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 the organisation, along with its unrivalled military capabilities and superpower reach on the one hand, and the existence of the political and military decision-making structure and process embodied in NATO on the other. It is this combination which makes NATO profoundly different in the field of security and defence from the European Union, notwithstanding the fact that 22 EU members out of 28 are members of NATO (and vice versa).

It was noted in the previous assessment on the “Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership” (21 December 2007) that “NATO’s original task, prevention of an attack from outside, is no longer as central…as it used to be. Within NATO, it is estimated that, in the next ten years at least, the Alliance will not face such a military threat which it would not be able to respond to”. This is no longer the case on both counts: Article 5 is back at the centre of the Alliance’s concerns, and new measures were taken at the NATO Summit in Wales (2014) or are under active consideration to enable the Alliance to credibly meet developing military threats, notably in the Baltic and on NATO’s Eastern border. The NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 will develop these measures further.

On the initiative of European members of NATO, Article 5 was invoked in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

Article 4 may be less well known to the broader public but is of substantial practical consequence. “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”: this instrument can thus be invoked by any member, and on occasion this is what happens in practice. Lithuania and Poland did so in 2014 in the face of Russian operations in Crimea, and Turkey has done so three times in recent years (in 2003 during the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq, in 2012 when a Turkish combat aircraft was shot down by Syria, and in 2015 during the siege of Kobane on the Turkish-Syrian border). In itself, Article 4 is fundamentally no different from other consultative instruments, in the UN or EU frameworks for instance. As it can represent a step on the ladder to Article 5, it has a quality of its own, however. This also helps explain why it is invoked relatively rarely: most member states usually understand that this instrument must not be abused.

THE ORGANISATION. If one strips away what NATO has in common with other treaty organisations relevant to Europe, four elements stand out. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 First, the existence of an integrated command structure, which gives the parties to the Treaty the authority to operate collectively in military terms with greater efficiency and promptness than would otherwise be the case, whether acting in the framework of Article 5 or not. This can be extended to include non-NATO members, as has been the case in Bosnia, Kosovo (with inter alia, Russian troops operating as part of NATO’s KFOR in 1999-2000) or Afghanistan (ISAF)). But this naturally does not readily apply to Article 5 contingencies, particularly those implying extremely short timelines such as NATO’s new VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force). By the same token, NATO’s key Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) is off limits to non-members.

Second, a NATO-specific infrastructure, including integrated air surveillance and air defence (notably NATO AWACS) and logistical networks. When France left the integrated command structure in 1966, it continued despite some caveats to be a full partner in the NATO air surveillance system and in the military pipeline organisation. These are highly integrated assets which imply an Article 5 commitment. They are essential to collective defence, whether as a part of deterrence or for the conduct of operations.

Third, despite their lack of prominence in post-Cold War NATO discourse, nuclear weapons remain an underpinning of NATO’s deterrence, with their ability to counter escalatory moves by a Russia which has in recent years placed increasing importance on its nuclear arsenal (see Chapter II). NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a strong reminder on this score at the February 2016 Munich Security Conference.

This nuclear role includes the nuclear forces of Britain and France, which are considered to be “contributing to the overall strengthening of the Alliance” (Ottawa Declaration of NAC in ministerial session, 19 June 1974). Nuclear weapons also contribute to overall deterrence by ensuring strategic coupling between the United States and Europe: American air-delivered non-strategic nuclear weapons are stationed in five European countries, under so-called “double key” arrangements. These weapons (B61 bombs) are currently the object of a life-extension programme ensuring their long-term effectiveness. This programme (B61-12 LEP) is expected to come to a conclusion by 2021 at an overall cost of some $958 million to the American taxpayer.

US forces thus operate alongside European forces in Europe at all levels of the escalatory ladder. 30

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 Fourth, and of everyday practical utility, NATO is the framework in which standards and norms are developed to enable the technical and procedural interoperability of Western forces at all levels of military activity, including those of a significant number of non-NATO partners. Without such interoperability, coalitions of the willing such as ISAF in Afghanistan would have been substantially more difficult to assemble and run. Full NATO membership is not a prerequisite for participation in this field, but it is the existence of NATO’s integrated command structure which makes it possible to produce this public good on a large scale and at all levels. Finland is already deeply engaged in a multifaceted policy conducive to interoperability, directly with and indeed within NATO (e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan) and with NATO members, or indirectly via cooperation with Sweden, itself an evidently bündnisfähig country. Indeed, there is a widespread sense in NATO that Finland is close to the limit that it can reach without being a full member.

In practice, the pace-setter of the production of standards will tend to be the Alliance’s most powerful member, the US, with some 70% of NATO’s overall defence spending. However, in a multilateral setting such as NATO, the US cannot purely and simply impose its technical and operational norms, in contrast to what tends to occur when the US operates a hub-and-spokes system as with its allies in Asia-Pacific (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand…): they and other non-NATO partners, which have been engaged in a long-standing direct defence-industrial relationship with the US, can end up being cramped into American-first choices.

WHAT NATO IS NOT. As the previous lines suggest, NATO essentially owes its depth and credibility to full US engagement in every facet of its activities, but it is not a mere extension of US power. It is a rare anomaly in the history of international affairs: a largely sui generis multilateral defence alliance.

This is in keeping with its historical origin. The Washington Treaty was the consequence not of American pressure but of the British and French quest for security reassurance once Stalin’s USSR had decided to treat the Marshall Plan as a strategic challenge, with the creation of the Kominform in late 1947. The establishment of NATO as a military structure was the product of the overall Western fear of a new World War after the invasion of South Korea. The Western Europeans’ attempt to create a “European army” (The THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 European Defence Community) as an integral part of NATO under SACEUR failed not because of non-existent US rejection, but because France refused to ratify the corresponding treaty in 1954.

In the post-Cold War era, strong British and French pressure was required to help convince the Clinton administration to accept the forceful intervention of NATO in Bosnia after the Srebrenica massacre. NATO’s war in Kosovo was the result of a joint US and Western European initiative. It was the Europeans not the Americans who took the lead in invoking Article 5 for the first time and in America’s favour after the attacks of 11 September 2001: the US preference was to use its Florida-based Central Command (CENTCOM) as the vehicle for the overthrow of the Taliban. ISAF became a NATO operation only 20 months after its creation in Afghanistan. US pressure did not succeed in securing NATO political endorsement of the planned invasion of Iraq, nor did it convince Turkey to allow the passage of US troops through its territory to Iraq. In the Libyan air campaign of 2011, France and the UK, not the US, were the prime movers once the operations had been handed over to NATO.

These and other examples tend to demonstrate that NATO is not a US “tool”; it often provides a vehicle to influence the US and it constrains rather than enhances US unilateralist inclinations.

US influence, as opposed to direct pressure, can and does have effects on national choices within NATO: during the years of NATO counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, the Baltic States ratcheted back on their territorial defence to make way for expeditionary forces. Their border guards, initially built on the Finnish model, and with Finnish help, were turned into a police force. But this in itself does not make NATO America’s tool. It is also worth noting that forces from the Baltic States gained valuable combat experience in Afghanistan: this is arguably facilitating the re-building of a credible territorial defence in Estonia, for instance.

Sweden’s decision to dismantle its territorial defence a few years ago was taken independently of NATO.

Nor is NATO a war machine that can be activated as a result of pressures from within the organisation. With the exception of assets such as those described above (air defence, logistics…), NATO does not “own” its own troops. The NRF, in which Finland is a participant, is composed of troops belonging to the member states. Even the VJTF, which will ‘belong’ to 32


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28 scholarships. The scholarsliip examination, therefore, constituted the annual general examination of the senior department.

In English the first and fourth classes of the junior department were examined by Mr. Lewis, the second by Mr. Kerr, and the third by Mr. Jones. The vernacular examination was conducted by the Professors of Smrite and Nyaya of the Sanskrit College.

Mr. Lewis expressed himself as upon the whole pleased with the manner in which the pupils of the first class acquitted themselves. He observes, in reference to their reading and explanation of a passage selected from, ‘About twelve of the pupils passed a very creditable examination, the rest succeeded but indifferently; but the passage was one of considerable difficulty, and I am fully satisfied that more could not be expected of pupils belonging to the junior department.’

And, in reference to the examination in geography, the examiner says, ‘the result gave me great satisfaction, though I should have been better pleased had a greater number of the pupils succeeded in map drawing, which is an important branch of the subject, and one to which more attention might be devoted by the learner with profit.’

Anundoram Phookun and Gresh Chunder Mitter, of this class, were found to be far ahead of the others in all subjects. The former, who has been very attentive, and who has improved greatly during the past year, has since the examination been promoted to the fourth class of the senior department.

The pupils of the 2d class, consisting of three divisions, read and explained remarkably well, passages selected from their class reading books; they also answered questions in English grammar and geography in a satisfactory manner.

But in arithmetic the first division did not please the examiner so well. Six simple arithmetical questions were proposed, and only eleven boys out of twenty-nine who were present, worked more than three of them correctly. Sosheebhooshun Baneyen, Anundolall Banerjee, Gresh Chunder Bose, and Prosonno Coomar Ghose, in particular, were very deficient in arithmetic. They did not work correctly a single question. With the above exception the examiner speaks with approbation of the state of the second class, especially of the first and second divisions, taught by Baboo Iswer Chundro Saha, and Baboo Gopeekissin Mitter.


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 on his feet twenty-four hours fighting for his life with these sharp agonies, and yet was as full of life and cheer and activity the next day as if nothing had happened.

The brightest passenger in the ship, and the most interesting and felicitous talker, was a young Canadian who was not able to let the whisky bottle alone. He was of a rich and powerful family, and could have had a distinguished career and abundance of effective help toward it if he could have conquered his appetite for drink; but he could not do it, so his great equipment of talent was of no use to him. He had often taken the pledge to drink no more, and was a good sample of what that sort of unwisdom can do for a man—for a man with anything short of an iron will. The system is wrong in two ways: it does not strike at the root of the trouble, for one thing, and to make a pledge of any kind is to declare war against nature; for a pledge is a chain that is always clanking and reminding the wearer of it that he is not a free man.

I have said that the system does not strike at the root of the trouble, and I venture to repeat that. The root is not the drinking, but the desire to drink. These are very different things. The one merely requires will—and a great deal of it, both as to bulk and staying capacity—the other merely requires watchfulness—and for no long time. The desire of course precedes the act, and should have one's first attention; it can do but little good to refuse the act over and over again, always leaving the desire unmolested, unconquered; the desire will continue to assert itself, and will be almost sure to win in the long run. When the desire intrudes, it should be at once banished out of the mind. One should be on the watch for it all the time—otherwise it will get in. It must be taken in time and not allowed to get a lodgment. A desire constantly repulsed for a fortnight should die, then. That should cure the drinking habit. The system of refusing the mere act of


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 SACEUR in military terms, will ultimately only be deployable at the rate of the slowest of the political authorisation processes of the countries involved. Indeed, this has been the case for previous forces assigned to SACEUR, such as the Cold War-era Allied Mobile Force (AMF): when SACEUR attempted to move its air component on his own initiative to protect Turkey during the 1991 Gulf War, countries whose aircraft and aircrew were part of the AMF withheld authorisation (Belgium and Germany).

If Article 5 is based on the principle of ‘all for one, one for all’, the same does not hold true for non-Article 5 combat operations: Greece did not participate in the Kosovo air campaign; fully half of NATO’s (and the EU’s) members, including major countries such as Germany and Poland, did not support the Libya campaign in 2011 and only nine out of 28 actually participated in the operations, in which a number of non-NATO countries (Sweden, United Arab Emirates, Qatar…) were also present.

In other words, NATO decision-making allows for substantial flexibility, as a somewhat paradoxical result of the rule of consensus. Since substantive decisions are not taken by a straight for-or-against vote (as is the case in the EU), those who don’t want to participate in a given non-Article 5 initiative simply opt out, without preventing others from moving forward. There are necessarily limits to this flexibility, but as the Libyan case indicates, they are very broad indeed.

For the purpose of this assessment, we have discarded the “Gaullist option” (membership with Article 5 but placed outside of NATO’s military force structure and defence planning machinery), for the reasons indicated above: it is not on offer. Any membership will be full membership.

However, this does not mean that there is only one way of being a full member with only one set of possible effects. Similarly, the effects of membership will vary as a function of the choices of other partners: a more or THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 less joint entry by Finland and Sweden will not generate the same consequences as a stand-alone decision by either country to become a member. Several templates will therefore be mentioned here, while some of their specific effects will be explained in greater detail in Chapter IV.

FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR BOTH FINLAND AND SWEDEN. This will be our baseline for assessing effects but it has variations, since Finland would have the possibility of choosing between different postures. One option is to adhere to what is absolutely required to be a full member but nothing beyond that requirement: this would be akin to Norway’s self-imposed restrictions, with no nuclear weapons, no foreign bases, and “non provocative” defence of Finnmark, with limited allied military activity eastward of 24° East longitude. Another is to choose to add on other features to its membership, as is the case today for Poland and the Baltic States, for instance, which are requesting a permanent foreign NATO presence on their territory. In the case of Germany, the non-deployment of foreign forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic is based on the “2+4” treaty (1990), which set the terms of German reunification. Conversely, NATO’s decision not to proceed with such deployments on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members in Central Europe is of a political nature.

A special treaty regime also applies to the Norwegian Svalbard Islands: Article 9 of the Paris Treaty (1920) prohibits naval bases and fortifications and the use of the islands for warlike purposes. The treaty includes 41 parties, and has been ratified by the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, Germany and all of the Scandinavian states.

The Faroe Islands, an autonomous territory exercising home rule within the Kingdom of Denmark are part of NATO. The same applies to Greenland.

If Finland and Sweden were both to join NATO, their specific posture could differ, as is already the case for EU membership, with both countries in the EU but with Sweden outside of the single currency. 34


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. [To the ] But this? What do you think of this? Allow me. Here is the best point of view.

. Marvellous! Magical!

. You are surprised to see this, eh? Now what do you say? Pardon, allow me. Here is another point of view.

. Marvellous! Magical!

. My own idea! It didn't occur to me in a moment. Ideas like this don't occur every day. The entire café converted into a grotto—rest for the body, recreation for the soul after the brilliancy of the spectacle. In all Europe, in all America, there is nothing to equal it. It is the most magnificent music-hall in the world—four million francs invested in it. You may say so in your paper.

. In my paper? Oh, Mr. Jacob, I am not a reporter!

. What? You are not the correspondent of the Dramatic Courier of Milan, of the Genoa Manager's Monitor?

. I did not say

. But the card you sent in to the office? 65


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 FINLAND IN, SWEDEN OUT. Although this appears an unlikely option, it is not impossible. It would generate substantially different effects than the baseline scenario for both Finland and NATO. The conditions under which Article 5 would be implemented would be more complex for geographical reasons than in the joint membership hypothesis and would probably be less appealing for NATO in terms of facilitating the defence of the Baltic States.

FINLAND OUT, SWEDEN IN. Although this possibility lies outside of a strict interpretation of our Terms of Reference, it calls for some consideration given its degree of likelihood. It may also have some attractiveness viewed from a logistical and operational NATO perspective, despite the potential for adverse effects for Finland. The membership of Sweden would greatly facilitate the circumvention of Russian Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) assets in Kaliningrad threatening NATO forces en route to the Baltic States. Given the military geography of the region, Article 5 defence of Sweden would also represent little stress for NATO compared to other recent members, notwithstanding the dismantling of territorial defence. Sweden’s military and defence-industrial cooperation with the US since the late 1950s, its American defence guarantee, and its relationship with NATO during the Cold War would give its possible membership of NATO a natural quality in the eyes of many observers. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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36

From the previous record of Colonel Olcott — described by Madame Blavatsky herself, in an epigrammatically candid moment, as “a psychologised baby”—he is almost the last person whom one would have expected to lead the way in any sceptical examination of “miracles.”

And no doubt he might have been content, like Mrs. Besant, to open his mouth and shut his eyes and take whatever Mr. Judge should send him, so long as that gentleman’ thaumaturgy was confined to benefiting the common cause. But it was another matter when the vice-president’s Mahatma showed a tendency to favour the vice-president, and that at the expense of the president himself, Had the oracle said “Olcott’s plan is right,” and declared that Olcott was the “friend,” “not Lancelot nor another”; had it made Olcott, and not Judge, Outer Head with Mrs. Besant—the president’s ears might have been an inch longer, and the course of Theosophic history have been changed.

But there was, from the first, about Mr. Judge’s Mahatma a certain crudity, a lack of tact in dissembling favouritism, which was bound, human nature being what it is, to make enemies.

On the decease of “H.P.B.,” President Olcott, like Vice-President Judge, had hurried to the headquarters at Avenue-road. He had to come from India, however, and the American disciple naturally out-ran him. When the former arrived, the latter’s Mahatma was already in full swing. On hearing of his performances with the seal, a look of more than usual intelligence may have crossed the president’s mild and venerable features; but, like Brer Rabbit, he wasn’t “sayin’ nuffin,” “he just lay low.”


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30 this proposition, and has recommended that a fee of 16 rupees per term levied on the pupils of this institution as well as all others who may attend those lectures, one-half to be paid to the lecturer, and the other half to be appropriated towards defraying the expences of fitting up and lighting the hall, keeping the apparatus in good order, and other incidental charges. The new hall on the western side of the senior department, the managers propose to appropriate to this purpose.

No lecturer on Political Economy has yet been appointed. In the mean time the subject continues to be taught, as formerly, by the Headmaster.

The general conduct of the students is reported to be remarkably good, and the discipline of both the senior and junior departments is well preserved. The conduct of the scholarship holders has in general been very satisfactory, and though they cannot be said to have behaved all equally well, none have on the ground of misconduct subjected themselves to the loss of their scholarships. The Principal remarks, that he has reason to be satisfied with the manner in which the Professors and the Headmasters have performed their duties during the past year, and that the Assistant Teachers also, and Pundits (with the exception of Ramnarayen, dismissed by order of the Committee for gross misconduct) appear to have given satisfaction to their immediate superiors.

Mr. Lewis, Headmaster of the senior department, has obtained leave of absence for 12 months on medical certificate. Mr. Halford, the 2d Master of the senior department, has been promoted to officiate as Headmaster during the absence of Mr. Lewis; and Mr. Brennand, who was employed for a few months as the officiating 2d Master on a former occasion, has been appointed to act for Mr. Halford. Mr. Giblin, the 3d Master in the senior department, resigned on the 19th February 1844, and his place has been filled up by promotion among the Teachers within the College; and the last place has been supplied by the appointment of Horo Sunker Doss, late Headmaster of the General Assembly’s School at Fort Gloster.

The buildings have lately undergone a thorough repair. The two new wings have been completed. The eastern one is appropriated as an additional school-room in the junior department, and the western one is reserved for a Lecture Room. Two covered passages between the old and new buildings, to connect them together, and also the


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Tweedside

 * "Tweedside", poem by Robert Crawford
 * "Tweedside", poem by John Hay
 * Tweedside, 1823 Scottish chapbook

title: Tweedside


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Rh That busy July, ’91, the period of Mahatma M’s greatest activity, was also marked by the assembling at Avenue-road of one of the periodical conventions of Theosophic Europe. Some conversation occurred between the president and vice-president about the expenses of this convention, and the former, being “H.P.B.’s” legatee, mentioned a happy thought of his, of selling some of the jewels that lady had left behind her, and giving the proceeds as her posthumous contribution to the expenses.

But here, too, Mr. Judge was prepared to “go one better,” as his countrymen say, than the president-legatee. He responded airily that Colonel Olcott need not trouble himself about it, as “Master” had promised him (Judge) that the cash should be forthcoming, and also that he would convey a “message” on the subject to Olcott himself.

The Colonel waited for his message. None came.

The Colonel jogged Mr. Judge’s memory. Mr. Judge said he had no more to tell.

But that very day, on sitting down at his writing-table, and lifting up a piece of blotting-paper, the Colonel found under it a piece of peculiar paper, reading as in the following facsimile (reds and blacks as per former samples):—


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38 Now, Colonel Olcott thought he recognised that particular quality of paper, and also, so far as it was legible, that seal-impression. The facsimile here necessarily makes it much clearer. In the original the impression was curiously faint and vague, as if the Master did not wish, in the Colonel’s case, to burst that seal upon him all at once; but preferred the manner of Tennyson’s Freedom, who “part by part to men revealed the fulness of her face.”

So Brer Rabbit continued to say nuffin’, and to lie low.

Presently Mr. William Q. Judge left on the same writing-table the following note (being scribbled on a torn-off scrap of paper, it also has rather a Mahatmic look. But that is accidental):—

“Dear Olcott” “looked” accordingly; and sure enough, in the ordinary envelope of a letter, previously opened and put by on the table, there was a piece of paper bearing a message with all the proper Mahatma-marks about it. And this time the Mahatma had taken heart and “precipitated” a decently clear impression of the seal.

And then the Colonel “smiled a sorter sickly smile.” For now he did recognise that seal. And this is its story.

Back in the palmy days of 1883, or ever the marvels of “H.P.B.” were besmirched by slanderous tongues, the Colonel was in a certain city of the Panjab. Passing an Urdu seal-engraver’s shop in the bazaar, he turned in and ordered the man to make a seal bearing the cryptograph signature which “H.P.B.” identified as that of the “Master of Wisdom,” Mahatma Morya.


text: Index:Thomas Franklin Fairfax Millard - Japan and the Irrepressible Expansion Doctrine (1921).pdf


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Rh What did the Colonel want the seal for? Let him explain himself:—

An odd idea, this “playful present” of the Colonel’s. Had the seal been intended for use by an ordinary person—by “H.P.B.” herself, for instance—there would have been some sense in it. But the Mahatma, of course, who “precipitated” his letters and his signature psychically, might just as well “precipitate” the latter in the shape of a seal impression as otherwise, if he wanted to; and where, then, should the use of a brass seal come in? However, as the Colonel says, the present was merely “playful.”

Back went the Colonel to Madras, where Madame was, and presented the seal to her, with a “jocular remark” (I am again quoting his own account). Madame’s keen eye dwelt on it a moment, and then she pointed out that the Colonel, in his jocularly playful mood, had made a slight mistake. “The Master’s cryptograph was not correctly drawn,” according to the pattern already familiar to recipients of his precious missives. There was a twiddle too much, or a twiddle too little, in it. The Colonel himself saw the blunder when it was pointed out, and he now declares that he would know it anywhere.

For this sufficient reason the “playful present” was not sent on to the Himalayas (Heaven knows, by the way, by what astral form of parcels-post service the Colonel had expected it to be sent); neither did it appear in any of the communications vouched for by Madame.

It went into Madame’s despatch-box, along with a lot of other mystical odds and ends, properties of the occult stage; and among these it was remarked, as late as 1888, by the Mr. Keightley already mentioned, who was then living with her in Lansdowne-road.

This gentleman asked the prophetess what the little brass seal might be? Madame Blavatsky’s answer—a characteristically racy “fragment of her prophet voice”—was:—


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40

In the same year, at a time when William Q. Judge was staying with Madame, Mr. Judge’s Mahatma evidently determined to overlook the inaccuracy in the seal, and to make use of it for the first time to save himself the trouble of a psychic signature.

He did this, of course, in a letter of Mr. William Q. Judge’s own, and in a sense endorsing Mr. William Q. Judge’s wishes—in fact, the letter was the one recorded in the last chapter, in which the Master’s seal came so plump upon the disciple’s prayer for a sign.

I have not mentioned before, however, that the recipient of this ’88 letter was Colonel Olcott. He presumably recognised, then as now, his own “playful present,” his own “flap-doodle”; but he appears to have let it pass in silence.

From this date the seal seems to have disappeared from among Madame Blavatsky’s belongings. It was, of course, intrinsically valueless.

But in 1890 it turned up again—in New York, and in close contiguity with Mr. Judge. Madame sent a message through Mr. Judge to a disciple, then in America, who happened to be the Mr. Keightley who had remarked the “flap-doodle of Olcott’s” at Lansdowne-road. The context, which is before me as I write, shows that Madame was persuading this disciple to take some course distasteful to him. Judge added his persuasions to hers. But what was bound to determine the disciple was the discovery on receiving the missive from Mr. Judge’s hands, that the Mahatma had added his vote in transitu by endorsing the word “RIGHT,” in red pencil, with cryptograph and impression of the Panjab seal.

Mr. Keightley, too, must have recognised the “flap-doodle”; but he, too, like Olcott, said never a word. He did, indeed, go so far as to ask Judge if he had affixed the seal? But on receiving a blandly surprised assurance that Mr. Judge did not so much as know there was a seal affixed, he let the matter drop.

These are, so far as I know, the only two instances in evidence of the use of this peculiar seal in Mahatma missives during the life-time of


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Rh Madame Blavatsky, and, as was to be expected from her objection to the seal, neither missive was among those vouched for by her, for the message from herself to New York was telegraphed, and it was the telegraph-form at the New York end that the Mahatma endorsed. Nevertheless, it is clear that no intimate of Madame’s would get hold of the seal and make use of it for bogus Mahatma missives under her very nose, unless he were under the impression either that she had it for that purpose herself, or that she might be relied on at least not to “peach” on a chela who used it.

But why did neither Colonel Olcott nor Mr. Keightley speak? The only answer I can suggest is that while Madame Blavatsky was in the flesh the faithful thought twice before they expressed a doubt about anything or anybody. They were accustomed to take their marvels as they found them, and be thankful.

Otherwise, they might at least have pointed out to Mr. Judge, in order that he might in turn apprise his Mahatma, whose supernal knowledge seems here to have been somewhat at fault, what a fatal blunder he was making in palming off upon the faithful a bogus edition of his own cryptograph, known as such by three of the faithful themselves.

However, there are the facts; and but for the Mahatma’s trop de zéle in pushing his favourite chela’s occult claims immediately on Madame Blavatsky’s decease, I fear we should never have been vouchsafed this instructive side-light on an earlier period of the Theosophical Society.

These Adventures of a Seal supply the clue to the great game of bluff between the two highest Theosophical officials which must be depicted in the next chapter.


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Lengths

Weights

Liquid Measures

Dry Measures


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 CHAPTER IV. THE EFFECTS OF FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP

The effects of Finland’s possible membership will be dealt with on the basis of what mathematicians call: “the problem is considered to have been as resolved”, i.e. Finland has joined NATO, without prejudging whether this will, or should, happen. Therefore, we will avoid a balance-sheet type of presentation of liabilities and assets, of pros and cons. Conversely, some of the effects will be heavily scenario-dependent, notably in terms of the existence or absence of a more or less joint approach between Finland and Sweden.

Since NATO’s raison d’être is to provide collective defence, the defence and military effects will be examined first, followed by an assessment of the strategic and political consequences.

Before detailing these effects, it must be noted that the pace of possible accession can have effects of its own. Membership processes can be more or less prolonged, depending on the state of political decision-making in the accession country and on the view existing NATO countries have as to the desirability of, and its readiness for, full membership. The entry of post-communist states was relatively slow both because of the preference for grouped memberships (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in 1999; then the “Big Bang” of 2004 with seven entrants including the Baltic States) and the intrinsic difficulty of making these former Warsaw Pact countries NATO-compatible. But time was not of the essence during this strategically benign period. Nor are other post-communist states such as Albania, Croatia and currently Montenegro models for Finland in terms of meeting NATO standards.

The accession process that is possibly the most comparable to Finland or Sweden in terms of the internal political dynamics may be that of Spain. Not unlike Finland (and Sweden), the population of Spain was divided on 36


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 the issue of membership, largely along party lines. Despite Spain’s joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1982, there was widespread disagreement and the implementation of its full participation was put on hold. The matter was put to a referendum in 1986, with 52.5% voting in favour, notwithstanding the backdrop of negative opinion polls. The pace of accession was clearly dictated by the political decision-making process not by technical obstacles. Time was not of the essence.

Finland is in a more exposed location and for legitimate political reasons a hypothetical accession process may be long. The transition period from the current security regime to possible NATO membership would have to be the object of careful diplomatic and political preparation (see section 4 below). The need for advance preparation by Finland with its Western partners in case of accession, notably in terms of handling possible Russian reactions, has been a recurrent theme in many of our meetings.

Finland’s possible membership of NATO has strategic and military consequences for NATO as well as for Finland. The effects for NATO will be examined first, since NATO’s response to a possible membership request by Finland will depend to a large extent on these effects. Furthermore, NATO’s ability to fulfil its treaty tasks vis-à-vis Finland as a member is of great potential importance for Finland.

COMMAND STRUCTURE. Unlike the situation during and after the Cold War, NATO’s command structure is no longer principally organised around territorial commands having responsibility for specific geographical areas. Its organisation is built along mainly functional lines, with operations (ACO, Allied Command Operations) in Mons (Belgium) under SACEUR on the one hand, and transformation based in Norfolk (Virginia) under ACT (Allied Command Transformation). Under ACO come land (LANDCOM, in Izmir, Turkey), air (AIRCOM, Ramstein, Germany), and maritime (MARCOM, Northwood, United Kingdom) commands and two joint forces commands (JFC) respectively in Brunssum (the Netherlands) and Naples (Italy). It is at this joint forces level that one can find a broad North-South division. Bringing Finland into this overall command structure should not pose significant difficulties for NATO, whether Finland joins alone or with Sweden as part of NATO’s North-East European theatre of operations. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 The experience of NATO’s newly created Force Integration Units (NFIUS) in the Baltic States and Poland may also be of relevance to Finland.

INFRASTRUCTURE. For NATO, the full integration of Finland’s air defence assets would be a substantial improvement on the current situation. Today, there is some transparency between NATO’s air situation and defence and Finland’s assets (notably the Air Situational Data Exchange, ASDE): this is necessary for air traffic management and safety reasons. However, the sharing of the regional air picture is partial in nature and incomplete in geographical scope when compared to what it would be in a full NATO framework. This applies both to air situation data in the airspace of Finland and its NATO or EU partners, as well as to the Russian airspace contiguous to Finland. The same remarks apply to Sweden’s limited sharing of air situation data with both NATO and Finland.

Technically and operationally, the integration of existing and planned NATO and Finnish air surveillance assets would be a straightforward task, with Finland joining NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS). Finland has the corresponding technological know-how and experience of cooperation with industrial partners involved in ACCS.

It is unclear whether Finland (and/or Sweden) could acquire ACCS without full membership of NATO. However, it could presumably secure a level of interoperability with ACCS comparable to that of neutral Switzerland’s FLORAKO air surveillance and control system. In the meantime, Finland’s and Sweden’s ability to share a detailed picture of the air situation between themselves and with NATO partners remains limited.

Conversely, logistical infrastructure issues would be largely scenario-dependent. From NATO’s standpoint, a joint entry by Finland and Sweden (or indeed by Sweden alone) would be convenient in the sense that circumvention of Kaliningrad’s A2AD and support for the defence of the Baltic States would presumably transit via Sweden. The situation would be different were Finland to join alone: in that case, planning for the defence of the Baltic States would call on access to Finnish land, airspace and territorial waters.

FORCE POSTURE AND PLANNING. If one assumes that Russian force dispositions and activities remain more or less what they are today, Finland’s current and planned (see below) force posture should be militari- 38


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 ly adequate from a NATO standpoint. Finland’s territorial defence is superior to that of the smaller Baltic States. This would be true whether Finland joins alone or with Sweden. Foreign military bases, let alone the stationing of nuclear weapons, would not be a prerequisite for the effective extension of NATO’s defence guarantee.

However, Russia may reinforce its forces in the former Leningrad Military District, notably in the Murmansk oblast and on the Karelian Isthmus, either in response to Finland and/or Sweden joining NATO, or independently of such an eventuality. Russia’s current deployment of an infantry brigade at the recently reactivated base of Alakurtti south of Murmansk demonstrates the importance Russia attaches to this particular military region, which remains a strategic nexus. This should not be overestimated however: according to the Estonian intelligence service’s most recent public report (March 2016), Russia can only field some 30 battalion-sized tactical groups in the whole of the Western Military District (from Kaliningrad to Vorkuta). Russia could also ramp up its military activities vis-à-vis Finland to levels equal or superior to those to which Sweden and NATO countries in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic have been subjected in recent years, including simulated strategic bombing attacks on critical Swedish installations.

In NATO terms, an increased threat level vis-à-vis Finland as a NATO member would be substantially easier to handle if Sweden were also in. The ability to provide timely NATO support and reinforcements to Finland would enhance the deterrent capabilities of the Finnish force structure and limit the risks of Russian miscalculation.

Conversely, in such a contingency, a stand-alone Finnish membership could lead NATO to propose additional military measures such as the prepositioning of equipment packages along lines being implemented in the Baltics and a substantial rotational NATO presence in Finland. Such measures could also be called for in order to facilitate the defence of Estonia and the other Baltic States.

In the event of a conflict, NATO would also expect Finland to participate actively in the common defence, not least in the Baltic area: there would therefore be pressure on Finland to develop its beyond-the-borders capabilities. However, to NATO planners, Finland’s territorial defence as a tool for deterrence-by-denial would appear to be the most important direct military asset that Finland could provide for the common defence. To the THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 extent that Finland attaches great value to its territorial defence, expeditionary military contributions should not be allowed to dimension Finland’s defence effort. Participation in coalition operations may be politically and symbolically important but should not constitute a defining factor in force planning terms. From the NATO perspective, the existence of Finland’s territorial defence as a member of NATO would cramp the military options of Russian force planners vis-à-vis the Baltic States.

However, a much more agile Russian decision and implementation capability will impose additional burdens in terms of response times on mobilisation-based territorial defence, whether or not Finland joins NATO.

NUCLEAR DIMENSION. In none of the membership options would there be any strategic or military reason for Finland to be invited to station nuclear weapons on its territory or to acquire dual-capable aircraft. Strategic coupling between the US and Europe does not require such measures. Indeed, for NATO, forward-basing such capabilities in Finland would be a factor of vulnerability as well as of escalation instability in the event of a “use-them or lose-them” situation.

From the NATO standpoint, Finland would fit readily into the NATO family in practical terms. Its military forces meet NATO standards, and its defence and strategic posture vis-à-vis Russia is consistent with NATO aims and policies. From Finland’s perspective, the same remark applies: NATO policy and requirements are generally congruent with the needs of Finnish defence policy.

DEFENCE PLANNING AND COMMAND STRUCTURE. As a member of NATO, Finland would be directly involved in NATO defence planning and in the command structure. This would represent a step-change vis-à-vis current military cooperation by Finland with NATO: Finland would be part of the overall benchmarking process between the members, and a measure of coherence could be established between Finnish defence preparations and the collective and individual preparations of NATO and its members. The Finnish military and civil servants would have their billets in the NATO command structure: if Finland decides to join, it will want to carefully target those postings that would be the most important in its eyes. 40


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 Given the recognised qualities of the Finnish politico-military establishment and its intimate cooperation with NATO and NATO partners, “plugging” into these aspects should be straightforward.

INTEROPERABILITY. As stated above, Finnish defence already enjoys a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces in general, and with those of its Scandinavian members more particularly. For instance, Finland is one of the very few non-NATO countries to be part of the Link 16 data exchange system between combat systems, such as its F-18 aircraft. With the exception of air surveillance and control, where there is substantial leeway for improvement, Finland is probably reaching the limit when it comes to generating increased interoperability with NATO (and therefore by ricochet with the EU) without being a full member of the Alliance. Entering NATO’s full-spectrum planning process under the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) will not be possible outside of full membership. The same applies to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), part of the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF). The VJTF is optimised for Article 5 tasks.

FINNISH DEFENCE POSTURE. The current changes being mooted in Finland in terms of the rapid activation of reservists and the more flexible use thereof are fully in line with the short-warning time threats which NATO aims to deter and, if need be, to defend against.

If Russia were to substantially increase the forces arrayed in proximity to Finland (see Chapter III, section 2), Finland may have to review its dispositions, for instance with further increases in readiness. It does not have the option of adopting the equivalent of Norway’s “Finnmark policy”, [sic]. For a power advancing from the East, Finnmark was a strategic dead end during the last World War and during the Cold War and remains so, unlike Finland whose territory opens access to the whole Baltic basin. Finland as a member of NATO could draw on allied solidarity to buttress Finland’s defence in the form of prepositioned materiel and the more or less sustained presence of allied forces, with a view to reducing the risk of Russian miscalculation.

REGIONAL DEFENCE. Finland’s territorial defence does not lend itself readily to out-of-the-country military intervention. As stated above, the importance of territorial defence for Finland implies that expeditionary capabilities should not be developed to the point of making territorial defence unsustainable, and thus put the Baltic basin at risk. However, THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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Author:John Hay (1645-1713)

Works

 * Tweedside

title: Author:John Hay (1645-1713)


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 Finland has already participated in military operations abroad, including in NATO and EU formats: with, in the past, up to 800 troops in KFOR Kosovo, a construction battalion in IFOR and SFOR Bosnia, and a company-sized commitment in the German sector of ISAF Afghanistan. No less importantly, it is also a force contributor to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), an excellent school for developing interoperability.

In the event that Article 5 entered into play in defence of the Baltic States, only the major powers could provide heavy military muscle: Finland’s contribution would in all cases be militarily limited. NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) may play an important role in case of an Article 5 crisis in the Baltic States. Finland as a possible NATO member could aim at providing a limited but cutting-edge contribution to that unit along with its existing participation in the NRF. The VJTF in totto is planned to encompass some 5,000 soldiers from the overall NATO family. Overall, however, NATO membership should not lead Finland to develop its expeditionary component substantially.

INFRASTRUCTURE. Finland’s defence infrastructure is close to NATO standards (see above) and could be plugged into integrated NATO without substantial difficulty if the basic mission is the defence of Finland. The most significant move would be the integration of Finland’s air surveillance and management networks with NATO’s Air Command and Control System (see chapter III, section 2).

If Sweden stays out of NATO, Finland would presumably be invited by NATO to also make its logistical infrastructure fit for use by NATO reinforcements to the Baltic States. The implications this would have from the Finnish standpoint would require a specific technical evaluation by Finland’s MoD in concert with NATO.

NUCLEAR ISSUES. The assessors assume that Finland-in-NATO would not request the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory, nor that Finland would acquire combat aircraft on the basis of their ability to deliver nuclear weapons. However, Finland would have to decide whether it would join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. For the time being, this is the case for 27 out of 28 members (only nuclear-armed France withholds its participation). Belonging to the NPG provides participant states with information on NATO’s nuclear doctrine and planning but does not imply participation in nuclear missions per se. Even NATO countries such as Denmark, 42


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62 instance probably to satisfy the demand for admission, and in the second, on account of the peculiar circumstances of the supernumerary class. This is a most interesting class, entirely paying its own expences and shewing by a comparison with other classes, that the pay system has by no means yet reached to its proper limits.

It was formed under a supernumerary master, placed in a vacant room and was intended to receive children who could not otherwise be admitted. Hence it is in some sense a measure of what will be paid for education, when it can no longer be had for nothing. In it the average payment exceeds a rupee, and yet the boys are young, in fact the youngest in the college, a circumstance which may be supposed to diminish the willingness of their parents to pay. They would undoubtedly be more willing to pay four rupees for a boy in a high class than one rupee in the lowest. It is not improbable that the schools newly established in Chinsurah, by ex-students of the college, may interfere with this class; one of the children in it has already left it to join one of the new establishments, and such cases will, in the opinion of the Principal, occur more frequently in the other low classes as well as in this—nor is this, in his opinion, to be regretted. The college appears to him too large, even without a supernumerary class, when it is considered that many of the pupils are scarcely beyond the alphabets. “Children,” as Mr. in his third Report says, “should not go to college to learn the alphabet.”

Hence if any falling of in these classes should occur, it need not be attributed to the institution being held in less than that high degree of estimation by the native community which it has hitherto enjoyed, but to the existence of schools in the immediate neighbourhood of the college, containing together 350 boys. The means adopted to increase the payments will also have a slight tendency to keep down the increase in magnitude of the college. But, from circumstances of frequent occurrence to his predecessor and himself, he does not think that the extension of the pay system will have any very great effect in reducing the numbers in the college.

The conduct of those concerned in imparting instruction has been unexceptionable. As few of the native parents in this district speak English fluently, and as none of the European masters have a sufficient knowledge of Bengallee to enable them to enter native society under advantageous circumstances, it is evident that the best means, such as personal intercourse, are not available to the natives for the


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 which objected publicly in the past to NATO nuclear policy, never ceased to be part of the NPG.

Members of NATO and of the NPG which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory are not expected to task their combat aircraft with nuclear strike missions. They can nonetheless play a part in the execution of such missions in the form of a fighter escort or the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), for instance. That is a matter of national choice, however.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE. Since NATO is a collective defence organisation, Finland alone or with Sweden would have the opportunity of exploiting its competitive advantage and thus be able to punch above its weight in the Alliance. Three areas (but others may exist as well) come to mind: THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT
 * Intelligence on Russia’s eastern approaches, from the White Sea southwards. Collecting and processing intelligence is not strictly a NATO task, since intelligence is usually not traded in multilateral contexts, but it naturally serves the collective defence. As Finland moves from a primarily counter-espionage posture to a broader spectrum intelligence-gathering policy, the country’s geographical location and deep knowledge of the region will give it substantial additional leverage.
 * Cyberdefence is another, already well-recognised area of Finnish expertise. Its ongoing participation in NATO’s Centre of Excellence in Tallinn sets a significant precedent in this regard.
 * So-called “hybrid” or “ambiguous” warfare is another field in which Finland has particular expertise due to the traditional Finnish concept of comprehensive security, which aims to increase the resilience of the whole of society. Hybrid warfare has already been the object of cooperation with NATO partners. Since “little green men” and other “soldiers without insignia” would presumably not enjoy a permissive environment in Finland, it is unclear whether this is a promising area for Finland to exploit in general. It could, however, function as a convenient vehicle for intra-regional cooperation with the Baltic States or serve in a CSDP framework if the EU were to set up a Hybrid Warfare Centre.


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 Which Painters hold, and such the heritage

This gentle solemn Spirit doth possess,

Being a better mirror of his age

In all his pity, love, and weariness,

Than those who can but copy common things,

And leave the Soul unpainted with its mighty questionings.

But they are few, and all romance has flown,

And men can prophesy about the sun,

And lecture on his arrows—how, alone,

Through a waste void the soulless atoms run,

How from each tree its weeping nymph has fled,

And that no more 'mid English reeds a Naïad shows her head.

Methinks these new Actæons boast too soon

That they have spied on beauty; what if we

Have analysed the rainbow, robbed the moon

Of her most ancient, chastest mystery,

Shall I, the last Endymion, lose all hope

Because rude eyes peer at my mistress through a telescope!

What profit if this scientific age

Burst through our gates with all its retinue

Of modern miracles! Can it assuage

One lover's breaking heart? what can it do 51

title: Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/65


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 DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY. With the important exception of ACCS (see above), NATO is no longer involved in the procurement of major equipment programmes. Conversely, it plays an essential role in setting norms and standards for defence systems. Being fully part of that process would be an improvement on the current situation. Today, Finland has little choice other than to acquire systems incorporating specifications which it has played no part in defining: this applies in practice not only to systems purchased abroad but also to those produced by Finnish contractors. Given the quality but also the diversity of Finland’s defence industrial base, there should be little difficulty in exercising due influence. Finland’s policy of emphasising national control of acquisition choices may be somewhat easier to sustain in the multilateral NATO framework than in pursuing purely bilateral relations with the most powerful foreign suppliers, notably the US, as Sweden has done.

NATO also plays a significant role in terms of providing logistical support, through the NSPA (NATO Supply and Procurement Agency) in Luxembourg and other agencies involved in the security of supply, including NATO’s pipeline system. The recent Host Nation Support Memorandum of Understanding concluded by Finland should facilitate peacetime cooperation in this area, ahead of possible membership of the Organisation.

Finland places greater emphasis than most of NATO’s members on security of supply broadly conceived, notably in terms of sustaining economic activity in a crisis. There would be no reason for NATO membership to change that national policy, which has no downside for the Alliance.

BUDGET IMPLICATIONS. NATO as such is a relatively low-cost organisation. Its annual infrastructure expenditure amounts to some EUR 5.2 bn. In view of Finland’s GDP as a proportion of NATO’s total, its share should be slightly in excess of 1%, meaning in practice less than EUR 55 million. These costs should rise in the near future given the currently unsatisfactory state of defence preparations in and towards the Baltic States. To this must be added the human resources cost of Finnish personnel working within the NATO framework in case of membership. NATO currently has an international staff of 1100, and 6700 military and civil servants in the command structure. Using the same ratio, this would represent about 80 people from Finland.

NATO’s benchmark for defence expenditure is set at 2% of GDP: out of 28 members, only four countries (including neighbouring Estonia) meet it, 44


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 possibly joined by a fifth (Poland) in 2016. Finland’s defence budget of EUR 2.69 billion stands at 1.3% of a GDP of EUR 207 billion. However, according to our assessment, the figure rises to EUR 3.41 billion and 1.64% of GDP on the basis of NATO definitions. To close the gap, annual expenditure would have to increase by approximately EUR 730 million.

Preserving conscript-based territorial defence while increasing readiness and modernising the force structure (e.g. the upcoming combat aircraft and naval equipment purchases) will require an increase in spending, whether or not Finland joins NATO.

In empirical terms, the membership (or non-membership) of NATO does not appear to have a major bearing on the ability of a small country to exercise diplomatic initiative on the global scene. Good offices, mediation or development policy are not variables which are tied to a country’s status in terms of collective defence. Norway has been no less dynamic and effective than Finland or Sweden in this respect.

The relationship between Finland and Russia is an asymmetric one and, whether as a part of Sweden or as an independent state, has been so for the past 300 years. This asymmetry has historically been managed through different strategies, co-operative relationships or even short-lived alliances with Russia (Sweden in the 1720s and during the final years of the Napoleonic Wars), alliances with other great powers to balance St. Petersburg/Moscow, or by adopting a neutral or non-aligned policy. Finland pursued a policy of neutrality from the 1950s onwards – and Sweden for much longer, since 1814 – and, after the demise of the Soviet Union and joining the EU, military non-alignment. Since 2007, Finland no longer uses the term non-alignment to describe its foreign policy, while Sweden still does. It is simply stated that Finland does not belong to any military alliance.

Unlike Sweden, however, Finland – just like Norway – has a broad bilateral agenda with Russia and a long land/sea border.

Finland’s – and Sweden’s – future relations with NATO, which have developed markedly not least since the end of the Cold War, can for the THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text: General Report on Public Instruction in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45)/Special Reports/Hooghly College and its subordinate Institutions


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Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation, 2008)

Overview of the Case
On 12 August 2008, the Republic of Georgia instituted proceedings before the Court against the Russian Federation relating to "its actions on and around the territory of Georgia in breach of CERD [the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]". Georgia claimed that

 * "the Russian Federation, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist forces and other agents acting on the instructions of, and under the direction and control of the Russian Federation, is responsible for serious violations of its fundamental obligations under CERD, including Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6".

As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Georgia relied on Article 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Georgia's Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures in order "to preserve [its] rights under CERD to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries".

On 15 August 2008, having considered the gravity of the situation, the President of the Court, acting under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, urgently called upon the Parties "to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may take on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects".

Following public hearings that were held from 8 to 10 October 2008, the Court issued an Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia. The Court found that it had prima facie jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD to deal with the case and it ordered the Parties,

 * "within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia, [to] refrain from any act of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions; [to] abstain from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; [to] do all in their power ... to ensure, without distinction as to national or ethnic origin, (i) security of persons; (ii) the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (iii) the protection of the property of displaced persons and of refugees ... [and to] do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions".

The Court also indicated that "[e]ach Party shall refrain from any action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve". Finally, the Court ordered each Party to "inform [it] as to its compliance with the ... provisional measures".

On 1 December 2009, the Russian Federation filed four preliminary objections in respect of jurisdiction.

In its Judgment of 1 April 2011, the Court began by considering the Russian Federation's first preliminary objection, according to which there had been no dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of CERD at the date Georgia filed its Application. It concluded that none of the documents or statements provided any basis for a finding that there had been a dispute about racial discrimination by July 1999. However, the Court concluded that the exchanges between the Georgian and Russian representatives in the Security Council on 10 August 2008, the claims made by the Georgian President on 9 and 11 August and the response on 12 August by the Russian Foreign Minister established that by that day, the day on which Georgia submitted its Application, there had been a dispute between Georgia and the Russian Federation about the latter's compliance with its obligations under CERD as invoked by Georgia in the case. The first preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was accordingly dismissed.

In its second preliminary objection, the Russian Federation had argued that the procedural requirements of Article 22 of CERD for recourse to the Court had not been fulfilled. According to this provision,

 * "[a]ny dispute between two or more States parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement".

First of all, the Court noted that Georgia did not claim that, prior to seising the Court, it had used or attempted to use the procedures expressly provided for in CERD. The Court therefore limited its examination to the question of whether the precondition of negotiations had been fulfilled.

In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observed that negotiations are distinct from mere protests or disputations.

The Court observed that negotiations had taken place between Georgia and the Russian Federation before the start of the relevant dispute. However, in the absence of a dispute relating to matters falling under CERD prior to 9 August 2008, those negotiations could not be said to have covered such matters, and were thus of no relevance to the Court's examination of the Russian Federation's second preliminary objection. The Court accordingly concluded that neither requirement contained in Article 22 had been satisfied. Article 22 of CERD thus could not serve to found the Court's jurisdiction in the case. The second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was therefore upheld.

Having upheld the second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation, the Court found that it was required neither to consider nor to rule on the other objections to its jurisdiction raised by the Respondent and that the case could not proceed to the merits phase. Accordingly, the Order of 15 October 2008 indicating provisional measures ceased to be operative upon the delivery of the Judgment of the Court.

Institution of Proceedings

 * Application Instituting Proceedings, 12 August 2008

Written Proceedings

 * Memorial of Georgia, 2 September 2008

 * Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation, 1 December 2009

Judgments

 * Judgment of 1 April 2011


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 foreseeable future be contained schematically in four scenarios (see section 2 above):
 * Both Finland and Sweden stay outside the Alliance
 * Finnish Alleingang: only Finland joins NATO
 * Swedish Alleingang: only Sweden joins NATO
 * Both countries join NATO

REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES. In the following, the three latter scenarios will be discussed assuming that neither the incumbent Finnish nor Swedish governments, barring some very dramatic occurrence in our neighbourhood, will act before the general elections in 2018 (Sweden) and 2019 (Finland) respectively.

Both countries have developed their relations with NATO in recent years. It is often argued that Finland and Sweden through membership of the Partnership for Peace Programme of 1994 and its Enhanced Opportunities Programme (EOP) follow-up of 2014 for all practical purposes are already members of the Alliance and seen as such by the outside world. The Host Nation Support agreement that both countries signed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 is already in force in Finland and will go before the Swedish Riksdag this spring. It could reinforce the assumption that Finland, and Sweden, would in all likelihood be part of a military conflict in the common strategic area of the Baltic Sea region by virtue of EU and bilateral commitments, and Western solidarity more broadly.

Nevertheless, the political discussion that centres on the issue of application for NATO membership demonstrates that the application itself has highly symbolic content politically. There is, of course, a distinction between a close co-operative relationship with NATO, such as the ones Finland and Sweden enjoy, and actual membership, whereby one signs up for the Article 5 guarantees. A co-operative relationship, however close, does not in itself provide guarantees. Furthermore, membership, once in place, is more or less irreversible. No NATO country has ever seriously discussed leaving the Alliance. France left the organisation and the integrated command structure in 1966 but stayed in the Alliance and rejoined in 2009. A co-operative relationship could, in contrast, be terminated in parts or, which is unlikely, in its entirety or just lose its significance. 46


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 An application should be seen as portending a major geopolitical change on the European map. Given the territorial size of Finland and Sweden, this would, in territorial terms, imply the single widest enlargement undertaken since Turkey and Greece joined in 1952. The direct border between NATO and Russia would increase by a factor of two and make the Baltic Sea, with the exception of the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad exclave, a “NATO sea”. After all, it is already an “EU sea”. It will thus constitute a considerable change of the territorial composition of the Alliance. The comparison with Turkey and Greece goes further: Finland, Sweden, and Norway are also “flank countries”.

Finnish membership of NATO would evidently strengthen Finland’s immediate security as it would be included in the Article 5 guarantees, and strengthen the deterrence of any potential attack against the country. Membership would probably also lead to a serious crisis with Russia, for an undefined period of time. While tension would mount, open conflict would not necessarily ensue as Russia would be aware that any transgression would engage the whole Alliance.

Since joining NATO, successive Norwegian governments have attempted to combine deterrence with reassurance. Norway promised not to station nuclear weapons or foreign troops on its soil in peacetime, nor to hold military exercises in the Finnmark region. Similar unilateral self-imposed restrictions could be adopted by Finland (and/or Sweden), but presumably excluding a Finnmark-type regime for any portion of Finland’s territory. Interestingly enough, such restrictions do not seem to have been discussed when Turkey joined, even though that country had a long direct border with the Soviet Union.

If Finland chose to apply for NATO membership, it would constitute a significant political defeat for Moscow. Russian efforts to convey repeated warning signals against joining in past years would have failed. It may be considered paradoxical that Russia is trying to prevent Finnish and/or Swedish membership of the Alliance by intimidation rather than reassurance. This, however, seems to conform to past Russian and Soviet practices and political culture. Moscow’s argument is that whatever it does is in response to aggressive NATO moves.

ON THE ACCESSION PROCEDURE. It should be noted that the pace of possible accession can have effects of its own. Membership processes can be more or less prolonged depending on the state of decision-making in an applicant country and the views existing NATO countries have as to the THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 desirability of, or readiness for, full membership. A Finnish application in the foreseeable future would, apart from doubling NATO’s direct border with Russia, probably take place in a charged international situation. As the domestic political process in Finland would require several months, approval by Parliament and, possibly, a referendum campaign, the country could be exposed to strong pressure from Russia. If Sweden were to apply simultaneously, the whole application process would be protracted, since a referendum in that country is, in the view of the Swedish establishment, a natural element of the accession process. How this would play out in Finland is uncertain. Public opinion will be an important part of the accession process.

Referendum processes always run into the problem of how to phrase the question, since this will inevitably influence the outcome. In the case of EU accession, the agreement reached was put to referenda in both Finland and Sweden. In Sweden, as in Denmark, a referendum also took place on whether or not to join the EMU.

A possible Finnish decision to apply for NATO membership would be taken by the President on the basis of a motion proposed by the Government. Before this takes place, the Government would present a report to the Parliament, and the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee would be continuously informed about the process and the negotiations. If the outcome of negotiations were decided to be put to a referendum, a specific law would need to be stipulated accordingly. After the referendum, the Parliament would have to approve the agreement on Finland’s accession, whereafter the President would take the final decision on membership.

The Swedish constitution, for its part, provides for both decisive and consultative referenda, the former only in relation to constitutional issues. However, in practice, the difference between the two forms is not that significant, as even a consultative referendum is seen as decisive. If and when there is a broad consensus that Sweden should apply for membership of NATO, it may well be a condition for Social Democratic support that an enabling referendum be held on whether to apply or not. This is widely seen as the politically central point in an accession process. In Sweden, foregoing an enabling referendum in favour of the Finnish model may lead to accusations that the Government is trying to prejudice 48


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 the outcome of the political process by applying without a clear political mandate.

FAST TRACK? Given this background, the issue of a possible fast-track procedure would in all likelihood be discussed, whereby Article 5 commitments would be declared to operate even before Finland (and Sweden) had become full members. This would be the first time such a procedure would be used by NATO. The high degree of overall interoperability between NATO and Finland and Sweden would make this technically a straightforward option. The downside to this approach is, of course, that if there were a “no” in a referendum (as there was on the single currency in Sweden), the Alliance would be bound by the Treaty to rescind the previous decision, with the ensuing very negative consequences. The incumbent government could be accused of deserting the operating grand strategy, only to be forced to change it back once again. A publicised fast-track procedure could, in practice, and paradoxically, galvanise the membership opponents as they could claim that the Alliance was trying to prejudice the outcome of a democratic process. A fast-track procedure, while obviously important from a security standpoint, would be fraught with internal political complications.

NEIGHBOURS. No doubt, the Baltic States would view Finnish membership and extending the NATO-Russia border as contributing to shifting the tension between them and Russia to the north. Finnish accession could, as it were, entail sharing the burden of tension along a much longer NATO-Russia frontier. They would no longer, with Norway and Poland, be the only frontline states. Should Sweden also apply, this would in practical terms greatly increase the strategic depth of Baltic defence and transform the Nordic/Baltic area into a common strategic space. This would facilitate further military integration between the Baltic States and the new member(s). Defending these republics today is a logistical challenge of the first order.

What reactions could be expected from within the Alliance, should Finland and Sweden apply? Some member states on the southern tier might feel that attention could shift from their concerns to the North. Conversely, some may fear that Finland – with regard to its long border with Russia and history of trying to find a modus vivendi with its great power neighbour – would hamper efforts to oppose Moscow more robustly. Others may feel that if Finnish/Swedish membership does lead to increased tension in Europe, then the Alliance is creating more problems than it will solve; hence, they could believe that it might be better to leave things as they are. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 Others could hesitate to take on Article 5 guarantees for a country with such an exposed geographical position as that of Finland: this argument is sometimes heard in the case of a possible Finnish Alleingang. However, the reality within the Alliance is one of a low degree of apprehension vis-à-vis potential membership by Finland and Sweden: acceptability of membership is high, even if views are not as clearly set on its desirability. As indicated in our meetings, however, a Swedish Alleingang, despite its operational advantages, is seen as problematic politically and strategically, as it would isolate Finland. In the case of Finland, the combination of military seriousness along with a proven track record of managing its “Russian agenda” is an asset even if each of its components can draw reservations of the sort indicated a few lines earlier.

Both countries are seen as fully-fledged Western powers with an proven track record as members of the EU and partners of NATO. Within the Alliance, they would be less contentious than the post-Cold War eastward expansion of NATO.

Under the prevailing political and strategic circumstances, we foresee a low probability of NATO deciding to close the door on further enlargement, but it has to be mentioned if only because of its potentially severe consequences for Finland (and Sweden). Furthermore, something of the sort has happened to the EU’s own enlargement process, which has slowed down dramatically in recent years, with no clear prospect of early enlargement to the candidate states of the Western Balkans. If a door-closing (Torschluss) policy took place in NATO, Finland would no longer be able to use the possibility –as well as the reality – of NATO membership as a tool to master the inescapable geopolitical dilemma posed by its unpredictable neighbour. Finland’s range of available policy options would be reduced. There is no push in NATO today for a Torschluss but this could change over time if America’s commitments in Asia were to lead the US to decrease its engagement in Europe.

As a flank country, Finland can also draw some lessons from the experience of Turkey, which had a long common border with the Soviet Union (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan SSRs) and was admitted into NATO in 1952 during the Korean War – namely in a very tense international situation – and which covered about the same expanse of territory as Finland and Sweden, around 800,000 square km. However, there are several differences between the two cases. Given Russia’s historical claims on control of the Turkish Straits, there was a strong consensus in Turkey about the 50


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 wish to become a member of the Alliance. Several of the founding members saw Turkey as a part of the Middle East, possibly entailing diverting resources from the North or Central front. However, strong commitment in the Korean War (with the distinguished participation of a full combat brigade) and NATO’s first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, were the two factors behind the decision to let Turkey in. It is interesting to note that the USSR, which had attempted in 1946 to secure rights over the control of the Straits, did not react with any particular vigour vis-à-vis Turkey’s (and Greece’s) entry into NATO.

Apart from its political ramifications, a Finnish application would focus attention on the importance of several geographical areas in Russia, namely St. Petersburg on the one hand, and Murmansk and Arkhangelsk on the other.

The former region has always been sensitive, ever since it was founded in 1703, and has contributed to several wars between first Sweden and then Finland and Russia. Today, the area is Russia’s second major economic engine, the closest major region to the borders of NATO. The distance from the Finnish border to St. Petersburg is less than 200 km.

The other region of Russia where NATO proximity would be seen as particularly sensitive is the Kola Peninsula, still the only home to Russian second strike capabilities in the form of nuclear submarines, with Murmansk located less than 200 km from the Finnish border. While the Murmansk area was no less important during the Cold War, it remains central to Russian claims to nuclear superpower status. Nuclear weapons again play a very visible role in Russian defence strategy and policy. Even if Finland were to follow Norwegian self-imposed restrictions when it comes to stationing nuclear weapons and foreign forces on its territory, Russia could seek to increase its forces in the North to protect the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions and their land communications with the rest of Russia (see Chapter II). As discussed above, this could in turn generate discussions about a NATO presence in Finland, which could collide with unilateral Finnish undertakings of the Norwegian model.

The argument could be made that since Russia has been living with NATO proximity to Murmansk for rather a long time, it could do so also with Finland in the Alliance. But from the Russian standpoint, there may be a dif- THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 ference between the two cases. Nuclear submarines based in Kola and the growing economic importance of the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean are issues which appeared on the scene well after the founding of the Alliance.. [sic] Finnish membership could be interpreted as a move closer to the Kola Peninsula by the Alliance.

While Finnish territory would be important in any conflict around the Baltic Sea, Russia’s strategic problems would be compounded if Sweden were to apply for membership as well. If NATO could use both Finnish and Swedish territory without restriction in such a conflict, the prospects for the Alliance to manage hostilities between Russia and one or two Baltic States would improve considerably. The extent to which Finnish and Swedish membership would change the strategic importance of the adjacent military regions in Russian eyes, as compared with other regions, is difficult to measure as it in all likelihood is connected with the general state of affairs between Russia and its adversaries, and possible conflicts elsewhere. But it is a reasonable assumption that more resources would be devoted to the Northwest.

ON RUSSIA’S POTENTIAL RESPONSE. Russia is not at ease with itself and the world. During the last fifteen years, Russia has turned into a unsatisfied power, questioning post-Cold War arrangements in Europe and even the norms and principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Paris Charter of 1990. Russia considers itself disadvantaged by the state of affairs in Europe. The view that Russia is not just another European state is largely shared by the Russian elite. This sets Russia apart and leads to a revisionist stand demanding a renegotiation of European security structures and even demanding the recognition of spheres of special interest, in other words a veto over developments that impinge on Russia’s interests. Due to historical experience, this would be unpalatable for Finland. In particular, the enlargement of NATO is seen as a threat, driven by the United States, and aimed at bringing American military bases and forces closer to Russian borders to contain Russia.

Russia shares a land border with fourteen states from North Korea to Norway. Its borders have historically been porous as there are few barriers. This partly explains the innate difficulty Russia has in dealing with its neighbours. Not a single conflict in the post-Soviet sphere has been settled. All remain simmering and are known as frozen conflicts, guaranteeing in most cases a degree of droit-de-regard for Moscow but concurrently hampering economic and human contacts with manifold consequences. 52


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 Despite the fact that the Soviet Union never fully embraced the Finnish policy of neutrality, present-day Russia has never questioned Finland’s integration into Western structures. In general, Russia, like the USSR, remains sceptical vis-à-vis all grey zone arrangements including neutrality, non-alignment and so forth, particularly towards closer cooperation with NATO, which Russia today regards as its adversary. Any enlargement of NATO would be a political defeat for Moscow as it notes in the latest update of its National Security Strategy from December 2015. It states that further enlargement of NATO and the moving of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders constitute a threat to Russian national security. In the event of Finnish membership, the long common border would only underscore the geopolitical change.

Continued cooperation with NATO, enhanced partnership and the right and possibility to apply for membership, as well as a deepening of military integration with Sweden plus intensive political and military-technical cooperation with the United States are all developments eyed closely by Moscow, but usually commented on below the government level. But a possible Finnish (and/or Swedish) membership of NATO would trigger a Russian response. The geopolitical change would be too major for Moscow to ignore. Fenno-Russian relations would take a beating and the political reaction would be harsh and probably also “personal”, as in the case of the downing of a Russian fighter plane by the Turkish Air Force during the Syrian conflict. The unexpected and unprovoked breach of the border regime in Northern Finland in late 2015 is an example of Russia’s propensity to create a problem, then leverage it and offer to manage it without necessarily solving it. Russian reactions could also include increased pressure on the borders with the Baltic States. An attempt to politically activate the ethnic Russians living in Finland may also be considered. During the accession process, the atmosphere would be poisoned and trade could be badly hit, along lines currently experienced in the Turkish-Russian dispute. As a backdrop to the domestic enlargement debate, the traditional Finnish bilateral agenda would be in a shambles, even if Norway’s ability as a NATO member to sustain a similar “Russian agenda” points to the reversibility of such a state of affairs.

More often than not, the Soviet Union’s and Russia’s track record towards successive NATO enlargements has followed a repetitive sequence: first, opposition, indeed sometimes strident opposition backed by political and economic pressure, then tacit acquiescence and eventually a return to THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 the diplomatic and economic status quo ante once enlargement has taken place. Turkey (1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (1955), the extension of NATO to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (1990), Poland (1999), and the Baltic States (2004) were the most salient episodes fitting into this pattern. Ukraine and Georgia have been the exceptions to this pattern, underscored by ostentatious and credibly backed red lines in a manner not present in other cases.

THE WILL TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY. The will to defend the country reflects historical identities and their role in security and defence policy. The Finnish will to defend the country has always been extremely high, reaching levels of around 80%. More or less the same level of each cohort completes military service. The assumption that NATO membership would weaken this will is just that, an assumption, although it is used in the Finnish debate.

It is difficult to see any direct linkage between NATO membership and the will to defend. Like now, the willingness is likely to depend on the method for formulating the division of responsibilities for defending the country by policies and in political debate. The starting point for NATO membership is national defence, which will be coordinated at the NATO level and supported by joint structures.

The high level of readiness to defend Finland has been well documented in polls conducted systematically for decades. It has not fluctuated to any great degree because of changes in the security political situation in Northern Europe. However, the recent developments in Russia and its aggressive posture are factors that influence this will to defend.

The most important explanation remains history, the legacy of having survived the war, and avoiding occupation. The unbroken military tradition perpetuated in the form of conscription, which covers almost eighty per cent of the male population, has in popular terms kept the tradition alive. Refresher training and the large number of reservists who have volunteered for service in the UN and other peacekeeping operations has further confirmed the image of the Defence Forces. Their ability to modernise 54


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 and purchase cutting-edge equipment like the F-18 Hornet fighter aircraft has enhanced their credibility. Universal conscription also remains the sole recruitment avenue for the officer corps and the NCOs.

Increased military co-operation with Sweden generally remains popular. The same applies to peacekeeping operations. This is also the case for conscripts and reservists when it comes to manoeuvres with NATO troops. It is very difficult to extrapolate any trends as to how the will to defend would be affected by Finland’s possible NATO membership.

FINLAND AND SWEDEN: JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY? If Finland were to apply unilaterally with Sweden staying out for reasons of its own, Finland’s strategic situation would be rather exposed. It would then stand alone as a NATO strategic outpost, with its only land connection with the Alliance a largely uninhabited, mountainous and inaccessible border area with Norway in the far North. The prospect of the Alliance assisting Finland without the use of Swedish territory is hard to imagine. The presence of Russian naval forces in the Gulf of Finland, furthermore, could make the connections with the nearest NATO land territory in Estonia precarious.

A similar Swedish unilateral move could increase Finnish exposure to Russia. Such considerations were important to the Swedish government during the Cold War, when joining NATO was discarded as it could make Finland’s relations with the USSR even more complicated – with the ensuing multiple effects on Sweden. “Back to the future” is a concept that no Swedish government would countenance lightly. It would create a “Finland question” for Sweden that it does not have at present.

It would seem that while a common Finnish and Swedish application for membership would entail a considerable change in the political geography of Europe, with the ensuing risks of at least temporarily augmented tension between NATO and Russia, it is, in strategic terms, clearly preferable to either a Finnish or Swedish Alleingang. A Finnish unilateral approach to the Alliance would create serious logistical problems for NATO, magnifying the problems that the Baltic States present, since there would be no real THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


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 territorial contiguity between the new member and the Alliance. A Swedish unilateral move could lead to a return to a Cold War scenario, whereby Finland would have to tread carefully to maintain a reasonable balance between Russia and the Alliance and rely upon Sweden to act as a bridge. This, in turn, would also involve serious diplomatic and other challenges for Stockholm.

A Finnish – and Swedish – application for membership of the Alliance is an issue of great strategic importance, not only for the possible applicant countries but also for the Alliance. It is, in essence, a question of grand strategy, which has to be considered thoroughly. Small nations do not often change their basic foreign policy guidelines. They are more dependent on continuity than great powers. Any change would also need a domestic consensus for it to gain legitimacy at home and abroad. 56


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I have come across this and seeing it was not using the TOC templates I switched it to that but between this page and the next there is a single row that continues so I took the beginning (which was here) and put it at the beginning of next page. Alien333 (what I did and why I did it wrong ) 17:48, 4 January 2024 (UTC)


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42

We left the president of the Theosophical Society staring at the impression of his own “flap-doodle” seal on that which purported to be a missive from the Mahatma.

The purport of the missive was precisely what the prescient Judge had foretold. Colonel Olcott was not to sell the Blavatsky jewels, as the money would be provided.

Having shown it to a brother member, the Colonel replaced it in the envelope, and went off to have a few words with Mr. William Q. Judge.

He remarked to Judge that he had missed a certain brass seal from among Madame Blavatsky’s relics, and described the Panjab seal and the story of its making; not mentioning, however, the name of the exact city where it was made. Had Judge seen the seal?

Judge answered in the negative. Upon which the Colonel remarked meaningly (I quote his own account) that he “hoped no scoundrel would get possession of it, and use it to give colour to bogus Mahatma messages,” adding that he would at once recognise an impression from the seal.

He did not mention that he had looked for and found the missive in the envelope.