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 moment he did so, but venturing a second time their eyes met, or he fancied they did, and blushing furiously he hurried past. But again she came with him, or, rather, preceded him. On each empty seat between him and the sinking sun he saw her quite plainly: the pale oval face and the brown shoes, and, between them, the fawn gloves folded one upon the other.

Only this evening, about the small, sensitive mouth there seemed to be hovering just the faintest suggestion of a timid smile. And this time she lingered with him past Queen's Crescent and the Malden Road, till he turned into Carlton Street. It was dark in the passage, and he had to grope his way up the stairs, but with his hand on the door of the bed-sitting room on the third floor he felt less afraid of the solitude that would rise to meet him.

All day long in the dingy back office in Abingdon Street, Westminster, where from ten to six each day he sat copying briefs and petitions, he thought over what he would say to her; tactful beginnings by means of which he would slide into conversation with her. Up Portland Place he would rehearse


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Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.

Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), an authorized dealer of heavy-duty trucks manufactured by Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo), generally sold those trucks through an industry-wide competitive bidding process, whereby the retail customer describes its specific product requirements and invites bids from dealers it selects based on such factors as an existing relationship, geography, and reputation. Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer's specifications, it requests from Volvo a discount or "concession" off the wholesale price. Volvo decides on a case-by-case basis whether to offer a concession. The dealer then uses its Volvo discount in preparing its bid; it purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when the retail customer accepts its bid. Reeder was one of many regional Volvo dealers. Although nothing prohibits a Volvo dealer from bidding outside its territory, Reeder rarely bid against another Volvo dealer. In the atypical case in which a retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, Volvo's stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer. In 1997, after Volvo announced plans to enlarge the size of its dealers' markets and to reduce by almost half the number of its dealers, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a price concession greater than the discounts Reeder typically received.

Reeder, suspecting it was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate, filed this suit under, inter alia, § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, alleging that its sales and profits declined because Volvo offered other dealers more favorable price concessions. At trial, Reeder presented evidence of two instances when it bid against another Volvo dealer for a particular sale. In the first, although Volvo initially offered Reeder a lower concession, Volvo ultimately matched the concession offered to the competing dealer. Neither dealer won the bid. In the second, Volvo initially offered the two dealers the same concession, but increased the other dealer's discount after it, rather than Reeder, was selected. Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between concessions it received on four occasions when it bid successfully against non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions other successful Volvo [p165] dealers received in bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. Reeder also compared concessions Volvo offered it on several occasions when it bid unsuccessfully against non-Volvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did not bid. Reeder did not look for instances in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, but acknowledged it was "quite possible" that such instances occurred. Nor did Reeder offer any statistical analysis revealing whether it was disfavored on average as compared to other dealers. The jury found a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder and other Volvo dealers, that Volvo's discriminatory pricing injured Reeder, and that Reeder's damages from Volvo's Robinson-Patman violation exceeded $1.3 million. The District Court awarded treble damages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment.

Affirming, the Eighth Circuit, among other things, noted the threshold requirement that Reeder show it was a "purchaser" within the Act's meaning; rejected Volvo's contention that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to Robinson-Patman claims; held that the four instances in which Reeder purchased trucks following successful bids rendered it a purchaser under the Act; determined that a jury could reasonably decide Reeder was in actual competition with favored dealers at the time price differentials were imposed; and held that the jury could properly find Reeder had proved competitive injury based on evidence that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the number of its dealers, (2) Reeder lost one contract for which it competed with another Volvo dealer, (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, had it received the concessions given other dealers, and (4) Reeder's sales declined over time.

Held: A manufacturer may not be held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail customer. The Act does not reach the case Reeder presents. It centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition of that character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process. Pp. 175–182.

1. Section 2 was enacted to curb financially powerful corporations' use of localized price-cutting tactics that gravely impaired other sellers' competitive position. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543, and n.6. Augmenting § 2, the Robinson-Patman Act targeted the perceived harm to competition occasioned by the advent of large chain- [p166] stores able to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could demand. Robinson-Patman does not ban all price differences charged to different purchasers of similar commodities, but proscribes only "price discrimination [that] threatens to injure competition," Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220. Of the three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman claim, secondary-line cases, like this one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller's customers (here, Volvo's dealerships). Reeder has satisfied the Act's first two requirements for establishing secondary-line injury: (1) The relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce, and (2) the trucks were of "like grade and quality," 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Because Reeder has not identified any differentially priced transaction in which it was both a "purchaser" under the Act and "in actual competition" with a favored purchaser for the same customer, see, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 518–519, Volvo and amicus United States maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the Act's third and fourth requirements—that (3) Volvo "discriminate[d] in price between" Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks, and (4) "the effect of such discrimination may be to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" to the advantage of a favored purchaser, i.e., one who "receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination," 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury the Act requires. Pp. 175–177.

2. The injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act is not established by the selective comparisons Reeder presented at trial: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-to-purchase comparisons); and (3) comparisons of two occasions on which Reeder bid against another Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). Pp. 177–180.

(a) Because the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder's "competitors," those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435. Both types of comparisons fall short because in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did it compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. Nor [p167] did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared dealers were consistently favored over it. Reeder simply paired occasions on which it competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with instances in which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no systematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven months. This Court declines to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. No similar risk of manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chainstore paradigm. Here, there is no discrete "favored" dealer comparable to a chainstore or a large independent department store—at least, Reeder's evidence is insufficient to support an inference that such a dealer exists. For all that appears, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal vis-à-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. While Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on potential sales in a broad geographic area, competition at that initial stage is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. Once the customer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of the particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the sale. Volvo dealers' bidding for sales in the same geographic area does not import that they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. Pp. 178–179.

(b) Nor is a Robinson-Patman violation established by Reeder's evidence of two instances in which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier's product to fulfill its contractual commitment. Even assuming the Act applies to head-to-head transactions, Reeder did not establish that it was disfavored vis-à-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale—let alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. Reeder's evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other dealer the same concession, but ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition, Volvo increased Reeder's initial discount to match the discount offered the other competing Volvo dealer, but neither dealer won the bid. If price discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the "favored" Volvo dealer. P. 179–180.

[p168] 3. The Robinson-Patman Act signals no large departure from antitrust law's primary concern, interbrand competition. Even if the Act's text could be construed as Reeder urges and the Eighth Circuit held, this Court would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition. There is no evidence here that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier's selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands. By declining to extend Robinson-Patman's governance to such cases, the Court continues to construe the Act consistently with antitrust law's broader policies. Pp. 180–181.

374 F.3d 701, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 182.

Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Donald J. Russell, Max Huffman, and David L. Williams.

Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Pate, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Delrahim, Jonathan L. Marcus, Catherine G. O'Sullivan, and David Seidman.

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Richard D. Bernstein, Stephen B. Kinnaird, and Joe D. Byars, Jr.

 * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Petroleum Institute by Carolyn F. Corwin, Harry M. Ng, and Douglas W. Morris; for the National Electrical Manufacturers Association by Clark R. Silcox; for the Truck Manufacturers Association et al. by G. Michael Halfenger; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and David Price.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Automobile Dealers Association by Paul R. Norman and Catherine [p169] Cetrangolo; and for the North American Equipment Dealers Association et al. by Wayne A. Mack.

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 them to himself. But at Cambridge Gate, when the little fawn gloves came in view, the words would run away, to join him again maybe at the gate into the Chester Road, leaving him meanwhile to pass her with stiff, hurried steps and eyes fixed straight in front of him. And so it might have continued, but that one evening she was no longer at her usual seat. A crowd of noisy children swarmed over it, and suddenly it seemed to him as if the trees and flowers had all turned drab. A terror gnawed at his heart, and he hurried on, more for the need of movement than with any definite object. And just beyond a bed of geraniums that had hidden his view she was seated on a chair, and stopping with a jerk absolutely in front of her, he said, quite angrily:

"Oh! there you are!"

Which was not a bit the speech with which he had intended to introduce himself, but served his purpose just as well—perhaps better.

She did not resent his words or the tone.

"It was the children," she explained. They wanted to play; so I thought I would come on a little farther."


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 Upon which, as a matter of course, he took the chair beside her, and it did not occur to either of them that they had not known one another since the beginning, when between St. John's Wood and Albany Street God planted a garden.

Each evening they would linger there, listening to the pleading passion of the blackbird's note, the thrush's call to joy and hope. He loved her gentle ways. From the bold challenges, the sly glances of invitation flashed upon him in the street or from some neighbouring table in the cheap luncheon room he had always shrunk confused and awkward. Her shyness gave him confidence. It was she who was half afraid, whose eyes would fall beneath his gaze, who would tremble at his touch, giving him the delights of manly dominion, of tender authority. It was he who insisted on the aristocratic seclusion afforded by the private chair; who, with the careless indifference of a man to whom pennies were unimportant, would pay for them both. Once on his way through Piccadilly Circus he had paused by the fountain to glance at a great basket of lilies of the valley, struck suddenly by the thought


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 how strangely their little pale petals seemed suggestive of her.

'Ere y' are, honey. Her favourite flower!" cried the girl, with a grin, holding a bunch towards him.

"How much?" he had asked, vainly trying to keep the blood from rushing to his face.

The girl paused a moment, a coarse, kindly creature.

"Sixpence," she demanded; and he bought them. She had meant to ask him a shilling, and knew he would have paid it. "Same as silly fool!" she called herself as she pocketed the money.

He gave them to her with a fine lordly air, and watched her while she pinned them to her blouse, and a squirrel halting in the middle of the walk watched her also with his head on one side, wondering what was the good of them that she should store them with so much care. She did not thank him in words, but there were tears in her eyes when she turned her face to his, and one of the little fawn gloves stole out and sought his hand. He took it in both his, and would have held it, but she withdrew it almost hurriedly.


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 They appealed to him, her gloves, in spite of their being old and much mended; and he was glad they were of kid. Had they been of cotton, such as girls of her class usually wore, the thought of pressing his lips to them would have put his teeth on edge. He loved the little brown shoes, that must have been expensive when new, for they still kept their shape. And the fringe of dainty petticoat, always so spotless and with never a tear, and the neat, plain stockings that showed below the closely fitting frock. So often he had noticed girls, showily, extravagantly dressed, but with red bare hands and sloppy shoes. Handsome girls, some of them, attractive enough if you were not of a finicking nature, to whom the little accessories are almost of more importance than the whole.

He loved her voice, so different from the strident tones that every now and then, as some couple, laughing and talking, passed them, would fall upon him almost like a blow; her quick, graceful movements that always brought back to his memory the vision of hill and stream. In her little brown shoes and gloves and the frock which was also of


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 a shade of brown though darker, she was strangely suggestive to him of a fawn. The timid, gentle look, the swift, soft movements that have taken place before they are seen; the haunting suggestion of fear never quite conquered, as if the little nervous limbs were always ready for sudden flight. He called her that one day. Neither of them had ever thought to ask one another's names; it did not seem to matter.

"My little brown fawn," he had whispered, "I am always expecting you to suddenly dig your little heels into the ground and spring away"; and she had laughed and drawn a little closer to him. And even that was just the movement of a fawn. He had known them, creeping near to them upon the hill-sides when he was a child.

There was much in common between them, so they found. Though he could claim a few distant relatives scattered about the North, they were both, for all practical purposes, alone in the world. To her, also, home meant a bed-sitting room—"over there," as she indicated with a wave of the little fawn glove embracing the north-west district gener-


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 ally; and he did not press her for any more precise address.

It was easy enough for him to picture it: the mean, close-smelling street somewhere in the neighbourhood of Lisson Grove, or farther on towards the Harrow Road. Always he preferred to say good-bye to her at some point in the Outer Circle, with its peaceful vista of fine trees and stately houses, watching her little fawn-like figure fading away into the twilight.

No friend or relative had she ever known, except the pale, girlish-looking mother who had died soon after they had come to London. The elderly landlady had let her stay on, helping in the work of the house; and when even this last refuge had failed her, well-meaning folk had interested themselves and secured her employment. It was light and fairly well paid, but there were objections to it, so he gathered, more from her halting silences than from what she said. She had tried for a time to find something else, but it was so difficult without help or resources. There was nothing really to complain about it, except And then she paused with a sudden clasp of the gloved hands, and, seeing


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 the troubled look in her eyes, he had changed the conversation.

It did not matter; he would take her away from it. It was very sweet to him, the thought of putting a protective arm about this little fragile creature whose weakness gave him strength. He was not always going to be a clerk in an office. He was going to write poetry, books, plays. Already he had earned a little. He told her of his hopes, and her great faith in him gave him new courage. One evening, finding a seat where few people ever passed, he read to her. And she had understood. All unconsciously she laughed in the right places, and when his own voice trembled, and he found it difficult to continue for the lump in his own throat, glancing at her he saw the tears were in her eyes. It was the first time he had tasted sympathy.

And so spring grew to summer. And then one evening a great thing happened. He could not make out at first what it was about her some little added fragrance that made itself oddly felt, while she herself seemed to be conscious of increased dignity. It was not until he took her hand to say good-bye that he discovered it. There was something


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 different about the feel of her, and, looking down at the little hand that lay in his, he found the reason. She had on a pair of new gloves. They were still of the same fawn colour, but so smooth and soft and cool. They fitted closely without a wrinkle, displaying the slightness and the gracefulness of the hands beneath. The twilight had almost faded, and, save for the broad back of a disappearing policeman, they had the Outer Circle to themselves; and, the sudden impulse coming to him, he dropped on one knee, as they do in plays and story books and sometimes elsewhere, and pressed the little fawn gloves to his lips in a long, passionate kiss. The sound of approaching footsteps made him rise hurriedly. She did not move, but her whole body was trembling, and in her eyes was a look that was almost of fear. The approaching footsteps came nearer, but a bend of the road still screened them. Swiftly and in silence she put her arms about his neck and kissed him. It was a strange, cold kiss, but almost fierce, and then without a word she turned and walked away; and he watched her to the corner of Hanover Gate, but she did not look back.


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 It was almost as if it had raised a barrier between them, that kiss. The next evening she came to meet him with a smile as usual, but in her eyes was still that odd suggestion of lurking fear; and when, seated beside her, he put his hand on hers it seemed to him she shrank away from him. It was an unconscious movement. It brought back to him that haunting memory of hill and stream when some soft-eyed fawn, strayed from her fellows, would let him approach quite close to her, and then, when he put out his hand to caress her, would start away with a swift, quivering movement.

"Do you always wear gloves?" he asked her one evening a little later.

"Yes," she answered, speaking low; "when I'm out of doors."

"But this is not out of doors," he had pleaded. "We have come into the garden. Won't you take them off?"

She had looked at him from under bent brows, as if trying to read him. She did not answer him then. But on the way out, on the last seat close to the gate, she had sat down, motioning him to sit beside her. Quietly she unbuttoned the fawn gloves; drew each


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 one off and laid them aside. And then, for the first time, he saw her hands.

Had he looked at her, seen the faint hope die out, the mute agony in the quiet eyes watching him, he would have tried to hide the disgust, the physical repulsion that showed itself so plainly in his face, in the involuntary movement with which he drew away from her. They were small and shapely with rounded curves, but raw and seared as with hot irons, with a growth of red, angry-coloured warts, and the nails all worn away.

"I ought to have shown them to you before," she said simply as she drew the gloves on again. "It was silly of me. I ought to have known."

He tried to comfort her, but his phrases came meaningless and halting.

It was the work, she explained as they walked on. It made your hands like that after a time. If only she could have got out of it earlier! But now! It was no good worrying about it now. They parted near to the Hanover Gate, but to-night he did not stand watching her as he had always done till she waved a last good-bye to him just before disappearing; so whether she turned or not he never knew.


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 He did not go to meet her the next evening. A dozen times his footsteps led him unconsciously almost to the gate. Then he would hurry away again, pace the mean streets, jostling stupidly against the passers-by. The pale, sweet face, the little nymphlike figure, the little brown shoes kept calling to him. If only there would pass away the horror of those hands! All the artist in him shuddered at the memory of them. Always he had imagined them under the neat, smooth gloves as fitting in with all the rest of her, dreaming of the time when he would hold them in his own, caressing them, kissing them. Would it be possible to forget them, to reconcile oneself to them? He must think—must get away from these crowded streets where faces seemed to grin at him. He remembered that Parliament had just risen, that work was slack in the office. He would ask that he might take his holiday now—the next day. And they had agreed.

He packed a few things into a knapsack. From the voices of the hills and streams he would find counsel.

He took no count of his wanderings. One evening at a lonely inn he met a young doctor.


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 The innkeeper's wife was expecting to be taken with child that night, and the doctor was waiting downstairs till summoned. While they were talking, the idea came to him. Why had he not thought of it? Overcoming his shyness, he put his questions. What work would it be that would cause such injuries? He described them, seeing them before him in the shadows of the dimly lighted room, those poor, pitiful little hands.

Oh! a dozen things might account for it—the doctor's voice sounded callous—the handling of flax, even of linen under certain conditions. Chemicals entered so much nowadays into all sorts of processes and preparations. All this new photography, cheap colour printing, dyeing and cleaning, metal work. Might all be avoided by providing rubber gloves. It ought to be made compulsory. The doctor seemed inclined to hold forth. He interrupted him.

But could it be cured? Was there any hope?

Cured? Hope? Of course it could be cured. It was only local—the effect being confined to the hands proved that. A poisoned condition of the skin aggravated by


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 general poverty of blood. Take her away from it; let her have plenty of fresh air and careful diet, using some such simple ointment or another as any local man, seeing them, would prescribe; and in three or four months they would recover.

He could hardly stay to thank the young doctor. He wanted to get away by himself, to shout, to wave his arms, to leap. Had it been possible he would have returned that very night. He cursed himself for the fancifulness that had prevented his inquiring her address. He could have sent a telegram. Rising at dawn, for he had not attempted to sleep, he walked the ten miles to the nearest railway station, and waited for the train. All day long it seemed to creep with him through the endless country. But London came at last.

It was still the afternoon, but he did not care to go to his room. Leaving his knapsack at the station, he made his way to Westminster. He wanted all things to be unchanged, so that between this evening and their parting it might seem as if there had merely passed an ugly dream; and timing himself, he reached the park just at their usual hour.


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 He waited till the gates were closed, but she did not come. All day long at the back of his mind had been that fear, but he had driven it away. She was ill, just a headache, or merely tired.

And the next evening he told himself the same. He dared not whisper to himself anything else. And each succeeding evening again. He never remembered how many. For a time he would sit watching the path by which she had always come; and when the hour was long past he would rise and walk towards the gate, look east and west, and then return. One evening he stopped one of the park-keepers and questioned him. Yes, the man remembered her quite well: the young lady with the fawn gloves. She had come once or twice—maybe oftener, the park-keeper could not be sure—and had waited. No, there had been nothing to show that she was in any way upset. She had just sat there for a time, now and then walking a little way and then coming back again, until the closing hour, and then she had gone. He left his address with the park-keeper. The man promised to let him know if he ever saw her there again.


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 Sometimes, instead of the park, he would haunt the mean streets about Lisson Grove and far beyond the other side of the Edgware Road, pacing them till night fell. But he never found her.

He wondered, beating against the bars of his poverty, if money would have helped him. But the grim, endless city, hiding its million secrets, seemed to mock the thought. A few pounds he had scraped together he spent in advertisements; but he expected no response, and none came. It was not likely she would see them.

And so after a time the park, and even the streets round about it, became hateful to him; and he moved away to another part of London, hoping to forget. But he never quite succeeded. Always it would come back to him when he was not thinking: the broad, quiet walk with its prim trees and gay beds of flowers. And always he would see her seated there, framed by the fading light. At least, that much of her: the little spiritual face, and the brown shoes pointing downwards, and between them the little fawn gloves folded upon her lap.


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first time I met him, to my knowledge, was on an evil-smelling, one-funnelled steamboat that in those days plied between London Bridge and Antwerp. He was walking the deck arm-in-arm with a showily dressed but decidedly attractive young woman; both of them talking and laughing loudly. It struck me as odd, finding him a fellow-traveller by such a route. The passage occupied eighteen hours, and the first-class return fare was one pound twelve and six, including three meals each way; drinks, as the contract was careful to explain, being extra. I was earning thirty shillings a week at the time as clerk with a firm of agents in Fenchurch Street. Our business was the purchasing of articles on commission for customers in India, and I had learned to be a judge of values. The beaver-lined coat he was wearing—for the evening, although it was late summer, was chilly—must have cost him a couple of hundred pounds, while his carelessly displayed jewellery


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Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc./Opinion of the Court

[p169] JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns specially ordered products—heavy-duty trucks supplied by Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo), and sold by franchised dealers through a competitive bidding process. In this process, the retail customer states its specifications and invites bids, generally from dealers franchised by different manufacturers. Only when a Volvo dealer's bid proves successful does the dealer arrange to purchase the trucks, which Volvo then builds to meet the customer's specifications. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), a Volvo dealer located in Fort Smith, Arkansas, commenced suit against Volvo alleging that Reeder's sales and profits declined because Volvo offered other dealers more favorable price concessions than those offered to Reeder. Reeder sought redress for its alleged losses under § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Robinson-Patman Act or Act), and the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-72-201 et seq. (2001). Reeder prevailed at trial and on appeal on both claims.

We granted review on the federal claim to resolve the question whether a manufacturer offering its dealers different wholesale prices may be held liable for price discrimination proscribed by Robinson-Patman, absent a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers contemporaneously competing to resell to the same retail customer. While state law designed to protect franchisees may provide, and in this case has provided, a remedy for the dealer exposed to conduct of the kind Reeder alleged, the Robinson-Patman Act, we hold, does not reach the case Reeder presents. The Act centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for [p170] resale of the purchased product. Competition of that character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process.

I
Volvo manufactures heavy-duty trucks. Reeder sells new and used trucks, including heavy-duty trucks. 374 F.3d 701, 704 (CA8 2004). Reeder became an authorized dealer of Volvo trucks in 1995, pursuant to a five-year franchise agreement that provided for automatic one-year extensions if Reeder met sales objectives set by Volvo. Ibid. Reeder generally sold Volvo's trucks through a competitive bidding process. Ibid. In this process, the retail customer describes its specific product requirements and invites bids from several dealers it selects. The customer's "decision to request a bid from a particular dealer or to allow a particular dealer to bid is controlled by such factors as an existing relationship, geography, reputation, and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by individual dealers." Id., at 719 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer's specifications, it turns to Volvo and requests a discount or "concession" off the wholesale price (set at 80% of the published retail price). Id., at 704. It is common practice in the industry for manufacturers to offer customer-specific discounts to their dealers. Ibid.; App. 334, 337. Volvo decides on a case-by-case basis whether to offer a discount and, if so, what the discount rate will be, taking account of such factors as industry-wide demand and whether the retail customer has, historically, purchased a different brand of trucks. App. 348–349, 333–334. The dealer then uses the discount offered by Volvo in prepar- [p171] ing its bid; it purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when the retail customer accepts its bid. Ibid.

Reeder was one of many Volvo dealers, each assigned by Volvo to a geographic territory. Reeder's territory encompassed ten counties in Arkansas and two in Oklahoma. 374 F.3d, at 709. Although nothing prohibits a Volvo dealer from bidding outside its territory, ibid., Reeder rarely bid against another Volvo dealer, see id., at 705; 5 App. in No. 02-2462 (CA8), pp. 1621–1622 (hereinafter C.A. App.). In the atypical event that the same retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, Volvo's stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer competing head to head for the same sale. 4 id., at 1161–1162; 5 id., at 1619, 1621.

In 1997, Volvo announced a program it called "Volvo Vision," in which the company addressed problems it faced in the market for heavy trucks, among them, the company's assessment that it had too many dealers. Volvo projected enlarging the size of its dealers' markets and reducing the number of dealers from 146 to 75. 374 F.3d, at 705. Coincidentally, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a price concession greater than the concessions Reeder typically received, and "Reeder came to suspect it was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate." Ibid. Reeder filed suit against Volvo in February 2000, alleging losses attributable to Volvo's violation of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.

At trial, Reeder's vice-president, William E. Heck, acknowledged that Volvo's policy was to offer equal concessions to Volvo dealers bidding against one another for a particular contract, but he contended that the policy "was not executed." 4 C.A. App. 1162. Reeder presented evidence concerning two instances over the five-year course of its authorized dealership when Reeder bid against other Volvo dealers for a particular sale. 374 F.3d, at 705, 708–709. One of the two instances involved Reeder's bid on a sale to [p172] Tommy Davidson Trucking. 4 C.A. App. 1267–1268. Volvo initially offered Reeder a concession of 17%, which Volvo, unprompted, increased to 18.1% and then, one week later, to 18.9%, to match the concession Volvo had offered to another of its dealers. 5 id., at 1268–1272. Neither dealer won the bid. Id., at 1272. The other instance involved Hiland Dairy, which solicited bids from both Reeder and Southwest Missouri Truck Center. Id., at 1626–1627. Per its written policy, Volvo offered the two dealers the same concession, and Hiland selected Southwest Missouri, a dealer from which Hiland had previously purchased trucks. Ibid. After selecting Southwest Missouri, Hiland insisted on the price Southwest Missouri had bid prior to a general increase in Volvo's prices; Volvo obliged by increasing the size of the discount. Id., at 1627. See also id., at 1483–1488; 374 F.3d, at 720 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between concessions Volvo offered when Reeder bid against non-Volvo dealers, with concessions accorded to other Volvo dealers similarly bidding against non-Volvo dealers for other sales. Reeder's evidence compared concessions Reeder received on four occasions when it bid successfully against non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions other successful Volvo dealers received in connection with bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. Id., at 705–706. Reeder also compared concessions offered by Volvo on several occasions when Reeder bid unsuccessfully against non-Volvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions received by other Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did not bid. Id., at 706–707.

Reeder's vice-president, Heck, testified that Reeder did not look for instances in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, although he acknowledged it was "quite possible" that such instances occurred. 5 C.A. App. 1462. Nor did Reeder endeavor to determine by any sta- [p173] tistical analysis whether Reeder was disfavored on average as compared to another dealer or set of dealers. Id., at 1462–1464.

The jury found that there was a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder and other Volvo truck dealers, and that Volvo's discriminatory pricing injured Reeder. App. 480–486. It further found that Reeder's damages from Volvo's Robinson-Patman Act violation exceeded $1.3 million. Id., at 486. The District Court summarily denied Volvo's motion for judgment as a matter of law and the company's alternative motion for new trial or remittitur, awarded treble damages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment.

A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court noted that, "as a threshold matter[,] Reeder had to show [that] it was a 'purchaser' within the meaning of the [Act]," 374 F.3d, at 708, i.e., that "there were actual sales at two different prices[,] a sale to [Reeder] and a sale to another Volvo dealer," id., at 707–708. Rejecting Volvo's contention that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to claims under the Robinson-Patman Act, id., at 708–709, the Court of Appeals observed that Reeder was "more than an unsuccessful bidder," id., at 709. The four instances in which Reeder "actually purchased Volvo trucks following successful bids on contracts," the court concluded, sufficed to render Reeder a purchaser within the meaning of the Act. Ibid.

The Court of Appeals next determined that a jury could reasonably decide that Reeder was "in actual competition" with favored dealers. Ibid. "[A]s of the time the price differential was imposed," the court reasoned, "the favored [p174] and disfavored purchasers competed at the same functional level and within the same geographic market." Ibid. (quoting Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578, 585 (CA2 1987)). The court further held that the jury could properly find from the evidence that Reeder had proved competitive injury from price discrimination. Specifically, the court pointed to evidence showing that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the number of its dealers; (2) Reeder lost the Hiland Dairy contract, for which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer; (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, had it received the concessions other dealers received; and (4) Reeder's sales had declined over a period of time. 374 F.3d, at 711–712. The court also affirmed the award of treble damages to Reeder. Id., at 712–714.

Judge Hansen dissented as to the Robinson-Patman Act claim. "Traditional [Robinson-Patman Act] cases," he observed, "involve sellers and purchasers that carry inventory or deal in fungible goods." Id., at 718. The majority, Judge Hansen commented, "attempt[ed] to fit a square peg into a round hole," ibid., when it extended the Act's reach to the marketplace for heavy-duty trucks, where "special-order products are sold to individual, pre-identified customers only after competitive bidding," ibid. There may be competition among dealers for the opportunity to bid on potential sales, he noted, but "[o]nce bidding begins, the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate sale." Id., at 719. Violation of the Act, in Judge Hansen's view, could not be predicated on the instances Reeder identified in which it was a purchaser, for "there was no actual competition between" Reeder and another Volvo dealer at the time of Reeder's purchases. Ibid. "Without proof of actual competition" for the same customer when the requisite purchases were made, he concluded, "Reeder can- [p175] not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of competitive injury." Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 544 U.S. 903 (2005), to resolve this question: May a manufacturer be held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail customer? Satisfied that the Court of Appeals erred in answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the Eighth Circuit's judgment.

II
Section 2, "when originally enacted as part of the Clayton Act in 1914, was born of a desire by Congress to curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive position of other sellers." FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543, and n.6 (1960) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1914); S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 2–4 (1914)). Augmenting that provision in 1936 with the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress sought to target the perceived harm to competition occasioned by powerful buyers, rather than sellers; specifically, Congress responded to the advent of large chainstores, enterprises with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could demand. See 14 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2302, p. 11 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter Hovenkamp); P. Areeda & L. Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis ¶ 602, pp. 908–909 (5th ed. 1997) (hereinafter Areeda). The Act provides, in relevant part:

"'It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know- [p176] ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ' 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)."

Pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, a private plaintiff may recover threefold for actual injury sustained as a result of a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981).

Mindful of the purposes of the Act and of the antitrust laws generally, we have explained that Robinson-Patman does not "ban all price differences charged to different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality," Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); rather, the Act proscribes "price discrimination only to the extent that it threatens to injure competition," ibid. Our decisions describe three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman Act claim: primary line, secondary line, and tertiary line. Primary-line cases entail conduct—most conspicuously, predatory pricing—that injures competition at the level of the discriminating seller and its direct competitors. See, e.g., id., at 220–222, 113 S.Ct. 2578; see also Hovenkamp ¶ 2301a, pp. 4–6. Secondary-line cases, of which this is one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller's customers (here, Volvo's dealerships); cases in this category typically refer to "favored" and "disfavored" purchasers. See ibid.; Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558, n.15 (1990). Tertiary-line cases involve injury to competition at the level of the purchaser's customers. See Areeda ¶ 601e, p. 907.

To establish the secondary-line injury of which it complains, Reeder had to show that (1) the relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce; (2) the trucks were of "like grade and quality"; (3) Volvo "discriminate[d] in price between" Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks; and (4) "the effect of such discrimination may be to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" to the advantage of a fa- [p177] vored purchaser,  i.e., one who "receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). It is undisputed that Reeder has satisfied the first and second requirements. Volvo and the United States, as amicus curiae, maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the third and fourth requirements, because Reeder has not identified any differentially priced transaction in which it was both a "purchaser" under the Act and "in actual competition" with a favored purchaser for the same customer.

A hallmark of the requisite competitive injury, our decisions indicate, is the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 518–519 (1963) (evidence showed patronage shifted from disfavored dealers to favored dealers); Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 437–438, and n.8 (1983) (complaint "supported by direct evidence of diverted sales"). We have also recognized that a permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that a favored competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial period of time. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49–51 (1948); Falls City Industries, 460 U.S., at 435. Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, however, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury required under the Act.

III
The evidence Reeder offered at trial falls into three categories: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-to- [p178] purchase comparisons); and (3) evidence of two occasions on which Reeder bid against another Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). The Court of Appeals concluded that Reeder demonstrated competitive injury under the Act because Reeder competed with favored purchasers "at the same functional level and within the same geographic market." 374 F.3d, at 709 (quoting Best Brands, 842 F.2d, at 585). As we see it, however, selective comparisons of the kind Reeder presented do not show the injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act.

A
Both the purchase-to-purchase and the offer-to-purchase comparisons fall short, for in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. Nor did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared dealers were consistently favored vis-à-vis Reeder. Reeder simply paired occasions on which it competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with instances in which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no systematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven months. See 374 F.3d, at 706, 710.

We decline to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–35, 55. No similar risk of manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chainstore paradigm. Here, there is no discrete "favored" dealer comparable to a chainstore or a large independent department store—at least, Reeder's evidence is insufficient to support an inference of such a dealer or set of dealers. For all we know, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal vis-à-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. See supra, at 172.

Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on potential sales in a broad geographic area. At that initial stage, however, competition is [p179] not affected by differential pricing; a dealer in the competitive bidding process here at issue approaches Volvo for a price concession only after it has been selected by a retail customer to submit a bid. Competition for an opportunity to bid, we earlier observed, is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. See supra, at 866. We reiterate in this regard an observation made by Judge Hansen, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit's Robinson-Patman holding: Once a retail customer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, "the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate sale." 374 F.3d, at 719. That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in the same geographic area does not import that they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. In sum, the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder's "competitors," hence those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, 460 U.S., at 435 (inference of competitive injury under Morton Salt arises from "proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over time" (emphasis added)).

B
Reeder did offer evidence of two instances in which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. See supra, at 171–172. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier's product to fulfill its [p180] contractual commitment. Because Robinson-Patman "prohibits only discrimination 'between different purchasers, Brief for Petitioner 26 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a); emphasis added), Volvo and the United States argue, the Act does not reach markets characterized by competitive bidding and special-order sales, as opposed to sales from inventory. See Brief for Petitioner 27; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 17–20. We need not decide that question today. Assuming the Act applies to the head-to-head transactions, Reeder did not establish that it was disfavored vis-à-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale—let alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. See 1 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 478–479 (5th ed. 2002) ("No inference of injury to competition is permitted when the discrimination is not substantial." (collecting cases)).

Reeder's evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder. 374 F.3d, at 705. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other dealer the same concession. Volvo ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer, but only after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition Reeder identified, Volvo increased Reeder's initial 17% discount to 18.9%, to match the discount offered to the other competing Volvo dealer; neither dealer won the bid. See supra, at 867–868. In short, if price discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the "favored" Volvo dealer.

IV
Interbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the "primary concern of antitrust law." Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52, n.19 (1977). The Robinson-Patman Act signals no large departure from that [p181] main concern. Even if the Act's text could be construed in the manner urged by Reeder and embraced by the Court of Appeals, we would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition. In the case before us, there is no evidence that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier's selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands. See id., at 51–52 (observing that the market impact of a vertical practice, such as a change in a supplier's distribution system, may be a "simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition"). By declining to extend Robinson-Patman's governance to such cases, we continue to construe the Act "consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws." Brooke Group, 509 U.S., at 220 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80, n. 13 (1979)); see Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953) (cautioning against Robinson-Patman constructions that "extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation"). [p182]

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


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Captain's operations are begun,—and, I hope, ended; for indeed poor Madame Duval has already but too much reason to regret Sir Clement's visit to Howard Grove.

Yesterday morning, during breakfast, as the Captain was reading the news-paper, Sir Clement suddenly begged to look at it, saying he wanted to know if there was any account of a transaction, at which he had been present the evening before his journey hither, concerning a poor Frenchman, who had got into a scrape which might cost him his life.

The Captain demanded particulars; and then Sir Clement told a long story, of being with a party of country friends, at the Tower, and hearing a man call out for mercy in French, and that, when he enquired into the occasion of his distress, he was informed, that he had been taken up upon suspicion of treasonable practices against the government. "The poor fellow," continued he, no sooner found. that I spoke French, than he besought me

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Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc./Dissent Stevens

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.

Franchised dealers who sell Volvo trucks, like those who sell automobiles, farm equipment, washing machines, and a variety of other expensive items, routinely engage in negotiations with prospective purchasers. Sometimes the prospect is simultaneously negotiating with two Volvo dealers, sometimes with a Volvo dealer and a dealer representing another manufacturer, and still other times a satisfied customer who is generally familiar with the options available in a competitive market may negotiate with only one dealer at a time. Until today, the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of price discrimination would have protected the dealer's ability to negotiate in all those situations. Today, however, by adopting a novel, transaction-specific concept of competition, the Court eliminates that statutory protection in all but those rare situations in which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two Volvo dealers at the same time.

I
Setting aside for the moment the fact that the case involves goods specially ordered for particular customers [p183] rather than goods stocked in inventory, the case is a rather ordinary Robinson-Patman suit. Respondent Reeder alleged a violation of the Act; the parties submitted a good deal of conflicting evidence to the jury; the trial judge properly instructed the jurors on the elements of price discrimination, competitive injury, and damages; and the jury returned a verdict resolving all issues in Reeder's favor. The Court of Appeals found no error in either the instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence. 374 F.3d 701 (CA8 2004).

Two issues of fact bear particular mention.

First, Volvo does not challenge the jury's finding of price discrimination. Reeder's theory of the case was that Volvo sought to cut back its number of dealers and deemed Reeder expendable. To avoid possible violations of franchise agreements and state laws, Volvo chose to accomplish this goal by offering Reeder worse prices than other regional dealers.

Reeder introduced substantial evidence of this theory. It showed that Volvo had an explicit business strategy, known as the "Volvo Vision," of "fewer dealers, larger markets." App. 34. It showed that Volvo could afford to lose sales as it squeezed dealers out, since the boom years of the late 1990's left Volvo with about as many orders as it could fill. Id., at 256–257. And it showed that Volvo frequently gave worse prices to it than to other regional dealers. On at least four occasions, Volvo sold trucks to Reeder at significantly higher prices than to other dealers buying similar trucks around the same time. To give one example, in the spring of 1998 Volvo sold 20 trucks to Reeder at a 9% concession, but sold similar trucks to a Texas dealer at a 12.3% concession. Id., at 132–134. This left Reeder paying $2,606 more per truck. Id., at 134. Although the Court chides Reeder [p184] for failing to perform statistical analyses, see ante, at 172–173, 178, the jury clearly had a sufficient basis for finding price discrimination. It could infer that Volvo's pricing policies were comparable to a secret catalog listing one set of low prices for its "A" dealers and a higher set for its "B" dealers like Reeder, with an exception providing for the same prices where an "A" dealer and a "B" dealer were engaged in negotiations with the same customer at the same time.

Second, the jury found that the favored dealers at issue in these comparisons were competitive players in the same geographic market as Reeder. This conclusion is implicit in the jury's finding of competitive injury, since the jury instruction on that element required Reeder to prove

"'a substantial difference in price in sales by defendant to plaintiff and other competing Volvo dealers over a significant period of time. This requires plaintiff to show that it and the other Volvo dealer(s) were retail dealers within the same geographic market and that the effect of the price differential was to allow the other Volvo dealer(s) to draw sales or profits away from plaintiff.' App. 480, Instruction No. 18."

Volvo does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that Reeder and the favored dealers operated in the same geographic market. Volvo's restraint is wise, as Reeder offered evidence that truck buyers are unsurprisingly mobile, that it delivered trucks to purchasers throughout the region, and that customers would sometimes solicit bids from more than one regional Volvo dealer. [p185]

II
For decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the Robinson-Patman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice Black's opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948):

"'It is argued that the findings fail to show that respondent's discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent's discounts, although the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. The statute requires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations 'may be substantially to lessen competition or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.' After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that 'the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they 'may' have such an effect.' Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U.S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found what would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate.' Id., at 45–47 (footnote omitted)."

We have treated as competitors those who sell "in a single, interstate retail market." Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 436 (1983); cf. ''Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.'', 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). Under this approach—uncontroversial until today—Reeder [p186] would readily prevail. There is ample evidence that Volvo charged Reeder higher prices than it charged to competing dealers in the same market over a period of many months. That those higher prices impaired Reeder's ability to compete with those dealers is just as obvious as the injury to competition described by the Court in Morton Salt.

Volvo nonetheless argues that no competitive injury could have occurred because it never discriminated against Reeder when Reeder and another Volvo dealer were seeking concessions with regard to the same ultimate customer. In Volvo's view, each transaction was a separate market, one defined by the customer and those dealers whom it had asked for bids. For each specific customer who has solicited bids, Reeder's only "competitors" were the other dealers making bids. Accordingly, if none of these other dealers were Volvo dealers, then Reeder suffered no competitive harm (relative to other Volvo dealers) when Volvo gave it a discriminatorily high price.

Unlike the Court, I cannot accept Volvo's vision. Nothing in the statute or in our precedent suggests that "competition" is evaluated by a transaction-specific inquiry, and such an approach makes little sense. It requires us to ignore the fact that competition among truck dealers is a continuing war waged over time rather than a series of wholly discrete events. Each time Reeder managed to resell trucks it had purchased at discriminatorily high prices, it was forced either to accept lower profit margins than were available to favored Volvo dealers or to pass on the higher costs to its customers (who then might well go to a different dealer the next time). And we have long indicated that lost profits relative to a competitor are a proper basis for permitting the Morton Salt inference. See, e.g., Falls City Industries, 460 U.S., at 435 (noting that to overcome the Morton Salt inference, a defendant needs "evidence breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales or profits" (emphasis added)). By ignoring these commonsense points, [p187] the Court gives short shrift to the Robinson-Patman Act's prophylactic intent. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (barring price discrimination where "the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition" (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Morton Salt, 334 U.S., at 46.

The Court appears to hold that, absent head-to-head bidding with a favored dealer, a dealer in a competitive bidding market can suffer no competitive injury. It is unclear whether that holding is limited to franchised dealers who do not maintain inventories, or excludes virtually all franchisees from the effective protection of the Act. In either event, it is not faithful to the statutory text.

III
As the Court recognizes, the Robinson-Patman Act was primarily intended to protect small retailers from the vigorous competition afforded by chainstores and other large volume purchasers. Whether that statutory mission represented sound economic policy is not merely the subject of serious debate, but may well merit Judge Bork's characterization as "wholly mistaken economic theory." I do not suggest that disagreement with the policy of the Act has played a conscious role in my colleagues' unprecedented decision today. I cannot avoid, however, identifying the irony in a decision refusing to adhere to the text of the Act in a case in which the jury credited evidence that discriminatory [p188] prices were employed as means of escaping contractual commitments and eliminating specifically targeted firms from a competitive market. The exceptional quality of this case provides strong reason to enforce the Act's prohibition against discrimination even if Judge Bork's evaluation (with which I happen to agree) is completely accurate.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.


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 And, likewise, when one who could move thousands with his electrifying eloquence; who could, not through his solicitation but by their invitation, find welcome access to Governors and Viceroys and the Sovereign herself, when he gave up all in the name of God, assumed the apostolic garb and went forth,. with truth on the lip and love in the heart, to proclaim the glory of God, when Keshub Chandra Sen went forward, that was another proof of God’s providential doing for the Dispensation of the Spirit. When a Kuleen Brahmin, by custom placed in the lofty position. of master of the whole society, whose word is social law, to gratify whose desire is held to be the salvation of one’s soul, when, he snaps, literally snaps into shreds, the mark and token of his supremacy and wears the garb of the poor servant of God, this is another proof of the providence of God in the history of the Dispensation of the Spirit. The humble to be exalted into the apostle-that is one way in which God vindicates His greatness. The powerful, the lofty, the proud to be humbled and enlisted into the lowly


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 HENRY JAMES

W. COLLINS SONS & CO. LTD.


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 service of man—this is the other way in which God vindicates His glory. There are innumerable such instances of God’s doing for the good of the Brahma Samaj in the short history of our church, for which we all join to render thanks unto His mercy.

He whose translation to higher spheres is the occasion for bur meeting here to-day, was a great man, a prince among men, a prophet among souls, a saint and sage among spirits. What could he net have been, had he chosen some other path! Not quite thirty, already holding a promising place in the Educational Department with a brilliant University record providing his credentials for future promotion and elevation, on the one hand; and faced, on the other, with poor means and humble position—often the excuse for adhering to a lucrative place when duty calls elsewhere—he in a moment gave up all in self-dedication to the service of God. What could not a man of undoubted ability, moving eloquence, inexhaustible energy and activity, commanding character and winning disposition, what could he not


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 have achieved for his own exaltation, if he had chosen to seek self before God! He gave up all, not from external pressure, not from the stress of circumstances, but from, the spontaneity of dedication to a great cause. All honour to him; all honour to the God that led him on to it! He lived, not merely a life of poverty, but a life of privation; and that, without a word of dissatisfaction, leave alone complaint. He felt the greatness of the task before him, the nobility of the vocation, the glory of the end, lie had placed before himself.

 * “Unknown delights are in the cross,
 * All joy beside to me is dross,”

says Madame Guyon. These delights of the cross Pandit Sastri assumed unto himself. All joy beside was to him dross!

And how cheerful was his temperament always! The very laughter of the man was a sunshine of the heart. As we all know, we laugh from different motives. There is the cynical laughter, the sardonic laughter, the empty laughter, the crowing laughter. But there is the laughter of spiritual fellowship, the ' laughter that comes from the


text: Bird-life; a guide to the study of our common birds/Chapters/The bird, its place in Nature and relation to man


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 NOTES FOR

THE IVORY TOWER


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 heart, in which there is the Sunshine of God. Once t was asked to preside Over the Provincial Social Conference at Ranipet; Pandit Sastri was then at Madras. Having taken my leave of him, I went and presided. And when I came back, Pandit Sastri asked me. What did you tell them in your address, Venkata Ratnam?” “In your name, sir, I told them to be cheerful.” “Why, do you always find me cheerful And even with the familiarity I always enjoyed with my guru, my soul’s parent, as when Coleridge asked Lamb whether he found him sermonising and Lamb, in his own broken, stammering way, blurted out, ‘I ne-ne-never saw you doing anything else,’ so I said I never found him anything but cheerful. And he burst into a laughter and said, “Yes, yes, you have correctly characterised me. Our religion must teach men to be cheerful. Too long have they taught in this country that the longer a man pulls his face, the deeper is his spirituality. Our religion must make men put on a broad face and teach them to be cheerful.” Think not it is a cheerfulness that


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 comes out of indifference to others’ concerns. No, no, it is the cheerfulness that comes out of the confidence that

 * “God’s in his heaven—
 * All’s right with the world.”

Madame Guyonhas said,

 * "Sorrow and love go side by side;
 * Nor height nor depth can e’er divide
 * Their heaven-appointed bands.”

And the man of God is a composite character, a reconciliation of contraries, just as God Himself is a reconciliation of contradictions, with a tear in the eye and a kiss on the lip—the tear to baptise, the kiss to bless; the tear which says that God is a, compassionate God, the kiss which says that God is a loving God. Thus this cheerful man was also a sorrowing man, grieving that God’s process has been arrested but hoping that God’s providence shall prevail. He shed tears, not with the bitterness of disappointment, but with the trembling responsiveness of fellow-feeling. Such was Sastri Mahashai; and such were several others in the Brahma Samaj.


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 PREFACE

, one of the two novels which Henry James left unfinished at his death, was designed to consist of ten books. Three only of these were written, with one chapter of the fourth, and except for the correction of a few obvious slips the fragment is here printed in full and without alteration. It was composed during the summer of 1914. The novel seems to have grown out of another which had been planned by Henry James in the winter of 1909–10. Of this the opening scenes had been sketched and a few pages written when it was interrupted by illness. On taking it up again, four years later, Henry James almost entirely recast his original scheme, retaining certain of the characters (notably the Bradham couple,) but otherwise giving an altogether fresh setting to the central motive. The new novel had reached the point where it breaks off by the beginning of August 1914. With the outbreak of war Henry James found he could no longer work upon a fiction supposed to represent contemporary or recent life. The completed chapters—which he had dictated to his secretary, in accordance with his regular habit for many years past—were revised and laid aside, not again to be resumed. v


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United States Reports/Volume 568

 * 568 U.S. 1 (2012) Lefemine v. Wideman
 * 568 U.S. 6 (2012) United States v. Bormes
 * 568 U.S. 17 (2012) Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard
 * 568 U.S. 23 (2012) Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 41 (2012) Kloeckner v. Solis
 * 568 U.S. 57 (2013) Ryan v. Valencia Gonzales
 * 568 U.S. 78 (2013) Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
 * 568 U.S. 85 (2013) Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.
 * 568 U.S. 106 (2013) Smith v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 115 (2013) Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida
 * 568 U.S. 145 (2013) Sebilius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center
 * 568 U.S. 165 (2013) Chafin v. Chafin
 * 568 U.S. 186 (2013) Bailey v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 216 (2013) Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.
 * 568 U.S. 237 (2013) Florida v. Harris
 * 568 U.S. 251 (2013) Gunn v. Minton
 * 568 U.S. 266 (2013) Henderson v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 289 (2013) Johnson v. Williams
 * 568 U.S. 313 (2013) Evans v. Michigan
 * 568 U.S. 342 (2013) Chaidez v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 371 (2013) Marx v. General Revenue Corp.
 * 568 U.S. 398 (2013) Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
 * 568 U.S. 442 (2013) Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission
 * 568 U.S. 455 (2013) Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
 * 568 U.S. 503 (2013) Levin v. United States
 * 568 U.S. 519 (2013) Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
 * 568 U.S. 588 (2013) Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles
 * 568 U.S. 597 (2013) Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center
 * 568 U.S. 627 (2013) Wos v. E.M.A.

title: United States Reports/Volume 568


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PREFACE The pages of preliminary notes, also here printed in full, were not of course intended for publication. It was Henry James's constant practice, before beginning a novel, to test and explore, in a written or dictated sketch of this kind, the possibilities of the idea which he had in mind. Such a sketch was in no way a first draft of the novel. He used it simply as a means of close approach to his subject, in order that he might completely possess himself of it in all its bearings. The arrangement of chapters and scenes would so be gradually evolved, but the details were generally left to be determined in the actual writing of the book. It will be noticed, for example, that in the provisional scheme of  no mention is made of the symbolic object itself or of the letter which is deposited in it. The notes, having served their purpose, would not be referred to again, and were invariably destroyed when the book was finished.

In the story of  Henry James has exactly described the manner of these notes, in speaking of the "written scheme of another book" which is shewn to the narrator by Neil Paraday: "Loose liberal confident, it might have passed for a great gossiping eloquent letter—the overflow into talk of an artist's amorous plan." If justification were needed for the decision to publish this "overflow" it might be found in Paraday's last injunction to his friend: "Print it as it stands—beautifully."

PERCY LUBBOCK. vi


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will be long before the poison of the Party System is worked out of the body politic. Some of its most indirect effects are the most dangerous. One that is very dangerous just now is this: that for most Englishmen the Party System falsifies history, and especially the history of revolutions. It falsifies history because it simplifies history. It paints everything either Blue or Buff in the style of its own silly circus politics: while a real revolution has as many colours as the sunrise—or the end of the world. And if we do not get rid of this error we shall make very bad blunders about the real revolution which seems to grow more


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 and more probable, especially among the Irish. And any human familiarity with history will teach a man this first of all: that Party practically does not exist in a real revolution. It is a game for quiet times.

If you take a boy who has been to one of those big private schools which are falsely called the Public Schools, and another boy who has been to one of those large public schools which are falsely called the Board Schools, you will find some differences between the two, chiefly a difference in the management of the voice. But you will find they are both English in a special way, and that their education has been essentially the same. They are ignorant on the same subjects. They have never heard of the same plain facts. They have been taught the wrong answer to the same confusing question. There is one fundamental element in the attitude of the Eton master talking about "playing the game," and the elementary


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 teacher training gutter-snipes to sing, "What is the Meaning of Empire Day?" And the name of that element is "unhistoric." It knows nothing really about England, still less about Ireland or France, and, least of all, of course, about anything like the French Revolution.

Now what general notion does the ordinary English boy, thus taught to utter one ignorance in one of two accents, get and keep through life about the French Revolution? It is the notion of the English House of Commons with an enormous Radical majority on one side of the table and a small Tory minority on the other; the majority voting solid for a Republic, the minority voting solid for a Monarchy; two teams tramping through two lobbies with no difference between their methods and ours, except that (owing to some habit peculiar to Gaul) the brief intervals were brightened by


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 a riot or a massacre, instead of by a whisky and soda and a Marconi tip. Novels are much more reliable than histories in such matters. For though an English novel about France does not tell the truth about France, it does tell the truth about England; and more than half the histories never tell the truth about anything. And popular fiction, I think, bears witness to the general English impression. The French Revolution is a snap division with an unusual turnover of votes. On the one side stand a king and queen who are good but weak, surrounded by nobles with rapiers drawn; some of whom are good, many of whom are wicked, all of whom are good-looking. Against these there is a formless mob of human beings, wearing red caps and seemingly insane, who all blindly follow ruffians who are also rhetoricians; some of whom die repentant and others unrepentant towards the end of the fourth act. The leaders of this boiling mass of all men


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 melted into one are called Mirabeau, Robespierre, Danton, Marat, and so on. And it is conceded that their united frenzy may have been forced on them by the evils of the old régime.

That, I think, is the commonest English view of the French Revolution; and it will not survive the reading of two pages of any real speech or letter of the period. These human beings were human; varied, complex and inconsistent. But the rich Englishman, ignorant of revolutions, would hardly believe you if you told him some of the common human subtleties of the case. Tell him that Robespierre threw the red cap in the dirt in disgust, while the king had worn it with a broad grin, so to speak; tell him that Danton, the fierce founder of the Republic of the Terror, said quite sincerely to a noble, "I am more monarchist than you;" tell him that the Terror really seems to have been brought to an end chiefly by the efforts of peo-


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 ple who particularly wanted to go on with it—and he will not believe these things. He will not believe them because he has no humility, and therefore no realism. He has never been inside himself; and so could never be inside another man. The truth is that in the French affair everybody occupied an individual position. Every man talked sincerely, if not because he was sincere, then because he was angry. Robespierre talked even more about God than about the Republic because he cared even more about God than about the Republic. Danton talked even more about France than about the Republic because he cared even more about France than about the Republic. Marat talked more about Humanity than either, because that physician (though himself somewhat needing a physician) really cared about it. The nobles were divided, each man from the next. The attitude of the king was quite different from the atti-


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 tude of the queen; certainly much more different than any differences between our Liberals and Tories for the last twenty years. And it will sadden some of my friends to remember that it was the king who was the Liberal and the queen who was the Tory. There were not two people, I think, in that most practical crisis who stood in precisely the same attitude towards the situation. And that is why, between them, they saved Europe. It is when you really perceive the unity of mankind that you really perceive its variety. It is not a flippancy, it is a very sacred truth, to say that when men really understand that they are brothers they instantly begin to fight.

Now these things are repeating themselves with an enormous reality in the Irish Revolution. You will not be able to make a Party


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The Ivory Tower

 * The Ivory Tower (London: W. Collins Sons & Co., 1917)
 * — First English book edition
 * The Ivory Tower (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917)
 * — First American book edition; a small number of copies were bound with front matter identifying it as Volume 25 of The Novels and Tales of Henry James (i.e. the "New York Edition"), and sold exclusively to collection subscribers.
 * "The Ivory Tower" in F. O. Matthiessen (ed.) (1947) The American Novels and Stories of Henry James.

title: The Ivory Tower


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 System out of the matter. Everybody is in revolt; therefore everybody is telling the truth. The Nationalists will go on caring most for the nation, as Danton and the defenders of the frontier went on caring most for the nation. The priests will go on caring most for religion, as Robespierre went on caring most for religgion. The Socialists will go on caring most for the cure of physical suffering, as Marat went on caring most for it. It is out of these real differences that real things can be made, such as the modern French democracy. For by such tenacity everyone sees at last that there is something in the other person's position. And those drilled in party discipline see nothing either past or present. And where there is nothing there is Satan.

For a long time past in our politics there has not only been no real battle, but no real bargain. No two men have bargained as Gladstone and Parnell bargained—each knowing


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 the other to be a power. But in real revolutions men discover that no one man can really agree with another man until he has disagreed with him.


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 BOOK FIRST

I

was but a question of leaving their own contracted "grounds," of crossing the Avenue and proceeding then to Mr. Betterman's gate, which even with the deliberate step of a truly massive young person she could reach in three or four minutes. So, making no other preparation than to open a vast pale-green parasol, a portable pavilion from which there fluttered fringes, frills and ribbons that made it resemble the roof of some Burmese palanquin or perhaps even pagoda, she took her way while these accessories fluttered in the August air, the morning freshness, and the soft sea-light. Her other draperies, white and voluminous, yielded to the mild breeze in the manner of those of a ship held back from speed yet with its canvas expanded; they conformed to their usual law of suggestion that the large loose ponderous girl, mistress as she might have been of the most expensive modern aids to the constitution of a "figure," lived, as they said about her, 1


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is a certain daily paper in England towards which I feel very much as Tom Pinch felt towards Mr. Pecksniff immediately after he had found him out. The war upon Dickens was part of the general war on all democrats, about the eighties and nineties, which ushered in the brazen plutocracy of to-day. And one of the things that it was fashionable to say of Dickens in drawing-rooms was that he had no subtlety, and could not describe a complex frame of mind. Like most other things that are said in drawing-rooms, it was a lie. Dickens was a very unequal writer, and his successes alternate with his failures; but his successes are subtle quite as often as they are simple. Thus, to take "Martin Chuzzlewit" alone,


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 I should call the joke about the Lord No-zoo a simple joke: but I should call the joke about Mrs. Todgers's vision of a wooden leg a subtle joke. And no frame of mind was ever so self-contradictory and yet so realistic as that which Dickens describes when he says, in effect, that, though Pinch knew now that there had never been such a person as Pecksniff, in his ideal sense, he could not bring himself to insult the very face and form that had contained the legend. The parallel with Liberal journalism is not perfect; because it was once honest; and Pecksniff presumably never was. And even when I come to feel a final incompatibility of temper, Pecksniff was not so Pecksniffian as he has since become. But the comparison is complete in so far as I share all the reluctance of Mr. Pinch. Some old heathen king was advised by one of the Celtic saints, I think, to burn what he had adored and adore what he had burnt. I am quite ready, if anyone will


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THE IVORY TOWER in wrappers and tea-gowns; so that, save for her enjoying obviously the rudest health, she might have been a convalescent creeping forth from the consciousness of stale bedclothes. She turned in at the short drive, making the firm neat gravel creak under her tread, and at the end of fifty yards paused before the florid villa, a structure smothered in senseless architectural ornament, as to put her question to its big fair foolish face. How Mr. Betterman might be this morning, and what sort of a night he might have had, was what she wanted to learn—an anxiety very real with her and which, should she be challenged, would nominally and decently have brought her; but her finer interest was in the possibility that Graham Fielder might have come.

The clean blank windows, however, merely gave her the impression of so many showy picture-frames awaiting their subjects; even those of them open to the charming Newport day seemed to tell her at the most that nothing had happened since the evening before and that the situation was still untouched by the change she dreamt of. A person essentially unobservant of forms, which her amplitude somehow never found of the right measure, so that she felt the misfit in many cases ridiculous, she now passed round the house instead of applying at the rather grandly gaping portal—which might in all conscience have accommodated her—and, crossing a stretch of lawn to the quarter 2


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 prove I was wrong, to adore what I have burnt; but I do really feel an unwillingness verging upon weakness to burning what I have adored. I think it is a weakness to be overcome in times as bad as these, when (as Mr. Grage wrote with something like splendid common sense the other day) there is such a lot to do and so few people who will do it. So I will devote this article to considering one case of the astounding baseness to which Liberal journalism has sunk.

One of the two or three streaks of light on our horizon can be perceived in this: that the moral breakdown of these papers has been accompanied by a mental breakdown also. The contemporary official paper, like the "Daily News" or the "Daily Chronicle" (I mean in so far as it deals with politics), simply cannot


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 argue; and simply does not pretend to argue. It considers the solution which it imagines that wealthy people want, and it signifies the same in the usual manner; which is not by holding up its hand, but by falling on its face. But there is no more curious quality in its degradation than a sort of carelessness, at once of hurry and fatigue, with which it flings down its argument—or rather its refusal to argue. It does not even write sophistry: it writes anything. It does not so much poison the reader's mind as simply assume that the reader hasn't got one. For instance, one of these papers printed an article on Sir Stuart Samuel, who, having broken the great Liberal statute against corruption, will actually, perhaps, be asked to pay his own fine—in spite of the fact that he can well afford to do so. The article says, if I remember aright, that the decision will cause general surprise and some indignation. That any modern Government making a very rich