text:
Thornburg v. Gingles/Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which JUSTICE WHITE joins.

This case requires that we construe for the first time § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The specific question to be decided is whether the three-judge District Court, convened in the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, correctly held that the use in a legislative redistricting plan of multimember districts in five North Carolina legislative districts violated § 2 by impairing the opportunity of black voters "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." § 2(b), 96 Stat. 134.

I. BACKGROUND
In April 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a legislative redistricting plan for the State's Senate and House of Representatives. Appellees, black citizens of North Carolina who are registered to vote, challenged seven districts, one single-member and six multimember districts, alleging that the redistricting scheme impaired black citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

After appellees brought suit, but before trial, Congress amended § 2. This amendment was largely a response to this Court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose. Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the "results test," applied by this Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and by other federal courts before Bolden, supra. S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982) (hereinafter S. Rep.).

Section 2, as amended, 96 Stat. 134, reads as follows: "(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).

"(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

The Senate Judiciary Committee majority Report accompanying the bill that amended § 2 elaborates on the circumstances that might be probative of a § 2 violation, noting the following "typical factors": "1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;

"2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;

"3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;

"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;

"5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as eduction, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;

"6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;

"7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

"Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:

 * "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.

 * "whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous."

S. Rep., at 28-29.

The District Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in § 2(b) to appellees' statutory claim, and, relying principally on the factors outlined in the Senate Report, held that the redistricting scheme violated § 2 because it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes in all seven disputed districts. In light of this conclusion, the court did not reach appellees' constitutional claims. Gingles v. Edmisten, 50 F. Supp. 345 (EDNC 1984).

Preliminarily, the court found that black citizens constituted a distinct population and registered-voter minority in each challenged district. The court noted that at the time the multimember districts were created, there were concentrations of black citizens within the boundaries of each that were sufficiently large and contiguous to constitute effective voting majorities in single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multimember districts. With respect to the challenged single-member district, Senate District No. 2, the court also found that there existed a concentration of black citizens within its boundaries and within those of adjoining Senate District No. 6 that was sufficient in numbers and in contiguity to constitute an effective voting majority in a single-member district. The District Court then proceeded to find that the following circumstances combined with the multimember districting scheme to result in the dilution of black citizens' votes.

First, the court found that North Carolina had officially discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing at different times a poll tax, a literacy test, a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting,, and designated seat plans for multimember districts. The court observed that even after the removal of direct barriers to black voter registration, such as the poll tax and literacy test, black voter registration remained relatively depressed; in 1982 only 52.7% of age-qualified blacks statewide were registered to vote, whereas 66.7% of whites were registered. The District Court found these statewide depressed levels of black voter registration to be present in all of the disputed districts and to be traceable, at least in part, to the historical pattern of statewide official discrimination.

Second, the court found that historic discrimination in education, housing, employment, and health services had resulted in a lower socioeconomic status for North Carolina blacks as a group than for whites. The court concluded that this lower status both gives rise to special group interests and hinders blacks' ability to participate effectively in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

Third, the court considered other voting procedures that may operate to lessen the opportunity of black voters to elect candidates of their choice. It noted that North Carolina has a majority vote requirement for primary elections and, while acknowledging that no black candidate for election to the State General Assembly had failed to win solely because of this requirement, the court concluded that it nonetheless presents a continuing practical impediment to the opportunity of black voting minorities to elect candidates of their choice. The court also remarked on the fact that North Carolina does not have a subdistrict residency requirement for members of the General Assembly elected from multimember districts, a requirement which the court found would offset to some extent the disadvantages minority voters often experience in multimember districts.

Fourth, the court found that white candidates in North Carolina have encouraged voting along color lines by appealing to racial prejudice. It noted that the record is replete with specific examples of racial appeals, ranging in style from overt and blatant to subtle and furtive, and in date from the 1890's to the 1984 campaign for a seat in the United States Senate. The court determines that the use of racial appeals in political campaigns in North Carolina persists to the present day and that its current effect is to lessen to some degree the opportunity of black citizens to participate effectively in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.

Fifth, the court examined the extent to which blacks have been elected to office in North Carolina, both statewide and in the challenged districts. It found, among other things, that prior to World War II, only one black had been elected to public office in this century. While recognizing that "it has now become possible for black citizens to be elected to office at all levels of state government in North Carolina," 590 F. Supp., at 367, the court found that, in comparison to white candidates running for the same office, black candidates are at a disadvantage in terms of relative probability of success. It also found that the overall rate of black electoral success has been minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total state population. For example, the court notes, from 1971 to 1982 there were at any given time only two-to-four blacks in the 120-member House of Representatives—that is, only 1.6% to 3.3% of House members were black. From 1975 to 1982 there were at any one time only one or two blacks in the 50-member State Senate—that is, only 2% to 4% of State Senators were black. By contrast, at the time of the District Court's opinion, blacks constituted about 22.4% of the total state population.

With respect to the success in this century of black candidates in the contested districts, see also Appendix B to opinion, post, p. 82, the court found that only one black had been elected to House District 36—after this lawsuit began. Similarly, only one black had served in the Senate from District 22, from 1975-1980. Before the 1982 election, a black was elected only twice to the House from District 39 (part of Forsyth County); in the 1982 contest two blacks were elected. Since 1973 a black citizen had been elected each 2-year term to the House from District 23 (Durham County), but no black had been elected to the Senate from Durham County. In House District 21 (Wake County), a black had been elected twice to the House, and another black served two terms in the State Senate. No black had ever been elected to the House or Senate from the area covered by House District No. 8, and no black person had ever been elected to the Senate from the area covered by Senate District No. 2.

The court did acknowledge the improved success of black candidates in the 1982 elections, in which 11 blacks were elected to the State House of Representatives, including 5 blacks from the multimember districts at issue here. However, the court pointed out that the 1982 election was conducted after the commencement of the litigation. The court found the circumstances of the 1982 election sufficiently aberrational and the success by black candidates too minimal and too recent in relation to the long history of complete denial of elective opportunities to support the conclusion that black voters' opportunities to elect representatives of their choice were not impaired.

Finally, the court considered the extent to which voting in the challenged districts was racially polarized. Based on statistical evidence presented by expert witnesses, supplemented to some degree by the testimony of lay witnesses, the court found that all of the challenged districts exhibit severe and persistent racially polarized voting.

Based on these findings, the court declared the contested portions of the 1982 redistricting plan violative of § 2 and enjoined appellants from conducting elections pursuant to those portions of the plan. Appellants, the Attorney General of North Carolina and others, took a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, with respect to five of the multimember districts—House Districts 21, 23, 36, and 39, and Senate District 22. Appellants argue, first, that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect standard in determining whether the contested districts exhibit racial bloc voting to an extent that is cognizable under § 2. Second, they contend that the court used an incorrect definition of racially polarized voting and thus erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of polarized voting. Third, they maintain that the court assigned the wrong weight to evidence of some black candidates' electoral success. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in concluding that these multimember districts result in black citizens having less opportunity than their white counterparts to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U.S. 1064 (1985), and now affirm with respect to all of the districts except House District 23. With regard to District 23, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.

II. SECTION 2 AND VOTE DILUTION THROUGH USE OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS
An understanding both of § 2 and of the way in which multimember districts can operate to impair blacks' ability to elect representatives of their choice is prerequisite to an evaluation of appellants' contentions. First, then, we review amended § 2 and its legislative history in some detail. Second, we explain the theoretical basis for appellees' claim of vote dilution.

A. SECTION 2 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Subsection 2(a) prohibits all States and political subdivisions from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices, or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial and language minorities. Subsection 2(b) establishes that § 2 has been violated where the "totality of circumstances" reveal that "the political processes leading to nomination or election... are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class]... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." While explaining that "[t]the extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered" in evaluating an alleged violation, § 2(b) cautions that "nothing in [§ 2] establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."

The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations and on the proof required to establish these violations. First and foremost, the Report dispositively rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters. See e.g., S. Rep., at 2, 15-16, 27. The intent test was repudiated for three principal reasons—it is "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities," it places an "inordinately difficult" burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question." Id., at 36. The "right" question, as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether "as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice." Id., at 28. See also id., at 2, 27, 29, n. 118, 36.

In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities "on the basis of objective factors." Id., at 27. The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim: the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Id., at 28-29; see also supra, at 36-37. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State's or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value. Id., at 29. The Report stresses, however, that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive. While the enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly to vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and may be considered. Id., at 29-30. Furthermore, the Senate Committee observed that "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." Id., at 29. Rather, the Committee determined that "the question whether the political processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,'" id., at 30 (footnote omitted), and on a "functional" view of the political process. Id., at 30, n. 120.

Although the Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-intensive test for § 2 violations, it limits the circumstances under which § 2 violations may be proved in three ways. First, electoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the electoral process. Id., at 16. Second, the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does not establish a violation. Ibid. Third, the results test does not assume the existence of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it. Id., at 33.

B. VOTE DILUTION THROUGH THE USE OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS
Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice.

The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives. This Court has long recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may "'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.'" Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 765; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971). The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters. See, e.g., Grofman, Alternatives, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 113-114. Multimember districts and at-large election schemes, however, are not per se violative of minority voters' rights. S. Rep., at 16. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at 617; Regester, supra, at 765; Whitcomb, supra, at 142. Minority voters who contend that the multimember form of districting violates § 2 must prove that the use of a multimember electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candidates. See, e.g., S. Rep., at 16.

While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group. Bonapfel 355; Blacksher & Menefee 34; Butler 903; Carpeneti 696-699; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview (hereinafter Davidson), in Minority Vote Dilution 4; Grofman, Alternatives 117. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S., at 105, n. 3 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious that the greater the degree to which the electoral minority is homogenous and insular and the greater the degree that bloc voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater will be the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by multimember districting"). These circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice for the following reasons. First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. If it is not, as would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect its candidates. Cf. Rogers, 458 U.S., at 616. See also, Blacksher & Menefee 51-56, 58; Bonapfel 355; Carpeneti 696; Davidson 4; Jewell 130. Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests. Blacksher & Menefee 51-55, 58-60, and n. 344; Carpeneti 696-697; Davidson 4. Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed, see, infra, at 57, and n. 26—usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 51, 53, 56-57, 60. Cf. Rogers, supra, at 616-617; Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 158-159; McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (CA5 1984). In establishing this last circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives.

Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the majority's success distinguishes structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, post, at 131-133, 139-140 (opinion of WHITE, J.); Bolden, supra, at 111, n. 7 (MARSHALL, J. dissenting); Whitcomb, supra, at 153. See also Blacksher & Menefee 57, n. 333; Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L.J. 189, 200, n. 66 (1984) (hereinafter Note, Geometry and Geography).

III. RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
Having stated the general legal principles relevant to claims that § 2 has been violated through the use of multimember districts, we turn to the arguments of appellants and of the United States as amicus curiae addressing racially polarized voting. First, we describe the District Court's treatment of racially polarized voting. Next, we consider appellants' claim that the District Court used an incorrect legal standard to determine whether racial bloc voting in the contested districts was sufficiently severe to be cognizable as an element of a § 2 claim. Finally, we consider appellants' contention that the trial court employed an incorrect definition of racially polarized voting and thus erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of racial bloc voting.

A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S TREATMENT OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
The investigation conducted by the District Court into the question of racial bloc voting credited some testimony of lay witnesses, but relied principally on statistical evidence presented by appellees' expert witnesses, in particular that offered by Dr. Bernard Grofman. Dr. Grofman collected and evaluated data from 53 General Assembly primary and general elections involving black candidacies. These elections were held over a period of three different election years in the six originally challenged multimember districts. Dr. Grofman subjected the data to two complementary methods of analysis—extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological regression analysis —in order to determine whether blacks and whites in these districts differed in their voting behavior. These analytic techniques yielded data concerning the voting patterns of the two races, including estimates of the percentages of members of each race who voted for black candidates.

The court's initial consideration of these data took the form of a three-part inquiry: did the data reveal any correlation between the race of the voter and the selection of certain candidates; was the revealed correlation statistically significant; and was the difference in black and white voting patterns "substantively significant"? The District Court found that blacks and whites generally preferred different candidates and, on that basis, found voting in the districts to be racially correlated. The court accepted Dr. Grofman's expert opinion that the correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of certain candidates was statistically significant. Finally, adopting Dr. Grofman's terminology, see Tr. 195, the court found that in all but 2 of the 53 elections the degree of racial bloc voting was "so marked as to be substantively significant, in the sense that the results of the individual election would have been different depending upon whether it had been held among only the white voters or only the black voters." 590 F. Supp., at 368.

The court also reported its findings, both in tabulated numerical form and in written form, that a high percentage of black voters regularly supported black candidates and that most white voters were extremely reluctant to vote for black candidates. The court then considered the relevance to the existence of legally significant white bloc voting of the fact that black candidates have won some elections. It determined that in most instances, special circumstances, such as incumbency and lack of opposition, rather than a diminution in usually severe white bloc voting, accounted for these candidates' success. The court also suggested that black voters' reliance on bullet voting was a significant factor in their successful efforts to elect candidates of their choice. Based on all of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded that each of the districts experienced racially polarized voting "in a persistent and severe degree." Id., at 367.

1. Appellants' Arguments
North Carolina and the United States argue that the test used by the District Court to determine whether voting patterns in the disputed districts are racially polarized to an extent cognizable under § 2 will lead to results that are inconsistent with congressional intent. North Carolina maintains that the court considered legally significant racially polarized voting to occur whenever "less than 50% of the white voters cast a ballot for the black candidate." Brief for Appellants 36. Appellants also argue that racially polarized voting is legally significant only when it always results in the defeat of black candidates. Id., at 39-40.

The United States, on the other hand, isolates a single line in the court's opinion and identifies it as the court's complete test. According to the United States, the District Court adopted a standard under which legally significant racial bloc voting is deemed to exist whenever "'the results of the individual election would have been different depending upon whether it had been held among only the white voters or only the black voters in the election.'" Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting 590 F. Supp., at 368). We read the District Court opinion differently.

2. The Standard for Legally Significant Racial Bloc Voting
The Senate Report states that the "extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized," S. Rep., at 29, is relevant to a vote dilution claim. Further, courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a key element of a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d, at 1043; United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (CA11), appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F. Supp. 161, 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom & Wildgen, 465, 469; Parker 107; Note, Geometry and Geography 199. Because, as we explain below, the extent of bloc voting necessary to demonstrate that a minority's ability to elect its preferred representatives is impaired varies according to several factual circumstances, the degree of bloc voting which constitutes the threshold of legal significance will vary from district to district. Nonetheless, it is possible to state some general principles and we proceed to do so.

The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting to twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates. See supra, at 48-51. Thus, the question whether a given district experiences legally significant racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white voting practices. A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, Blacksher & Menefee 59-60, and n. 344, and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the context of § 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting. Id., at 60. The amount of white bloc voting that can generally "minimize or cancel," S. Rep., at 28; Regester, 412 U.S., at 765, black voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice, however, will vary from district to district according to a number of factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; the size of the district; and, in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in the field. See, e.g., Butler 874-876; Davidson 5; Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 Urb. Aff. Q. 345 (1976); United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals 38-41 (1981).

Because loss of political power through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to win a particular election, Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 153, a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time is more probative of a claim that a district experiences legally significant polarization than are the results of a single election. Blacksher & Menefee 61; Note, Geometry and Geography 200, n. 66 ("Racial polarization should be seen as an attribute not of a single election, but rather of a polity viewed over time. The concern is necessarily temporal and the analysis historical because the evil to be avoided is the subordination of minority groups in American politics, not the defeat of individuals in particular electoral contests"). Also for this reason, in a district where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one or a few individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the district experiences legally significant bloc voting. Furthermore, the success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized voting in that election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain minority electoral success in a polarized contest.

As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc voting that is cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will vary according to a variety of factual circumstances. Consequently, there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting. However, the foregoing general principles should provide courts with substantial guidance in determining whether evidence that black and white voters generally prefer different candidates rises to the level of legal significance under § 2.

3. Standard Utilized by the District Court
The District Court clearly did not employ the simplistic standard identified by North Carolina—legally significant bloc voting occurs whenever less than 50% of the white voters cast a ballot for the black candidate. Brief for Appellants 36. And, although the District Court did utilize the measure of "substantive significance" that the United States ascribes to it—"'the results of the individual election would have been different depending on whether it had been held among only the white voters or only the black voters,'" Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting 590 F. Supp., at 368)—the court did not reach its ultimate conclusion that the degree of racial bloc voting present in each district is legally significant through mechanical reliance on this standard. While the court did not phrase the standard for legally significant racial bloc voting exactly as we do, a fair reading of the court's opinion reveals that the court's analysis conforms to our view of the proper legal standard.

The District Court's findings concerning black support for black candidates in the five multimember districts at issue here clearly establish the political cohesiveness of black voters. As is apparent from the District Court's tabulated findings, reproduced in Appendix A to opinion, post, p. 80, black voters' support for black candidates was overwhelming in almost every election. In all but 5 of 16 primary elections, black support for black candidates ranged between 71% and 92%; and in the general election, black support for black Democratic candidates ranged between 87% and 96%.

In sharp contrast to its findings of strong black support for black candidates, the District Court found that a substantial majority of white voters would rarely, if ever, vote for a black candidate. In the primary elections, white support for black candidates ranged between 8% and 50%, and in the general elections it ranged between 28% and 49%. See ibid. The court also determined that, on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections. In the general elections, white voters almost always ranked black candidates either last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently ranked black candidates last among the Democrats, if not last or next to last among all candidates. The court further observed that approximately two-thirds of white voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections, even after the candidate had won the Democratic primary and the choice was to vote for a Republican or for no one.

While the District Court did not state expressly that the percentage of whites who refused to vote for black candidates in the contested districts would, in the usual course of events, result in the defeat of the minority's candidates, that conclusion is apparent both from the court's factual findings and from the rest of its analysis. First, with the exception of House District 23, see infra, at 77, the trial court's findings clearly show that black voters have enjoyed only minimal and sporadic success in electing representatives of their choice. See Appendix B to opinion, post, p. 82. Second, where black candidates won elections, the court closely examined the circumstances of those elections before concluding that the success of these blacks did not negate other evidence, derived from all of the elections studied in each district, that legally significant racially polarized voting exists in each district. For example, the court took account of the benefits incumbency and running essentially unopposed conferred on some of the successful black candidates, as well as of the very different order of preference blacks and whites assigned black candidates, in reaching its conclusion that legally significant racial polarization exists in each district.

We conclude that the District Court's approach, which tested data derived from three election years in each district, and which revealed that blacks strongly supported black candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment, whites rarely did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper legal standard.

1. Appellants' Arguments
North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence upon which the District Court relied in finding that voting patterns in the challenged districts were racially polarized. They argue that the term "racially polarized voting" must, as a matter of law, refer to voting patterns for which the principal cause is race. They contend that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect definition of racially polarized voting by relying on bivariate statistical analyses which merely demonstrated a correlation between the race of the voter and the level of voter support for certain candidates, but which did not prove that race was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According to appellants and the United States, only multiple regression analysis, which can take account of other variables which might also explain voters' choices, such as "party affiliation, age, religion, income[,] incumbency, education, campaign expenditures," Brief for Appellants 42, "media use measured by cost,... name, identification, or distance that a candidate lived from a particular precinct," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, n. 57, can prove that race was the primary determinant of voter behavior.

Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is the voter's race or the candidate's race that must be the primary determinant of the voter's choice is unclear; indeed, their catalogs of relevant variables suggest both. Age, religion, income, and education seem most relevant to the voter; incumbency, campaign expenditures, name identification, and media use are pertinent to the candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter and the candidate. In either case, we disagree: For purposes of § 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates. Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 203. As we demonstrate infra, appellants' theory of racially polarized voting would thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve when it amended § 2 and would prevent courts from performing the "functional" analysis of the political process, S. Rep., at 30, n. 119, and the "searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,'" id., at 30 (footnote omitted), mandated by the Senate Report.

2. Causation Irrelevant to Section 2 Inquiry
The first reason we reject appellants' argument that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns that are in some way caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the race of the voter, is that the reasons black and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of § 2. By contrast, the correlation between race of voter and the selection of certain candidates is crucial to that inquiry.

Both § 2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the critical question in a § 2 claim is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. See, e.g., S. Rep., at 2, 27, 28, 29, n. 118, 36. As we explained, supra, at 47-48, multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be able to elect their preferred candidates in a black majority, single-member district and where a white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the candidates chosen by blacks. It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites—not the reasons for that difference—that results in blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives. Consequently, we conclude that under the "results test" of § 2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the correlation, matters.

The irrelevance to a § 2 inquiry of the reasons why black and white voters vote differently supports, by itself, our rejection of appellants' theory of racially polarized voting. However, their theory contains other equally serious flaws ' that merit further attention. As we demonstrate below, the addition of irrelevant variables distorts the equation and yields results that are indisputably incorrect under § 2 and the Senate Report.

3. Race of Voter as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior
Appellants and the United States contend that the legal concept of "racially polarized voting" refers not to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the voter's race, but to voting patterns that are determined primarily by the voter's race, rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic characteristics.

The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that members of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount of education, housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See, e.g., Butler 902 (Minority group "members' shared concerns, including political ones, are... a function of group status, and as such are largely involuntary... As a group blacks are concerned, for example, with police brutality, substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems fall disproportionately upon the group"); S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 151-152 (1972) ("Socioeconomic status... is closely related to race. Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status jobs than whites, to have less education, and to have lower incomes"). Where such characteristics are shared, race or ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic characteristics. Appellants' definition of racially polarized voting is even more pernicious where shared characteristics are causally related to race or ethnicity. The opportunity to achieve high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced by the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A definition of racially polarized voting which holds that black bloc voting does not exist when black voters' choice of certain candidates is most strongly influenced by the fact that the voters have low incomes and menial jobs—when the reason most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes is attributable to past or present racial discrimination—runs counter to the Senate Report's instruction to conduct a searching and practical evaluation of past and present reality, S. Rep., at 30, and interferes with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the electoral opportunities of minorities. Id., at 5, 40.

Furthermore, under appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, even uncontrovertible evidence that candidates strongly preferred by black voters are always defeated by a bloc voting white majority would be dismissed for failure to prove racial polarization whenever the black and white populations could be described in terms of other socioeconomic characteristics.

To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2. The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and 47.8% of the black community lives in poverty. More than half—51.5%—of black adults of the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Just over half of black citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units. And, almost a third of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in the district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042. White residents are better educated than blacks—only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Furthermore, only 26.2% of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households with no vehicle available. 1 App., Ex-44. As is the case in Senate District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban district have never been able to elect a representative of their choice.

According to appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, proof that black and white voters in this hypothetical district regularly choose different candidates and that the blacks' preferred candidates regularly lose could be rejected as not probative of racial bloc voting. The basis for the rejection would be that blacks chose a certain candidate, not principally because of their race, but principally because this candidate best represented the interests of residents who, because of their low incomes, are particularly interested in government-subsidized health and welfare services; who are generally poorly educated, and thus share an interest in job training programs; who are, to a greater extent than the white community, concerned with rent control issues; and who favor major public transportation expenditures. Similarly, whites would be found to have voted for a different candidate, not principally because of their race, but primarily because that candidate best represented the interests of residents who, due to their education and income levels, and to their property and vehicle ownership, favor gentrification, low residential property taxes, and extensive expenditures for street and highway improvements.

Congress could not have intended that courts employ this definition of racial bloc voting. First, this definition leads to results that are inconsistent with the effects test adopted by Congress when it amended § 2 and with the Senate Report's admonition that courts take a "functional" view of the political process, S. Rep. 30, n. 119, and conduct a searching and practical evaluation of reality. Id., at 30. A test for racially polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely correlated permits neither a practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis of vote dilution. And, contrary to Congress' intent in adopting the "results test," appellants' proposed definition could result in the inability of minority voters to establish a critical element of a vote dilution claim, even though both races engage in "monolithic" bloc voting, id., at 33, and generations of black voters have been unable to elect a representative of their choice.

Second, appellants' interpretation of "racially polarized voting" creates an irreconcilable tension between their proposed treatment of socioeconomic characteristics in the bloc voting context and the Senate Report's statement that "the extent to which members of the minority group... bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health" may be relevant to a § 2 claim. Id., at 29. We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leads—that Congress intended, on the one hand, that proof that a minority group is predominately poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should be considered a factor tending to prove a § 2 violation; but that Congress intended, on the other hand, that proof that the same socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black voters' choice of candidates should destroy these voters' ability to establish one of the most important elements of a vote dilution claim.

4. Race of Candidate as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior
North Carolina's and the United States' suggestion that racially polarized voting means that voters select or reject candidates principally on the basis of the candidate's race is also misplaced.

First, both the language of § 2 and a functional understanding of the phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis. Section 2(b) states that a violation is established if it can be shown that members of a protected minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to... elect representatives of their choice." (Emphasis added.) Because both minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black candidate is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor from Chandler Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate that tendency—blacks preferred black candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter of convenience, we and the District Court may refer to the preferred representative of black voters as the "black candidate" and to the preferred representative of white voters as the "white candidate." Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and race of candidate is often correlated is not directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry. Under § 2, it is the status of a candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is important.

An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a submergence claim is that minority group members prefer certain candidates whom they could elect were it not for the interaction of the challenged electoral law or structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for different candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 98; Note, Geometry and Geography 207.

Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members of their own race or are hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because the white candidates spent more on their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater name recognition than the black candidate, fails for another, independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be the primary determinant of the voter's ballot, is inconsistent with the purposes of § 2 and would render meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political participation.

Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination. S. Rep., at 5, 40; H.R. Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this Court and other federal courts have recognized that political participation by minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 768-769; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 554 F.2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). See also S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 152 (1972). The Senate Report acknowledges this tendency and instructs that "the extent to which members of the minority group... bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process," S. Rep., at 29 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in order to win ' election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 720-721 (WD Tex. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part ''sub nom. White v. Regester, supra''. Berry & Dye 88; Davidson & Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an At-Large Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution 122-123; Derfner 554; n. 126; Jewell 131; Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb. Aff. Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than whites, they will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral losses by candidates preferred by the black community may well be attributable in part to the fact that their white opponents outspent them. But, the fact is that, in this instance, the economic effects of prior discrimination have combined with the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks less opportunity than whites to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. It would be both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to hold that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination which hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend to prove a § 2 violation, while holding on the other hand that, where these same effects of past discrimination deter whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a crucial element of a vote dilution claim. Accord, Escambia County, 748 F.2d, at 1043 ("'[T]he failure of the blacks to solicit white votes may be caused by the effects of past discrimination'") (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536 (CA11 1984)); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d, at 1567.

5. Racial Animosity as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior
Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized voting refers only to white bloc voting which is caused by white voters' racial hostility towards black candidates. To accept this theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by repudiating the intent test of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and would prevent minority voters who have clearly been denied an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice from establishing a critical element of a vote dilution claim.

In amending § 2, Congress rejected the requirement announced by this Court in Bolden, supra, that § 2 plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory intent of state or local governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism. Appellants' suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual white voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2 claim must fail for the very reasons Congress rejected the intent test with respect to governmental bodies. See Engstrom, The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L.J. 495 (1985).

The Senate Report states that one reason the Senate Committee abandoned the intent test was that "the Committee... heard persuasive testimony that the intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities." S. Rep., at 36. The Committee found the testimony of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, particularly persuasive. He testified: "[Under an intent test] [l]itigators representing excluded minorities will have to explore the motivations of individual council memebrs, mayors, and other citizens. The question would be whether their decisions were motivated by individual racial considerations. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It is the intent test, not the results test, that would make it necessary to brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial relief. Ibid. (footnote omitted)."

The grave threat to racial progress and harmony which Congress perceived from requiring proof that racism caused the adoption or maintenance of a challenged electoral mechanism is present to a much greater degree in the proposed requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that racial animosity determined white voting patterns. Under the old intent test, plaintiffs might succeed by proving only that a limited number of elected officials were racist; under the new intent test plaintiffs would be required to prove that most of the white community is racist in order to obtain judicial relief. It is difficult to imagine a more racially divisive requirement.

A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was that in most cases it placed an "inordinately difficult burden" on § 2 plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent test would be equally, if not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a specific factor—racial hostility—determined white voters' ballots, it would be necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal factors, such as socioeconomic characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate better than racial animosity with white voting behavior. As one commentator has explained:

"Many of the[se] independent variables... would be all but impossible for a social scientist to operationalize as interval-level independent variables for use in a multiple regression equation, whether on a step-wise basis or not. To conduct such an extensive statistical analysis as this implies, moreover, can become prohibitively expensive.

"Compared to this sort of effort, proving discriminatory intent in the adoption of an at-large election system is both simple and inexpensive." McCrary, Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of "Purpose" Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How. L.J. 463, 492 (1985) (footnote omitted).

The final and most dispositive reason the Senate Report repudiated the old intent test was that it "asks the wrong question." S. Rep., at 36. Amended § 2 asks instead "whether minorities have equal access to the process of electing their representatives." Ibid.

Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather than the behavior of the voters, also asks the wrong question. All that matters under § 2 and under a functional theory of vote dilution is voter behavior, not its explanations. Moreover, as we have explained in detail, supra, requiring proof that racial considerations actually caused voter behavior will result—contrary to congressional intent—in situations where a black minority that functionally has been totally excluded from the political process will be unable to establish a § 2 violation. The Senate Report's remark concerning the old intent test thus is pertinent to the new test: The requirement that a "court... make a separate... finding of intent, after accepting the proof of the factors involved in the White [v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755] analysis... [would] seriously clou[d] the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances of racial discrimination in American elections." Id., at 37. We therefore decline to adopt such a requirement.

6. Summary
In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent.

A
North Carolina and the United States maintain that the District Court failed to accord the proper weight to the success of some black candidates in the challenged districts. Black residents of these districts, they point out, achieved improved representation in the 1982 General Assembly election. They also note that blacks in House District 23 have enjoyed proportional representation consistently since 1973 and that blacks in the other districts have occasionally enjoyed nearly proportional representation. This electoral success demonstrates conclusively, appellants and the United States argue, that blacks in those districts do not have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Essentially, appellants and the United States contend that if a racial minority gains proportional or nearly proportional representation in a single election, that fact along precludes, as a matter of law, finding a § 2 violation.

Section 2(b) provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office... is one circumstance which may be considered." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The Senate Committee Report also identifies the extent to which minority candidates have succeeded as a pertinent factor. S. Rep, at 29. However, the Senate Report expressly states that "the election of a few minority candidates does not 'necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black vote,'" noting that if it did, "the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade [§ 2] by manipulating the election of a 'safe' minority candidate." Id., at 29, n. 115, quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (CA5 1973) (en banc), aff'd ''sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam)''. The Senate Committee decided, instead, to "'require an independent consideration of the record.'" S. Rep., at 29, n. 115. The Senate Report also emphasizes that the question whether "the political processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality.'" Id., at 30 (footnote omitted). Thus, the language, of § 2 and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim.

Moreover, in conducting its "independent consideration of the record" and its "searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,'" the District Court could appropriately take account of the circumstances surrounding recent black electoral success in deciding its significance to appellees' claim. In particular, as the Senate Report makes clear, id., at 29, n. 115, the court could properly notice the fact that black electoral success increased markedly in the 1982 election—an election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had been filed—and could properly consider to what extent "the pendency of this very litigation [might have] worked a one-time advantage for black candidates in the form of unusual organized political support by white leaders concerned to forestall single-member districting." 590 F. Supp., at 367, n. 27.

Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited the court from viewing with some caution black candidates' success in the 1982 election, and from deciding on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not err, as a matter of law, in refusing to treat the fact that some black candidates have succeeded as dispositive of appellees' § 2 claim. Where multimember districting generally works to dilute the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority voters.

B
The District Court did err, however, in ignoring the significance of the sustained success black voters have experienced in House District 23. In that district, the last six elections have resulted in proportional representation for black residents. This persistent proportional representation is inconsistent with appellees' allegation that the ability of black voters in District 23 to elect representatives of their choice is not equal to that enjoyed by the white majority.

In some situations, it may be possible for § 2 plaintiffs to demonstrate that such sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority group's ability to elect its preferred representatives,, but appellees have not done so here. Appellees presented evidence relating to black electoral success in the last three elections; they failed utterly, though, to offer any explanation for the success of black candidates in the previous three elections. Consequently, we believe that the District Court erred, as a matter of law, in ignoring the sustained success black voters have enjoyed in House District 23, and would reverse with respect to that District.

V. ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF VOTE DILUTION
Finally, appellants and the United States dispute the District Court's ultimate conclusion that the multimember districting scheme at issue in this case deprived black voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

A
As an initial matter, both North Carolina and the United States contend that the District Court's ultimate conclusion that the challenged multimember districts operate to dilute black citizens' votes is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review on appeal. In support of their proposed standard of review, they rely primarily on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), a case in which we reconfirmed that, as a matter of constitutional law, there must be independent appellate review of evidence of "actual malice" in defamation cases. Appellants and the United States argue that because a finding of vote dilution under amended § 2 requires the application of a rule of law to a particular set of facts it constitute a legal, rather than factual, determination. Reply Brief for Appellants 7; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. Neither appellants nor the United States cite our several precedents in which we have treated the ultimate finding of vote dilution as a question of fact subject to the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S., at 622-627; City of Rome v. United States 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 765-770. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).

In Regester, supra, we noted that the District Court had based its conclusion that minority voters in two multimember districts in Texas had less opportunity to participate in the political process than majority voters on the totality of the circumstances and stated that

"'we are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the... multimember district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise.' Id., at 769-770."

Quoting this passage from Regester with approval, we expressly held in Rogers v. Lodge, supra, that the question whether an at-large election system was maintained for discriminatory purposes and subsidiary issues, which include whether that system had the effect of diluting the minority vote, were questions of fact, reviewable under Rule 52(a)'s clearly-erroneous standard. 458 U.S., at 622-623. Similarly, in City of Rome v. United States, we declared that the question of whether certain electoral structures had a "discriminatory effect," in the sense of diluting the minority vote, was a question of fact subject to clearly-erroneous review. 446 U.S., at 183.

We reaffirm our view that the clearly-erroneous test of Rule 52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review of a finding of vote dilution. As both amended § 2 and its legislative history make clear, in evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution through districting, the trial court is to consider the "totality of the circumstances" and to determine, based "upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,'" S. Rep., at 30 (footnote omitted), whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. "'This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case,'" Rogers, supra, at 621, quoting Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 224 (CA5 1978), and requires "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact" of the contested electoral mechanisms. 458 U.S., at 622. The fact that amended § 2 and its legislative history provide legal standards which a court must apply to the facts in order to determine whether § 2 has been violated does not alter the standard of review. As we explained in Bose, Rule 52(a) "does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law." 466 U.S., at 501, citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); Inward Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855, n. 15 (1982). Thus, the application of the clearly-erroneous standard to ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law.

B
The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. It found that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982 elections, perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion. Excepting House District 23, with respect to which the District Court committed legal error, see supra, at 77, we affirm the District Court's judgment. We cannot say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember electoral structure has caused black voters in the districts other than House District 23 to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J.
Percentages of Votes Cast by Black and White Voters for Black Candidates in the Five Contested Districts

590 F. Supp., at 369-371.

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J.
See Brief for Appellees, table printed between pages 8 and 9; App. 93-94.


text: Private Crossings (Signs and Barriers) Regulations 1996

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Page:Lucian (IA lucianlucas00collrich).pdf/148

needs but a slight acquaintance with Greek and Roman literature, and with social life at Athens in its later days, and at Rome in the times of the emperors, to know that the men of rank and wealth filled their tables not only with their private friends, but also with guests who stood lower in the social scale, and were invited because they contributed in some way either to the amusement of the company or to the glorification of the host. A rich man, if he had any pretence to a good position in society, kept almost open house: and there was a class of men who, by means of sponging and toadying, and all those kindred arts which are practised, only under somewhat finer disguises, in modern society, contrived seldom either to go without a dinner or to dine at home. This disreputable fraternity of diners-out—"Parasites," as the Greek term was—supplied an inexhaustible subject for the satirist and the play-writer, as has been already noticed in these volumes,


text:
Page:Lucian (IA lucianlucas00collrich).pdf/149

Rh in examining the comedies of Plautus and Terence. Lucian has not omitted to handle, in his own style, a character so well known, and which presented such fair game to the writer who set himself to hunt down the follies of the times. Yet the little dialogue called "," in which he introduces one of these mendicants of society arguing stoutly in defence of his vocation, is one of the most good-humoured of all. Perhaps there was an amount of bonhomie about a man who could not afford to he disagreeable which disarmed the satirist, together with a serio-comic "poor-devil" misery inevitable to his position which excited pity as well as contempt. Few readers can lay down the "Phormio" of Terence without a kindly feeling towards its unabashed and ingenious hero.

Simo, the Parasite of Lucian's Dialogue, makes open profession of his vocation, like Phormio. The friend with whom the conversation is carried on, knowing that Simo's private means are small, is curious to know by what trade or employment he gains his living, since he cannot make out that he follows any. Simo assures him that there is a school of art in which he is a perfect master, and which never allows him to be in want. It is the art of Parasitism. And he proceeds to prove, by an argument in the catechetical style of Socrates and Plato, that it is an art of the highest and most perfect kind. It falls quite within the definition of art as given by the philosophers—"a system of approved rules co-operating to a certain end, useful to society." As to the usefulness of the end, nothing is so useful—nay, so absolutely needful—as eating and


text:
Page:Lucian (IA lucianlucas00collrich).pdf/150

140 drinking. It is not a gift of nature, but acquired, therefore an art, if the schoolmen be right in their technical distinctions. It is also most practical, which is the essence of a perfect art: other arts may exist in their possessor in posse, yet be seldom or never in operation; whereas this must be always at work—for when the parasite ceases to get his dinners, there is an end, not only of the art, but of the artificer. It excels all other arts also in this,—that whereas most arts require toil and discipline, and even threats and stripes, in order to be learnt thoroughly—which things are manifestly contrary to our nature—this art can be studied pleasantly and cheerfully without any of these disagreeable accompaniments. "Who ever yet returned in tears from a feast, as many scholars do from their masters? Who that is going to a good dinner ever looks pale and melancholy, as those do who frequent the Schools?" Other arts we pay to learn, this we are paid for learning; others require a master, this may he learnt without. Other systems seem vague; all give different definitions of wisdom and happiness—and that which is so indefinite can have no real existence at all; whereas the end and object of Parasitism is distinct and obvious. And in this alone of all systems the practice of the school agrees with its professions. And whereas no parasite was ever known to desert his art and turn philosopher, many philosophers have turned parasites, and do so to this day. Euripides became the dependant of Archelaus of Macedon; and even Plato was content to sit at the table of the tyrant Dionysius. If the testimony


text:
Page:Paraplangia sinespeculo, a new genus and species of bush-cricket, with notes on its biology and a key to the genera of Phaneropterinae (Orthoptera, Tettigonioidea) from Madagascar.pdf/3

Rh

* Only Mimoscudderia paulyi Massa, 2017 with unusually wide tegmina.

Brunner von Wattenwyl (1891) combined several genera in Amblycoryphini using the key character “fastigium as wide or wider than scapus”. This may well be a convergently evolved character, but as long as no better grouping is available, it is useful for placing and finding similar genera. The group included and still includes (even after the splitting by Cadena-Castañeda 2014, 2015) African and American genera which were separated in Brunner von Wattenwyl (1891)’s key but not by Cadena-Castañeda (2014). According to the preliminary molecular tree (Mugleston et al. 2013), Amblycorypha, the type genus, is deeply nested among New World genera from different tribes. In other molecular studies, Eurycorypha and Plangia are closely related (Mugleston 2016), with Isopsera nearby (Liu Cx unpubl.). Indogneta Ingrisch & Shisodia, 2002, which also has a broad fastigium, certainly belongs to Isopserae (see Kang et al. 2014), and Isopsera has ant-like nymphs like Eurycorypha.

We also include Corycomina Karsch, 1896 because of its similarity to some Eurycorypha (E. flavescens was considered as member of Corycomina Karsch, 1896; see Massa 2017c).

When splitting up Amblycoryphini, Cadena-Castañeda (2015) listed the similarities between Amblycoryphini s.s. and his Plangiae. They had all generic characters in common except the eye shape. We consider this single trait to be insufficient for excluding Plangia and Monteiroa from the tribe, especially since Plangiae obviously do not have any similarities to other phaneropterine genera, but share e.g. nymphal properties with Eurycorypha, the largest genus of the tribe (see Hemp in preparation). Despite some doubts, we retain the group as a subtribe and include Madagascarantia Massa, 2017, which is a sister genus to Plangia, Pseudoplangia Massa, 2014, and Paraplangia gen. n.

After having seen photos of one of the syntypes of Plangia albolineata (described as Turpilia albo-lineata), it turned out that Madagascarantia bartolozzii is conspecific with this species. Since Madagascarantia is considered as generically distinct from Plangia, we propose the following taxonomical corrections.

Type species of the genus.—Paraplangia sinespeculo sp. n., here designated.

Description.—Large size, short head, wide round eyes, fastigium verticis as wide as or slightly wider than scapus of antennae, in contact with fastigium frontis, fronto-genal carinae very indistinct. Antennae shorter than tegmina. Pronotum without lateral carinae, length shorter than height, two small pits at two-thirds point on midline; prozona hardly separable from metazona, anterior margin straight, posterior margin rounded, with evident lateral excisions where wings are inserted. Prothoracic spiracle slit-like, very


text:
Page:Paraplangia sinespeculo, a new genus and species of bush-cricket, with notes on its biology and a key to the genera of Phaneropterinae (Orthoptera, Tettigonioidea) from Madagascar.pdf/4

146 Table 1. List of the known phaneropterine species from Madagascar and some islands in the Western Indian Ocean together with some selected measurements. Abbreviations: Mad = Madagascar, Mau = Mauritius, Com = Comoros, Sey = Seychelles, B.v.W. = Brunner von Wattenwyl. Measurements in mm (taken from original sources).


text:
Page:Holy Bible Berean Standard Bible.pdf/75

 The Israelites Multiply in Egypt (Genesis 46:7–27)

These are the names of the sons of Israel who went to Egypt with Jacob, each with his family:

The descendants of Jacob numbered seventy in all, including Joseph, who was already in Egypt.

Now Joseph and all his brothers and all that generation died, but the Israelites were fruitful and increased rapidly; they multiplied and became exceedingly numerous, so that the land was filled with them.

Oppression by a New King (Acts 7:15–19)

Then a new king, who did not know Joseph, came to power in Egypt. “Look,” he said to his people, “the Israelites have become too numerous and too powerful for us. Come, let us deal shrewdly with them, or they will increase even more; and if a war breaks out, they may join our enemies, fight against us, and leave the country. ”

So the Egyptians appointed taskmasters over the Israelites to oppress them with forced labor. As a result, they built Pithom and Rameses as store cities for Pharaoh. But the more they were oppressed, the more they multiplied and flourished; so the Egyptians came to dread the Israelites.

They worked the Israelites ruthlessly and made their lives bitter with hard labor in brick and mortar, and with all kinds of work in the fields. Every service they imposed was harsh.

Then the king of Egypt said to the Hebrew midwives, whose names were Shiphrah and Puah, “When you help the Hebrew women give birth, observe them on the birthstools. If the child is a son, kill him; but if it is a daughter, let her live.”

The midwives, however, feared God and did not do as the king of Egypt had instructed; they let the boys live. So the king of Egypt summoned the midwives and asked them, “Why have you done this? Why have you let the boys live?”

The midwives answered Pharaoh, “The Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian women, for they are vigorous and give birth before a midwife arrives.”

So God was good to the midwives, and the people multiplied and became even more numerous. And because the midwives feared God, He gave them families of their own.

Then Pharaoh commanded all his people: “Every son born to the Hebrews you must throw into the Nile, but every daughter you may allow to live.”


text:
Page:Holy Bible Berean Standard Bible.pdf/76

'''68 The Birth and Adoption of Moses (Acts 7:20–22; Hebrews 11:23)

Now a man of the house of Levi married a daughter of Levi, and she conceived and gave birth to a son. When she saw that he was a beautiful child, she hid him for three months.

But when she could no longer hide him, she got him a papyrus basket and coated it with tar and pitch. Then she placed the child in the basket and set it among the reeds along the bank of the Nile. And his sister stood at a distance to see what would happen to him.

Soon the daughter of Pharaoh went down to bathe in the Nile, and her attendants were walking along the riverbank. And when she saw the basket among the reeds, she sent her maidservant to retrieve it. When she opened it, she saw the child, and behold, the little boy was crying. So she had compassion on him and said, “This is one of the Hebrew children.”

Then his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call one of the Hebrew women to nurse the child for you?”

“Go ahead,” Pharaoh’s daughter told her. And the girl went and called the boy’s mother.

Pharaoh’s daughter said to her, “Take this child and nurse him for me, and I will pay your wages.” So the woman took the boy and nursed him.

When the child had grown older, she brought him to Pharaoh’s daughter, and he became her son. She named him Moses and explained, “I drew him out of the water.”

The Rejection and Flight of Moses (Acts 7:23–29)

One day, after Moses had grown up, he went out to his own people and observed their hard labor. He saw an Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his own people. After looking this way and that and seeing no one, he struck down the Egyptian and hid his body in the sand.

The next day Moses went out and saw two Hebrews fighting. He asked the one in the wrong, “Why are you attacking your companion?”

But the man replied, “Who made you ruler and judge over us? Are you planning to kill me as you killed the Egyptian? ”

Then Moses was afraid and thought, “This thing I have done has surely become known.”

When Pharaoh heard about this matter, he sought to kill Moses. But Moses fled from Pharaoh and settled in the land of Midian, where he sat down beside a well.

Now the priest of Midian had seven daughters, and they came to draw water and fill the troughs to water their father’s flock. And when some shepherds came along and drove them away, Moses rose up to help them and watered their flock.

When the daughters returned to their father Reuel, he asked them, “Why have you returned so early today?”

“An Egyptian rescued us from the shepherds,” they replied. “He even drew water for us and watered the flock.”

“So where is he?” their father asked. “Why did you leave the man behind? Invite him to have something to eat.”


text:
Page:Holy Bible Berean Standard Bible.pdf/77

'''Exodus 3:15  Moses agreed to stay with the man, and he gave his daughter Zipporah to Moses in marriage. And she gave birth to a son, and Moses named him Gershom, saying, “I have become a foreigner in a foreign land.”

God Hears the Cry of the Israelites

After a long time, the king of Egypt died. The Israelites groaned and cried out under their burden of slavery, and their cry for deliverance from bondage ascended to God.

So God heard their groaning, and He remembered His covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. God saw the Israelites and took notice. Moses at the Burning Bush (Acts 7:30–38)

Meanwhile, Moses was shepherding the flock of his father-in-law Jethro, the priest of Midian. He led the flock to the far side of the wilderness and came to Horeb, the mountain of God. There the angel of the LORD appeared to him in a blazing fire from within a bush. Moses saw the bush ablaze with fire, but it was not consumed. So Moses thought, “I must go over and see this marvelous sight. Why is the bush not burning up?”

When the LORD saw that he had gone over to look, God called out to him from within the bush, “Moses, Moses!”

“Here I am,” he answered.

“Do not come any closer,” God said. “Take off your sandals, for the place where you are standing is holy ground.” Then He said, “I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.”

At this, Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look at God.

The LORD said, “I have indeed seen the affliction of My people in Egypt. I have heard them crying out because of their oppressors, and I am aware of their sufferings. I have come down to rescue them from the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land to a good and spacious land, a land flowing with milk and honey—the home of the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites.

And now the cry of the Israelites has reached Me, and I have seen how severely the Egyptians are oppressing them. Therefore, go! I am sending you to Pharaoh to bring My people the Israelites out of Egypt.”

But Moses asked God, “Who am I, that I should go to Pharaoh and bring the Israelites out of Egypt?”

“I will surely be with you,” God said, “and this will be the sign to you that I have sent you: When you have brought the people out of Egypt, all of you will worship God on this mountain.”

Then Moses asked God, “Suppose I go to the Israelites and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is His name?’ What should I tell them?”

God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM. This is what you are to say to the Israelites: ‘I AM has sent me to you.’”

God also told Moses, “Say to the Israelites, ‘The LORD, the God of your fathers—the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of


text:
Arkansas v. Texas/Dissent Jackson

, whom and  join, dissenting.

We would deny this motion outright, because we think no case is presented appropriate for original action here.

In 1923, William Buchanan, a citizen and resident of Texas, executed within that State a conveyance of personal property to trustees. They, in Texas, duly accepted [p372] the trust. The trust instrument recited the purpose to create and endow an incorporated charitable enterprise known as "The William Buchanan Foundation" in the City of Texarkana, Texas. Such a corporation was created by the State of Texas for the particular purpose of carrying out the provisions of the trust deed made by Buchanan.

It is needless to recite these purposes beyond saying that they are broadly stated, and some clauses leave the broadest discretion to the Foundation. Another clause contemplates that the trust "shall be administered in Bowie County, Texas, but for the benefit not only of the citizens or residents of said county, but also for the benefit of the citizens or residents of adjoining counties, as well as for the benefit of such other persons as in the judgment of the Trustees should receive the benefits of the activities or institutions established hereunder." That this instrument is open in good faith to different interpretations seems apparent.

The trustees have made an agreement to expend a large sum for a charity hospital at the University of Arkansas, a state institution. The validity of that contract is questioned in the courts of Texas by the Attorney General thereof, whose duties include some supervision of the administration of charitable trusts.

If under these circumstances the courts of Texas cannot finally decide the validity and interpretation of its own charter and trust instrument and its corporation's power to contract, then there is little left of the original conception of state power. This Court seems to agree that some vestige, at least, of such power remains.

If a controversy between two states concerns the construction of a compact, Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, or presents "a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive," [p373] Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110, this Court must, of course, determine their rights inter sese.

Local questions may be intertwined with these ultimate federal rights, and if there are sufficient grounds for delaying final action we may wait in order to "have the advantage of the views of the state court." See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 177.

But where, as here, we are concerned with a question of Texas law in which the courts of that State necessarily "have the final say" the only basis for our holding the suit is to ride herd on the Texas court, on the assumption that it may deny Arkansas some federal right. We ought not to entertain such a possibility in the administration of justice of one state against a sister state. Of course Arkansas will get justice in Texas, just as Texas would get justice in Arkansas.

If Texas courts decide that the contract is valid, Arkansas has no grievance. If Texas decides the other way, what more does this Court plan to do? What is the meaning of holding this case on the docket? We think the Texas courts should be left to decide their state law questions without the threat implicit in keeping this case alive. Exertion of a state's power to determine whether a contract of its corporation is ultra vires cannot be made a tortious interference with the rights of any party to the contract. Since we think the contention is frivolous, we would deny the motion and have done with the business.

title: Arkansas v. Texas/Dissent Jackson


text:
Page:The Pima Indians.pdf/204

] Theft became a common crime with the increasing vagabondage arising from deprivation due to the whites. An extensive system of horse and cattle stealing grew up, whereby the Papagos stole in Sonora and sold to the Pimas, and the latter stole from one another and sold to the Papagos, who bought or stole to sell again in Mexico.

During the worst period of their demoralization they stole wheat from each other and sold it to buy whisky. It is to be remembered that by far the greater part of the tribe disapproved of such deeds, and the few that engaged in such enterprises had not the support of public opinion, which even in an Indian village is an autocratic power.

Thus intoxication was always regarded as reprehensible, though a distinction was made between the persons guilty of drinking the white man's whisky and those who followed the immemorial custom of getting drunk on native-brewed liquors during the saguaro harvest.

Laziness was condemned, and boys and girls were taught to spin and delve—how well may be judged from the fact that the tribe produced a large surplus crop year after year during the early period of American occupancy of the region and at the same time fought back the Apaches and aided the soldiers materially, while the Americans and Mexicans with all their soldiers and outside resources were driven into the shelter of the forts.

Cleanliness is learned by imitation. The floors of the houses are kept free of such objects as can be picked up with the hands and the yards are swept with bundles of arrow bushes or mesquite branches. Bathing was a daily practice.

Public opinion strongly condemned lying. Stinginess could not be more abhorred. The chiefs, especially, were expected to bestow liberally all gifts within their control. The present chief has had a canny sense of thrift and possesses a large bank account, which renders him much less popular than he might otherwise be.

No conventional words of greeting were in use before the introduction of the Spanish and American forms. Tciârs tam w’sahaĭn, "the god sends his regards," were the closing words of any speech. Hâʼik-lt, "good-bye," was the usual response of the listeners. Sometimes in finishing a story the narrator exclaimed atoa’tûk, "anus," at which those present said the word expressing the degree of their relationship to the speaker, or if they were not related they said na’wotc, 'friend." The same expressions are used in accepting a gift.

Hand shaking was unknown until introduced by the whites, though it is now universally practised. It is said that the custom of kissing

title: Page:The Pima Indians.pdf/204


text: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/Q

title: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/Q


text: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/R

title: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/R


text: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/S

title: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/S


text: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/T

title: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/T


text: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/U

title: Dictionary of Spoken Spanish/Part 1/U