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 the purpose of God in the attainment of value is in a sense a creative purpose. Apart from God, the remaining formative elements would fail in their functions. There would be no creatures, since, apart from harmonious order, the perceptive fusion would be a confusion neutralizing achieved feeling. Here “feeling” is used as a synonym for “actuality.”

The adjustment is the reason for the world. It is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also since there is a world, we know that there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world.

This line of thought extends Kant’s argument. He saw the necessity for God in the moral order. But with his metaphysics he rejected the argument from the cosmos. The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds

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 en, but I don't know what stronger circumstantial evidence could be brought to convict a man. Why, Doc hadn't an enemy in the whole world that I ever heard of. He was so generous with men, and so gentle with women, that I often envied him his power to attract everybody to him. This is the only trouble of any sort I ever knew him to get into—this fatal claim-quarrel."

"Yes, and that makes it seem so much worse, that he was killed by malice—if killed by malice he was. But suppose, as that man said, the other shot might have killed him, and killed him accidentally?"

"In that case do you suppose any man would be so base as to conceal the circumstances, and let another man bear the accusation of willful murder? It is not probable, in the least; and if nothing better than such a supposition comes to aid him, Newcome will surely be convicted."

The young men remained silent for some moments, each engaged in painful reflections. There was no light in the room but that of the moon, which shone in at the uncurtained windows so as to illuminate it quite enough to make all its contents distinctly visible. Without thinking about it at the time. they had, as they afterward remembered, specially noticed -the order and arrangement of every thing in the room, as being so remarkably brought out by the unusual splendor of the moon's brilliancy. Some such recognizance of the fact was present to their minds at that moment. It was a momentary, partial obscurity of one of the windows, which drew their attention to the circumstance that some one was passing it in the direction of the door, and led them to look for it to open. It did so, though without noise or jar, and the familiar form of their late friend glided beside their bed.

Standing there, he opened his vest and put a finger to the wound in his side, his face wearing an expression of agony which was perfectly distinct, and terrible to behold. Then silently turning, he pointed to where Ed was lying muttering in his sleep, and vanished away before their eyes. So paralyzed with horror were both the young men, that, for a brief interval, neither of them spoke or stirred. Squire was the first to recover himself.

"Did you see any thing, Flag?"

"Why do you ask?" returned he, with an involuntary shudder. "Did you see any thing?"

"I saw Doc standing beside the bed."

"So did I. Can this be a trick of Ed's? Ile seems to be unusually sound asleep, for all our talking has not waked him, and that looks suspicious."

"But he does not know. Let's get up and look out."

They arose, and going out of doors, took a view of the neighborhood. There were no hiding-places anywhere near—nothing but the open prairie shining with dew, and no creature in sight except Ed's Indian pony quietly feeding near the house corner.

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 the foundations of the world in the æsthetic experience, rather than — as with Kant — in the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is therefore æsthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of æsthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the æsthetic order, and the æsthetic order is derived from the immanence of God.

Descartes grounded his philosophy on an entirely different metaphysical description of the actual world. He started with cogitating minds, and with extended bodies which are the organic and inorganic bits of matter.

Now in some sense no one doubts but that there are bodies and minds. The only point at issue is the status of such bodies and minds in the scheme of things. Descartes affirmed that they were individual substances, so that each bit of matter is a substance, and each mind is a substance. He also states what he means by a substance. He says:

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These sentences are a summary of the presupposition of scientific thought in recent centuries: that the world is composed of bits of stuff with attributes. There are insuperable

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 difficulties in Descartes’ view which have led to attempts at simplification, keeping his general supposition of stuff with attributes.

Note that Descartes presupposes three types of substance — namely, God, bits of matter, minds. Descartes’ proof of the existence of God is accepted by very few philosophers, religious or otherwise. Indeed, given his starting point, it is difficult to see how any proof can be found.

The simplifications all concern dropping either one or two of these types of substances. For example, dropping God, and retaining only matter and mind; or dropping God and minds, and retaining the matter, as with Hobbes; or dropping matter, and retaining God and minds, as with Berkeley; or dropping matter and minds, and retaining God alone. In this latter case, the temporal world becomes an appearance forming an attribute of God.

But the main point of all such philosophies is that they presuppose individual substance,

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 either one or many individual substances, “which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.” This presupposition is exactly what is denied in the more Platonic description which has been given in this lecture. There is no entity, not even God, “which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.”

According to the doctrine of this lecture, every entity is in its essence social and requires the society in order to exist. In fact, the society for each entity, actual or ideal, is the all inclusive universe, including its ideal forms.

But Descartes has the great merit that he states facts which any philosophy must fit into its scheme. There are bits of matter, and there are minds. Both matter and mind have to be fitted into the metaphysical scheme.

Now, according to the doctrine of this lecture, the most individual actual entity is a definite act of perceptivity. So matter and mind, which persist through a route of such occasions, must be relatively abstract; and

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 they must gain their specific individualities from their respective routes. The character of a bit of matter must be something common to each occasion of its route; and analogously, the character of a mind must be something common to each occasion of its route. Each bit of matter, and each mind, is a subordinate community — in that sense analogous to the actual world.

But each occasion, in its character of being a finished creature, is a value of some definite specific sort. Thus a mind must be a route whose various occasions exhibit some community of type of value. Similarly a bit of matter — or an electron — must be a route whose various occasions exhibit some community of type of value.

Again in such a route — material or mental — the environment will also partially determine the forms of the occasions. But that which the occasions have in common, so as to form a route of mind or a route of matter, must be derived by inheritance from the antecedent members

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 of the route. The environment may favour this inheritance or may obstruct it. But such influence must be in the background so that there is a real transmission of the common element along the route.

In the case of men and animals, there are obviously routes of mind and routes of matter in the very closest connection, which we will consider more particularly in a moment. In the case of a bit of inorganic matter, any associate route of mentality seems to be negligible.

A belief in purely spiritual beings means, on this metaphysical theory, that there are routes of mentality in respect to which associate material routes are negligible, or entirely absent. At the present moment the orthodox belief is that for all men after death there are such routes, and that for all animals after death there are no such routes.

Also at present it is generally held that a purely spiritual being is necessarily immortal. The doctrine here developed gives no warrant

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 for such a belief. It is entirely neutral on the question of immortality, or on the existence of purely spiritual beings other than God. There is no reason why such a question should not be decided on more special evidence, religious or otherwise, provided that it is trustworthy. In this lecture we are merely considering evidence with a certain breadth of extension throughout mankind. Until that evidence has yielded its systematic theory, special evidence is indefinitely weakened in its effect.

This account of what is meant by the enduring existence of matter and of mind explains such endurance as exemplifying the order immanent in the world. The solid earth survives because there is an order laid upon the creativity in virtue of which second after second, minute after minute, hour after hour, day after day, year after year, century after century, age after age, the creative

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 energy finds in the maintenance of that complex form a centre of experienced perceptivity focusing the universe into one unity.

It survives because the universe is a process of attaining instances of definite experience out of its own elements. Each such instance embraces the whole, omitting nothing, whether it be ideal form or actual fact. But it brings them into its own unity of feeling under gradations of relevance and of irrelevance, and thereby by this limitation issues into that definite experience which it is.

Accordingly, any given instance of experience is only possible so far as the antecedent facts permit. For they are required in order to constitute it. The maintenance, throughout ages of life history, of a given type of experience, in instance after instance of its separate occasions, requires, therefore, the stable order of the actual world.

The creative process is thus to be discerned in that transition by which one occasion, already actual, enters into the birth of another

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 instance of experienced value. There is not one simple line of transition from occasion to occasion, though there may be a dominant line. The whole world conspires to produce a new creation. It presents to the creative process its opportunities and its limitations.

The limitations are the opportunities. The essence of depth of actuality — that is of vivid experience — is definiteness. Now to be definite always means that all the elements of a complex whole contribute to some one effect, to the exclusion of others. The creative process is a process of exclusion to the same extent as it is a process of inclusion. In this connection “to exclude” means to relegate to irrelevance in the æsthetic unity, and “to include” means to elicit relevance to that unity.

The birth of a new instance is the passage into novelty. Consider how any one actual fact, which I will call the ground, can enter into the creative process. The novelty which enters into the derivate instance is the information of the actual world with a new

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 set of ideal forms. In the most literal sense the lapse of time is the renovation of the world with ideas. A great philosopher has said that time is the mind of space. In respect to one particular new birth of one centre of experience, this novelty of ideal forms will be called the “consequent.” Thus we are now considering the particular relevance of the consequent to the particular ground supplied by one antecedent occasion.

The derivate includes the fusion of the particular ground with the consequent, so far as the consequent is graded by its relevance to that ground.

In this fusion of ground with consequent, the creative process brings together something which is actual and something which, at its entry into that process, is not actual. The process is the achievement of actuality by the ideal consequent, in virtue of its union with the actual ground. In the phrase of Aristotle, the process is the fusion of being with not-being.

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 The birth of a new æsthetic experience depends on the maintenance of two principles by the creative purpose:

These two principles are derived from the doctrine that an actual fact is a fact of æsthetic experience. All æsthetic experience is feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity.

Thus the consequent must agree with the ground in general type so as to preserve definiteness, but it must contrast with it in respect to contrary instances so as to obtain vividness and quality. In the physical world, this principle of contrast under an identity expresses itself in the physical law that vibration enters into the ultimate nature of atomic

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 quent as it stands in his vision is also added. Thus God in the world is the perpetual vision of the road which leads to the deeper realities.

God is that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial as to our own interests. He is that element in life in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond facts of existence to values of existence. He is that element in virtue of which our purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others. He is that element in virtue of which the attainment of such a value for others transforms itself into value for ourselves.

He is the binding element in the world. The consciousness which is individual in us, is universal in him: the love which is partial in us is all-embracing in him. Apart from him there could be no world, because there could be no adjustment of individuality. His pur-

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 pose in the world is quality of attainment. His purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world. Thus all attainment is immortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are God in the world as it is now. Every act leaves the world with a deeper or a fainter impress of God. He then passes into his next relation to the world with enlarged, or diminished, presentation of ideal values.

He is not the world, but the valuation of the world. In abstraction from the course of events, this valuation is a necessary metaphysical function. Apart from it, there could be no definite determination of limitation required for attainment. But in the actual world, He confronts what is actual in it with what is possible for it. Thus He solves all indeterminations.

The passage of time is the journey of the world towards the gathering of new ideas into actual fact. This adventure is upwards and downwards. Whatever ceases to ascend, fails

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 value. Actual fact always means fusion into one perceptivity. God is one such conceptual fusion, embracing the concept of all such possibilities graded in harmonious, relative subordination. Each actual occasion in the temporal world is another such fusion. The forms belong no more to God than to any one occasion. Apart from these forms, no rational description can be given either of God or of the actual world. Apart from God, there would be no actual world; and apart from the actual world with its creativity, there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God.

Each actual occasion gives to the creativity which flows from it a definite character in two ways. In one way, as a fact, enjoying its complex of relationships with the rest of the world, it contributes a ground — partly good and partly bad — for the creativity to fuse with a novel consequent, which will be the outcome of its free urge. In another way, as transmuted in the nature of God, the ideal conse-

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 into the world. Through it his ideal vision is given a base in actual fact to which He provides the ideal consequent, as a factor saving the world from the self-destruction of evil. The power by which God sustains the world is the power of himself as the ideal. He adds himself to the actual ground from which every creative act takes its rise. The world lives by its incarnation of God in itself.

He transcends the temporal world, because He is an actual fact in the nature of things. He is not there as derivative from the world; He is the actual fact from which the other formative elements cannot be torn apart.

But equally it stands in his nature that He is the realization of the ideal conceptual harmony by reason of which there is an actual process in the total universe — an evolving world which is actual because there is order.

The abstract forms are thus the link between God and the actual world. These forms are abstract and not real, because in themselves they represent no achievement of actual

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 abnormal psychology is to surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for religious doctrine.

Religion starts from the generalization of final truths first perceived as exemplified in particular instances. These truths are amplified into a coherent system and applied to the interpretation of life. They stand or fall — like other truths — by their success in this interpretation. The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values. It brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe which we can care for. It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, for our own existence, a meaning which flows from the nature of things.

It is not true, however, that we observe best when we are entirely devoid of emotion. Unless there is a direction of interest, we do not observe at all. Further, our capacity for observation is limited. Accordingly, when we are observing some things, we are in a bad position for observing other things.

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 Thus there are certain emotional states which are most favourable for a peculiar concentration on topics of religious interest, just as other states facilitate the apprehension of arithmetical truths. Also, emotional states are related to states of the body. Most people are more likely to make arithmetical slips when they are tired in the evening. But we still believe that arithmetic holds good from sundown to cockcrow.

Again, it is not true that all people are on a level in respect to their perceptive powers. Some people appear to realize continuously, and at a higher level, types of emotional and perceptive experience, which we recognize as corresponding to those periods of our own lives most worthy of confidence for that sort of experience. In so far as what they say interprets our own best moments, it is reasonable to trust to the evidential force of their experience.

These considerations are all commonplaces, but it is necessary to keep them clearly in

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 mind when we endeavour to form our philosophy of religious knowledge.

A dogma is the precise enunciation of a general truth, divested so far as possible from particular exemplification. Such precise expression is in the long run a condition for vivid realization, for effectiveness, for apprehension of width of scope, and for survival.

For example, when the Greeks, such as Pythagoras or Euclid, formulated accurately mathematical dogmas, the general truths which the Egyptians had acted upon for more than thirty generations became thereby of greater importance.

It is not the case, however, that our apprehension of a general truth is dependent upon its accurate verbal expression. For it would follow that we could never be dissatisfied with the verbal expression of something that we had never apprehended. But this consciousness of failure to express our accurate meaning must have haunted most of us.

For example, the notion of irrational num-

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 ber had been used in mathematics for over two thousand years before it received accurate definition in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Also, Newton and Leibnitz introduced the differential calculus, which was the foundation of modern mathematical physics. But the mathematical notions involved did not receive adequate verbal expression for two hundred and fifty years.

Such recondite examples are quite unnecessary. We know more of the characters of those who are dear to us than we can express accurately in words. We may recognize the truth of some statement about them. It will be a new statement about something which we had already apprehended but had never formulated.

This example brings out another fact: that a one-sided formulation may be true, but may have the effect of a lie by its distortion of emphasis. Such distortion does not stand in its character of a truth, but depends upon those who are affected by it. So far as the

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 difficulties it finally involves. When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of puttings things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch.

One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the modern period. It is embodied in the conception which is supposed to express the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers asked, What is nature made of? The answer is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material, — the particular name chosen is indifferent — which has the property of simple location in space and time, or, if you adopt the more modern ideas, in space-time. What I mean by matter, or material, is anything which has this property of simple location. By simple location I mean one major characteristic which refers equally both to space and to time, and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between space and time.

The characteristic common both to space and time is that material can be said to be here in space and here in time, or here in space-time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time. Curiously


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 enough this character of simple location holds whether we look on a region of space-time as determined absolutely or relatively. For if a region is merely a way of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities, then this characteristic, which I call simple location, is that material can be said to have just these relations of position to the other entities without requiring for its explanation any reference to other regions constituted by analogous relations of position to the same entities. In fact, as soon as you have settled, however you do settle, what you mean by a definite place in space-time, you can adequately state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying that it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location is concerned, there is nothing more to be said on the subject.

There are, however, some subordinate explanations to be made which bring in the minor characteristics which I have already mentioned. First, as regards time, if material has existed during any period, it has equally been in existence during any portion of that period. In other words, dividing the time does not divide the material. Secondly, in respect to space, dividing the volume does divide the material. Accordingly, if material exists throughout a volume, there will be less of that material distributed through any definite half of that volume. It is from this property that there arises our notion of density at a point of space. Anyone who talks about density is not assimilating time and space to the extent that some extremists of the modern school of relativists very rashly desire. For the division of time functions, in respect


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 to material, quite differently from the division of space.

Furthermore, this fact that the material is indifferent to the division of time leads to the conclusion that the lapse of time is an accident, rather than of the essence, of the material. The material is fully itself in any sub-period however short. Thus the transition of time has nothing to do with the character of the material. The material is equally itself at an instant of time. Here an instant of time is conceived as in itself without transition, since the temporal transition is the succession of instants.

The answer, therefore, which the seventeenth century gave to the ancient question of the Ionian thinkers, ‘What is the world made of?’ was that the world is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter, — or of material, if you wish to include stuff more subtle than ordinary matter, the ether for example.

We cannot wonder that science rested content with this assumption as to the fundamental elements of nature. The great forces of nature, such as gravitation, were entirely determined by the configurations of masses. Thus the configurations determined their own changes, so that the circle of scientific thought was completely closed. This is the famous mechanistic theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever since the seventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed of physical science. Furthermore, the creed justified itself by the pragmatic test. It worked. Physicists took no more interest in philosophy. They emphasized the anti-rationalism of the Historical Revolt. But the difficulties of this theory of materialistic mechan-


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 ism very soon became apparent. The history of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a general idea which it could neither live with nor live without.

This simple location of instantaneous material configurations is what Bergson has protested against, so far as it concerns time and so far as it is taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it a distortion of nature due to the intellectual ‘spatialisation’ of things. I agree with Bergson in his protest: but I do not agree that such distortion is a vice necessary to the intellectual apprehension of nature. I shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that this spatialisation is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions. There is an error; but it is merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. It is an example of what I will call the ‘Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.’ This fallacy is the occasion of great confusion in philosophy. It is not necessary for the intellect to fall into the trap, though in this example there has been a very general tendency to do so.

It is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to make great difficulties for induction. For, if in the location of configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times, past or future, it immediately follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly, induction is not based on anything which can be observed as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to nature for the justification of our belief in any law


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 such as the law of gravitation. In other words, the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature. For there is nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to the past or to the future. It looks, therefore, as though memory, as well as induction, would fail to find any justification within nature itself.

I have been anticipating the course of future thought, and have been repeating Hume’s argument. This train of thought follows so immediately from the consideration of simple location, that we cannot wait for the eighteenth century before considering it. The only wonder is that the world did in fact wait for Hume before noting the difficulty. Also it illustrates the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that, when Hume did appear, it was only the religious implications of his philosophy which attracted attention. This was because the clergy were in principle rationalists, whereas the men of science were content with a simple faith in the order of nature. Hume himself remarks, no doubt scoffingly, ‘Our holy religion is founded on faith.’ This attitude satisfied the Royal Society but not the Church. It also satisfied Hume and has satisfied subsequent empiricists.

There is another presupposition of thought which must be put beside the theory of simple location. I mean the two correlative categories of Substance and quality. There is, however this difference. There were different theories as to the adequate description of the status of space. But whatever its status, no one had any doubt but that the connection with space enjoyed by entities, which are said to be in space, is that of simple location. We may put this shortly by say-


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 ing that it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus of simple locations. Whatever is in space is simpliciter in some definite portion of space. But in respect to substance and quality the leading minds of the seventeenth century were definitely perplexed; though, with their usual genius, they at once constructed a theory which was adequate for their immediate purposes.

Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple location, are the most natural ideas for the human mind. It is the way in which we think of things, and without these ways of thinking we could not get our ideas straight for daily use. There is no doubt about this. The only question is, How concretely are we thinking when we consider nature under these conceptions? My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves with simplified editions of immediate matters of fact. When we examine the primary elements of these simplified editions, we shall find that they are in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical constructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of course, as a point of individual psychology, we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method of suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details. But when we attempt to justify this suppression of irrelevance, we find that, though there are entities left correspond- ing to the entities we talk about, yet these entities are of a high degree of abstraction.

Thus I hold that substance and quality afford another instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Let us consider how the notions of substance and quality arise. We observe an object as an entity with certain characteristics. Furthermore, each individual


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 entity is apprehended through its characteristics. For example, we observe a body; there is something about it which we note. Perhaps, it is hard, and blue, and round, and noisy. We observe something which possesses these qualities: apart from these qualities we do not observe anything at all. Accordingly, the entity is the substratum, or substance, of which we predicate qualities. Some of the qualities are essential, so that apart from them the entity would not be itself; while other qualities are accidental and changeable. In respect to material bodies, the qualities of having a quantitative mass, and of simple location somewhere, were held by John Locke at the close of the seventeenth century to be essential qualities. Of course, the location was changeable, and the unchangeability of mass was merely an experimental fact except for some extremists.

So far, so good. But when we pass to blueness and noisiness a new situation has to be faced. In the first place, the body may not be always blue, or noisy. We have already allowed for this by our theory of accidental qualities, which for the moment we may accept as adequate. But in the second place, the seventeenth century exposed a real difficulty. The great physicists elaborated transmission theories of light and sound, based upon their materialistic views of nature. There were two hypotheses as to light: either it was transmitted by the vibratory waves of a materlalistic ether, or — according to Newton — it was transmitted by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles of some subtle matter. We all know that the wave theory of Huyghens held the field during the nineteenth century, and that at present physicists are en-


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 deavouring to explain some obscure circumstances attending radiation by a combination of both theories. But whatever theory you choose, there is no light or colour as a fact in external nature. There is merely motion of material. Again, when the light enters your eyes and falls on the retina, there is merely motion of material. Then your nerves are affected and your brain is affected, and again this is merely motion of material. The same line of argument holds for sound, substituting waves in the air for waves in the ether, and ears for eyes.

We then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness qualities of the body. By analogous reasoning, we also ask in what sense is its scent a quality of the rose.

Galileo considered this question, and at once pointed out that, apart from eyes, ears, or noses, there would be no colours, sounds, or smells. Descartes and Locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary qualities. For example, Descartes in his ‘Sixth Meditation’ says: “And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colours, sounds, odours, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them;. . .”

Also in his Principles of Philosophy, he says: “That by our senses we know nothing of external objects beyond their figure [or situation], magnitude, and motion.”

Locke, writing with a knowledge of Newtonian dynamics, places mass among the primary qualities of bodies. In short, he elaborates a theory of pri-


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 mary and secondary qualities in accordance with the state of physical science at the close of the seventeenth century. The primary qualities are the essential qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal relationships constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships constitute nature. The orderliness of these relationships constitutes the order of nature. The occurrences of nature are in some way apprehended by minds, which are associated with living bodies. Primarily, the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences in certain parts of the correlated body, the occurrences in the brain, for instance. But the mind in apprehending also experiences sensations which, properly speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. These sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.

However you disguise it, this is the practical outcome of the characteristic scientific philosophy which closed the seventeenth century.

In the first place, we must note its astounding efficiency as a system of concepts for the organisation of scientific research. In this respect, it is fully worthy


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 of the genius of the century which produced it. It has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific studies ever since. It is still reigning. Every university in the world organises itself in accordance with it. No alternative system of organising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested. It is not only reigning, but it is without a rival.

And yet — it is quite unbelievable. This conception of the universe is surely framed in terms of high ab- stractions, and the paradox only arises because we have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities.

No picture, however generalised, of the achievements of scientific thought in this century can omit the advance in mathematics. Here as elsewhere the genius of the epoch made itself evident. Three great Frenchmen, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated the modern period in geometry. Another Frenchman, Fermat, laid the foundations of modern analysis, and all but perfected the methods of the differential calculus. Newton and Leibniz, between them, actually did create the differential calculus as a practical method of mathematical reasoning. When the century ended, mathematics as an instrument for application to physical problems was well established in something of its modern proficiency. Modern pure mathematics, if we except geometry, was in its infancy, and had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to make in the nineteenth century. But the mathematical physicist had appeared, bringing with him the type of mind which was to rule the scientific world in the next century. It was to be the age of ‘Victorious Analysis.’

The seventeenth century had finally produced a


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 neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was either of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an intuition (inspectio) of the mind,. . .” It must be noted that the Latin word ‘inspectio’ is associated in its classical use with the notion of theory as opposed to practice.

The two great preoccupations of modern philosophy now lie clearly before us. The study of mind divides into psychology, or the study of mental functionings as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations, and into epistemology, or the theory of the knowledge of a common objective world. In other words, there is the study of the cogitations, quâ passions of the mind, and their study quâ leading to an inspection (intuition) of an objective world. This is a very uneasy division, giving rise to a host of perplexities whose consideration has occupied the intervening centuries.

As long as men thought in terms of physical notions for the objective world and of mentality for the subjective world, the setting out of the problem, as achieved by Descartes, sufficed as a starting point. But the balance has been upset by the rise of physiology. In the seventeenth century men passed from the study of physics to the study of philosophy. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, notably in Germany, men passed from the study of physiology to the study of psychology. The change in tone has been decisive. Of course, in the earlier period the intervention of the human body was fully considered, for example, by Descartes in Part V of the ‘Discourse on Method.’ But the physiological instinct had not been developed. In considering the human body, Descartes


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 thought with the outfit of a physicist; whereas the modern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities of medical physiologists. The career of William James is an example of this change in standpoint. He also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could state in a flash the exact point at issue.

The reason why I have put Descartes and James in close juxtaposition is now evident. Neither philosopher finished an epoch by a final solution of a problem. Their great merit is of the opposite sort. They each of them open an epoch by their clear formulation of terms in which thought could profitably express itself at particular stages of knowledge, one for the seventeenth century, the other for the twentieth century. In this respect, they are both to be contrasted with St. Thomas Aquinas, who expressed the culmination of Aristotelian scholasticism.

In many ways neither Descartes nor James were the most characteristic philosophers of their respective epochs. I should be disposed to ascribe these positions to Locke and to Bergson respectively, at least so far as concerns their relations to the science of their times. Locke developed the lines of thought which kept philosophy on the move; for example he emphasized the appeal to psychology. He initiated the age of epoch-making enquiries into urgent problems of limited scope. Undoubtedly, in so doing, he infected philosophy with something of the anti-rationalism of science. But the very groundwork of a fruitful methodology is to start from those clear postulates which must be held to be ultimate so far as concerns the occasion in question. The criticism of such methodological postulates is thus reserved for


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 another opportunity. Locke discovered that the philosophical situation bequeathed by Descartes involved the problems of epistemology and psychology.

Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century. His protest against spatialisation is a protest against taking the Newtonian conception of nature as being anything except a high abstraction. His so-called anti-intellectualism should be construed in this sense. In some respects he recurs to Descartes; but the recurrence is accompanied with an instinctive grasp of modern biology.

There is another reason for associating Locke and Bergson. The germ of an organic theory of nature is to be found in Locke. His most recent expositor, Professor Gibson, states that Locke’s way of conceiving the identity of self-consciousness ‘like that of a living organism, involves a genuine transcending of the mechanical view of nature and of mind, embodied in the composition theory.’ But it is to be noticed that in the first place Locke wavers in his grasp of this position; and in the second place, what is more important still, he only applies his idea to self-consciousness. The physiological attitude has not yet established itself. The effect of physiology was to put mind back into nature. The neurologist traces first the effect of stimuli along the bodily nerves, then integration at nerve centres, and finally the rise of a projective reference beyond the body with a resulting motor efficacy in renewed nervous excitement. In biochemistry, the


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 ligion and Virtue. If the event happened contrary to his Expectations, this poibly proceeded from ome Fault in the Plan itelf; which the Reader hath my Leave to dicover, if he can: For we do not pretend to introduce any infallible Characters into this Hitory; where we hope nothing will be found which hath never yet been een in human Nature.

To return therefore; the Reader will not, I think, wonder that the different Behaviour of the two Ldas above commemorated, produced the different Effects, of which he hath already een ome Intance; and beides this, there was another Reaon for the Conduct of the Philoopher and the Pedagogue; but this being Matter of great Importance, we hall reveal it in the next Chapter.  Containing a better Reaon till for the before mentioned Opinions.

T is to be known then, that thoe two learned Peronages, who have lately made a coniderable Figure on the Theatre


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 delicate adjustment of the chemical composition of the parts to the preservation of the whole organism is detected. Thus the mental cognition is seen as the reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself what it is in itself as one unit occurrence. This unit is the integration of the sum of its partial happenings, but it is not their numerical aggregate. It has its own unity as an event. This total unity, considered as an entity for its own sake, is the prehension into unity of the patterned aspects of the universe of events. Its knowledge of itself arises from its own relevance to the things of which it prehends the aspects. It knows the world as a system of mutual relevance, and thus sees itself as mirrored in other things. These other things include more especially the various parts of its own body.

It is important to discriminate the bodily pattern, which endures, from the bodily event, which is pervaded by the enduring pattern, and from the parts of the bodily event. The parts of the bodily event are themselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns, which form elements in the bodily pattern. The parts of the body are really portions of the environment of the total bodily event, but so related that their mutual aspects, each in the other, are peculiarly effective in modifying the pattern of either. This arises from the intimate character of the relation of whole to part. Thus the body is a portion of the environment for the part, and the part is a portion of the environment for the body; only they are peculiarly sensitive, each to modifications of the other. This sensitiveness is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to preserve the stability of the pattern of the body. It is a par-


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 ticular example of the favourable environment shielding the organism. The relation of part to whole has the special reciprocity associated with the notion of organism, in which the part is for the whole; but this relation reigns throughout nature and does not start with the special case of the higher organisms.

Further, viewing the question as a matter of chemistry, there is no need to construe the actions of each molecule in a living body by its exclusive particular reference to the pattern of the complete living organism. It is true that each molecule is affected by the aspect of this pattern as mirrored in it, so as to be otherwise than what it would have been if placed elsewhere. In the same way, under some circumstances an electron may be a sphere, and under other circumstances an egg-shaped volume. The mode of approach to the problem, so far as science is concerned, is merely to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies properties which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings. In the same way, in a magnetic field soft iron exhibits magnetic properties which are in abeyance elsewhere. The prompt self-preservative actions of living bodies, and our experience of the physical actions of our bodies following the determinations of will, suggest the modification of molecules in the body as the result of the total pattern. It seems possible that there may be physical laws expressing the modification of the ultimate basic organisms when they form part of higher organisms with adequate compactness of pattern. It would, however, be entirely in consonance with the empirically observed action of environments, if the direct effects of aspects as between the whole body and its parts were negligible.


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 We should expect transmission. In this way the modification of total pattern would transmit itself by means of a series of modifications of a descending series of parts, so that finally the modification of the cell changes its aspect in the molecule, thus effecting a corresponding alteration in the molecule, — or in some subtler entity. Thus the question for physiology is the question of the physics of molecules in cells of different characters.

We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics. The private psychological field is merely the event considered from its own standpoint. The unity of this field is the unity of the event. But it is the event as one entity, and not the event as a sum of parts. The relations of the parts, to each other and to the whole, are their aspects, each in the other. A body for an external observer is the aggregate of the aspects for him of the body as a whole, and also of the body as a sum of parts. For the external observer the aspects of shape and of sense-objects are dominant, at least for cognition. But we must also allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves direct aspects of the mentalities of higher organisms. The claim that the cognition of alien mentalities must necessarily be by means of indirect inferences from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is wholly unwarranted by this philosophy of organism. The fundamental principle is that whatever merges into actuality, implants its aspects in every individual event.

Further, even for self-cognition, the aspects of the parts of our own bodies partly take the form of aspects of shape, and of sense-objects. But that part of the


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 bodily event, in respect to which the cognitive mentality is associated, is for itself the unit psychological field. Its ingredients are not referent to the event itself; they are aspects of what lies beyond that event. Thus the self-knowledge inherent in the bodily event is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity, whose ingredients involve all reality beyond itself, restricted under the limitation of its pattern of aspects. Thus we know ourselves as a function of unification of a plurality of things which are other than ourselves. Cognition discloses an event as being an activity, organising a real togetherness of alien things. But this psychological field does not depend on its cognition; so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted from its self-cognition.

Accordingly, consciousness will be the function of knowing. But what is known is already a prehension of aspects of the one real universe. These aspects are aspects of other events as mutually modifying, each the others. In the pattern of aspects they stand in their pattern of mutual relatedness.

The aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern weaves itself are the aspects of shapes, of sense-objects, and of other eternal objects whose self-identity is not dependent on the flux of things. Wherever such objects have ingression into the general flux, they interpret events, each to the other. They are here in the perceiver; but, as perceived by him, they convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond himself. The subject-object relation takes its origin in the double rôle of these eternal objects. They are modifications of the subject, but only in their character


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 of this Hitory, had from their firt Arrival at Mr. Allworthy’s Houe, taken o great an Affection, the one to his Virtue, the other to his Religion, that they had meditated the cloet Alliance with him.

For this Purpoe they had cat their Eyes on that fair Widow, whom, tho’ we have not for ome Time made any Mention of her, the Reader, we trut, hath not forgot. Mrs. Blifil was indeed the Object to which they both apired.

It may eem remarkable that of four Perons whom we have commemorated at Mr. Allworthy’s Houe, three of them hould fix their Inclinations on a Lady who was never greatly celebrated for her Beauty, and who was, moreover, now a little decended into the Vale of Years; but in reality Boom Friends, and intimate Acquaintance, have a kind of natural Propenity to particular Females at the Houe of a Friend; viz. to his Grand-mother, Mother, Siter, Daughter, Aunt, Niece and Couin, when they are rich, and to his Wife, Siter, Daughter, Niece, Couin, Mitres or Servant Maid, if they hould be handome.


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 of conveying aspects of other subjects in the community of the universe. Thus no individual subject can have independent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of subjects other than itself.

The technical phrase ‘subject-object’ is a bad term for the fundamental situation disclosed in experience. It is really reminiscent of the Aristotelian ‘subject-predicate.’ It already presupposes the metaphysical doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private predicates. This is the doctrine of subjects with private worlds of experience. If this be granted, there is no escape from solipsism. The point is that the phrase ‘subject-object’ indicates a fundamental entity underlying the objects. Thus the ‘objects,’ as thus conceived, are merely the ghosts of Aristotelian predicates. The primary situation disclosed in cognitive experience is ‘ego-object amid objects.’ By this I mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending the ‘here-now’ which marks the ego-object, and transcending the ‘now’ which is the spatial world of simultaneous realisation. It is a world also including the actuality of the past, and the limited potentiality of the future, together with the complete world of abstract potentiality, the realm of eternal objects, which transcends, and finds exemplification in and comparison with, the actual course of realisation. The ego-object, as consciousness here-now, is conscious of its experient essence as constituted by its internal relatedness to the world of realities, and to the world of ideas. But the ego-object, in being thus constituted, is within the world of realities, and exhibits itself as an organism requiring the ingression of ideas for the


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 We would not, however, have our Reader imagine, that Perons of uch Characters as were upported by Thwackum and Square, would undertake a Matter of this Kind, which hath been a little cenured by ome rigid Moralits, before they had thoroughly examined it, and conidered whether it was (as Shakespear phraes it) ‘Stuff o’ th’ Concience’ or no. Thwackum was encouraged to the Undertaking, by reflecting, that to court your Neighbour’s Siter is no where forbidden, and he knew it was a Rule in the Contruction of all Laws, that “Expreum facit ceare Tacitum”, the Sene of which is, “When a Law-giver ets down plainly his whole Meaning, we are prevented from making him mean what we pleae ourelves.” As ome Intances of Women, therefore, are mentioned in the divine Law, which forbids us to covet our Neighbours Goods, and that of a Siter omitted, he concluded it to be lawful. And as to Square, who was in his Peron what is called a jolly Fellow, or a Widow’s Man, he eaily reconciled his Choice to the eternal Fitnes of Things.

Now, as both thee Gentlemen were indutrious in taking ever Opportunity of


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 make-up of an individual mind is concerned, there is a proportion in truth as well as in art.

Thus an ill-balanced zeal for the propagation of dogma bears witness to a certain coarseness of aesthetic sensitiveness. It shows a strain of indifference — due perhaps to arrogance, perhaps to rashness, perhaps to mere ignorance — a strain of indifference to the fact that others may require a proportion of formulation different from that suitable for ourselves. Perhaps our pet dogmas require correction: they may even be wrong.

The fate of a word has to the historian the value of a document. The modern unfavourable implications of the kindred words, dogma, dogmatic, dogmatist, tell the story of some failure in habits of thought. The word “dogma” originally means an “opinion,” and thence more especially a “philosophic opinion.” Thus, for example, the Greek physician, Galen, uses the phrase “dogmatic physicians” to mean “physicians who guide themselves by general principles” — surely a praiseworthy

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 recommending themelves to the Widow, they apprehended one certain Method was, by giving her Son the contant Preference to the other Lad; and as they conceived the Kindnes and Affection which Mr. Allworthy hewed the latter, mut be highly diagreeable to her, they doubted not but the laying hold on all Occaions to degrade and villify him, would be highly pleaing to her; who, as he hated the Boy, mut love all thoe who did him any Hurt. In this, Thwackum had the Advantage; for while Square could only carify the poor Lad’s Reputation, he could flea his Skin; and indeed he conidered every Lah he gave him as a Compliment paid to his Mitres; o that he could with the utmot Propriety repeat this old flogging Line, “Catigo te non quod odio habeam, ed quod, ; I chatize thee not out of Hatred, but out of Love.” And this indeed he often had in his Mouth, or rather, according to the old Phrae, never more properly applied, at his Fingers Ends.

For this Reaon principally, the two Gentlemen concurred, as we have een above, in their Opinion concerning the two Lads; this being indeed almot the only Intance of their concurring on any Point:


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 practice. The nearest Greek dictionary will give this elementary information. But the dictionary — and this is why I have quoted it — gives an ominous addition to the information about Galen. It says that Galen contrasts “dogmatic physicians” with “empiric physicians.” If you then refer to the word “empiric,” you will find that “empiric physicians” contended that “experience was the one thing needful.” In this lecture we have to investigate the application to religion of this contrast between “dogmatic” and “empiric.”

The philosophy of expression is only now receiving its proper attention. In the framing of dogmas it is only possible to use ideas which have received a distinct, well-recognized signification. Also, no idea is determinate in a vacuum: It has its being as one of a system of ideas. A dogma is the expression of a fact as it appears within a certain sphere of thought. You cannot convey a dogma by

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 merely translating the words; you must also understand the system of thought to which it is relevant. To take a very obvious example, “The Fatherhood of God” is a phrase which would have a significance for a Roman citizen of the early Republic different from that which it has for a modern American — stern for the one, tender for the other.

In estimating the validity of a dogma, it must be projected against the alternatives to it within that sphere of thought. You cannot claim absolute finality for a dogma without claiming a commensurate finality for the sphere of thought within which it arose. If the dogmas of the Christian Church from the second to the sixth centuries express finally and sufficiently the truths concerning the topics about which they deal, then the Greek philosophy of that period had developed a system of ideas of equal finality. You cannot limit the inspiration to a narrow circle of creeds.

A dogma — in the sense of a precise statement — can never be final; it can only be ade-

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 quate in its adjustment of certain abstract concepts. But the estimate of the status of these concepts remains for determination.

You cannot rise above the adequacy of the terms you employ. A dogma may be true in the sense that it expresses such interrelations of the subject matter as are expressible within the set of ideas employed. But if the same dogma be used intolerantly so as to check the employment of other modes of analyzing the subject matter, then, for all its truth, it will be doing the work of a falsehood.

Progress in truth — truth of science and truth of religion — is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality.

Expression is the one fundamental sacrament. It is the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. It follows that,

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 while rival pedants cut out neat little dogmatic systems to serve as the unalterable measure of the Universe.

The general history of religious thought, of which the Reformation period is a particular instance, is that of the endeavour of mankind to interpret the great standard experiences as leading to a more definite knowledge than can be derived from a metaphysic which founds itself upon general experience.

There can be nothing inherently illegitimate in such an attempt. But if we attend to the general principles which regulate all endeavours after clear statement of truth, we must be prepared to amplify, recast, generalize, and adapt, so as to absorb into one system all sources of experience.

The earlier statements will be not so much wrong, as obscured by trivial limitations, and as thereby implying an exclusion of complementary truths. The growth will be in the proportion of truth.

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 For beide the Difference of their Principles, they had both long ago trongly upected each others Deign, and hated one another with no little Degree of Inveteracy.

This mutual Animoity was a good deal increaed by their alternate Succees: For Mrs. Blifil knew what they would be at long before they imagined it; or indeed intended he hould: For they proceeded with great Caution let he hould be offended, and acquaint Mr. Allworthy; but they had no Reaon for any uch Fear. She was well enough pleaed with a Paion of which he intended none hould have any Fruits but herelf. And the only Fruits he deigned for herelf were Flattery and Courthip; for which Purpoe, he oothed them by Turns, and a long Time equally. She was indeed rather inclined to favour the Paron’s Principles; but Square’s Peron was more agreeable to her Eye; for he was a comely Man; whereas the Pedagogue did in Countenance very nearly reemble that Gentleman, who in the Harlot’s Progres is een correcting the Ladies in Bridewel.

Whether Mrs. Blifil had been urfeited with the Sweets of Marriage, or diguted


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 plicity of its origin. The dogmas are statements of how the complex world is to be expressed in the light of the intuitions fundamental to the religion. They are not necessarily simple in character or limited in number.

The divergence in the expression of dogmas is most clearly shown in the two traditions of Buddhism and Christianity. This divergence is important because it reaches down to the most fundamental religious concepts, namely, the nature of God, and the aim of life.

There are close analogies between the two religions. In both there is, in some sense, a saviour — Christ in the one, and the Buddha in the other. But their functions differ, according to the theologies of the two religions. In both, the souls of the blessed return to God. Again, this analogy cloaks a wide divergence; for the respective concepts of God, and the respective concepts of the meaning of the

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 the Nonconformist—for so we call him, seeing he would neither conform to Neolithic fashions nor Roman barbarites—built the Temple of Janus, and, with astrological abitities which now cause wonder to some and doubt to others, fixed, as regards linquistic [sic] forms, ten months, as we presently use them. The period down to 510 B.C. is known as the era of the kings in which Numa was second.

18. In or about the year 509 B.C., the Romans adopted a novel mode of securing a visible tally to the twelve months, and of counting the flight of time. Every year on (what is our) thirteenth day of September, a large nail was publicly driven into the wall of the Temple of Minerva, the Goddess of Wisdom and Science. This duty was first performed by the praetor, and afterwards by one of the consuls. These officials were appointed first in 244 A.U.C. or 509 B.C., when the years were calculated as containing 354 days, with bi-annual additions of twenty-two days, which made 1,460 days in four years. The Roman pontiffs, in exchange for private bribes, began to corrupt and falsify the Calendar Rolls. They at times, for instance, ordained special intercalculations, so as to favour a moneyed friend, who wished to retain an office, or they failed to announce annual addition when justly needed, because some wealthy legate wished to return to the Eternal City before his regular recall. But, as the art of the pontiffs, which had become an artifice, was not understood by the people, these chronologic tricks passed unheeded for a long period. Finally the civil and the solar year fell months out of time. Consuls, who were supposed to enter upon office in January,


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the ladies left us, Utis and I passed out on the broad veranda, and looked for a while on the moon-lit scene. My host seemed so absorbed in meditation, that, though burning to ask an explanation on certain points, I did not venture to break in on his revery. Ile gave me the impression of one debating inwardly how to open a subject, and not able to resolve on the way. At last he said, half absently,—

"It is much pleasanter on the roof: there is more air."

We re-entered the house, and began to ascend the stair. Thinking he had forgotten the matter, I reminded him that all the doors and windows were wide open.

"Now that it is so warm," he replied, "we leave the house as open as possible."

"But," said I with some hesitation, "have you no fear of burglars?"

"Burglars," he repeated slowly, "burglars, what is that?"

I was about to reply by a formal definition of the term, but it occurred to me that it was somewhat difficult to

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 by its Bitters, or from what other Caue it proceeded, I will not determine; but he could never be brought to liten to any econd Propoals. However, he at lat convered with Square with uch a Degree of Intimacy, that malicious Tongues began to whiper Things of her, to which, as well as for the Sake of the Lady, as that they were highly diagreeable to the Rule of Right, and the Fitnes of Things, we will give no Credit; and therefore hall not blot our Paper with them. The Pedagogue, ’tis certain, whipt on without getting a Step nearer to his Journey’s End.

Indeed he had committed a great Error, and that Square dicovered much ooner than himelf. Mrs. Blifil (as perhaps the Reader may have formerly gues’d) was not over and above pleaed with the Behaviour of her Huband; nay, to be honet, he abolutely hated him, till his Death at lat a little reconciled him to her Affections. It will not be therefore greatly wondered at, if he had not the mot violent Regard to the Offspring he had by him. And, in fact, he had o little of this Regard, that in his Infancy he eldom aw her Son, or took any Notice of him; and hence he acquieced, after a little Reluctance, in all


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reconducted me to my sleeping apartment, and turned on the electric light. Going forward, he drew my attention to a magnetic needle suspended below the ceiling, and over the hammock already mentioned. It might, perhaps, be more correctly designated as a suspended bed. I had supposed the material to be silk; but it was, in reality, derived from a certain vegetable fibre that emulated silk in many of its properties. The whole was suspended from a circular metallic plate resting on supports in the ceiling that allowed of its being adjusted in any direction. The friction of the points of suspension was reduced to a minimum by ingenious mechanical devices. By pressing on a small knob, placed within convenient reach, the occupant of the hammock could cause a gentle swing to be communicated to his couch, which motion, moreover, could be made to continue for a regulated time. A sort of punka, set in motion and controlled in the same manner, could be made to gently fan the sleeping occupant of the hammock. On warm nights I found this highly acceptable. Another knob, also within easy reach, enabled me at will to control the electric light, so as to

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early dawn afforded barely sufficient light to render objects distinguishable when I awoke. According to the dial, it was nearly half-past four. That should be about right, was my thought: perhaps the dial had been set right during the night. My eyes, still wandering round the room, next caught sight of Utis standing in the doorway.

"You were sleeping so soundly," said he, after a pleasant greeting, "that I had not the heart to rouse you. I am glad, however, that you are awake, as it is time for your first lesson; that is," he continued with a smile, "if you still desire to keep up the fiction agreed on."

"For me, at least, it is no fiction," said I, by this time fully awake. "My memory of the past is quite the same as yesterday."

"Let us see," said he, seating himself, and making a gesture for me not to rise. What recollection have you of the events of yesterday?"

He listened with absorbed interest, while I gave a succinct account of the sights and impressions of the day before. At intervals he gave a nod of assent, as if to

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and I did not sit out on the roof this evening. He proposed, instead, to help me unpack my trunks, and arrange the contents. Hitherto I had scarcely looked into them; nor, in spite of my host's assurances, could I gain any strong sense of propriety in them. Yet while Utis, by the brilliant electric light, unpacked those things that, I felt certain, had never been packed by my hands, a strange feeling of familiarity with the different objects would grow upon me. Surely those books, writing-implements, table-ornaments, and pictures, had once been mine. Alt, however, had undergone a peculiar change,—a change analogous to the difference between my personal history as present to my consciousness, and that attributed to me by Utis. Last of all, he produced from the second trunk, and placed on the table, an article having some resemblance, both in size and shape, to a writing-desk that was once mine. On being opened. however, the interior presented a most unfamiliar appearance. It was a phonograph of the latest construction.

"This instrument, or, rather, the first crude idea, was known as early as your period. In its present form it

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 home to celebrate. There is no mistaking it: we are in Jewtown.

It is said that nowhere in the world are so many people crowded together on a square mile as here. The average five-story tenement adds a story or two to its stature in Ludlow Street and an extra building on the rear lot, and yet the sign "To Let" is the rarest of all there. Here is one seven stories high. The sanitary policeman whose beat this is will tell you that it contains thirty-six families, but the term has a widely different meaning here and on the avenues. In this house, where a case of small-pox was reported, there were fifty-eight babies and thirty-eight children that were over five years of age. In Essex Street two small rooms in a six-story tenement were made to hold a "family" of father and mother, twelve children, and six boarders. The boarder plays as important a part in the domestic economy of Jewtown as the lodger in the Mulberry Street Bend. These are samples of the packing of the population that has run up the record here to the rate of three hundred and thirty thousand per square mile. The densest crowding of Old London, I pointed out before, never got beyond a hundred and seventy-five thousand. Even the alley is crowded out. Through dark hallways and filthy cellars, crowded, as is every foot of the street, with dirty children, the settlements in the rear are reached. Thieves know how to find them when pursued by the police, and the tramps that sneak in on chilly nights to fight for the warm spot in the yard over some baker's oven. They are out of place in this hive of busy industry, and they know it. It has nothing in common with them or with their philosophy of life, that the world owes the idler a living. Life here means the hardest kind of work almost from the cradle. The world as a debtor

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the time we reached home—for so I already began to regard my new abode—it was time for the mid-day collation. As was the case with the early four-o'clock breakfast, all the members of the household do not necessarily meet at this meal. Each enters the dining-room when convenient, to partake, as may seem fit, of what is provided in the compartments of the ever serviceable cebin. In this way the whole time between nine in the morning and six in the evening is at the free disposal of each.

After this informal repast, where we did, however, exchange a few words with the ladies of the house, Utis carried me off to his indoor retreat, a combination of study and workshop. Here was a workbench of ingenious mechanical construction, a lathe, and various tools adapted for delicate operations on glass or metal. From these articles, of which I had but little knowledge, I soon turned my attention to the contents of the book-cases. The number of volumes was not great,—about a thousand, besides a cyclopædia in one hundred volumes.

"You see before you," said Utis, noting the direction

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breakfast to which we sat down it is not necessary to characterize more fully than by saying that it fairly matched the dinner of the previous evening, Except in the absence of wines, the repast reminded me of an artistically prepared déjeuner à la fourchette where quality rather than quantity was the aim.

The ladies, bright-eyed and cheerful from exercise, and rosy from the morning bath, lent sparkle to the conversation. No one, seeing their fresh and elegant costumes, would have imagined them to have spent three active hours in the labors of a factory-hand. Nor must it be thought that these labors had been performed in a perfunctory manner. Whatever these people did, they did with all their might. The labor of the early morning was entered into with the zest inspired among us by athletic exercises alone. Even the children, so well bred and neat, had been three hours already out of bed, attending to certain small household duties appropriate to their age.

I was somewhat mystified, during breakfast, by hearing strains of magnificent music, which proceeded evidently from a full orchestra. At times the sound appeared to

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 flood the room with a light rivalling that of day, or produce total darkness.

"This hammock," said Utis, after he had explained the use of the different knobs, "is suspended, as you see, in the line of the magnetic meridian. This is for physiological reasons that I will explain some other time. Let us take another look into your trunk," he added, leading the way to the other room. "It seems to me that I noticed something resembling a diary among your other effects."

By this time he had approached the one trunk that had been opened. At his suggestion I raised the lid; and there, sure enough, lay a large morocco-covered volume, with heavy clasp and lock.

"You may find much to interest you in that volume," said Utis. "But do not sit up too late. I will call you early."

Having thus said, he wished me pleasant slumbers, and left me to my meditations. Fatigued as I was with the crowd of novel ideas that had thronged upon me in such rapid succession, I could not refrain from a cursory examination of the diary of Ismar Thiusen, as was signified on the cover. Surely I had before seen a volume not unlike this. The contents, too, had a vaguely familiar air, like that of the long-forgotten story read again for the first time since childhood. Interspersed with numerous notes on favorite archeological subjects were observations suggested by visits to the great cities of the island-continent now known as Australia. My travels, or, rather, Ismar's, had apparently not extended beyond that archipelago. But these regions were vast enough


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 in droves from Eastern Europe to escape persecution, from which freedom could be bought only with gold, it has enslaved them in bondage worse than that from which they fled. Money is their God. Life itself is of little value compared with even the leanest bank account. In no other spot does life wear so intensely bald and materialistic an aspect as in Ludlow Street. Over and over again I have met with instances of these Polish or Russian Jews deliberately starving themselves to the point of physical exhaustion, while working night and day at a tremendous pressure to save a little money. An avenging Nemesis pursues this headlong hunt for wealth; there is no worse paid class anywhere. I once put the question to one of their own people, who, being a pawnbroker, and an unusually intelligent and charitable one, certainly enjoyed the advantage of a practical view of the situation: "Whence the many wretchedly poor people in such a colony of workers, where poverty, from a misfortune, has become a reproach, dreaded as the plague?"

"Immigration," he said, "brings us a lot. In five years it has averaged twenty-five thousand a year, of which more that seventy per cent, have stayed in New York. Half of them require and receive aid from the Hebrew Charities from the very start, lest they starve. That is one explanation. There is another class than the one that cannot get work: those who have had too much of it; who have worked and hoarded and lived, crowded together like pigs, on the scantiest fare and the worst to be got, bound to save whatever their earnings, until, worn out, they could work no longer. Then their hoards were soon exhausted. That is their story." And I knew that what he said was true.

Penury and poverty are wedded everywhere to dirt and

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 for a very extensive course of travel. They seemed, indeed, to contain as many great cities as are now contained in the whole world.

Frequent references to another volume caused me to search for it. This volume, bound to match the other, proved to be a sort of album containing excellent views of picturesque or otherwise interesting localities, as well as of many cities visited by the artist. By dates and annotations on the margin, the views were shown to be the work of the owner of the diary. From the character of the work, the views were evidently the result of some kind of photographic process. What filled me with admiration. was, the minute care and fidelity to nature with which the views were colored. But, as I subsequently learned, all was the work of the sun. The photographer had long since mastered the problem of taking pictures as faithful in color as in form and shading.

One inference I was enabled to reach from a study of these views. Costume and architecture, making due allowance for differences of climate, were much the same throughout the Southern Hemisphere as in the city and country I had seen with such interest that day. I was especially interested in the views of the city of Olim and its environs.

On the maps of the present, the centre of Australia is represented as a waterless, untrodden waste. In this album were views of a great city occupying almost the centre of that region. Its streets were as stately as those I had seen in Nuiore: many of its edifices, especially those of its famous university, showed signs of a venera-


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 ble antiquity. All the surrounding region was in a state of high cultivation, and seemed to be the seat of a numerous population.

Musing on the strange mutations produced by time, I had almost fallen asleep. I raised my eyes to examine the dial placed above the door between sitting and bed Of the dial I could make little. It was divided into twelve spaces, indeed, as at present; but these, instead of into five, were subdivided into twelve smaller spaces. That the hands were moving, I could see. But it could not possibly be only eight o'clock. I judged it to be more nearly eleven. Too tired to dwell long on the subject, I retired to my hammock, where I soon slept the dreamless sleep of exhaustion.


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 the Favours which Mr. Allworthy howered on the Foundling; whom the good Man called his own Boy, and in all Things put on an intire Equality with Mater Blifil. This Acquiecence in Mrs. Blifil was conidered by the Neighbours, and by the Family, as a Mark of her Condecenion to her Brother’s Humour, and he was imagined by all others, as well as Thwackum and Square, to hate the Foundling in her Heart; nay, the more Civility he hewed him, the more they conceived he deteted him, and the urer Schemes he was laying for his Ruin: For as they thought it her Interet to hate him, it was very difficult for her to perwade them he did not.

Thwackum was the more confirmed in his Opinion, as he had more than once lily caued him to whip Tom Jones, when Mr. Allworthy, who was an Enemy to this Exercie, was abroad; whereas he had never given any uch Orderes concerning young Blifil. And this had likewie impoed upon Square. In reality, though he certainly hated her own Son; of which, however montrous it appears, I am aured he is not a ingular Intance, he appeared, notwithtanding all her outward Compliance, to be in her Heart ufficiently dipleaed with


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 say, "That is quite correct." Once only he raised his hand as if in doubt. But I soon convinced him, by the mention of certain accessory circumstances, that my recollection of the matter was correct.

"Your memory is surprisingly exact," he remarked: "that occurrence had entirely escaped my memory. Naturally, many things might pass unobserved by me that would arrest your attention with all the force of novelty."

He thus indicated his frank acceptance of my theory as the basis of our future intercourse: thenceforth he always spoke in consistence with that view; that is, in our private intercourse. When communicated to him, my impressions of men and things, as they appeared to me, came to excite in him an interest perhaps even more vivid than that experienced by myself. It became our daily custom for me to give him a detailed account of my new discoveries during the day. He was thus enabled, in a degree that otherwise would have been impossible, to follow the current of my ideas, so as to appreciate and solve my difficulties. A peculiar effect of this interchange of thought was gradually produced. Utis not only spoke, but frequently appeared to think also, from my point of view; while I, on the other hand, found myself insensibly acquiescing in the belief, that that former life of mine was but a delusion.

"The first thing in order," said Utis, when I had ended my summary of events, "is to explain our manner of dividing time. The system of division you see on that dial, he went on, is the result of a series of changes. It is so characteristic and so typical of the course of change in many similar matters, that it is worth an explanation in detail.


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 "When electric wires became the ordinary means of communication over all distances, the differences of local time became an intolerable nuisance. This nuisance was got rid of in a very simple way. By general consent, it was agreed to take the time of some fixed meridian as the standard time throughout the world. For several reasons, that of Greenwich was adopted. Thus, when the sun passes over the meridian of Greenwich, it is twelve o'clock all over the world, and similarly of other hours. The habit of associating certain hours with certain positions of the sun soon wore off. It became rather a subject of astonishment that so absurd an association of ideas could stand so long in the way of the only rational system. A change adopted about the same time was, the division of the dial into twenty-four spaces, instead of twelve, and the numbering of the hours consecutively from one to twenty-four. In the course of time this was, in its turu, superseded by the decimal division of the day and dial. By this system, which remained. unchanged through several thousand years, the day was divided into ten equal parts, each called a meris, and equivalent to about two hours and a half of the old system. The decimal divisions of the meris bore no distinctive names, but were referred to merely as tenths, hundredths, etc.

"About three thousand years ago, twelve was adopted by common consent as the basis of the numerical system. As a matter of course, a corresponding change had to be made in the division of all units of quantity: instead of a decimal we have a duodecimal system. That dial, for example, is divided into twelve spaces; each of these,


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 again, into twelve. Similarly, the day is divided into twelve parts, each, of course, equivalent to two of the ancient hours; and so on, by duodecimal subdivisions, as far as necessary. Thus when, in our present notation, an event is said to happen at 3.86, this corresponds to 7h. 25m. old Greenwich time."

"But," objected I, "how was it found possible to overcome the enormous friction that the introduction of such extensive changes must have encountered? In my time the metric system, in spite of its manifest advantages, was making but slow headway. As for the reform of the absurd spelling of my native tongue, it was a thing greatly desired, but hardly hoped for."

"The friction you mention," said Utis, "being the result of ignorance, naturally diminished in direct proportion with ignorance. Even in the days you allude to, scientists readily adopted improvements in terminology; while astronomers and meteorologists, scattered over the globe, framed and adhered to rules for the apportionment of their special work.

"Another important advantage was, that the progress of science had rendered many of the changes I mentioned comparatively inexpensive. At the present time four great electric clocks—one in each quarter of the globe— govern all the timepieces, each in its own quarter. Our timepieces, indeed, are only dials, like this you see, the hands of which move in unison with those of the great central clock."

"Have you no watches?" I inquired.

"Since every apartment and public edifice shows a dial, we have generally as little occasion to carry a time-


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 piece as to carry a drinking-cup. We keep them, however, for special purposes."

So saying, he entered the next room, and returned, to place in my hands a watch of the period. The case was of ualin of the finest quality. The watch being wound and regulated on the principle of the stem-winder, the case was hermetically sealed; as it did not require to be opened, perhaps, once in a lifetime. The works, though of excellent finish, were of the utmost simplicity, there being only two hands. The smallest portion of time indicated, about five-sixths of our minute, was considered as sufficiently small for all practical purposes.

"After a brief plunge in the bath," said Utis, when I had returned the watch, "put on this working-suit that I have placed on the chair. Do not spend more than ten minutes on the whole operation: our toilet proper is performed after the morning's work is over. When you come down, I will initiate you further."

Within the prescribed time I met my host at the foot of the stair. On entering the dining-room, we found on the side-table a pitcher of milk, tumblers, and a plate of very palatable sandwiches.

"We have three hours of hard work before us," said Utis, as an inducement for me to follow his example.

None of the rest of the household made their appearance while we partook of this simple refreshment, but that some were up and at work was manifest. The sound of a power-loom was heard in the next apartment. Mingled with this could be distinguished the peculiar hum of some other machine; while at intervals the pleasant sound of female voices, and an occasional burst of half


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 all the Favour hewn by Mr. Allworthy to the Foundling. She frequently complained of this behind her Brother’s Back, and very harply cenured him for it, both to Thwackum and Square; any, he wou’d throw it in the Teeth of Allworthy himelf, when a little Quarrel or Miff, as it is vulgarly called, aroe between them.

However, when Tom grew up, and gave Tokens of that Gallantry of Temper which greatly recommends Men to Women, this Diinclination which he had dicovered to him when a Child, by Degrees abated, and at lat he o evidently demontrated her Affection to him to be much tronger than what he bore her own Son, that it was impoible to mitake her any longer. She was o deirous of often eeing him, and dicovered uch Satisfaction and Delight in his Company, that before he was eighteen Years old, he was become a Rival to both Square and Thwackum; and what is wore, the whole Country began to talk as loudly of her Inclination to Tom, as they had before done of that which he had hewn to Square; on which Account the Philoopher conceived the most implacable Hatred for our poor Hero.


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 unconscious song, informed me of the personality of the operators.

I had, afterwards, frequent opportunities of seeing the ladies' workroom, the counterparts of which were to be seen in every home. The apartment itself was as diverse from the aspect of the typical factory-room as is the boudoir of a princess from the kennel of a Caffre's female drudge. Beneath the protecting covering of wide sheets of ualin, the walls were adorned with designs exquisite in drawing, and harmonious in color.

One end of the apartment was occupied by glazed wardrobes containing, some, materials; others, finished products. The loom, as well as the other machine, which proved to be a sort of stocking-frame, was finished in the style of the machinery I had seen in the city, and was worked by electric power. The ingenuity of man, exerted through thousands of years, had brought these machines to a degree of perfection that awoke in me ever increasing admiration in proportion as I became more capable of appreciating the genius employed in their construction. They might, indeed, be called "poems in metal;" embodying, as they did, the hopes, the aspirations, the enthusiasms, of a long line of inventors. Anxiety had been shown, not only to insure rapid and delicate work, but also to render less irksome the task of the operator, by admitting several changes of posture. Every thing was maintained in a state of exquisite neatness: not a speck of dust or fluff was to be seen.

In another place will be found an account of the system on which the people of this period arranged their time. It will suffice, for the present, to give an account of my


text: The Journal of Indian Botany/Volume 1/December 1919/On the use of the term "Variety" in Systematics.


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LIVERWORTS IN THE WESTERN HIMALAYAS. 155 Of the next two localities the first, Pathankote, is at the foot of the Outer Himalayas, and the second, Lahore, is in the plains. The poverty of the species is noteworthy,

Long. 32° 16 N. Lat. 75° 40' E. Aver, annual rain. 47" Mean. Mas. temp. — Mean Min temp. — Biccia pathankotensis, Grimaldia inclica and Fimbriaria pathankotensis are the only common species, the first two much more so than the third. The first is quite abundant along the river flowing near by.

Long. 31° 35' N. Lat. 74" 20' E. Aver, annual rain. 19.58". Mean Max. temp. 90.9°. Mean Min. temp. 64.2.

The only Liverworts that are found throughout the year here and there in favourable places are Biccia sanguinca Kash., Marchantia ncpalensis and M. palmata. In winter Biccia robusta Kash., B. cruciata Kash. and B. pathankotensis are also seen, the first in pretty large numbers. Biclla inclica St. appears in some years in a water-channel about March. Very rarely Plagiochasma appendicula- tum, P. articulatum, Grimaldia inclica and Anthoceros himalayensis are met with along the river bank. This list is the result of very thorough observations extending over a number of years and can hardly be improved. All the species except the first three and perhaps the fourth also are undoubtedly brought down from other places by the canal water.

The following species have been found. The localities, where recorded, are also noted : —

(Ghamba, the main town, is situated at an elevation of 3,027 ft. Long. 32° 29' N. Lat. 76° 11' E. Aver, annual rain. 47.60". Mean Max. temp. 77.7°. Mean Min. temp. 56.5° J

Targionia hypophylla.

Athalamia pinguis.

Grimaldia indica.

Plagiochasma appendiculatiim.

P. articulatum,

Beboulia hemispherica.

Sauchia spongiosa. Chamba-Pangi road, about 10,000 ft.

Fegatella conica. Common in moist places on northern slopes ; also Chamba-Pangi road.

Wicsnerella denudata. Above Khajiar.

Dumorticra vclutina. Common in moist places.


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156 THE JOURNAL OF INDIAN BOTANY. Marchantia ncpalansis.

M. palmata.

Aneura Levieri. Chainba-Chuari road.

P cilia calycina. Common in moist places.

Met zg aria pubascans. Chamba-Pangi road, about 10,000 ft.

Calycularia crispatula. Dalhousie-Khajiar road.

Fossombronia himalayansis. Chamba-Pangi road.

Anthoccros sp. Along the Ravi above Chamba.

Madoiheca sp. Pangi road.

Badula sp. Dalhousie-Khajiar road ; Chamba-Pangi road.

Galypogcia sp.

Chiloscyphus gollani St. Pangi road.

C. argutus, Nces.

Nardia sp. Pangi road.

Plagiochila sp.

Arachniopsis sp. Pangie road, about 11,000 ft.

Lcjaunia sp. Pangi road.

Frullania sp.

The number of individuals is very small and specimens are found only at long intervals. Pallia, Damortiara, and Pcgatalla are pretty common in or near running water. Wiasiiarclla has beeQ found in one or two places.

Biccia himalayansis. Near Salgraon, Chamba-Lahoul.

B. sp. Along with the above.

B. robusta. Above Kyelang, about 11,000 ft. Very curious distribution as it occurs in Lahore also at 700 ft.

Grimaldia indica. Above Kyelang, about J 1,000 ft. Also occurs at Lahore, etc.

Athalamia dioica. Near Saor, Pangi.

Mindal Pangicnsis. Along with the above.

Bcboulia hemisphar ica. Above Kyelang, about 11,000 ft. Very common in the Himalayas.

Fagatalla conica. Near Kilar bridge, Pangi, and elsewhere.

Prcissia commutata. Along with the above, and elsewhere.

Dumortiera ■valutina. At the above place and common elsewhere, also in moist places.

Marchantia polymorpha. Common in moist places.

Pallia calycina. Common in moist places.

Pallia epiphylla ? Near Shaichu, Pangi.

Aneura Levieri. Near Shaichu, Pangi.

Anthoccros sp. Near Sissoo, British Lahoul, about 10,000 ft.