text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/342

 WRITING - CASE.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER. MATERIALS.-Blue silk, coarse gray crochet cotton, blue silk cord, cardboard, blue filoselle. This Writing - Case is very pretty and easily made. It is covered with gray cotton plaiting, varnished with copal varnish, so as to imitate carved wood. The back and pockets of the case are of blue glace silk, ornamented round the edge with blue silk braid. Cut first the covers of thick cardboard, each twelve inches long, nine inches wide, and cover them with plaiting from No. 2, which shows that the cotton is not cut off at the edges of the cardboard. Both covers are joined together on one side

with a strip of blue silk one inch and a fifth wide, which forms the back ; the same material

TATTED

AND

lines the wrong side of the covers. A piece of coarse tape must be sewn in at the back. For the pockets, which are fastened inside the covers, cut two pieces of blue silk, lined with thin cardboard. The pockets must be much longer than the covers, so as to make a deep pleat at the sides, which is to take the place of gores. Then sew the cardboard lining into the pockets with button-hole stitches of blue silk, and fasten the pockets on three sides of the cover. Lastly, edge the case with blue silk braid, and fasten some fly-leaves of blottingpaper by means of a piece of blue silk ribbon.

CROCHET

EDGE.

by the outer scallops, worked with the helpingthread, and on the other by the closed eyes, worked with fine cotton. The scallops contain three double knots, three picots separated by two double knots, and three double knots ; the WITH coarse cotton work first the Josephine closed eyes contain twelve double knots. The knots containing six of the concluding stitches footing consists of an interrupted row of treble of a double knot. They are joined on one side in the joining thread of the closed eyes.

INITIALS.

CROCHET.

AG 307

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/342


text:
Page:Satyagraha in South Africa.pdf/361

 CALCUTTA, 49, 52, 257

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 17, 19

Cape Colony, the, 5, 13, 19, 25, 36; Indian grievances in, 36 ff.

Cape of Good Hope, 5

Cape Town, 5, 6, 8, 13, 36, 262

Cartwright, Albert, 154 ff., 181, 196

Chamberlain, 62 ff., 69, 81

Chamney, 168 ff., 307, 309

Champaran, Satyagraha in, xii, xiii, 84

Charlestown, 290, 294 ff., 297 ff.

Chelmsford, Lord, xii

Chesney, 50

Christ, 12, 16, 114, 172

Christopher, A., 295

Clifford, Dr, 112

Clothes, the philosophy of, 10

‘Colour Bar’ In legislation, 29, 87 ff.

Co-education on Tolstoy Farm, 243 ff.

Constitution of the Union of South Africa, how framed, 19 ff.

Courland, s. s., 52 ff.

Crewe, Lord, 228

Cronje, General, 14, 80

Cullinan, the, the world’s largest diamond, 4

Curtis, Lionel, 93, 96, 109

Curzon, Lord, 79

DADA ABDULLA, Indian firm in Durban, 41-3, 52 ff.

Dadabhai Naoroji, 65 ff., 118 ff.

Dadibarjor, Dr, 59

Daily Mail, the, 204

Daily Star, the, 154

Damania, N., 238

Daud Muhammad, Sheth, 185, 216 ff.

Deccan Sabha, 51 ff.

Defence of India Act, 94

Delagoa Bay, 4, 38, 178

Deportation to India, Satyagrahis punished with, 221 ff.

Desai, Pragji Khandubhai, 216, 238, 241

De Wet, General, 15

Dharma-yuddha, xiv

Dick, Miss, 179

Diepkloof prison, hunger strike in, 226

Doctor, Mrs J. M., 281

Doke, Miss Olive, 170

Doke, Rev. J., 142, 168 ff., 179, 181

Doukhobors of Russia, 115

Drew, Rev. Dewdney, 181

Drugless healing on Tolstoy Farm, 247 ff., 254 ff.

Duncan, 108

Dundee, 309-10

Durban, 4, 6, 8, 41-3, 54 ff., 141, 175, 177, 184 ff., 290 ff.; the author mobbed in, 58

EDWARD, KING, 16

Elgin, Lord, 28, 118 ff., 120; his crooked policy, 124 ff.

Ellis, 262

Emigration Act, the Indian, xii

Empire, the British, 19

English, the, in South Africa, 14; defeated by the Dutch at Majuba, 14; in Natal, 21

Escombe, Harry, 22, 45, 54, 75

Esselen, 322, 327

Europeans’ argument for excluding Indians from South Africa, 90

European traders, their relations with Negroes, 24

FARRAR, SIR GEORGE, 121

Food on Tolstoy Farm, 246

Fourth Resolution, the famous, 102

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Page:Satyagraha in South Africa.pdf/361


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/341

 PEN-WIPER. BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

UPON a round of cardboard, mensuring two, in color. The patterns shown in the engraving inches and a quarter, fasten a double round of are worked upon them with cordon of a condark-colored cloth, scalloped at the edge, mea- trasting color. A button, covered with silk or suring four inches in diameter. Upon this fasten crochet, and ring for a handle, hide the place a scalloped strip, thickly pleated. Above this where the separate parts are fastened to the are six oval-scalloped pieces, measuring two double round underneath. They are fastened inches by one inch and a balf, and alternating firmly at the back to each other and to the folds.

INSERTION

IN

STRIPES ,

ETC.,

ETC.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

eeeee e

e a 68ere WE give here two new and pretty designs. The first is an insertion in stripes of braid and muslin. The two braid scallops are fastened at the points on the wrong side. The thread, which is always carried on, must be twisted several times in returning to give firmness to 306

the work. The stripes of muslin are double, and must be sewn on. The other is a striped pattern of braid and crochet. The braid is joined by cross trebles, and ornamented with raised embroidery dots.

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/341


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/340

 BASKET

FOR

KNITTING.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

MATERIALS.-Five skeins of green silk cordon, one yard and a half of green sarcenet ribbon an inch broad, little pieces of white sarcenet, one hundred and fifty brass rings measuring half an inch, two larger rings, four raised buttons, a little powdered violet-root. The under part, consisting of rings covered with crochet, is made with the help of a large India-rubber ball, to form the round. Begin with the middle ring at the bottom, which, like the rest, is worked over with crochet, but separately. Join the other rings all together in a round ; for this, crochet over only half of each ring first, and then lay on another ring close to it; then, in order to keep the rings at the proper distance, work two single on to the ring of the preceding row. In working over the second half of the ring, loop round the second ring with two single. The first row contains six rings, the second eleven rings ; then follow rows with sixteen, twenty-one, twenty-five : and the sixth row contains twenty-eight rings. For

each fresh row it is advisable to place the round over the ball to try the shape. As shown in the design, a ring of double the diameter divides the seventh and eighth rows in two halves after each thirteenth ring : this is to pass the pins through. Twelve interrupted treble rows and one row of double-treble form the upper part of the basket. In working the former there must be two trebles upon each ring, always one double-treble over the joining of the two rings. At the bottom, inside the basket, a round cushion is placed, two inches in diameter, of white sarcenet, and filled with violet powder. The upper part is crochet, worked round in double-stitch, beginning in the middle and properly widened. Four round buttons with eyes- one fastened in the middle ring of the bottom of the basket, the three others in the first row of rings- are placed so as to form a triangle; these serve for the foot. A ribbon is drawn through at the top, and tied in a bow at the sides to complete the whole. 305

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/340


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/339

 CROCHET

SHAWL

FOR

GENTLEMEN.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER. common tricot. The second row commences the pattern, in which, in taking up the stitches, the thread is always drawn under the firm, single edge stitches of the preceding row. In order to preserve the proper slanting form of the shawl, at the beginning of every row forward, stick the needle in the first hole, and at the end in the last hole of the preceding row. The number of stitches must always remain the same. Our model consists of red, lilac, green, cerise, blue, and brown stripes of three rows each, and separated by four rows of white. The middle row of these is worked with Shetland wool four times double, lilac, green, yellow, and red twisted together. Repeat this striped pattern until the work is thirteen inches and a half broad, and thirty-four inches long, finishing with a white stripe. Fold the work, which will form the sloped ends of the shawl. The corners must be filled in afterward. Chain off only half of the stitches, and work out the corMATERIALS.-White, dark-red, lilac, dark- ners with the remainder ; for this, at the begingreen, cerise, blue, and fawn- colored Berlinning of each row on the open side of the work, wool, lilac, blue, green, maize, and dark- red decrease regularly, and join the other side of Shetland wool, a suitable hook for tricot. the work, which is to be worked straight at each This shawl is worked in stripes of interrupted row to the chained - off stitches. Sew the outer tricot. Commence with seventy stitches with edges of the finished shawl together with white the white wool, and crochet the first row in wool.

OPEN PATTERN ON LINEN, FOR INSERTIONS FOR DRAWERS. BY MRS. JANE WEAVER. THE cotton must be coarser or finer, according to the material. Draw out fifteen threads lengthwise and crosswise, and leave in eighteen threads ; from one of these draw out stripes to the other. Then draw a thread a little coarser than the linen, through the part where the threads are drawn out, (see design, ) and cross four and four threads with it. A thread is drawn through the empty squares ; the cross stitches extend over eight threads in breadth and height. The plain, thick squares may be filled up with little knots or stars in point Russe, with white or colored thread. This pattern is extremely pretty in Java canvas for anti- macassars, etc.

304

er

Th

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/339


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/338

 SILK- WINDER IN THE

SHAPE

OF A STAR.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

THESE winders are meant to show how to wind cotton or silk in the shape of a star. Take two pieces of cardboard one inch and threequarters square, pasted one over the other in such a manner as to form a star pattern with eight branches, as can be seen in No. 1. Insert into these eight pins, (see No. 2 ; ) these pins are meant to fasten the windings of the cotton, and ornament the star in the center with a colored wafer, or point Russe embroidery pattern. Begin to wind the cotton at the place marked a; continue to wind it from No. 2, always four

times double ; follow the order of the letters-that is, wind four times from a to b, carry the thread on the wrong side from 6 to c, wind four times from c to d, then four times from e to f, and so on. When you have come back again to a, repeat as before till the cardboard is covered , as can be seen in No. 1. The cotton is then fastened on the wrong side. These winders make exceedingly pretty frames for small photograph pictures, done in brown cotton ; the imitation of Walnut is quite good.

WORK- BASKET. BY MRS. JANE WEAVER. MATERIALS. -A basket, red and white cloth, white medallion is sewn down with button-hole black velvet, black, white, gold and red purse- stitches taken in black silk at prolonged intersilk, maroon ribbon, No. 4. (The pattern is the vals. A line of gold silk in back stitches folcolored one in the front of the number. ) To lows the contour of the medallion. The aramake this original- looking receptacle for either work or keys first procure a basket of the required form, line it with quilted, red silk, and proceed to decorate it outside with four lambrequins, as illustrated in colored engraving. The lambrequin is cut out of maroon or red cloth, and a medallion of white cloth is pasted in the center. A griffin is cut out of black velvet, and pasted in the center of the white medallion, the edges being sewn down with neat, invisible stitches taken in fine black sewing- silk. The

besques are produced by chain- stitches taken with black silk, and the dots are French knots in white silk. These four decorated pieces of cloth are arranged on the outside of the basket in their respective places, and a quilling of maroon colored ribbon is added at the top; bows decorate the ends of the handle, and some of the ribbon is wrapped around it. This may be made in a variety of colors-a combination of blue and black, red and gray, yellow and black ; any of these combinations will be found pretty. 303

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/338


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/337

 SEGAR- CASE

IN

LEATHER

EMBROIDERY ,

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

6

THE foundation of the Segar- Case is of a light gray kid or Chamoise leather, the outer lines of black silk braid, sewed over with gold thread. All the solid black trefoils and the middle star cut out of black velvet, and gum them on carefully, sewing them down with white or maizecolored silk. Fill out the other parts of the 802

design with chain-stitch in fine white sewingsilk, ornamented with fine jet beads. For this single color we give for the thread- like parts of the design ; a variety of colored silks may be introduced, and give it quite an Oriental appearance. Make the case up over cardboard, or send it to the pocket-book manufactory to be made up.

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/337


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/336

 DIAGRAM OF AUTUMN JACKET.

301

διν 8IN

1 ° N

N ° 2

N

4½I

21IN

28IN

8IN

N °4

№5

22 IN

15IN

N ° 3

BORDER IN POINT RUSSE.

VOL. LVI.-20

CROCHET

EDGE.

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/336


text:
Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/73

 62 Among the troops and commanders, German-Bulgarian relations remained amicable enough. In evacuating the coastal area, Bulgarian artillery units left their immobile pieces in position for German crews to man, and the German liaison officer to the II Corps was allowed to maintain contact with the headquarters of Army Group E. Individuals and small parties outside their respective zones were allowed to return to their units unmolested.

While resigned to the loss of Thrace, the Bulgarian Government, despite the imminent crisis with the Soviet Union, had no intention of relinquishing its status in Yugoslavia. Accordingly, since it lay directly across the main axis of communications between Army Group E and German headquarters for all the southeast at Belgrade, it was necessary for the Germans to make plans to secure Yugoslav Macedonia and southeastern Serbia, the former occupied by the Bulgarian V Corps and the latter by the I Corps. Plan TREUBRUCH assigned the 1st Mountain Division the mission of seizing Skoplje, largest city and rail center of the area; Plan HUNDESSOHN involved the movement of the 4th SS Police Division into Bulgaria in the direction of Sofiya, the capital; Plan JUDAS was the disarmament of the Bulgarian forces in Thrace and Macedonia. Arrangements were made with Army Group F for units of Army Group E to move into its area of responsibility.

While German units prepared for their respective parts in the operations planned in event of hostilities with Bulgaria, fighting with the guerrilla forces increased in intensity. For the 2-month period ending in August, the Germans suffered a total of 936 dead, 1,235 wounded, and 275 missing, meanwhile inflicting casualties on the guerrillas amount to 5,394 dead and 768 captured. Personnel casualties in air attacks on trains, convoys, and troop areas also reached a high during this period, with 32 dead and 26 wounded for the week ending 4 August alone. To improve the air defense of their rail lines and installations, Luftwaffe units were directed to fly high over the railroads and to avoid flying parallel to them. Antiaircraft crews and troops defending the trains and lines were then free to open fire on any aircraft approaching at a low altitude.

The situation by the end of August made it necessary for Army Group E to order the evacuation of all troops in Greece, with the exception of the garrisons of Crete and Rhodes, to the area north of the line Corfu–Yannina–Kalabaka–Olympus. The withdrawal was to be orderly, and measures taken to prevent German intentions becoming known to the Greek population. The troops on railroad security duty were reinforced, and Corps Group Salonika, a provisional organization formed from the administrative command for the Salonika-Aegean area, was merged with an existing skeletal staff to form the


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/335

 AUTUMN

JACKET.

BY EMILY H. MAY.

WE give, above, an engraving of a very desirable jacket for fall wear. The pattern consists of five pieces. Half of front and half of back, side-piece, half of panier, and upper part of sleeve, (the under part being marked on the paper. ) There is a notch on the front to mark where the seam of the sleeves is placed. A plait is pricked on the front, so that the casaque falls to the figure. The panier is gathered at the top and sewn on to the back of the waist ; the line where the pricked marks are should 300

also be gathered. The sides of the panier are fulled in to the front at the upper part, both being caught or bunched up with bow and ends. The sash is made of the same material as the rest of the mantle. Our model is of black silk, and trimmed with frills and satin rouleaux. This jacket takes two yards and a quarter of a material that measures twenty- seven inches in width. On the next page we give a diagram of the five pieces of which this jacket is composed.

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/335


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/334

 CROCHET CURTAIN - BAND.

299

with one thread loop, and afterward by one chain. Inclose them all closely together, (see No. 2. Then, for the next pattern, commence with fourteen stitches ; the three additional stitches are for the chain between the shells.

through these two stitches at the same time. The back of the crochet is the right side of the work. The patterns are further joined by an interrupted treble row, eighteen inches long, upon a chain-stitch chain, which is sewn on

When the line is completely finished, the pat- , terns are always placed with their right side upward. They are made to form a double line by separate single. For this carry the needle, according to No. 2, first through the chain which incloses the bunch of stitches, and then return ing through the middle-stitch of the three chain -the joining chain- so that the shell lies over the joining chain, and the stitch- loop is drawn

underneath along the middle, and the ends extending beyond form a loop for hanging the curtain-band on. Join the two stripes in a serpentine form, as shown in No. 1, and ornament them with little balls of twist and fringe of the same material. The fringe is three inches long, and is tied into the row lying at the back of the shells.

BRAID

TRIMMINGS.

BY MRS. JANE WEATER.

111

THESE braid trimmings are very easily made, ornament children's dresses and ladies' morning } as will be seen in the designs. They serve to costumes.

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/334


text:
Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/333

 LAMP - MAT. BY MRS. JANE WEAVER.

MATERIALS -Pasteboard, black velvet one ; mencing at the middle and fastened together on inch broad, scarlet cord or braid, pearl beads, the wrong side with stitches of red silk. When chalk-white beads, steel beads, and sewing-silk about half the foundation is finished, place it The illustration is considerably reduced in upon the covered pasteboard, putting the middle size ; it represents a mat ten inches in diameter to the middle as smoothly and evenly as possi Cut a thin pasteboard the required size. It ble, joining it underneath and to the pasteboard must not be too stiff for a needle to pass through.with almost invisible stitches as far as the velvet Fasten round the outer edge a black velvet rib - edge. When all the cord is wound round, place bon about an inch broad, and turn it over upon a looping of cord, as shown in the design, and the inside in little folds, as flat as possible, as fasten it at the places where the cord crosses, represented in the design. The foundation con- and at the upper middle. Ornament it with a sists of thick cord wound round and round, com- trimming of beads, according to design.

CROCHET CURTAIN - BAND.

BY MRS. JANE WEAVER. WORK with fine cotton piping- cord. Our Work alternately one shell, beginning with model represents stripes of a double kind of eleven chain, and, as in tricot, sticking always shell pattern Commence with a line of fifty in one stitch ; collect ten stitch-loops loosely three shells placed at great and small distances. upon the needle, draw them all through together 298

title: Page:Peterson Magazine 1869B.pdf/333


text: Page:Passing (1929).pdf/5

title: Page:Passing (1929).pdf/5


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/34

 worked, and he took no thought of the morrow. He ate when his disciples asked him to honor their tables; they must have liked his company, for he gave every indication of physiological prosperity. He was not so welcome at home, for he neglected his wife and children; and from Xanthippe's point of view he was a good-for-nothing idler who brought to his family more notoriety than bread. Xanthippe liked to talk almost as much as Socrates did; and they seem to have had some dialogues which Plato failed to record. Yet she, too, loved him, and could not contentedly see him die even after three-score years and ten.

Why did his pupils reverence him so? Perhaps because he was a man as well as a philosopher: he had at great risk saved the life of Alcibiades in battle; and he could drink like a gentleman—without fear and without excess. But no doubt they liked best in him the modesty of his wisdom: he did not claim to have wisdom, but only to seek it lovingly; he was wisdom's amateur, not its professional. It was said that the oracle at Delphi, with unusual good sense, had pronounced him the wisest of the Greeks; and he had interpreted this as an approval of the agnosticism which was the starting-point of his philosophy—"One thing only I know, and that is that I know nothing." Philosophy begins when one learns to doubt—particularly to doubt one's cherished beliefs, one's dogmas and one's axioms. Who knows how these cherished beliefs became certainties with us, and whether some secret wish did not furtively beget them, clothing desire in the dress of thought? There is no real philosophy until the mind turns round and examines itself. Gnothe seauton, said Socrates: Know thyself.

There had been philosophers before him, of course: strong men like Thales and Heraclitus, subtle men like Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, seers like Pythagoras and Empedocles; but for the most part they had been physical philosophers; they had sought for the physis or nature of external things, the laws and constituents of the material and measurable world.

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/34


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/35

 That is very good, said Socrates; but there is an infinitely worthier subject for philosophers than all these trees and stones, and even all those stars; there is the mind of man. What is man, and what can he become?

So he went about prying into the human soul, uncovering assumptions and questioning certainties. If men discoursed too readily of justice, he asked them, quietly, tò tí?—what is it? What do you mean by these abstract words with which you so easily settle the problems of life and death? What do you mean by honor, virtue, morality, patriotism? What do you mean by yourself? It was with such moral and psychological questions that Socrates loved to deal. Some who suffered from this "Socratic method," this demand for accurate definitions, and clear thinking, and exact analysis, objected that he asked more than he answered, and left men's minds more confused than before. Nevertheless he bequeathed to philosophy two very definite answers to two of our most difficult problems—What is the meaning of virtue? and What is the best state?

No topics could have been more vital than these to the young Athenians of that generation. The Sophists had destroyed the faith these youths had once had in the gods and goddesses of Olympus, and in the moral code that had taken its sanction so largely from the fear men had for these ubiquitous and innumerable deities; apparently there was no reason now why a man should not do as he pleased, so long as he remained within the law. A disintegrating individualism had weakened the Athenian character, and left the city a prey at last to the sternly-nurtured Spartans. And as for the state, what could have been more ridiculous than this mob-led, passion-ridden democracy, this government by a debating-society, this precipitate selection and dismissal and execution of generals, this unchoice choice of simple farmers and tradesmen, in alphabetical rotation, as members of the supreme court of the land? How could a new and natural morality be developed in Athens, and how could the state be saved?

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/35


text: Page:Passing (1929).pdf/6

title: Page:Passing (1929).pdf/6


text:
Lockhart v. Nelson

Arkansas' habitual criminal statute provides that a defendant who is convicted of a class B felony may be sentenced to an enhanced term of imprisonment if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt, at a separate sentencing hearing, that he has at least four prior felony convictions. At respondent's sentencing hearing following his guilty plea to a class B felony, the State introduced certified copies of four prior felony convictions, one of which, unbeknownst to the prosecutor, had been pardoned by the Governor. The case was submitted to the jury, which found that the State had met its burden of proving four prior felony convictions and imposed an enhanced sentence. Several years later, respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, contending that the enhanced sentence was invalid because one of the convictions used to support it had been pardoned. The District Court determined that the conviction in question had in fact been pardoned and set aside the enhanced sentence. The District Court then held, in reliance on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the State from attempting to resentence respondent as a habitual offender on the basis of another prior conviction not offered or admitted at the initial sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the pardoned conviction was inadmissible under state law, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbade retrial because the remaining evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of enhancement.

Held: When a reviewing court determines that a defendant's conviction must be set aside because certain evidence was erroneously admitted against him, and further finds that once that evidence is discounted, there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid his retrial so long as the sum of the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court—whether erroneously or not—would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. The general rule is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the retrial of a defendant who succeeds in getting his conviction set aside for such "trial errors" as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. The Burks exception to that rule is based on the view that a reversal for [p34] evidentiary insufficiency is the functional equivalent of a trial court's granting a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. Because a trial court in passing on such a motion considers all of the evidence it has admitted, it must be this same quantum of evidence which is considered in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Permitting retrial in this instance is not the sort of oppression at which the Double Jeopardy Clause is aimed, but simply affords the defendant an opportunity to obtain a fair adjudication of his guilt free from error. Pp. 289–292.

828 F.2d 446, reversed.

, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which, and , JJ., joined. , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which and, JJ., joined, post, p. 42.

J. Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Clint Miller, Assistant Attorney General.

John Wesley Hall, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 485 U.S. 956, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

title: Lockhart v. Nelson


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/36

 It was his reply to these questions that gave Socrates death and immortality. The older citizens would have honored him had he tried to restore the ancient polytheistic faith; if he had led his band of emancipated souls to the temples and the sacred groves, and bade them sacrifice again to the gods of their fathers. But he felt that that was a hopeless and suicidal policy, a progress backward, into and not "over the tombs."

He had his own religious faith: he believed in one God, and hoped in his modest way that death would not quite destroy him; but he knew that a lasting moral code could not be based upon so uncertain a theology. If one could build a system of morality absolutely independent of religious doctrine, as valid for the atheist as for the pietist, then theologies might go without loosening the moral cement that makes of wilful individuals the peaceful citizens of a community.

If, for example, good meant intelligent, and virtue meant wisdom; if men could be taught to see clearly their real interests, to see afar the distant results of their deeds, to criticize and coördinate their desires out of a self-cancelling chaos into a purposive and creative harmony—this, perhaps, would provide for the educated and sophisticated man the morality which in the unlettered relies on reiterated precepts and external control. Perhaps all sin is error, partial vision, foolishness? The intelligent man may have the same violent and unsocial impulses as the ignorant man, but surely he will control them better, and slip less often into imitation of the beast. And in an intelligently administered society—one that returned to the individual, in widened powers, more than it took from him in restricted liberty—the advantage of every man would lie in social and loyal conduct, and only clear sight would be needed to ensure peace and order and good will.

But if the government itself is a chaos and an absurdity, if it rules without helping, and commands without leading,

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/36


text: Category:United States Supreme Court decisions in Volume 488


text: Page:In re Directives.pdf/1

title: Page:In re Directives.pdf/1


text:
Lockhart v. Nelson/Opinion of the Court

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case a reviewing court set aside a defendant's conviction of enhanced sentence because certain evidence was erroneously admitted against him, and further held that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbade the State to retry him as a habitual offender because the remaining evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support a conviction. Nothing in the record suggests any misconduct in the prosecutor's submission of the evidence. We conclude that in cases such as this, where the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court—whether erroneously or not—would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial.

Respondent Johnny Lee Nelson pleaded guilty in Arkansas state court to burglary, a class B felony, and misdemeanor theft. He was sentenced under the State's habitual criminal [p35] statute, which provides that a defendant who is convicted of a class B felony and "who has previously been convicted of [or] found guilty of four [4] or more felonies," may be sentenced to an enhanced term of imprisonment of between 20 and 40 years. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1001(2)(b) (1977) (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501 (1987)). To have a convicted defendant's sentence enhanced under the statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, at a separate sentencing hearing, that the defendant has the requisite number of prior felony convictions. § 41-1005 (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-502 (1987)); § 41-1003 (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-504 (1987)). Section 41-1003 of the statute sets out the means by which the prosecution may prove the prior felony convictions, providing that "[a] previous conviction or finding of guilt of a felony may be proved by any evidence that satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or found guilty," and that three types of documents, including "a duly certified copy of the record of a previous conviction or finding of guilt by a court of record," are "sufficient to support a finding of a prior conviction or finding of guilt." § 41-1003 (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-504 (1987)). The defendant is entitled to challenge the State's evidence of his prior convictions and to rebut it with evidence [p36] of his own. § 41-1005(2) (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-502(2) (1987)).

At respondent's sentencing hearing, the State introduced, without objection from the defense, certified copies of four prior felony convictions. Unbeknownst to the prosecutor, one of those convictions had been pardoned by the Governor several years after its entry. Defense counsel made no objection to the admission of the pardoned conviction, because he too was unaware of the Governor's action. On cross-examination, respondent indicated his belief that the conviction in question had been pardoned. The prosecutor suggested that respondent was confusing a pardon with a commutation to time served. Under questioning from the court, respondent agreed that the conviction had been commuted rather than pardoned, and the matter was not pursued any further. The case was submitted to the jury, which found that the State had met its burden of proving four prior convictions and imposed an enhanced sentence. The State courts upheld the enhanced sentence on both direct and collateral review, despite respondent's protestations that one of the convictions relied upon by the State had been pardoned.

[p37] Several years later, respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, contending once again that the enhanced sentence was invalid because one of the prior convictions used to support it had been pardoned. When an investigation undertaken by the State at the District Court's request revealed that the conviction in question had in fact been pardoned, the District Court declared the enhanced sentence to be invalid. The State announced its intention to resentence respondent as a habitual offender, using another prior conviction not offered or admitted at the initial sentencing hearing, and respondent interposed a claim of double jeopardy. After hearing arguments from counsel, the District Court decided that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the State from attempting to resentence respondent as a habitual offender on the burglary charge. 641 F. Supp. 174 (ED Ark. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 828 F.2d 446 (1987). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the pardoned conviction was not admissible under state law, and that "[w]ithout [it], the state has failed to provide sufficient evidence" to sustain the enhanced sentence. Id., at 449–450. We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 485 U.S. 904 (1988).

[p38] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." It has long been settled, however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (retrial permissible following reversal of conviction on direct appeal); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (retrial permissible when conviction declared invalid on collateral attack). This rule, which is a "well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence," id., at 465, is necessary in order to ensure the "sound administration of justice":

"Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." Id., at 466.

[p39] Permitting retrial after a conviction has been set aside also serves the interests of defendants, for "it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution." Ibid.

In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), we recognized an exception to the general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the retrial of a defendant who has succeeded in getting his conviction set aside for error in the proceedings below. Burks held that when a defendant's conviction is reversed by an appellate court on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial on the same charge. Id., at 18; see Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 42–43 (1981).

Burks was based on the view that an appellate court's reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is in effect a determination that the government's case against the defendant was so lacking that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal, rather than submitting the case to the jury. Burks, 437 U.S., at 16–17. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause affords the defendant who obtains a judgment of acquittal at the trial level absolute immunity from further prosecution for the same offense, it ought to do the same for the defendant who obtains an appellate determination that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal. Id., at 10–11, 16. The fact that the determination of entitlement to a judgment of acquittal is made by the appellate court rather than the trial court should not, we thought, affect its double jeopardy consequences; to hold otherwise "would create a purely arbitrary distinction" between defendants based on the hierarchical level at which the determination was made. Id., at 11.

[p402] The question presented by this case—whether the Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial when a reviewing court determines that a defendant's conviction must be reversed because evidence was erroneously admitted against him, and also concludes that without the inadmissible evidence there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction—was expressly reserved in Greene v. Massey, supra, at 26, n. 9, decided the same day as Burks. We think the logic of Burks requires that the question be answered in the affirmative.

Burks was careful to point out that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary "trial errors" as the "incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence." 437 U.S., at 14–16. While the former is in effect a finding "that the government has failed to prove its case" against the defendant, the latter "implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant," but is simply "a determination that [he] has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect." Id., at 15 (emphasis added).

It appears to us to be beyond dispute that this is a situation described in Burks as reversal for "trial error"—the trial court erred in admitting a particular piece of evidence, and without it there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction. But clearly with that evidence, there was enough to support the sentence: the court and jury had before them certified copies of four prior felony convictions, and that is sufficient to support a verdict of enhancement under the statute. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1003 (1977) (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-504 (1987)). The fact that one of the convictions had been later pardoned by the Governor vitiated its legal effect, but it did not deprive the certified copy of that conviction of its probative value under the statute. It is quite clear from our opinion in [p41] Burks that a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause—indeed, that was the ratio decidendi of Burks, see 437 U.S., at 16–17—and the overwhelming majority of appellate courts considering the question have agreed. The basis for the Burks exception to the general rule is that a reversal for insufficiency of the evidence should be treated no differently than a trial court's granting a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. A trial court in passing on such a [p42] motion considers all of the evidence it has admitted, and to make the analogy complete it must be this same quantum of evidence which is considered by the reviewing court.

Permitting retrial in this instance is not the sort of governmental oppression at which the Double Jeopardy Clause is aimed; rather, it serves the interest of the defendant by affording him an opportunity to "obtai[n] a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error." Burks, supra, at 15; see Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). Had the defendant offered evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove that the conviction had become a nullity by reason of the pardon, the trial judge would presumably have allowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer evidence of another prior conviction to support the habitual offender charge. Our holding today thus merely recreates the situation that would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the conviction because of the showing of a pardon. Cf. our discussion in Burks, supra, at 6–7.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.

title: Lockhart v. Nelson/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/37

 how can we persuade the individual, in such a state, to obey the laws and confine his self-seeking within the circle of the total good? No wonder an Alcibiades turns against a state that distrusts ability, and reverences number more than knowledge. No wonder there is chaos where there is no thought, and the crowd decides in haste and ignorance, to repent at leisure and in desolation. Is it not a base superstition that mere numbers will give wisdom? On the contrary is it not universally seen that men in crowds are more foolish and more violent and more cruel than men separate and alone? Is it not shameful that men should be ruled by orators, who "go ringing on in long harangues, like brazen pots which, when struck, continue to sound till a hand is put upon them"? Surely the management of a state is a matter for which men cannot be too intelligent, a matter that needs the unhindered thought of the finest minds. How can a society be saved, or be strong, except it be led by its wisest men?

Imagine the reaction of the popular party at Athens to this aristocratic gospel at a time when war seemed to require the silencing of all criticism, and when the wealthy and lettered minority were plotting a revolution. Consider the feelings of Anytus, the democratic leader whose son had become a pupil of Socrates, and had then turned against the gods of his father, and laughed in his father's face. Had not Aristophanes predicted precisely such a result from this specious replacement of the old virtues by unsocial intelligence?

Then the revolution came, and men fought for it and

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/37


text:
Lockhart v. Nelson/Dissent Marshall

, with whom and  join, dissenting.

Under Arkansas law, a defendant who is convicted of a class B felony and "who has previously been convicted of [or] found guilty of four [4] or more felonies" may be sentenced to an enhanced term of imprisonment ranging from 20 years to 40 years. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1001(2)(b) (1977) (current version at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(b)(3) (1987)). At the March 1982 sentencing trial held after Johnny Lee Nelson pleaded guilty to the class B felony of burglary, the State of Arkansas introduced evidence indicating that Nelson [p43] had four prior felony convictions. Nelson protested that he had received a gubernatorial pardon for one of the convictions. The prosecutor and the trial judge disbelieved Nelson's claim, however, and the jury sentenced him to 20 years in prison. Three and a half years later—during which time Nelson, from jail, persistently implored Arkansas courts to investigate his pardon claim—a Federal District Court finally ordered the State to check its records. Lo and behold, it turned out that Nelson had been pardoned—and Arkansas soon announced its intention to try Nelson, once again, as a habitual offender.

The majority holds today that, although Arkansas attempted once and failed to prove that Nelson had the four prior convictions required for habitual offender status, it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause for Arkansas to attempt again. I believe, however, that Nelson's retrial is squarely foreclosed by [p44] Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), [p44] where we held that a State may not retry a defendant where it failed initially to present sufficient evidence of guilt. The majority rushes headlong past those facets of Nelson's case and of Arkansas law that reveal the prosecution's failure to present sufficient evidence of guilt in this case, in order to answer the open and narrow question of double jeopardy law on which the Court granted certiorari. By virtue of the majority's haste, Nelson now faces a new sentencing trial, and Arkansas will be able to augment the evidence it presented at Nelson's initial trial with evidence of prior convictions it opted not to introduce in the first place. Because this result embodies the classic Double Jeopardy evil of a State "honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction," Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982), I dissent.

I
The Double Jeopardy Clause is "designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). Reflecting this principle, we held in Burks that the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents retrial where a State's evidence at trial is found insufficient. See also Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). The Burks rule is based on the time-honored notion that the State should be given only "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it [can] assemble." Burks, supra, at 16. Unlike a finding of reversible trial error, which traditionally has not barred retrial, see United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), reversal for evidentiary insufficiency "constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case." Burks, supra, at 15.

This case is troubling in a number of respects, not the least of which is that no one in the Arkansas criminal justice system seems to have taken Nelson's pardon claim at all seriously. [p45] At bottom, however, this case is controlled by the Burks insufficiency principle. For under Arkansas' law of pardons, the State's evidence against Nelson in his sentencing trial was at all times insufficient to prove four valid prior convictions. The majority errs in treating this as a case of mere trial error, and in reaching the unsettled issue whether, after a trial error reversal based on the improper admission evidence, a reviewing court should evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by including, or excluding, the tainted evidence. See Greene v. Massey, supra, at 26, n. 9 (expressly reserving this question). This case has nothing to do with inadmissible evidence and everything to do with Arkansas' defective proof.

As the District Court noted in ruling for Nelson, Arkansas decisional law holds that pardoned convictions have no probative value in sentence enhancement proceedings. See 641 F. Supp. 174, 183 (ED Ark. 1986) (under Arkansas law: "[A] pardon renders the conviction a nullity [F]or purposes of the enhancement statute, a conviction which has been pardonned [sic] is not a conviction"). The District Court cited a 1973 decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court, Duncan v. State, 254 Ark. 449, 494 S.W.2d 127 (1973), which held that a pardoned conviction cannot be counted toward the four prior convictions required under the State's sentence enhancement statute. The Duncan court, id., at 451, 494 S.W.2d, at 129, quoted with approval this Court's decision in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867), where we stated: "A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." Drawing upon that state-court holding, the District Court in this case concluded: "The truth is that the state could not [p46] have provided any evidence to rebut the petitioner's contention because it did not exist." 641 F. Supp., at 184.

That Arkansas was not roused to investigate Nelson's pardon claim until long after his trial does not transform the State's failure of proof—fatal for double jeopardy purposes under Burks —into a mere failure of admissibility. As the District Court noted, Arkansas law establishes "that the prosecutor must carry the significant burden of ferreting out information regarding the validity of prior convictions whenever he seeks enhancement." 641 F. Supp., at 184 (citing Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973)). The delay in the discovery of Nelson's pardon does not change the essential fact that, as a matter of state law, the paper evidence of the disputed conviction presented by the prosecutor was devoid of probative value from the moment the conviction was expunged by the pardon. A pardon simply "blots out of existence" the conviction as if it had never happened. Duncan v. State, supra, at 451, 494 S.W.2d, at 129. If, in seeking to prove Nelson's four prior convictions, the State had offered documented evidence to prove three valid prior convictions and a blank piece of paper to prove a fourth, no one would doubt that Arkansas had produced insufficient evidence and that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. There is no constitutionally significant difference between that hypothetical and this case.

[p47] In sum, Arkansas had "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble" that Nelson had four prior convictions, Burks, 437 U.S., at 16, but it "failed to prove its case." Id., at 15. In reversing both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to give Arkansas a second chance to sentence Nelson as a habitual offender, the majority pays no more than lipservice to the Burks insufficiency principle. I would therefore hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits Arkansas from subjecting Nelson to a new sentencing trial at which it can "supply evidence" of a fourth conviction "which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." Id., at 11.

II
Even if I did not regard this as a case of insufficient evidence controlled by Burks, I could not join my colleagues in the majority. The question whether a reviewing court, in evaluating insufficiency for double jeopardy purposes, should look to all the admitted evidence, or just the properly admitted evidence, is a complex one. It is worthy of the thoughtful consideration typically attending this Court's decisions concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The majority instead resolves this issue as if it had already been decided. Ante, at 40–41. In the majority's view: "It is quite clear from our opinion in Burks that a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Ibid. Burks decided no such thing. At issue in Burks was whether a finding of initial insufficiency bars a defendant's retrial; we held that it did. [p48] Burks did not presume to decide the completely distinct issue, raised by this case, of by what measure a reviewing court evaluates insufficiency in cases where a piece of evidence which went to the jury is later ruled inadmissible. Indeed, had Burks settled or even logically foreclosed this issue, there would have been no reason for us specifically to reserve its resolution in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S., at 26, n. 9—a case decided the very same day as Burks.

It seems to me that the Court's analysis of this issue should begin with the recognition that, in deciding when the double jeopardy bar should apply, we are balancing two weighty interests: the defendant's interest in repose and society's interest in the orderly administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S., at 466. The defendant's interest in avoiding successive trials on the same charge reflects the idea that the State

"should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U.S., at 187–188.

[p49] See also Burks, supra, at 11. Society's corresponding interest in the sound administration of justice reflects the fact that "[i]t would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." United States v. Tateo, supra, at 466.

I do not intend in this dissenting opinion to settle what rule best accommodates these competing interests in cases where a reviewing court has determined that a portion of a State's proof was inadmissible. At first blush, it would seem that the defendant's interest is every bit as great in this situation as in the Burks situation. Society's interest, however, would appear to turn on a number of variables. The chief one is the likelihood that retrying the defendant will lead to conviction. See United States v. Tateo, supra, at 466 (noting society's interest "in punishing one whose guilt is clear"). In appraising this likelihood, one might inquire into whether prosecutors tend in close cases to hold back probative evidence of a defendant's guilt; if they do not, there would be scant societal interest in permitting retrial given that the State's remaining evidence is, by definition, insufficient. Alternatively, one might inquire as to why the evidence at issue was deemed inadmissible. Where evidence was stricken for reasons having to do with its unreliability, it would seem curious to include it in the sufficiency calculus. Inadmissible hearsay evidence, for example, or evidence deemed defective or nonprobative as a matter of law thus might not be included. By contrast, evidence stricken in compliance with evidentiary rules grounded in other public policies—the policy of encouraging subsequent remedial measures embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 407, for example, [p50] or the policy of deterring unconstitutional searches and seizures embodied in the exclusionary rule—might more justifiably be included in a double jeopardy sufficiency analysis.

The Court today should have enunciated rules of this type, rules calibrated to accommodate, as best as possible, the defendant's interest in repose with society's interest in punishing the guilty. Regrettably, the majority avoids such subtlety in its terse opinion. Instead, it opts for a declaration that our decision in Burks—although no one knew it at the time—was settling the issue on which we granted certiorari here. This is ipse dixit jurisprudence of the worst kind. I dissent.

title: Lockhart v. Nelson/Dissent Marshall


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/38

 against, bitterly and to the death. When the democracy won, the fate of Socrates was decided: he was the intellectual leader of the revolting party, however pacific he might himself have been; he was the source of the hated aristocratic philosophy; he was the corrupter of youths drunk with debate. It would be better, said Anytus and Meletus, that Socrates should die.

The rest of the story all the world knows, for Plato wrote it down in prose more beautiful than poetry. We are privileged to read for ourselves that simple and courageous (if not legendary) "apology," or defence, in which the first martyr of philosophy proclaimed the rights and necessity of free thought, upheld his value to the state, and refused to beg for mercy from the crowd whom he had always contemned. They had the power to pardon him; he disdained to make the appeal. It was a singular confirmation of his theories, that the judges should wish to let him go, while the angry crowd voted for his death. Had he not denied the gods? Woe to him who teaches men faster than they can learn.

So they decreed that he should drink the hemlock. His friends came to his prison and offered him an easy escape; they had bribed all the officials who stood between him and liberty. He refused. He was seventy years old now (399 ); perhaps he thought it was time for him to die, and that he could never again die so usefully. "Be of good cheer," he told his sorrowing friends, "and say that you are burying my body only." "When he had spoken these words," says Plato, in one of the great passages of the world's literature,

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/38


text: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/39

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/39


text: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/40

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/40


text: Page:In re Directives.pdf/2

title: Page:In re Directives.pdf/2


text:
Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/41

Plato's meeting with Socrates had been a turning point in his life. He had been brought up in comfort, and perhaps in wealth; he was a handsome and vigorous youth—called Plato, it is said, because of the breadth of his shoulders; he had excelled as a soldier, and had twice won prizes at the Isthmian games. Philosophers are not apt to develop out of such an adolescence. But Plato's subtle soul had found a new joy in the "dialectic" game of Socrates; it was a delight to behold the master deflating dogmas and puncturing presumptions with the sharp point of his questions; Plato entered into this sport as he had in a coarser kind of wrestling; and under the guidance of the old "gad-fly" (as Socrates called himself) he passed from mere debate to careful analysis and fruitful discussion. He became a very passionate lover of wisdom, and of his teacher. "I thank God," he used to say, "that I was born Greek and not barbarian, freeman and not slave, man and not woman; but above all, that I was born in the age of Socrates."

He was twenty-eight when the master died; and this tragic end of a quiet life left its mark on every phase of the pupil's thought. It filled him with such a scorn of democracy, such a hatred of the mob, as even his aristocratic lineage and breeding had hardly engendered in him; it led him to a Catonic resolve that democracy must be destroyed, to be replaced by the rule of the wisest and the best. It became the absorbing problem of his life to find a method whereby the wisest and the best might be discovered, and then enabled and persuaded to rule.

Meanwhile his efforts to save Socrates had marked him out

title: Page:The Story of Philosophy.pdf/41


text: Talk:Lockhart v. Nelson

title: Talk:Lockhart v. Nelson


text:
Page:In re Directives.pdf/3

 [redacted text].

Gregory G. Garre, Acting Solicitor General, with whom Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General, J. Patrick Rowan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, John A. Eisenberg. Office of the Deputy Attorney General, John R. Phillips, Office of Legal Counsel, Sharon Swingle, Civil Division, and Matthew G. Olsen, John C. Demers, Jamil N. Jaffer, Andrew H. Tannenbaum, and Matthew A. Anzaldi, National Security Division, United States Department of Justice, were on brief, for respondent.

Before SELYA, Chief Judge, WINTER and ARNOLD, Senior Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Chief Judge.

This petition for review stems from directives issued to the petitioner [redacted text] pursuant to a now-expired set of amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1871 (2007). Among other things, those amendments, known as the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA), Pub.L. No. 110–55, 121 Stat. 552, authorized the United States to direct communications service providers to assist it in acquiring foreign intelligence when those acquisitions targeted third persons (such as the service provider’s customers) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Having received [redacted text] such directives, the petitioner challenged their legality before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). When that court found the directives lawful and compelled obedience to them, the petitioner brought this petition for review.

As framed, the petition presents matters of both first impression and constitutional significance. At its most elemental level, the petition requires us to weigh the nation’s security interests against the Fourth Amendment privacy interests of United States persons.

After a careful calibration of this balance and consideration of the myriad of legal issues presented, we affirm the lower court’s determinations that the directives at issue are lawful and that compliance with them is obligatory.

I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

On August 5, 2007, Congress enacted the PAA, codified in pertinent part at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805a to 1805c, as a measured expansion of FISA’s scope. Subject to certain conditions, the PAA allowed the government to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance on targets (including United States persons) “reasonably believed” to be located outside the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1805b(a). This proviso is of critical importance here.

title: Page:In re Directives.pdf/3


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/24

24


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/25

Rh


text:
Page:Succession to the Crown Act 2015 (Australia).pdf/13

 Part 2—Repeal of the Royal Marriages Act 1772

8 The whole of the Act

Repeal the Act.

9 Validation of some marriages voided by the Royal Marriages Act 1772

(1) A marriage that was void under the Royal Marriages Act 1772 of Great Britain, so far as that Act was part of the law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, is to be treated as never having been void if:

 * (a) neither party to the marriage was one of the 6 persons next in the line of succession to the Crown at the time of the marriage; and

 * (b) no consent was sought under section 1 of that Act, or notice given under section 2 of that Act, in respect of the marriage; and

 * (c) in all the circumstances it was reasonable for the person concerned not to have been aware at the time of the marriage that the Act applied to it; and

 * (d) no person acted, before the commencement of this item, on the basis that the marriage was void.

(2) Subitem (1) applies for all purposes except those relating to succession to the Crown.

[]


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/26

26


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/27

MODERN JAPAN


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/28

28


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/29

MODERN JAPAN


text:
Page:Fifteen Poets of Modern Japan - A Book of Translations (1928).pdf/30

30


text:
Chicot County v. Sherwood

An action will lie in a Circuit Court of the United States in the State of Arkansas at the suit of a citizen of New York, against a county in Arkansas, to recover on bonds and coupons issued by the county to aid in the construction of a railroad and held by the citizen of New York, notwithstanding the provisions in the act of the Legislature of Arkansas of February 27, 1879, repealing all laws authorizing counties within the State to be sued, requiring all demands against them to be presented to the County Courts of the several counties for allowance or rejection; and allowing appeals to be prosecuted from the decisions of those courts.

An answer to a declaration on such bonds and coupons setting out the statutory provisions under which the bonds were issued and averring that the election under which they were claimed to have been authorized was not a free and fair election but was a sham "as shown by papers filed with the county clerk," and reciting various irregularities which were alleged to appear "by reference to certified copies of the papers sent into the clerk's office" from some of the various precincts of the county, and concluding "and so the county says that there was in fact no election held in said county on February 27, 1872, to determine whether or not the county would subscribe to the capital of said railroad company and issue bonds to pay the same" presents no issuable question of fact, going to the merits of the suit, and if demurred to, the demurrer should be sustained.

While matters of fact, well pleaded, are admitted by a demurrer, conclusions of law are not so admitted.

case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. D. H. Reynolds for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

title: Chicot County v. Sherwood


text:
Chicot County v. Sherwood/Opinion of the Court

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action by the defendants in error, citizens of the state of New York, against Chicot County, Arkansas, upon 17 bonds and 80 interest warrants or coupons thereto attached, forming a portion of an issue of bonds made and executed by that county in 1872 for the amount of a stock subscription made by it to the Mississippi, Ouachita & Red [p530] River Railroad Company. The bonds and coupons sued on were in the following form:

"No. 3.

"It is hereby certified that the county of Chicot is indebted unto and will pay the Mississippi, Ouachita and Red River Railroad Company or bearer, on the first day of January, 1887, five hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum, payable semiannually, on the first day of January and July of each year, at the Union Trust Company, in the city of New York, on the presentation and surrender of the proper coupon hereto annexed. This bond is one of a series of two hundred, numbered from one to two hundred, inclusively, of like date, tenor, and amount, issued under an act of the general assembly of the state of Arkansas, entitled "An act to authorize counties to subscribe stock in railroads," approved July 23, 1868, and in obedience to the vote of the people of said county at an election held in accordance with the provisions of said act, authorizing the subscription of one thousand dollars to the capital stock of said railroad company.

"In witness whereof, the said county has caused to be affixed hereto its seal, and has caused the same to be attested by the signature of its county and probate judge, countersigned by the signature of its county clerk, who also signs the coupons hereto annexed, at their office, in said county, this 11th day of May, 1872.

4em

"County and Probate Judge.

", County Clerk.

"Receivable in payment of all county taxes.

"

"The treasurer of the county of Chicot will pay fifteen dollars to bearer at the office of the Union Trust Company, in the city of New York, on the first day of January, 1887, being amount ofinterest on bond No. 3.

", County Clerk."

[p531] Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of the bonds and coupons sued on, and the county prosecutes this writ of error therefrom, assigning as grounds of reversal, first, that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and, secondly, that said court erred in sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrer to the plea or answer of the county, and in rendering judgment against it, upon its delining to make further answer in bar or defence of the action.

After being summoned in the usual manner, the defendant moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that since the passage of an act of the legislature of Arkansas, on February 27, 1879, Gantt's Dig. (1884), 350, repealing all laws authorizing counties in the state to sue and be sued, the county could not be sued or proceeded against in any court, state or federal, by complaint and summons, or otherwise than in the manner provided by said act; that the county had not been brought into the circuit court in any manner authorized by law, so as to acquire jurisdiction over the same, that the plaintiffs had not presented their demand to the county court of Chicot county, duly verified according to the requirements of the statute, for allowance or rejection, and that without such verification and demand no case against or controversy with the county could arise of which any state or federal court could take cognizance or jurisdiction. The second section of the act of February 27, 1879, on which this motion was based, provided "that hereafter all persons having demands against any county shall present the same, duly verified according to law, to the county court of such county for allowance or rejection. From the order of the county court therein, appeals may be prosecuted as now provided by law. If in any appeal the judgment of the county court is reversed, the judgment of reversal shall be certified by the court rendering the same to the county court, and the county court shall thereupon enter the judgment of the superior court as its own."

The Circuit Court overruled this motion to dismiss the suit, and this action of the court constitutes the first error relied on for reversal of its judgment. It is claimed for plaintiff in error that, inasmuch as the courts of general jurisdiction in Arkansas [p532] have no original jurisdiction to hear and determine cases like the present since the passage of said act of February 27, 1879, the courts of the United States can exercise no such jurisdiction. In the case of Nevada County v. Hicks, 50 Arkansas, 416, 420, it was said by the Supreme Court of Arkansas that, "whilst it is true, by the act of February 27, 1879, counties cannot be sued in the ordinary way of bringing suits, still judgments may be and are rendered against them. Every allowance of a claim by the county is a judgment; and unquestionably, when an appeal is prosecuted from the action of the county court in allowing or rejecting a claim, the decision of the appellate court is a judgment; and when the judgment of the county court is reversed the judgment of reversal, when certified to the county court, is required to be entered as the judgment of the county court."

If, under this construction of the act, the allowance or rejection by the county court of any demand against the county, duly verified according to law, has the force and effect of a judgment for or against the county, from which an appeal will lie, it would seem that the making or presenting a demand against the county to the county court is, to all intents and purposes, such a legal proceeding as would permit the application of the rule which plaintiff in error invokes to defeat the jurisdiction of the federal court, for in the case of Gaines v. Fuentes, (92 U.S. 10, 20,) cited and relied on to support its position, it is said, "if by the law obtaining in the state, customary or statutory, they [suits] can be maintained in a state court, whatever designation that court may have, we think they may be maintained by original process in a federal court where the parties are on one side citizens of Louisiana, and on the other citizens of other states."

If, however, the presentation of a demand against the county, duly verified according to law, to the county court thereof, "for allowance or rejection," is not the beginning of a suit, or does not involve a trial inter partes, it is then only a preliminary proceeding to a suit or controversy which, by the appeal of either side, is or may be carried to an appellate court, before which there is an actual trial between the parties interested. [p533] The right to maintain this revisory trial in the state court, even under the principle contended for, will be sufficient to maintain a like suit by original process in a federal court where the requisite diverse citizenship exists. In Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., 133 U.S. 473, 486, 487, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for this court, and commenting upon a somewhat similar statutory provision, said: "It was also objected that the petition for removal was filed too late, after the case had been tried and determined by the board of county commissioners. But, under the statutes of Indiana then in force, although the proceedings of county commissioners in passing upon claims against a county are in some respects assimilated to proceedings before a court, and their decision, if not appealed from, cannot be collaterally drawn in question, yet those proceedings are in the nature, not of a trial inter partes, but of an allowance or disallowance, by officers representing the county, of a claim against it. At the hearing before the commissioners there is no representative of the county, except the commissioners themselves. They may allow the claim, either upon evidence introduced by the plaintiff, or without other proof than their own knowledge of the truth of the claim; and an appeal from this decision is tried and determined by the circuit court of the county as an original cause, and upon the complaint filed before the commissioners.It follows, according to the decisions of this court in analogous cases, that the trial in the circuit court of the county was 'the trial' of the case, at any time before which it might be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States under clause 3 of section 639 of the Revised Statutes."

If, therefore, the presentation of a demand to the county court under the Arkansas statute is not the commencement of a suit against the county, then, under the rule stated in Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., just quoted, the court to which such demand may be carried after allowance or rejection receives and determines it as an original cause. In either case the suit is so maintainable in the state courts as to be cognizable by original process in a federal court, where the parties have the proper citizenship to confer jurisdiction. Any other [p534] view of the subject would prevent citizens of other states from resorting to the federal courts for the enforcement of their claims against counties of the state, and limit them to the special mode of relief prescribed by the act of February 27, 1879. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is not to be defeated by such state legislation as this. In Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175, it is said: "But this court has repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different states cannot be impaired by the laws of the states, which prescribe the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. In many cases state laws form a rule of decision for the courts of the United States, and the forms of proceeding in these courts have been assimilated to those of the states, either by legislative enactment or by their own rules. But the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Union Bank v. Jolly's Administrators, 18 How. 503." This principle has been steadily adhered to by this court.

In the case under consideration the state statute relied on to defeat the jurisdiction of the United States circuit court was passed after the bonds sued on were issued and put in circulation, and if its requirement of presenting the bonds to the county court of Chicot county "for allowance or rejection" was binding upon citizens of other states holding such bonds, as a condition of bringing suit, it would present a very grave question whether it was not such a substantial and material change in the remedy in force when the contract was made as to impair its obligation. But it is not necessary to consider and determine that question, as the objection is merely to the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and, for the reasons already stated, is not well taken.

The second assignment of error is to the action of the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer to the answer of the county. The answer, after setting out the constitutional and statutory provisions of the state under which the county was authorized [p535] to issue the bonds in question, and the proceedings of the county court in reference to the submission of the question of subscribing $100,000 to the capital stock of the railroad company, and the election had thereunder by the people of the county, together with the result of the vote, which, according to the returns, as ascertained and found by the county court, showed a majority of 320 votes in favor of the county's making the subscription, proceeds to set forth a mass of irrelevant matter, such as the occurrence of a riot at a former election; the occupation of the county seat by a force of state troops to protect life and property when the order for the election under which the subscription voted was made, and continued so occupied till after the election; and alleges "that a condition of affairs existed in the county that precluded a free and fair election, and the veriest sham of an election was held at some of the various precincts on February 17, 1872, (the day of the election,) as shown by papers filed with the county clerk, and which upon their face show that there was not a legal election at any precinct in the county of Chicot on said February 17, 1872; and that no poll books were furnished to the several precincts as required by law", together with various other recited irregularities, alleged to be shown by papers filed, but by whom filed is not averred; nor is it stated how or in what way, as matter of fact, such irregularities affected the vote actually cast and counted, on which the subscription was carried. After a recital of these matters, which, it is said, appear "by reference to certified copies of the papers sent into the clerk's office from some of the various precincts in the county," numerous papers are marked as "exhibits," and made part of the answer, and from which is drawn the conclusion set up in the answer, as follows: "And so the county says that there was in fact no election held in said county on February 17, 1872, to determine whether or not the county would subscribe to the capital of said railroad company and issue bonds to pay the same."

It is further averred in the answer that the county court was not the proper tribunal to determine whether an election had been held in pursuance of the statute regulating the matter, [p536] that the false recitals on the face of the bonds to the contary did not estop the county; that the terms and conditions of the order submitting the question of subscription to a vote of the people were not complied with so that the county was not legally bound to pay the bonds, or any part thereof; and that the railroad company had delivered the stock to the county court before the election was held, and, after said election, had obtained the bonds illegally and fraudulently, etc. The answer also sets out proceedings had in the county court after the bonds were issued, and reports made to it in relation thereto, which are made exhibits to the answer, and which, it is claimed, show that the bonds were not issued in conformity to law.

To this answer there was interposed a demurrer, which was sustained, and, the county electing to stand on its answer, and say nothing further in bar of the plaintiffs' right to recover, judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of the bonds and coupons sued on, with interest and costs of suit.

It is urged by the plaintiff in error that this action of the lower court was erroneous for the reason that the answer set forth sufficient facts to invalidate the bonds within the rule laid down in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U.S. 83, 92, 93. We do not take this view of the answer. It abounds in recitals, in statements of what papers made exhibits thereto show, and in conclusions of law, which are not admitted by the demurrer; the rule being well settled that only matters of fact well pleaded are admitted by a demurrer, while conclusions of law are not. United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35, 45, Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 139 U.S. 569, 578.

The answer was of such a character as to present no issuable questions of fact going to the merits of the suit, and was properly demurred to, and there was no error in sustaining the demurrer.

Our conclusion is that the judgment should be

Affirmed.


text: Category:United States Supreme Court decisions in Volume 514


text:
Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/74

 GERMAN ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS (1941–1944) XCI Corps headquarters and control units in the Salonika region, through which all forces from the south would have to pass.

On 8 September, Bulgaria declared war on Germany and immediately dispatched strong forces from Sofiya in the direction of the Yugoslav frontier. Lacking the strength to put their ambitious HUNDESSOHN and JUDAS plans into effect, the Germans hurried the 1st Mountain Division to Skoplje, where it operated temporaril under control of the Second Panzer Army, to implement Plan TREUBRUCH. While 5,000 Bulgarians at Bitolj laid down their arms after a brief show of resistance, the garrison at Prilep and Bulgarian units in the Skoplje area fought stubbornly. However, the 1st Mountain Division eventually managed to seize and hold the city of Skoplje and the vital railroad along the Vardar River. Bulgarian units bypassed in the fast German move to the north succeeded in breaking the line at a number of points and had to be driven off by combat groups formed from troops moving northward from Greece to join the 1st Mountain Division.

On the night of 8–9 September, a general rising made it obvious that German units below the line Corfu–Yannina–Kalabaka–Olympus would have to fight their way north. Moving down from the mountains in force, both ELAS and EDES attempted to block the major roads and railways to the north. In western Greece, troops of the XXII Mountain Corps had to fight hard to keep the Arta–Yannina road open in order to evacuate the Cephalonia garrison and units in southwestern Greece. In eastern Greece, the LXVIII Reserve Corps, having already lost its 11th Luftwaffe Field Division to the defense of Macedonia, managed to regain long stretches of the rail line to Salonika only after a series of seesaw actions with strong ELAS units.

To reinforce the units already heavily engaged in the north and threatened by an estimated three Bulgarian armies moving west to cut off the withdrawal of Army Group E, General Loehr directed an airlift of combat troops from Crete and Rhodes. A total of 11,500 men evacuated from Crete alone in this operation, most of them from the 22d Airborne Division, proved to be a substantial addition to the hard-pressed units north of Salonika. However, fighter aircraft from Allied carriers now operating in force in Greek waters made impossible the completion of the airlift. As of 12 October, some 26,500 service and combat troops were still stranded on Crete, Rhodes, and other German-held islands, with little or no prospect of escape. Instructed to fight to the end and destroy all installations and materiel of value to the enemy, the bulk of these troops, representing all three services, were left to their fate.


text:
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.

Respondents were convicted under the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which prohibits "knowingly" transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing a visual depiction, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (2), if such depiction "involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §§ 2252(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A). In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that § 2252 was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it did not require a showing that the defendant knew that one of the performers was a minor.

Held: Because the term "knowingly" in §§ 2252(a)(1) and (2) modifies the phrase "the use of a minor" in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), the Act is properly read to include a scienter requirement for age of minority. This Court rejects the most natural grammatical reading, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, under which "knowingly" modifies only the relevant verbs in subsections (1) and (2), and does not extend to the elements of the minority of the performers, or the sexually explicit nature of the material, because they are set forth in independent clauses separated by interruptive punctuation. Some applications of that reading would sweep within the statute's ambit actors who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material, an anomalous result that the Court will not assume Congress to have intended. Moreover, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271, reinforced by Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, instructs that the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, and the minority status of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under § 2252. The legislative history, although unclear as to whether Congress intended "knowingly" to extend to performer age, persuasively indicates that the word applies to the sexually explicit conduct depicted, and thereby demonstrates that "knowingly" is emancipated from merely modifying the verbs in subsections (1) and (2). As a matter of grammar, it is difficult to conclude that the word modifies one of the elements in subsections (1)(A) and (2)(A), but not the other. This interpretation is supported by the canon that a [p65] statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions. Pp. 67–79.

982 F.2d 1285, reversed.

, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which, and , JJ., joined. , J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 472. , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which, J., joined, post, p. 473.

Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Joel M. Gershowitz.

Stanley Fleishman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Barry A. Fisher and David Grosz.

title: United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.


text: Talk:United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.


text: Category:United States Supreme Court decisions in Volume 513


text:
Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/75

 64 Its success in holding open the route of withdrawal to the north could not obscure the fact that Army Group E was in a difficult position. All available troops had been thrown into the fighting against the Russians and Bulgarians along a line roughly paralleling the southeastern Yugoslav border. In the rear areas in Yugoslav Macedonia, Albanian guerrillas and Partisan units roamed almost at will off the main roads and rail lines, and the Partisans had established contact with Bulgarian irregulars operating with their own army as reconnaissance and screening forces. Accordingly, Army Group E directed the complete evacuation of Greece and the establishment of a new defense along the line Scutari–Skoplje–Negotin. (Map 4.) On 14 October headquarters of Army Group E moved to Yugoslav Macedonia, where it estimated it had the equivalent of four German divisions holding a line of 375 miles against 131/2 Soviet and Bulgarian divisions. While the rugged country allowed them to confine their efforts to holding the mountain passes and other avenues of approach, this advantage was more than offset by the German inferiority in numbers and lack of air support and by the activities of the guerrillas. Information from prisoners revealed the Third Ukrainian Front (Army Group) to be in Sofiya directing operations, with the Thirty Seventh and Fifty Seventh Soviet Armies under its control. The Bulgarian armies were the First, Second, and Fourth. The use of Stuka aircraft by the Bulgarians, who had obtained them under the Axis equivalent of lend-lease during the period of the alliance with Germany, was particularly exasperating to the troops of Army Group E.

The few units still remaining in Greece, comprising mostly supply and other service troops, now found themselves in a position similar to that of the island garrisons. Lacking adequate transportation and the fire-power of combat units, these troops were ordered to fight to the last and to destroy all stocks and equipment of any value to the guerrillas. While some carried out the destruction as ordered, in a number of cases installation commanders turned critically needed food, medicines, and clothing over to agencies of the Greek Government. As British troops landed in southern Greece and the occupation rapidly approached its end, ELAS and EDES became engaged in a civil war that prevented both them and the British from participating in the pursuit of the Germans. On 2 November the last organized German units to evacuate Greece crossed the border into Yugoslavia, and German control of Greece was history.

'''III. The Area of Army Group F'''

The German command structure in Yugoslavia as of the first of the year was an anomaly. Army Group F, which controlled all German


text: German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)/Part Four


text: Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/96


text:
Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/99

The German official sources used in the preparation of this study included the war diaries (Kriegstagebuecher) of the Commander-in-Chief and Armed Forces Commander, Southeast; of Army Groups E and F; of the territorial commanders (Militaerbefehlshaber) in Serbia and southern Greece, and such selected corps and division diaries as were available. In addition to these, reference was made to those portions of the war diaries of the Armed Forces High Command and Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab), and such Hitler Directives (Fuehrerweisungen) as applied to the southeastern theater.

Other official sources such as résumés of the conferences of senior commanders and staffs included in the headquarters files, summaries of operations such as "The Great Withdrawal in the Southeast" (Die Grosse Absetzbewegung im Suedosten), and various activity reports supplemented the chronological record of events presented in the diaries.

A personal touch was added to the official record by the eyewitness accounts of General Lanz in his "Guerrilla War in the Mountains" and Colonel Gaisser in his "Guerrilla Battles in Croatia." Similar material, from a more detached viewpoint, was found in various commentaries by General der Artillerie (Lieutenant General) Walter Warlimont, Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. Reference was made to unofficial German publications and non-German sources, including the accounts of former Allied liaison officers, only where necessary to fill gaps in the official records and monographs.

82


text: Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/100


text: German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)/Appendix 1


text:
Page:The Last Judgement and Second Coming of the Lord Illustrated.djvu/262

 clare itself to be the true one: it will not strip itself of the pretensions under which its depravity has grown, and it will be vain to expect from it any declaration of its own apostasy. It will not accept the signs occurring within itself as the inauguration of a new era; and it will treat as heresy any explanations which may be presented from without. Hence it is to be expected that the second coming of the Lord will be denied by the declining Church, whensoever it may occur, just as the Jews denied His coming at the first. It will not see when the good cometh; that must be declared to it by some other means: and in time some will be enabled to acknowledge the prevalence of its errors.

There may be, there always have been, some in the Church in whom a spiritual apprehension has been quickened to perceive, in the surrounding events of extraordinary times, some portents of a coming change. When the Adamic dispensation fell, Noah and his family were enabled to see something of the evils which prevailed, to make provision against the catastrophe that was impending, and to become the instruments for the introduction of another era of religious life to men. When the Noetic Church became corrupt. Abraham and his descendants were enabled to discern somewhat of the enormities around them, to guard against the perils which were threatened, and to become the depositories of information for a superior age. When the Jewish economy rendered the Word of God of none effect by the traditions of the elders, there were wise men in the east, Zacharias in the temple, and some pious among the people, who not only knew something of the perversity of the times, but were gifted with a perception that a deliverance was at hand; they also became the instrnments for bringing to the notice of the world the commencement of a new condition of spiritual existence. When ancient


text: German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)/Appendix 2


text: Madagascar; with Other Poems/Ieffereidos, or the Captivitie of Jeffery


text:
Page:The Last Judgement and Second Coming of the Lord Illustrated.djvu/263

 Christianity became corrupt, there were Luther and others who beheld the abominations which were put forth under that sacred name; they broke down many of the inventions which had been set up, and opened a pathway for the transmission of some freer thought. When Protestantism became selfish in its aims, and dilatory in the performance of its duties; when courts and the nobility became sensual and voluptuous in their practices, and the common people deeply sunk in vice and degradation, there were Wesley and others who were gifted with the penetration to notice some of the evils which had been permitted to grow up with so much luxuriance and danger; and they became the instruments of bringing into society a superior influence by which to prepare the mind for nobler ends. God has never left His Church without a witness to His excellence. But all those premonitions of danger, and experiences of change in the Christian Church, are only so many fluctuations attending its decline. Error, with its kindred evils, had been the source of its difficulties, and the revivals which had been effected were little else than the occasional flickers of an expiring lamp. The reason was because those reformations left the fundamental principles of ancient heresy untouched. The doctrines which the Church accepts concerning God and the means of salvation, are held to be mysteries which cannot enter into rational thought; and so long as such doctrines remain, darkness and danger will always be imminent. True doctrines about God and the means of salvation are essential things of His Church. Doctrines which cannot be reasonably understood cannot edify. With such doctrines men are no wiser with a revelation than they would be without it. The Word is light, and its purpose is to make men the children of light; therefore any darkness in the Church must come from


text: Madagascar; with Other Poems/For the Lady, Olivia Porter