the State Council Information Office set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Ürümqi to assist foreign reporters. It invited foreign media to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and look at the aftermath themselves. Journalists were also given CDs with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," according to Professor Xiao Qiang, quoted by Newsweek.

Propaganda on the internet
Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski. In later years the internet played a key role in the spread of propaganda to Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites remain a leading source of Chinese-language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady.

Brady cites an example of the role of the internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese, its usage by the state against a perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of 2008 Tibetan unrest and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay. Brady noted that these protests were genuine and popular, demonstrating the effectiveness of China's efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese overseas diaspora, but the demonstrations nevertheless received official support both symbolically and in practice. While there was no compulsion for overseas Chinese to attend the rallies, those who did were given free T-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and accommodation, donated by local embassy officials and China-based donors.

50 Cent Party
The Chinese government regularly uses fake social media accounts and posts to attempt to shape online dialogue and steer discussions away from sensitive topics. This is done by specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums, or wikis, to shift the debate in favor of the CCP and influence public opinion. They are sometime called the "50-cent party" – named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make, though some speculate that they are probably not paid anything for the posts, instead being required to do so as a part of their official party duties.

An internal government document released by the BBC outlines the requirements for those employed as online posters, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc.

It is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands; David Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280,000 while The Guardian puts the estimate as 300,000. According to The Guardian, the growth in popularity of such astroturfing owes to the ease with which web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube can be employed to sway public opinion. The BBC reports that special centres have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'. Data analysis of social media activity and leaked government emails by a team led by Gary King at Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Science showed that the Chinese government generates over 440 million posts every year through such accounts.

Wikipedia
On 13 September 2021, the Wikimedia Foundation banned seven Wikipedia users and removed administrator privileges from twelve users that were part of Wikimedians of Mainland China (WMC). Maggie Dennis, the foundation's vice present of community resilience and sustainability, said that there had been an yearlong investigation into infiltration concerns. Dennis observed that the infiltrators had tried to promote "the aims of China, as interpreted through whatever filters they may bring to bear". Dennis said, “we needed to act based on credible information that some members (not all) of that group [WMC] have harassed, intimidated, and threatened other members of our community, including in some cases physically harming others, in order to secure their own power and subvert the collaborative nature of our projects”.

Domestic propaganda
Within the doctrine of China's peaceful rise resorting to Peace Journalism has been analyzed as a growing trend in China's strategy for domestic propaganda, in particular in covering news from Xinjiang. After Zbigniew Brzezinski's having termed Central Asia the "Global Balkans" Idriss Aberkane has argued the resorting to unilateral, state-endorsed Peace Journalism could be a way for China to "de-balkanize" Xinjiang. This he has called "coercive Peace Journalism".

"Peace journalism does not sell well because it typically proscribes the coverage of a conflict by news eliciting strong emotional reactions. Man becomes easily addicted to strong emotions and this has played a central role in peace journalism's failure at being adopted by mainstream media. On the other hand, mainstream media badly need (and compete with each other) to provide the strongest emotional value to their audience and this has become a vital part of their business model.

Yet in China the media industry is not driven by returns on financial investments but by returns on political interests. Thus paradoxically promoting Peace Journalism is much easier for the PRC than say for countries of the European Union as in promoting a political agenda the former can afford to broadcast news with low emotional weight, especially in a non-competitive environment for its media industry."

The Chinese government has used its public evaluations of historical, public figures as a means of communicating to the Chinese public the traits and political goals that it considers desirable and undesirable. The Chinese government has historically tended towards evaluating public figures either as villains or heroes, leaving little room for interpretation and making it clear whether the traits and goals of individual figures should be emulated or despised. The public image of some figures, including Peng Dehuai, have undergone radical reverses throughout the history of the PRC, as required by CCP propagandists: Peng was portrayed as a subhuman villain during the Cultural Revolution; but, since 1978, has been evaluated as a nearly perfect Marxist, general, and public official.

By examining the qualities associated with public figures whose images have been manipulated to make those figures either exaggeratedly positive or exaggeratedly negative symbols, scholars have developed a number of assumptions about the traits and political goals generally desired by various PRC governments. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them positive symbols will be portrayed as: coming from proletarian or semi-proletarian backgrounds; being courageous, fair, straightforward, and honest in their treatment of subordinates and superiors; leading a simple and frugal life; demonstrating great concern for the "masses"; achieving outstanding professional success; and, being impeccably loyal to the CCP and to the communist cause. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them negative symbols will be portrayed as: coming from backgrounds which have exposed them to "bourgeoise" thoughts and attitudes; adhering to all or most historical attempts to oppose political figures in the PRC who later became powerful, which are also vilified; being professionally inept, only succeeding temporarily or appearing to succeed through trickery or deception; participating in "conspiracies" against the correct leadership of the CCP; cooperating with "foreign countries" (historically either the Soviet Union or the United States, depending on which is more threatening at the time); and, having numerous negative traits, such as opportunism or corruption. Usually, public figures will provide considerable examples of either positive or negative qualities, but will be made to fit either a positive or negative stereotype through exaggerating qualities which support the interpretation desired by the CCP, and by omitting from the historical narrative qualities which contradict the CCP's intended interpretation.

As part of the "Propaganda Teaching Team" (xuan jiang tuan), tens of thousands of CCP cadre routinely travel from China's urban areas to rural China to engage in xuanchuan activities at the grassroots level.

External propaganda
The Chinese state refers to all media work abroad as wai xuan, or "external propaganda." Through its external propaganda operations, frequently directed by the CCP's United Front Work Department, China seeks to shape international perception of the Chinese government and its policies to "allay concerns about China's economic rise, military build-up and increasing political and diplomatic influence." Specifically by:
 * 1) Reducing fears that China is a threat to neighboring countries. China seeks to change its image within the region from that of a growing threat and aggressor to that of a benefactor and potential partner.  Beijing is working to "diminish fears of China's future military power, or concerns that China's massive economic growth would divert trade and foreign investment from other nations."
 * 2) Securing access to resources and energy. As China's economy continues to grow at a rapid pace, the need for resources and energy has become more pressing. To protect its access to these resources, China is working to gain the trust of foreign states that possess oil, gas, and other materials.
 * 3) Building alliances and weaken Taiwan's relationship with the international community. In 1994, China announced that it would "use all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan." Through propaganda as well as economic incentives, China seeks to convince any nation that still recognizes Taiwan to switch their loyalty to Beijing and formally declare that Taiwan is part of China.
 * 4) Promoting a multipolar world and constrain U.S. global power. China seeks to slowly diminish the United States' influence in Asia, and create its own sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.

In a 2008 report, the U.S. State Department's International Security Advisory Board declared that China was in the midst of a "comprehensive strategic deception campaign," which was said to include "Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of 'legal regimes' to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him)." On its official Chinese Web site, CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," and lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," referring to new foreign-language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda."

CCP propaganda themes
Former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leadership to "hide your capabilities, and bide your time." Most modern Chinese foreign propaganda seeks to pursue China's strategic goals while adhering to this advice. The following themes were stated by Zheng Bijian to be characteristic of China's foreign propaganda prior to Xi Jinping:

External propaganda efforts have since shifted to denigrating liberal democracy and stoking anti-American sentiment.
 * China seeks a peaceful rise. In other words, "China is not a threat." As it industrializes, China does not seek to rival other nations for resources. It also seeks to industrialize without high amounts of pollution, energy consumption, and investment.
 * China does not seek hegemony. "Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world." China "advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations."
 * The CCP is evolving and is no longer an authoritarian regime. China's government has evolved from the days of Mao Zedong. It is no longer a strict, authoritarian style Communist/Maoist system, but is democratizing. The CCP seeks to "transcend outdated modes of social control and to construct a harmonious socialist society."
 * China does not view the United States as a strategic adversary. Instead, "Beijing wants Washington to play a positive role in the region's security as well as economic affairs."

Instruments
The PRC uses many tactics and techniques to disseminate its propaganda themes abroad. China uses its news and media outlets, which are directly influenced by various state organizations (and ultimately the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP), to relay news stories consistent with these themes to foreign audiences. In 2009, reports emerged that China intends to invest US$6.6 billion to expand its foreign language news service. This includes plans for a 24-hour English-language news network to discuss world affairs from Beijing's point of view. A 2015 investigative report by Reuters found a network of at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries that obscures China Radio International (CRI) as its majority shareholder. A significant portion of the programming on these stations is either produced or provided by CRI, or by media firms CRI controls in the United States, Australia, and Europe.

Generative artificial intelligence
Spamouflage, an online disinformation and propaganda campaign of the Ministry of Public Security, has used news anchors created with generative artificial intelligence to deliver fake news clips.

Soft power initiative
Since 2005, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao has promoted a "soft power initiative" aimed at increasing China's influence overseas through cultural and language programs. These trends have been identified by the American Council of Foreign Relations, which describes that "Beijing is trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan." The article points out that adverse effects of soft power, that "China has the potential to become the 600-pound gorilla in the room," and that "Chinese influence may begin to breed resentment."

The CCP Politburo Standing Committee members Li Changchun and Liu Yunshan have repeatedly stressed that Chinese propaganda should be equally spread both domestically and internationally, and Li Changchun stated that the Confucius Institutes are "an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world", which is "part of China's foreign propaganda strategy".

The Economist noted that Confucius Institutes are used to project China's soft power and win the support of an external audience, and Confucius was specifically chosen to cast an image of peace and harmony. Such centers are partially sponsored by the Chinese government, with a hands-off approach to management, its directors being directly appointed by their attached universities.

In 2009, Chinese state media launched the English-language version of the Global Times, a nationalistic tabloid under the auspices of the People's Daily. It was described as a part of a larger push by the Chinese government to have a greater say in international media, as well as supplanting what it considers to be biased Western media sources.

In early 2011, the Chinese government launched a million dollar advertising campaign, which was aimed to improve the "incomplete understandings" the American public has about China. A 60-second ad was shown at New York's Times Square, which featured Chinese personalities such as scientist Sun Jiadong, singer Liu Huan and news anchor Jing Yidan, ending with the message of "Chinese Friendship". Newsweek noted the ad's great production values, but criticized it as confusing and explaining little about the featured Chinese identities. China scholar David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University, says that "the scale of Beijing’s [propaganda] push is unprecedented" and estimates that "China spends $10bn a year on external propaganda".

Propaganda in the arts
As in the Soviet Union, the CCP under Mao Zedong took socialist realism as its basis for art, making clear its goal was the 'education' of the people in CCP ideology. This included, as during the Cultural Revolution, transforming literature and art to serve these ends. Pre-revolutionary songs and operas  were banned as a poisonous legacy of the past. Middle and high schools were targeted by one campaign because the students circulated romance and love stories among themselves.

Maoist propaganda art has been remade and modernized for almost two decades, and old Cultural Revolution era propaganda productions have appeared in new formats such as DVDs and karaoke versions. They appear in rock and pop versions of revolutionary songs in praise of Mao, as well as T-shirts, watches, porcelain, and other memorabilia. The works of propaganda from the Cultural Revolution have been selling extremely well in recent years, largely for nostalgia, social, patriotic or entertainment purposes.

Propaganda songs and music, such as guoyue and revolutionary opera, have a long and storied history in the PRC, featuring prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s to the 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including Red Rock and Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley. The latter sold 6–10 million copies in China. Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the People's Liberation Army, the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

In recent times, films and documentaries such as Silent Contest, Amazing China, The Founding of a Party, Republic and Army has become the new staple of Chinese propaganda, known as "main melody" films.

Novel
Red Crag, a famous 1961 Chinese novel featuring underground CCP agents fighting an espionage battle against the Kuomintang.

Sculpture
Rent Collection Courtyard, a 1965 sculpture depicting former landlord Liu Wencai as an evil landlord collecting rent from poor, although this depiction has been disputed by modern accounts.

Films and plays

 * Battle on Shangganling Mountain, a 1956 Chinese war film also known as Shangganling Battle, depicting the Battle of Triangle Hill during the Korean War.
 * The East Is Red, a 1965 song and dance film performed in the People's Great Hall depicting the history of China from the Boxer Rebellion to the Chinese Communist Revolution.
 * The Battle at Lake Changjin, a 2021 film set during the Korean War about Chinese troops defeating American troops. It is the second highest-grossing film of 2021 worldwide, behind Spider-Man: No Way Home and ahead of No Time to Die and Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings.
 * The Eight model plays (八个样板戏), revolutionary themed operas and ballets, were the only ones allowed to be performed during the Cultural Revolution.
 * Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (智取威虎山), a play about CCP soldiers infiltrating a bandit camp during the Chinese Civil War.
 * The Legend of the Red Lantern (红灯记), a play based on the activities of the CCP resistance against Japan in Hulin during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
 * Red Detachment of Women (红色娘子军), a pre-Cultural Revolution-era play, later extolled during the Cultural Revolution, about the women of Hainan Island who rose up in resistance on behalf of the CCP
 * The White Haired Girl (白毛女), a play exploring the miseries of China peasants in 1930's China.

Songs
The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:

 * "Nanniwan" (《南泥湾》/《南泥灣》), a 1943 revolutionary song
 * "The East is Red" (《东方红》/《東方紅》), the de facto national anthem of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution
 * "Socialism is Good" (《社会主义好》), a modern rock adaptation of which was performed by Zhang Qu and featured on the 1990s album Red Rock.
 * "Battle Hymn of the Chinese People's Volunteers" (《中国人民志愿军战歌》/《中國人民志願軍戰歌》) – a well-known song from the Korean War period
 * "Red Sun Shining Over the Border" (《红太阳照边疆》/《紅太陽照邊疆》) – a song from the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province
 * "A Wa People Sing New Songs" (阿佤唱新歌曲) – a song attributed to the Wa ethnic minority of Yunnan
 * "Laundry Song" (《洗衣歌》) – a song celebrating the liberation of Tibet
 * "Liuyang River" (《浏阳河》) – a song about a river near Mao Zedong's hometown of Shaoshan in Hunan
 * "Saliha Most Follows the Words of Chairman Mao" (《萨利哈听毛主席的话》/《薩利哈最聽毛主席的話》) – a song attributed to the Kazakh minority of the Xinjiang
 * "The Never-Setting Sun Rises Over the Grassland" (《草原上升起不落的太阳》/草原上升起不落的太陽 – ) from Inner Mongolia
 * "Xinjiang is Good" (新疆好) – attributed to the ethnic Uyghurs of Xinjiang
 * "I Love Beijing Tiananmen" (《我爱北京天安门》/《我愛北京天安門》) – claimed to have been translated into over 50 languages, this song is frequently taught to schoolchildren in the PRC
 * "Zhuang Brocade Dedicated to Chairman Mao" (莊錦獻給毛主席) – a song attributed to the Zhuang ethnic minority of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
 * "Sweet-Scented Osmanthus Blooms With the Arrival of Happiness"(《桂花开放幸福来》) (attributed to the Miao, or Chinese Hmong, ethnic minority group)
 * "Generations Remember Chairman Mao's Kindness"(《世世代代铭记毛主席的恩情》) (a song celebrating the "liberation of the ethnic Xibe people")
 * "Salaam Chairman Mao" (《萨拉姆毛主席》/《薩拉姆毛主席》) – a Xinjiang song praising Mao, composed by Wang Luobin. A modern version was performed by Chinese rock singer Dao Lang.
 * "Song of Mount Erlangshan" (《歌唱二郎山》) – a 1950s song celebrating the development of Tibet, which made Mount Erlangshan in western Sichuan famous
 * "Story of the Spring" (春天的故事) – a song performed by Dong Wenhua, initially at the 1997 CCTV New Year's Gala, days before his death, dedicated to late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
 * "The Cultural Revolution is Just Great" (《无产阶级文化大革命就是好》/《無產階級文化大革命就是好》) – a song praising the Cultural Revolution
 * "On the Golden Mountains of Beijing" (北京的金山上) – a song attributed to the Tibetan people praising Mao as the shining sun
 * "Ode to the Socialist Motherland" (《歌唱社会主义祖国》/《歌唱社會主義祖國》) – the Cultural Revolution-era modification of the well-known patriotic song "Ode to the Motherland" (《歌唱祖国》/《歌唱祖國》).
 * "Where are you going, Uncle Kurban?" (库尔班大叔您上哪儿) – a song attributed to a Uyghur elder named Kurban Tulum (also known as Uncle Kurban) praising People's Liberation Army.

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times".

title: Propaganda in China


text:
List of drugs: Iq–Iz

iq-ir

 * Iqirvo
 * iquindamine (INN)
 * Iquix
 * iralukast (INN)
 * iratumumab (INN, USAN)
 * irbesartan (INN)
 * Iressa
 * irindalone (INN)
 * irinotecan (INN)
 * irloxacin (INN)
 * irolapride (INN)
 * iroplact (INN)
 * irsogladine (INN)

isa-ism

 * isaglidole (INN)
 * isalsteine (INN)
 * isamfazone (INN)
 * isamoltan (INN)
 * isamoxole (INN)
 * isavuconazole (INN)
 * isaxonine (INN)
 * isbogrel (INN)
 * isbufylline (INN)
 * iscotrizinol (USAN)
 * iseganan (USAN)
 * isepamicin (INN)
 * Ismelin
 * Ismo
 * ismomultin alfa (USAN)
 * Ismotic

isoa-isol

 * isoaminile (INN)
 * isobromindione (INN)
 * isobutamben (INN)
 * Isocaine
 * isocarboxazid (INN)
 * Isoclor
 * isoconazole (INN)
 * isocromil (INN)
 * isoetarine (INN)
 * isofezolac (INN)
 * isoflupredone (INN)
 * isoflurane (INN)
 * Isohexal (Hexal Australia) [Au]. Redirects to isotretinoin.
 * isoleucine (INN)
 * Isolyte

isom-isor

 * isomazole (INN)
 * isometamidium chloride (INN)
 * isomethadone (INN)
 * isometheptene (INN)
 * isomolpan (INN)
 * Isomonit (Hexal Australia) [Au]. Redirects to isosorbide mononitrate.
 * isoniazid (INN)
 * isonixin (INN)
 * Isopaque
 * isophane insulin (INN)
 * isoprazone (INN)
 * isoprednidene (INN)
 * isoprenaline (INN)
 * isoprofen (INN)
 * isopropamide iodide (INN)
 * isopropicillin (INN)
 * isopropyl myristate (USAN)
 * Isoptin
 * Isopto Cetamide
 * Isopto Cetapred
 * Isordil

isos-isox

 * isosorbide dinitrate (INN)
 * isosorbide mononitrate (INN)
 * isosorbide (INN)
 * isospaglumic acid (INN)
 * isosulpride (INN)
 * isothipendyl (INN)
 * isotiquimide (INN)
 * Isotonic Gentamicin Sulfate
 * isotretinoin (INN)
 * isovaleramide (USAN)
 * Isovue
 * isoxaprolol (INN)
 * isoxepac (INN)
 * isoxicam (INN)
 * isoxsuprine (INN)

isp-isu

 * ispinesib mesylate (USAN)
 * ispronicline (USAN, (INN))
 * isradipine (INN)
 * israpafant (INN)
 * Istalol
 * istaroxime (INN)
 * istradefylline (INN)
 * Isuprel

it-iw

 * itameline (INN)
 * itanoxone (INN)
 * itasetron (INN)
 * itazigrel (INN)
 * itopride (INN)
 * itraconazole (INN)
 * itramin tosilate (INN)
 * itrocainide (INN)
 * itrocinonide (INN)
 * iturelix (INN)
 * IV Persantine
 * ivabradine (INN)
 * ivacaftor (USAN)
 * Ivadantin
 * ivarimod (INN)
 * ivermectin (INN)
 * ivoqualine (INN)
 * Ivy Block
 * Iwilfin

ix-iz

 * ixabepilone (USAN)
 * Ixchiq
 * Ixinity
 * Iyuzeh
 * Izervay

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: List of drugs: Iq–Iz


text:
Phelps, Missouri

Phelps is an unincorporated community in Lawrence County, Missouri, United States. It lies along former U.S. Route 66 (Route 96), twenty-one miles east of Carthage.

A post office called Phelps was established in 1857, and remained in operation until 1864. The community has the name of William Wallace Phelps, a state legislator.

title: Phelps, Missouri