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 beginning that the goal of ISIS has been to rid the region of any religious diversity. That is genocide.

In July of 2015 I wrote a letter to President Obama which stated, “If the Islamic State achieves its stated goals- capturing large swaths of land, restoring the caliphate, and strictly enforcing its “pure” Shari’a law on all under its rule- the specter of full-scale genocide once again looms large. Furthermore, the atrocities committed by the Islamic State are a direct threat to the United States national security. If allowed to grow in size and resources, there is no doubt that this insurgency will spill out of the Middle East and into the West, bringing this system of organized desolation to our doorstep.”

In October of 2015 and in February of 2016, with the help of the International Religious Freedom Roundtable a letter, signed by a broad coalition of human rights groups, lawyers, NGO’s, and individuals, was sent to President Obama. The October letter expressed that: “It is our belief that officially declaring and subsequently halting this genocide and its spread is a matter of vital more and strategic importance for the United States, the international community, and the overall state of religious freedom around the world. Perhaps equally as important, such a declaration will give a stronger voice to the long-suffering victims while furthering and sharpening ideological engagement against those currently at the forefront of this campaign.”

I, along with my colleagues at the 21 Century Wilberforce Initiative, and many other groups and individuals, have not only travelled to the region, but advocated through private meetings, letters, and briefings that the State Department should investigate the possibility of genocide as well as to refer the situation to the United Nations Security Council.

Religious leaders including Pope Francis, Anglican Archbishop Justin Welby, Cardinal Wuerl, Cardinal Dolan, and many others called for the world to be honest about ISIS’ crimes. Politicians also acted. Rep. Chris Smith pushed to get the bi-partisan resolution of Representatives Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) and Anna Eshoo (D-CA) to an on-record vote in the House of Representatives. Ambassador Sapperstein and Special Envoy Knox Thames presented the evidence within the State Department. Robbie George and Katrina Lantos Swett and others with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom were instrumental in this effort. Law firms such as The Beckett Fund, ACLJ, and Andrews Kurth, LLP all submitted briefs as further evidence.

People such as Marte Hudson, Chris Seiple with Institute for Global Engagement, Nina Shea of the Hudson Institute, Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch, Juliana Taimoorzy of Iraqi Christian Relief Council, Robert Nicholson from Philos Project, and Greg Mitchell along with the members of the International Religious Freedom Roundtable, as well as groups like Knights of Columbus, In Defense of Christians, the Holocaust Museum and others all worked to bring these crimes to light.

I believe that it was a very significant step that the House of Representatives passed H. Con. Res 75, (393-0) which decried the atrocities committed by ISIS to be genocide. I do not think this would have happened without the advocacy of so many around the world and in the United States. As Samantha Power indicated in her book, A Problem from Hell, “It taketakes [sic] political


text: Index:Biographies of representative women of the South (IA biographiesofrep03coll).pdf

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 pressure to put genocide on the map in Washington.” It is my hope that the Senate will work to pass S. Res. 340. I would also like to thank Secretary Kerry for publicly acknowledging that the Islamic State has committed genocide against the religious minorities in Iraq and Syria. While I am aware that defining these crimes does not necessarily mean that justice will prevail, this is a change from cases in the past when genocide was committed and the U.S. stood by in silence. Granted, such a designation now requires the need to act. The genocide designation is important on many levels, but first and foremost, it honors the victim’s memories. Additionally, targeted groups are better able to seek refugee status or receive aid if they wish to stay in their home country, as many wish to do. One area of major concern is the rehabilitation of the women and girls who have been released from ISIS as well as trauma counseling for the children. An article published by Human Rights Watch this past Wednesday revealed once again that such services are limited and non-existent in some places. According to the article, the UN thinks that as many as 3,500 people may still be held by ISIS, many women and girls.

Another area of need is that of a Safe Haven for religious minorities. These people need a place to live where they can rebuild their lives without having to re-live the horrors of what happened to them. (Many have suggested the creation of a province in the Nineveh Plains for Christians, Yezidis, Shia Turkmen and other religious minorities.)

The genocide designation also provides an avenue for the prosecution of perpetrators or for those who aid them. In September of 2015 I wrote a letter to Attorney General Loretta Lynch requesting the prosecution of those involved in the murder of the four American citizens (James Foley, Stephen Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and Kayla Mueller).

If the Justice Department is able to find a way to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a case of sports corruption as seen with FIFA, surely it can do the same against a genocidal group that has taken the lives of American citizens.

Many of you may have attended the private Member briefing with the young Yezidi girl, Bazi, last summer. She was allegedly held by an American who had joined ISIS. Our Justice Department should not only be concerned about the American citizens who were killed by ISIS, but also with those who have joined their vile ranks. Just a month ago an article came out about a young man from Virginia who had joined ISIS, and finding life to difficult, tried to defect to Turkey. He was apprehended and is still being held by the Kurdistan Regional Government. I would hope that our Justice Department has a plan to move forward on prosecution of these individuals. Such prosecution should also include countries or individuals who fund or harbor members of ISIS. While I was in Iraq I was told multiple times that some in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have aided the Islamic State. This must come to a stop.

It should be made clear that anyone aiding ISIS in any way should be charged with genocide in various governmental courts but also before the International Criminal Court. Also, Congress should quickly pass legislation to change Title 18 of the United States criminal code to ensure


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 that the world’s worst human rights offenders cannot evade prosecution for their crimes and find a legal “safe haven” within the U.S. borders. This gap in our criminal codes is especially of concern now given the ongoing- and increasing- atrocities being committed against civilians, especially women and children in Iraq and Syria by ISIS and its affiliates. If past history is an example, many who have been involved in genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes, will find their way to the United States. The success of the effort to designate this genocide is a tribute to the cooperation of the groups mentioned above and a number of others including the critical voices of Amb. David Sapperstein and Special Envoy Knox Thames. Without those two individuals and the many groups working together this would not have happened.

The success of the effort to designate this genocide is a tribute to the cooperation of the groups mentioned above and a number of others including the critical voices of Amb. David Sapperstein and Special Envoy Knox Thames. Without those two individuals and the many groups working together this would not have happened.


text: Written Testimony (Wolf, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing)


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Page:The House at Pooh Corner (1961).pdf/37

woke up suddenly in the middle of the night and listened. Then he got out of bed, and lit his candle, and stumped across the room to see if anybody was trying to get into his honey-cupboard, and they weren’t, so he stumped back again, blew out his candle, and got into bed. Then he heard the noise again.

“Is that you, Piglet?” he said.

But it wasn’t.

“Come in, Christopher Robin,” he said.

But Christopher Robin didn’t.

“Tell me about it tomorrow, Eeyore,” said Pooh sleepily.

But the noise went on.

“Worraworraworraworraworra,” said Whatever-it-was, and Pooh found that he wasn’t asleep after all.


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 Class

_

Book. GopyrigM?_ COPXRIGHT DEPOSIR

GPO


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 “What can it be?” he thought. “There are lots of noises in the Forest, but this is a different one. It isn’t a growl, and it isn’t a purr, and it isn’t a bark, and it isn’t the noise-you-make-before-beginning-a-piece-of-poetry, but it’s a noise of some kind, made by a strange animal. And he’s making it outside my door. So I shall get up and ask him not to do it.”

He got out of bed and opened his front door.

“Hallo!” said Pooh, in case there was anything outside.

“Hallo!” said Whatever-it-was.

“Oh!” said Pooh. “Hallo!”

“Hallo!”

“Oh, there you are!” said Pooh. “Hallo!”

“Hallo!” said the Strange Animal, wondering how long this was going on.


text:
Portal:United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Works

 * By Any Other Name by Todd F. Buchwald and Adam Keith (2019)


text: Index:Biographies of representative women of the South (IA biographiesofrep04coll).pdf


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Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Arkansas Public Service Commission

Appellant is a customer-owned rural power cooperative established with loan funds and technical assistance provided by the federal Rural Electrification Administration (REA), but unlike most such cooperatives, which provide power directly to consumers, appellant's sole members and primary customers are 17 smaller Arkansas rural power cooperatives which in turn serve the ultimate consumer. Although tied into an interstate "grid" arrangement with other producers, appellant obtains most of its energy from power plants located in Arkansas, which it wholly or partially owns, and sells most of what it generates to its member cooperatives. Appellee Arkansas Public Service Commission entered an order asserting jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by appellant to its member cooperatives, concluding that state regulation was neither forbidden by Public Utilities Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83—which held that while consistent with the Commerce Clause the States could regulate retail sales of electricity, they could not regulate wholesale sales—nor pre-empted by the Federal Power Act or the Rural Electrification Act of 1936. On review, the Pulaski County Circuit Court set aside appellee's order, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.

Held:

1. Appellee's assertion of jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by appellant to its members does not offend the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Pp. 383–389.

(a) Neither the Federal Power Act nor administrative actions taken thereunder pre-empt state regulation. The Federal Power Commission determined in 1967 that it did not have jurisdiction under the Act over the wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives under the supervision of the REA, and such decision was based on the Commission's conclusion that the relevant statutes gave the REA exclusive authority among federal agencies to regulate rural power cooperatives, not on a conclusion that, as a matter of policy, such cooperatives that are engaged in sales for resale should be left unregulated. Pp. 383–385.

(b) The Rural Electrification Act does not expressly pre-empt state rate regulation of power cooperatives financed by the REA, and the legislative history of the Act establishes that, although the REA was expected to assist the fledgling rural power cooperatives in setting their [p376] rate structures, it would do so within the constraints of existing state regulatory schemes. In addition, the REA's present policy is wholly inconsistent with pre-emption of state regulatory jurisdiction over wholesale rates. Pp. 385–389.

2. Appellee's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over wholesale rates does not offend the Commerce Clause. Pp. 389–395.

(a) If the mechanical wholesale/retail test articulated in Attleboro, supra, were applied here, it would require setting aside appellee's assertion of jurisdiction. However, the general trend in this Court's modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to look in every case to the nature of the state regulation involved, the State's objective, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce involved, and that modern jurisprudence, rather than the mechanical line drawn in Attleboro, must govern the decision here. Pp. 389–393.

(b) "Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits" Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142. Economic protectionism is not implicated here, and state regulation of the wholesale rates charged by appellant to its members is well within the scope of "legitimate local public interests," particularly considering that although appellant is tied into an interstate grid, its basic operation consists of supplying power from generating facilities located within the State to member cooperatives, all of which are located within the State. Although appellee's regulation of appellant's rates charged to its members will have an incidental effect on interstate commerce, "the burden imposed on such commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pp. 393–395.

273 Ark. 170, 618 S.W.2d 151, affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 396.

Robert D. Cabe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Leland F. Leatherman.

Jeff Broadwater argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Robert H. Wood, Jr.


text: Category:United States Supreme Court decisions in Volume 461


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Author:Margaret Wootten Collier

Works

 * Biographies of Representative Women of the South, Volume 1, (1920)
 * Biographies of Representative Women of the South, Volume 2, (1923)
 * Biographies of Representative Women of the South, Volume 3, (1925)
 * Biographies of Representative Women of the South, Volume 4, (1927)
 * Biographies of Representative Women of the South, Volume 5, (1929)

title: Author:Margaret Wootten Collier


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“His Strengthening Medicine,” said Piglet. “He hates it.”

So Tigger came closer, and he leant over the back of Roo’s chair, and suddenly he put out his tongue, and took one large golollop, and, with a sudden jump of surprise, Kanga said, “Oh!” and then clutched at the spoon again just as it was disappearing, and pulled it safely back out of Tigger’s mouth. But the Extract of Malt had gone.


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 Pooh was just going to say “Hallo!” for the fourth time when he thought that he wouldn’t, so he said: “Who is it?” instead.

“Me,” said a voice.

“Oh!” said Pooh. “Well, come here.”

So Whatever-it-was came here, and in the light of the candle he and Pooh looked at each other.

“I’m Pooh,” said Pooh.

“I’m Tigger,” said Tigger.

“Oh!” said Pooh, for he had never seen an animal like this before. “Does Christopher Robin know about you?”

“Of course he does,” said Tigger.

“Well,” said Pooh, “it’s the middle of the night, which is a good time for going to sleep. And tomorrow morning we’ll have some honey for breakfast. Do Tiggers like honey?”

“They like everything,” said Tigger cheerfully.

“Then if they like going to sleep on the floor, I’ll go back to bed,” said Pooh, “and we’ll do things in the morning. Good night.” And he got back into bed and went fast asleep.

When he awoke in the morning, the first thing he saw was Tigger, sitting in front of the glass and looking at himself.

“Hallo!” said Pooh.

“Hallo!” said Tigger. “I’ve found somebody just like me. I thought I was the only one of them.”


text: Index:Guidance Regarding Gender Identity and Inclusion in the Federal Workplace.pdf


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/388

 705–15] the adjacent country of Algeciras, when Roderic, receiving tidings of the descent, hastened to repel the invader. Ṭāriḳ, apprised of this through Julian and his followers, appealed for additional troops to Mūsa, who sent him 5000 Arabs. Thus reinforced, Ṭāriḳ was able now, with 12,000 men, to hold his ground against the great army of Roderic. They met on the banks of the Guadalete, to the north of Medīna Sidonia. For a week the issue was uncertain. But there was treachery in the Spanish camp. The numerous party opposed to Roderic, buoyed with the hope that the Arabs, satiated with spoil, would soon recross the sea and leave the throne to its proper claimant, fought feebly, and at last gave way. The Spanish force was routed, and Roderic in his flight drowned. But the spoil had not the effect expected. Instead of retiring, the Arabs, flushed with victory, stormed Ecija; and, daily swelled by fresh contingents scenting from afar a rich reward, spread themselves over the land. Malaga and Granada were captured and the province overrun. The people everywhere fled to the hills and fortresses, vainly fancied impregnable; and all the quicker, at the fearful report spread by the conquerors themselves that they fed on human flesh. Leaving Cordova besieged by one of his generals, Ṭāriḳ, guided still by Julian, hastened to Toledo, the capital, which to his astonishment he found deserted by all but Jews. These, delivered from Christian thraldom, now threw in their lot with the invaders (how different from the days of Moḥammad!), and were placed in charge of cities which the conquerors found themselves too few to occupy. The inhabitants had all fled in terror, some as far even as Galicia. But it was by no means the policy of the Arabs to make the land a desert. And so the people were gradually tempted back by promise of security, toleration for their religion if only preached unostentatiously, and the establishment of Christian courts. In a city beyond the hills, carried there perhaps for safety, a relic beyond all value fell into Ṭāriḳ's hands, the famous Table of Solomon, set with pearls and rubies and all manner of precious stones, and having 360 feet. With this priceless jewel


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Pooh got out of bed, and began to explain what a looking-glass was, but just as he was getting to the interesting part, Tigger said:

“Excuse me a moment, but there’s something climbing up your table,” and with one loud Worraworraworraworraworra he jumped at the end of the tablecloth, pulled it to the ground, wrapped himself up in it three times, rolled to the other end of the room, and, after a terrible struggle, got his head into the daylight again, and said cheerfully: “Have I won?”

“That’s my tablecloth,” said Pooh, as he began to unwind Tigger.

“I wondered what it was,” said Tigger.

“It goes on the table and you put things on it.”

“Then why did it try to bite me when I wasn’t looking?”


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Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Arkansas Public Service Commission/Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal requires us to decide whether the Arkansas Public Service Commission (PSC) acted contrary to the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution when it asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by the Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation (AECC) to its member retail distributors, all of whom are located within the State. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the PSC's assertion of jurisdiction. We affirm.

I
Maintaining the proper balance between federal and state authority in the regulation of electric and other energy utilities has long been a serious challenge to both judicial and congressional wisdom. On the one hand, the regulation of utilities is one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). On the other hand, the production and transmission of energy is an activity particularly likely to affect more than one State, and its effect on interstate commerce is often significant enough that uncontrolled regulation by the States can patently interfere with broader national interests. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755–757 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).

This dilemma came into sharp focus for this Court early in this century in a series of cases construing the restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulation of the sale of natural gas. Our solution was to fashion a bright line dividing permissible from impermissible state regulation. See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919); cf. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 252 U.S. 23 (1920). Simply put, the doctrine of these cases was that the retail sale of gas was subject to state regulation, "even though the gas be brought from another State and drawn for distribution directly from interstate mains; and this is so [p378] whether the local distribution be made by the transporting company or by independent distributing companies," Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., supra, at 309, but that the wholesale sale of gas in interstate commerce was not subject to state regulation even though some of the gas being sold was produced within the State. Our rationale was that "[t]ransportation of gas from one State to another is interstate commerce; and the sale and delivery of it to the local distributing companies is a part of such commerce," 265 U.S., at 307, but that "[w]ith the delivery of the gas to the distributing companies the interstate movement ends" and the further "effect on interstate commerce, if there be any, is indirect and incidental," id., at 308. See also, e.g., State Corporation Comm'n v. Witchita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 563–564 (1934); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 470–471 (1931).

The wholesale/retail line drawn in Landon and Kansas Gas was applied to electric utilities in Public Utilities Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). Attleboro involved an attempt by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission to regulate the rates at which the Narragansett Electric Lighting Co.—a Rhode Island utility—could sell electric current to a Massachusetts distributor. We struck down the regulation, holding that, because it involved a transaction at wholesale, it imposed a "direct" rather than an "indirect" burden on interstate commerce. In doing so we held that it was immaterial "that the general business of the Narragansett Company appears to be chiefly local," id., at 90, or that the State Commission grounded its assertion of jurisdiction on the need to facilitate the regulation of the company's retail sales to its Rhode Island customers.

As a direct result of Attleboro and its predecessor cases, Congress undertook to establish federal regulation over most of the wholesale transactions of electric and gas utilities engaged in interstate commerce, and created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) to carry out that task. See [p379] Federal Power Act of 1935 (Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935), 49 Stat. 838–863; Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821. Although the main purpose of this legislation was to "fill the gap" created by Attleboro and its predecessors, see New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, supra, at 340; United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345 U.S. 295, 311 (1953), it nevertheless shifted this Court's main focus—in determining the permissible scope of state regulation of utilities—from the constitutional issues that concerned us in Attleboro to analyses of legislative intent. For example, in Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942), we were required to determine whether the sale of natural gas by an Illinois pipeline corporation to local distributors in Illinois was subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission or the Illinois Commerce Commission. We began our analysis by describing the wholesale/retail test drawn in Landon, Kansas City, Attleboro, and other cases. We then noted another line of cases—relating to both utility regulation and other Commerce Clause issues—in which the Court was "less concerned to find a point in time and space where the interstate commerce ends and intrastate commerce begins, and  looked [instead] to the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce." 314 U.S., at 505. We stated:

"In the absence of any controlling act of Congress, we should now be faced with the question whether the interest of the state in the present regulation of the sale and distribution of gas transported into the state, balanced against the effect of such control on the commerce in its [p380] national aspect, is a more reliable touchstone for ascertaining state power than the mechanical distinctions on which appellee relies." Id., at 506.

We concluded, however, that we were "under no necessity of making that choice here," ibid., for Congress, partly to avoid "drawing the precise line between state and federal power by the litigation of particular cases," id., at 507, had adopted the "mechanical" line established in Kansas City and Attleboro as the statutory line dividing federal and state jurisdiction.

The analysis in Illinois Gas was reaffirmed in subsequent cases and extended to similar jurisdictional disputes arising under the Federal Power Act. See, e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947) ("The line of the statute was clear and complete. It cut sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales for consumptive uses."); United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, supra, at 308 ("Congress interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale, and so armed the Federal Power Commission with precisely that power.") (footnote omitted); FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964). The last of these cases is particularly noteworthy for our purposes here, for it held, among other things, that under the Attleboro test, a California utility that received some of its power from out-of-state was subject to federal and not state regulation in its sales of electricity to a California municipality that resold the bulk of the power to others. See also FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).

II
AECC is one of a large number of customer-owned rural power cooperatives established with loan funds and technical assistance provided by the federal Rural Electrification Administration [p381] (REA) in order to bring electric power to parts of the country not adequately served by commercial utility companies. See generally Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Unlike most rural power cooperatives, however, AECC does not provide power directly to individual consumers. Rather, its sole members and primary customers are 17 smaller Arkansas rural power cooperatives who in turn serve the ultimate consumer. AECC is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of 34 persons, two designated by each of the 17 member cooperatives. Among the duties of this board is to determine the rates charged the member cooperatives by AECC.

AECC obtains most of its energy from a number of power plants located in Arkansas, which it wholly or partially owns. Moreover, it sells most of what it generates to its member cooperatives. Like most electric utilities, however, AECC also participates in a variety of sale and exchange arrangements with other producers, buying power when its own need or the excess capacity of other utilities is high, and selling it when the opposite is the case. By virtue of these arrangements, AECC is ultimately tied into a multi-company and multi-state "grid," and, electricity being what it is, see FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra, it is difficult to say with any confidence that the power AECC provides to its member cooperatives at any particular moment originated entirely within the State.

The retail rates charged by AECC's member cooperatives are regulated by the Arkansas PSC. If AECC were not a rural power cooperative, the wholesale rates it charges to its members would, under the scheme we described in Part I, supra, be subject exclusively to federal regulation. See § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838, 847, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V); FPC v. Southern California Edison Company, supra (1964); FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra. In 1967, however, the FPC held [p382] that it had no jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act to regulate wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives under the supervision of the REA. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. 12, 67 P.U.R.3d 340. Thus, until the proceedings that culminated in this case, the rates charged by AECC to its member cooperatives were not subject, at either the federal or the state level, to the type of pervasive rate regulation almost universally associated with electric utilities in this country.

In 1979, after public hearings, the Arkansas PSC entered an order asserting jurisdiction over the rates charged by AECC to its member cooperatives. The PSC based its decision on the same Arkansas statutes that authorize its regulation of rural power cooperatives engaged in retail sales of electricity. App. 52–53; see Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 73-201(a), 73-202(a), 73-202.1 (1979). In response to objections raised by AECC, the PSC held that state regulation was neither forbidden by Attleboro or FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., supra, nor pre-empted by the Federal Power Act or the Rural Electrification Act. On review, the Pulaski County Circuit Court set aside the PSC's order, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and upheld the jurisdiction of the PSC. 273 Ark. 170, 618 S.W.2d 151 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 457 U.S. 1130 (1982).

In its brief on the merits, AECC presses both the Commerce Clause and the pre-emption arguments rejected by the Arkansas PSC. We consider the statutory argument first. [p383]

III
The basic principles governing the pre-emption of state regulation by federal law are well known. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–526 (1977). In this case, we are concerned with the possible pre-emptive effects of two federal statutes and administrative acts taken pursuant to them: the Federal Power Act and the Rural Electrification Act.

A
As we discuss supra, at 381–382, the FPC determined in 1967 that it did not have jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act over the wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives. That does not dispose of the possibility that [p384] the Federal Power Act pre-empts state regulation, however, because a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate. See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, supra, 155. In this case, however, nothing in the language, history, or policy of the Federal Power Act suggests such a conclusion. Congress's purpose in 1935 was to fill a regulatory gap, not to perpetuate one. Moreover, the FPC's refusal in 1967 to assert jurisdiction over rural power cooperatives does not suggest anything to the contrary. In that decision, the FPC simply held that, purely as a jurisdictional matter, the relevant statutes gave the REA exclusive authority among federal agencies to regulate rural power cooperatives. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C., at 26, 67 P.U.R.3d, at 352–354. It did not determine that, as a matter of policy, rural power cooperatives that are engaged in sales for resale should be left unregulated. Indeed, the [p385] FPC's published opinion concluded by specifically urging Congress to amend the statute and grant it jurisdiction over at least some of the activities of such utilities. Id., at 28, 67 P.U.R.3d, at 355. We therefore find no bar to the PSC's assertion of jurisdiction either in the Federal Power Act itself or in the FPC's Dairyland decision.

B
We turn then to the REA. Nothing in the Rural Electrification Act expressly pre-empts state rate regulation of power cooperatives financed by the REA. Nevertheless, AECC and certain of the amici, including the United States, argue that the PSC's assertion of jurisdiction interferes with the REA's pervasive involvement in the management of the rural power cooperatives to which it loans funds, and may frustrate important federal interests. As the United States expresses this position in its brief:

"The terms and conditions of a loan to a generation and transmission association [such as AECC] require the borrower's rates and rate structure to be approved by the REA, not just at its inception, but throughout the term of the loan. And in passing on rate questions, the REA considers, not only the security thus afforded for payment of the loan, but also the suitability of the rates and structure to the Act's underlying purpose of facilitating the availability of cheap electric power in rural America.

"The spectre of state regulation poses a threat to the REA loan because of the possibility that the state may refuse to permit its cooperatives to pay a generation and transmission association the rates to which they agreed [p386] and upon the security of which the loan was issued. Moreover, the policy behind the Rural Electrification Act is at stake [T]he REA has always encouraged its borrowers to establish affordable rates for all of its suscribers. In this way, costs are shared in a manner which, over the long run, benefits all by the creation of a sound, extensive rural electric system. If the state were to insist on a restructuring of the generation and transmission association's rate structure, the policies of the Act would be undermined." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 12–13.

As the United States and AECC admit, the REA is a lending agency rather than a classic public utility regulatory body in the mold of either FERC or the Arkansas PSC. This case might therefore present the interesting question of how we should in general define the proper relationship between the requirements established by federal lending agencies and the more direct regulatory activities of state authorities. We need not examine the issue at that level of abstraction, however, because we have quite specific indications of congressional and administrative intent on precisely the question before us. Cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S., at 159, n.14.

First, the legislative history of the Rural Electrification Act makes abundantly clear that that, although the REA was expected to play a role in assisting the fledgling rural power cooperatives in setting their rate structures, it would do so within the constraints of existing state regulatory schemes. See, e.g., 80 Cong. Rec. 5316 (1936) (Rep. Lea); Hearing on S. 3483 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign [p387] Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 30, 37, 51, 52 (1936). Admittedly, the legislative record focuses on retail rates charged by rural power cooperatives, but with respect to the particular concerns that AECC and amici have pressed in support of pre-emption, we can discern no relevant difference between wholesale and retail rates: both types of rates implicate the Government's interest in securing its loans, and, if anything, retail rates more directly implicate the Government's interest in assuring that individual rural households receive electricity at a reasonable price.

Second, the present published policy of the REA is wholly inconsistent with pre-emption of state regulatory jurisdiction. Although generating cooperatives dealing with the REA must obtain the agency's approval whenever they modify their wholesale rates, the same document setting out guidelines for what constitutes proper wholesale rates also states: "Borrowers must, of course, submit proposed rate changes to any regulatory commissions having jurisdiction and must seek approval in the manner prescribed by those [p388] commissions." REA Bulletin 111-4, at 1–2 (1972). Since Bulletin 111-4 was issued subsequent to the FPC's decision in Dairyland, the "regulatory commissions having jurisdiction" to which it refers can only be state regulatory agencies such as the Arkansas PSC. Moreover, it is worth noting that the REA's supervision of wholesale rates charged by its borrowers appears to be no more exclusive than its supervision over their retail rates, REA Bulletin 111-2 (1971); REA Bulletin 112-1, at 1, 16 (1979), and it has never been contended that state regulatory jurisdiction over those rates is pre-empted, see REA Bulletin 111-2, at 5; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 11.

There may come a time when the REA changes its present policy, and announces that state rate regulation of rural [p389] power cooperatives is inconsistent with federal policy. If that were to happen, and if such a rule was valid under the Rural Electrification Act, it would of course pre-empt any further exercise of jurisdiction by the Arkansas PSC. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 171–172 (1978); cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S., at 154; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962). Similarly, as Arkansas already recognizes, see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-202.3 (1979), the PSC can make no regulation affecting rural power cooperatives which conflicts with particular regulations promulgated by the REA. Moreover, even without an explicit statement from the REA, a particular rate set by the Arkansas PSC may so seriously compromise important federal interests, including the ability of the AECC to repay its loans, as to be implicitly pre-empted by the Rural Electrification Act. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S., at 525–526, 540–543; cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231–232 (1947). We will not, however, in this facial challenge to the PSC's mere assertion of jurisdiction, assume that such a hypothetical event is so likely to occur as to preclude the setting of any rates at all. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130–131 (1978). See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, Inc., 414 U.S. 117, 136–140 (1973).

A
Even in the absence of congressional legislation, "the Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate commerce." Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) (footnote omitted). If the constitutional rule articulated in Attleboro were applied in this case, it would require setting aside the PSC's assertion of jurisdiction over AECC, since AECC, like [p390] the utility in Attleboro, sells at wholesale electric energy transmitted in interstate commerce. As we pointed out in Illinois Gas, however, see supra, at 379–380, it is difficult to square the mechanical line drawn in Attleboro and its predecessor cases, and based on a supposedly precise division between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce, with the general trend in our modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence to look in every case to "the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce." 314 U.S., at 505. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). This modern jurisprudence has usually, although not always, given more latitude to state regulation than the more categorical approach of which Attleboro is one example. But in any event, it recognizes, as Attleboro did not, that there is "an infinite variety of cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of [interstate] commerce, [and] in which reconciliation of state and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved." ''Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan'', 325 U.S. 761, 768–769 (1945). See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, at 142; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362–363 (1943).

We are faced, then, in this case, with precisely the question left open in Illinois Gas: Do we follow the mechanical test set out in Attleboro, or the balance-of-interests test applied [p391] in our Commerce Clause cases for roughly the past 45 years? Of course, the principle of stare decisis counsels us, here as elsewhere, not lightly to set aside specific guidance of the sort we find in Attleboro. Nevertheless, the same respect for the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also requires us, if with somewhat more caution and deliberation, to seek consistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time. Thus, in recent years, this Court has explicitly abandoned a series of formalistic distinctions—akin to the one in Attleboro—which once both defined and controlled various corners of Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (abandoning rule that constitutionality of state severance tax depended on whether it was imposed on goods prior to their entry into interstate commerce); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (rejecting rule, based on legal fiction of ownership, that States had absolute control over disposition of wild animals within their borders); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (rejecting rule that tax on stevedoring automatically constituted an impermissible "direct" tax on interstate commerce); cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (overruling "original package" rule in Import-Export Clause doctrine).

The wholesale/retail line drawn in Attleboro is no less anachronistic than the rules we rejected in the cited cases. Moreover, we have had no occasion, since the 1930s, either to apply that line or to reject it in a case not governed by statute. The difficulty of harmonizing Attleboro with modern Commerce Clause doctrine has been apparent for a long time, so much so that we expressed skepticism about its continuing soundness as a constitutional, rather than statutory, rule in Illinois Gas. Our constitutional review of state utility regulation in related contexts has not treated it as a special province insulated from our general Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See [p392] New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 336–337 (1951). Finally, we can see no strong reliance interests that would be threatened by our rejection today of the mechanical line drawn in Attleboro. Therefore, here, as in few other contexts, the burden shifts somewhat to the party defending the rule to show why it should be applied in this case.

AECC makes essentially two arguments, in the course of its brief and oral argument, for why Attleboro should govern here. First, it contends that the constitutional import of the Attleboro line was reaffirmed in FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, which was decided in 1964. This claim is simply wrong. Southern California Edison Co. did no more than interpret the Federal Power Act, and it cited with approval the constitutional agnosticism spelled out at length in Illinois Gas. See 376 U.S., at 214.

Second, AECC argues that, although "[t]he Attleboro line of cases established an admittedly mechanical test for determining the limitation of state power, the court arrived at that test by careful consideration of what was national importance as opposed to what was essentially local and could be, therefore, regulated by the states," Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, and that nothing that has happened since has changed that implicit balance. This contention is also unpersuasive. Even if we assume—as is not necessarily the case, see supra, at 390—that the underlying substantive concerns motivating the Court to strike down the state regulation in Attleboro were identical to the considerations articulated in our more recent cases, that in itself does not explain why the bright line test drawn in Attleboro should be applied to the somewhat different set of facts present here, see n.16, supra. Bright lines are important and necessary in many areas of the law, including constitutional law. Moreover, Southern California Edison Co. and other cases have made it clear that the Federal Power Act draws a bright line between the respective jurisdictions of federal and state regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, [p393] AECC has given us no good reason why a bright line between state regulation and unexercised federal power is more justifiable here than in other contexts in which we must interpret the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.

Attleboro and its predecessors are by no means judicial atrocities, plainly wrong at the time they were decided. In the first place, it is not entirely insignificant, quite apart from the sort of statutory analysis in which we engaged in Part III, supra, that those cases were decided in a day before Congress had already spoken with some breadth on the subject of utility regulation. Cf. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). This Court was in 1927 the sole authority safeguarding federal interests over a wide range of state utility regulation. Under those circumstances, drawing a fairly restrictive bright line may have made considerable sense. Indeed, the line the Court drew in Attleboro, though by no means perfect, would undoubtedly lead in a large number of cases to results entirely consistent with present-day doctrine. Second, the judicial turn of mind apparent in Attleboro, although problematic in many respects, can also be a healthy counterweight in many contexts to an otherwise too-easy dilution of guarantees contained in the Constitution. Nevertheless, Attleboro can no longer be thought to provide the sole standard by which to decide this case, and we proceed instead to undertake an analysis grounded more solidly in our modern cases.

B
Illinois Gas cited as examples of the less formalistic approach to the Commerce Clause such now-classic cases as South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), and Duckworth v. Arkansas, supra. One recent reformulation of the test established in those cases is found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:

"Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate [p394] commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and in whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 397 U.S., at 142 (citation omitted).

Applying the Bruce Church test to this case is relatively simple. The most serious concern identified in Bruce Church—economic protectionism—is not implicated here. Compare Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S., at 471–472. Moreover, state regulation of the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members is well within the scope of "legitimate local public interests," particularly considering that although AECC is tied into an interstate grid, its basic operation consists of supplying power from generating facilities located within the State to member cooperatives, all of whom are located within the State. Cf. id., at 473, n.17.

An argument could be made that, because AECC's Board of Directors consists exclusively of representatives of its 17 customers, it is effectively self-regulating, and that therefore any state regulation is not supported by an appreciable state interest. Cf. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. FPC, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 120, 391 F.2d 470, 473 (1968). Nevertheless, there is evidence that even cooperative power utilities may engage in economically inefficient behavior, see generally R. Schmalensee, The Control of Natural Monopolies 91–93 (1979), and sources cited, and we will not under these circumstances second-guess the State's judgment that some degree of governmental oversight is warranted. See [p395] Clover Leaf Creamery Co., supra, at 469, 473; Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S., at 128.

Finally, although we recognize that the PSC's regulation of the rates AECC charges to its members will have an incidental effect on interstate commerce, we are convinced that "the burden imposed on such commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Part of the power AECC sells is received from out-of-State. But the same is true of most retail utilities, and the national fabric does not seem to have been seriously disturbed by leaving regulation of retail utility rates largely to the States. Similarly, it is true that regulation of the prices AECC charges to its members may have some effect on the price structure of the interstate grid of which AECC is a part. But, again, we find it difficult to distinguish AECC in this respect from most relatively large utilities which sell power both directly to the public and to other utilities. It is not inconceivable that a particular rate structure required by the Arkansas PSC would be so unreasonable as to disturb appreciably the interstate market for electric power. But, as we said in our discussion of the pre-emption issue, see supra, at 389, we are not willing to allow such a hypothetical possibility to control this facial challenge to the PSC's mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, supra, at 128–129. [p396]

V
On this record, the PSC's assertion of jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members offends neither the Supremacy Clause nor the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is

Affirmed.


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/389

 358 Ṭāriḳ returned to Toledo, having within the short space of two years reduced the greater part of Spain, and put every enemy to flight that dared to meet him in the field.

The splendid exploits of his lieutenant aroused the jealousy of Mūsa. To rival his success, he set out himself with a large force and many warriors of note, and landed in Spain, 93 Guided in a course which Julian promised him would eclipse the glory of Ṭāriḳ, he struck out a new line of victory, stormed Sidonia, Carmona, and the ancient capital Seville. Merida was laid siege to, and the walls battered by engines. It resisted many months, and the garrison fought with desperate bravery. A spot, our Historian tells us, was still in his day called the "Martyrs' bastion," where a column of Muslims was cut to pieces by a party issuing from a hole beneath the wall. At last the city fell, and Mūsa, on the way to Toledo, met Ṭāriḳ at Talavera. He received him angrily, struck him on the head with his whip, and demanded an account of the booty. Friendly relations restored, the famous table was given up to Mūsa. The generals then separated, Ṭāriḳ for Saragossa, and Mūsa for Salamanca and Astorga. Saragossa held out long, and it was not till Mūsa had rejoined his lieutenant there that by their united efforts it was stormed. Mūsa then continued his victorious progress to the extreme north-east of Spain, and occupying Tarragona and Barcelona, reached as far even as to Gerona, on the border of France. There, tradition says, he was confronted by an image with the words engraved, "Sons of Ismāʿīl hitherto and no farther—Return!" and so he turned back. Ṭāriḳ, taking a more southerly course, overran the entire coast, reducing Tortosa on the Ebro, Valencia, and other leading cities on his way.


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 “I don’t think it did,” said Pooh.

“It tried,” said Tigger, “but I was too quick for it.”

Pooh put the cloth black on the table, and he put a large honey-pot on the cloth, and they sat down to breakfast. And as soon as they sat down, Tigger took a large mouthful of honey and he looked up at the ceiling with his head on one side, and made exploring noises with his tongue and considering noises, and what-have-we-got-here noises  and then he said in a very decided voice:

“Tiggers don’t like honey.”

“Oh!” said Pooh, and tried to make it sound Sad and Regretful. “I thought they liked everything.”


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 705–15] The tidings of Ṭāriḳ's ill-treatment by Mūsa had meanwhile reached the Caliph, who, displeased at it, and not unlikely jealous of his viceroy’s independent attitude, sent a messenger to recall him to Damascus. The summons met him on a new campaign to the West. Bidding the messenger fall into his train, Mūsa continued his progress of victory and devastation, till entering Galicia, he came in sight of the blue waves of the northern sea. A second messenger followed him to Lugo, with a sterner and immediate mandate. He was turned out of the camp by the imperious conqueror, who now, however, felt that the summons could no longer be disobeyed. Carrying Ṭāriḳ therefore with him, he turned his face southward; and so, marching through the scenes of their unparalleled achievement, the two conquerors made their way back to the straits of Gibraltar. Before quitting Spain, Mūsa placed his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz at the head of the government. Two other sons were also put in command, the one at Ḳairawān, the other over Western Africa. Perhaps no family ever enjoyed a wider fame, or power more uncontrolled, than that of Mūsa at the moment.

The marvellous achievements of Mūsa—with but few parallels in history—were sufficient to have disturbed the equilibrium of any mind. But this will hardly excuse the indiscretion which led the recalled conqueror to make his return through Africa a royal and triumphal progress, and thus justify the suspicions which had no doubt already marked him out at Court as a subject of danger. He carried with him countless store of rare and precious things, laden on endless lines of waggons and camels. At Cairo he stayed some time, and distributed rich marks of favour among his friends, especially the family of his patron ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the late governor of Egypt, to whom he owed his rise. Progress was thus so slow that he did not reach Damascus till after the death of Al-Welīd. The new Caliph, Suleimān, received him coldly, deposed him from all his commands, cast him into prison, and laid such heavy


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 “Everything except honey,” said Tigger.

Pooh felt rather pleased about this, and said that, as soon as he had finished his own breakfast, he would take Tigger round to Piglet’s house, and Tigger could try some of Piglet’s haycorns.

“Thank you, Pooh,” said Tigger, “because haycorns is really what Tiggers like best.”

So after breakfast they went round to see Piglet, and Pooh explained as they went that Piglet was a Very Small Animal who didn’t like bouncing, and asked Tigger not to be too Bouncy just at first. And Tigger, who had been hiding behind trees and jumping out on Pooh’s shadow when it wasn’t looking, said that Tiggers were only bouncy before breakfast, and that as soon as they had had a few haycorns they became Quiet and Refined. So by and by they knocked at the door of Piglet’s house.

“Hallo, Pooh,” said Piglet.

“Hallo, Piglet. This is Tigger.”

“Oh, is it?” said Piglet, and he edged round to the other side of the table. “I thought Tiggers were smaller than that.”

“Not the big ones,” said Tigger.

“They like haycorns,” said Pooh, “so that’s what we’ve come for, because poor Tigger hasn’t had any breakfast yet.”

Piglet pushed the bowl of haycorns towards Tigger, and said: “Help yourself,” and then he got close


text:
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Arkansas Public Service Commission/Dissent White

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I believe that state regulation of rural cooperative wholesale power rates is preempted because Congress has occupied the field of wholesale power rate regulation.

Several years before the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to regulate interstate wholesale power rates, this Court had invalidated as repugnant to the Commerce Clause state attempts to regulate interstate power wholesale rates. Public Utilities Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). The Court drew a bright line demarking the permissible scope of state regulation. States could regulate retail sales of energy in interstate commerce, but could not regulate wholesale sales of energy in interstate commerce. “Attleboro declared state regulation of interstate transmission of power for resale forbidden as a direct burden on commerce.” United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953). Had there been at the time of Attleboro a cooperative that generated electricity and sold it for resale across state lines, state regulation of such sales would have been foreclosed as an interference with commerce. I do not see how that conclusion could be questioned.

Nor is it sensible to argue that such a cooperative's rates became subject to state regulation when a few years later Congress subjected to federal regulation most wholesale [p397] rates previously unregulated. Quite the contrary is true. Although under the relevant cases, with which it was surely familiar, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917),, Congress could have authorized State regulation of such rates, it chose not to do so. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982) ("Nothing in the legislative history or language of [16 U.S.C. § 824(b)] evinces a congressional intent ‘to alter the limit of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause,’ or to modify the earlier holdings of this Court concerning the limits of state authority to restrain interstate trade”). Instead Congress enacted Titles II and III of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 847, 16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), in 1935 (and the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), in 1938) expressly adopting the Attleboro bright-line demarkation, see FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964); United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., supra. That Act provided that the FPC would set just and reasonable rates for a public utilities that sold electric power at wholesale. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). The term public utility was defined broadly. [p398] 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Nowhere in the Act is there any indication that state authority to regulate wholesale rates was in any way expanded beyond that permitted by the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Attleboro. “What Congress did was to adopt the test developed in the Attleboro line [of cases] which denied state power to regulate a ‘sale at wholesale to local distributing companies. FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., supra, at 214. “The line of the statute was thus clear and complete. It cut sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales for consumptive uses. No exceptions were made in either category for particular uses, quantities or otherwise.” Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947).

Congress thus affirmatively asserted jurisdiction over wholesale rates charged by all entities, either by giving the FPC jurisdiction or by freeing such entities from regulation because of their quasi-governmental nature. Neither of these options leaves room for state control of wholesale rates charged by public utilities (except those that are arms of the state or its political subdivisions), the first gives sole control to the FPC, the latter can be viewed as a decision that the rates of governmental and quasi-governmental entities and are “best left unregulated”, ante at 384.

The Rural Electrification Act, 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), was passed in 1936, and the Federal Power Commission later held that cooperatives such as petitioner are not within its regulatory authority, not because they were exempted by the Rural Electrification Act, but because they are beyond the jurisdiction conferred [p399] on the Commission by the Federal Power Act. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. 12, 67 P.U.R.3d 340 (1967). This left the cooperatives' wholesale rates unregulated and beyond the reach of state authority, just as they would have been immediately after Attleboro. In the 47 years since the passage of the Rural Electrification Act, Congress has not sought to authorize state regulation of the wholesale rates charged by rural cooperatives. It has adhered to its wholesale-retail boundary between federal and state authority. In all these years, there has been no state rate regulation of rural cooperative's wholesale rates. This was the necessary result of Congress adopting as its own the Attleboro line and thereby occupying the field of wholesale regulation.

[p400] The Court claims support for its apparent view that Congress authorized (or somehow expected) state control over wholesale rates charged by rural cooperatives in the legislative history of the Rural Electrification Act. In particular it points to statements that cooperatives were to comply with state regulation of retail rates, a power which the states possessed in the absence of Congressional authorization. The Court then opines that there is no more reason to control retail rates than there is to control wholesale rates. From these two premises it infers that Congress in effect authorized, or at the very least expected, state regulation that this Court had barred states from engaging in. The two premises, however, do not support the conclusion. Congress did not expressly authorize state regulation of wholesale rates charged by cooperatives and I find nothing in the history of the Rural Electrification Act to indicate that Congress was in any way departing from its basic decision to embrace the holding in Attleboro that the Commerce Clause barred the states from regulating wholesale rates.

The second source for its apparent view that the Rural Electrification Act allows state regulation of wholesale rates is a statement appearing in a Rural Electrification bulletin. The statement basically instructs the borrower to comply with the wholesale rate orders of any body that has jurisdiction to make such rate orders. This statement is supposed to express a “policy of the REA [that] is wholly inconsistent with the preemption of state regulatory jurisdiction” over wholesale rates. Ante, at 387. The Court's reliance on [p401] this statement is misplaced. First, given the silence of the Rural Electrification Administration on this point, an isolated reference in an administrative bulletin is not persuasive evidence of the Administration's position. Second, in the absence of any persuasive evidence that Congress intended to depart from the Attleboro line in the case of cooperatives, I doubt seriously that the REA itself would purport to adopt a policy at odds with the law. And surely it did not do so in advising cooperatives to comply with the orders of any authority having jurisdiction. Nor am I persuaded that there was a general understanding at the state level that each of the states to which a generating cooperative delivered power at the wholesale level was free to regulate that cooperative's wholesale prices. Finally, the statement could have been intended to direct wholly intrastate cooperatives to comply with the orders of state commissions. In such a situation a state would have jurisdiction over wholesale rates and the Administration might well have concluded that it should honor state control over intrastate rates.

Given the 48-year period in which Congress has asserted jurisdiction over wholesale rates and never manifested any belief that its policies would be furthered by state regulation of such rates, this Court should not purport to negate the Congressional decision to abide by Attleboro. I would hold, as a matter of preemption, that absent a contrary indication from Congress States may not regulate wholesale rates of cooperatives.


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“But you said,” began Pooh—“you said that Tiggers like everything except honey and haycorns.”

“And thistles,” said Tigger, who was now running round in circles with his tongue hanging out.

Pooh looked at him sadly.

“What are we going to do?” he asked Piglet.

Piglet knew the answer to that, and he said at once that they must go and see Christopher Robin.

“You’ll find him with Kanga,” said Eeyore. He came close to Pooh, and said in a loud whisper:

“Could you ask your friend to do his exercises somewhere else? I shall be having lunch directly, and don’t want it bounced on just before I begin. A trifling matter, and fussy of me, but we all have our little ways.”

Pooh nodded solemnly and called to Tigger.

“Come along and we’ll go and see Kanga. She’s sure to have lots of breakfast for you.”


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 “Oh, well then, Kanga can give you some breakfast.”

So they went into Kanga’s house, and when Roo had said, “Hallo, Pooh,” and “Hallo, Piglet” once, and “Hallo, Tigger” twice, because he had never said it before and it sounded funny, they told Kanga what they wanted, and KankaKanga [sic] said very kindly, “Well, look in my cupboard, Tigger dear, and see what you’d like.” Because she knew at once that, however big Tigger seemed to be, he wanted as much kindness as Roo.

“Shall I look, too?” said Pooh, who was beginning to feel a little eleven o’clockish. And he found a small tin of condensed milk, and something seemed to tell him that Tiggers didn’t like this, so he took it into a corner by itself, and went with it to see that nobody interrupted it.

But the more Tigger put his nose into this and his paw into that, the more things he found which Tiggers didn’t like. And when he had found everything in the cupboard, and couldn’t eat any of it, he said to Kanga, “What happens now?”

But Kanga and Christopher Robin and Piglet were all standing round Roo, watching him have his Extract of Malt. And Roo was saying, “Must I?” and Kanga was saying “Now, Roo dear, you remember what you promised.”

“What is it?” whispered Tigger to Piglet.


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The New York Times/1912/12/03/How Rose Livingston Works In Chinatown

How Rose Livingston Works In Chinatown. '''Free Lance Missionary's Worst Enemy Is Mayor Gaynor, Metropolitan Temple Audience Hears. Needs Only A Dollar A Day. Threats of Death Will Not Deter Her. Watching 350 White Girls There Now.''' Mrs. Rose Livingston, the battling free lance missionary of Chinatown, left her work among the white girls there last night long enough to journey through the rain to the Metropolitan Temple at Fourteenth Street and Seventh Avenue to stir an audience of men and women with a few chapters from her experiences. Her friends and patrons, Mr. and Mrs. James Lees Laidlaw, were there to present her as one who by her personal service had rescued 300 girls from " living death." Mr. Laidlaw said: You can judge Rose Livingston and her work pretty well by seeing who her friends are and who her enemies are. District Attorney Whitman and his assistant, Frank Moss, have been her best and strongest friends. Her worst enemy — I am sorry to have to say it — is our Mayor, William J. Gaynor." This reference to the Mayor was received in surprised silence, but Mrs. Livingston could be seen nodding her head in vigorous assent, and when she got to her feet she did not let the matter rest. I am glad Mr. Laidlaw said what he did about Mayor Gaynor. If you only knew all the meanness that man has done to me you would understand. Just let me tell you." And she plunged right into an account of what happened one night last Spring in the dark hall of a still darker Doyers street when she had charged to the rescue of a girl and had come face to face with that girl's cadet, who was waiting for her, knife in hand. She emerged from that encounter with a splintered jaw and seven teeth gone, and had felt very despondent for a while. As a consequence, a petition for better police protection in Chinatown for workers like Mrs. Livingston had gone in to Mayor Gaynor. What The Mayor Said. "And do you know what that man said? " Mrs. Livingston asked. " He said, Well, if Mrs. Livingston is not safe in Chinatown, let her stay out. She got drunk down there and got into trouble. That's the kind of help I've had from Mayor Gaynor and that's the kind of man he is. "Perhaps some or you people have an idea of writing to the Mayor and asking for better police protection. Now take my advice. Save your postage and buy bread for some poor family. That might do some good." Mrs. Livingston did not tone down her speech to make things easier for her audience. She, in none of the euphemisms so common in social evil discussions, but kept her talk homely and sharp with the vernacular of the gutter. Her own kind of missionary work, she explained, was not the soft kind. "I don't go in to visit these girls and give them a tract and say 'God bless you,' and invite them around to take tea with me. That's not my kind of work. There are some girls that it's nighty hard to help, but there are some little, fresh young things that have just been brought to Chinatown, and that you can sometimes reach in time to save them. Sometimes you can get there before the harm is done. There are 350 white girls in Chinatown now, by friends. I got thirty-seven of them out last year. I once rescued a little bit of a girl who was only 10 years old. That's the sort of work it is. "I don't get much help. It seems as though as soon as a cop in Chinatown shows himself to be honest they move him to some other part of town. They don't want honest cops down there. I don't know whose fault it is — Gaynor's or Waldo's or whose — but it makes it mighty hard sometimes. Sometimes they tell me these are bad girls and there's nothing I can do for them. They try to tell me that these girls could escape if they wanted to, but that they don't want to. I tell you it isn't true. I saw a girl running away from a cadet, and she ran almost into a policeman's arms. I was over there in a jiffy. 'Officer,' I said, 'won't you protect this poor girl from this fellow?' and, would you believe it. that policeman just knocked her back into the cadet's arms and watched while he beat her up." Served the Warrant Herself. Then she told of a girl dragged by the hair till her scalp "stood up," and kicked brutally in the stomach, and of how she, Mrs. Livingston got a warrant and served it herself when the police would not. And of how that man was now serving out more than two-years in the penitentiary. Mrs. Livingston said that those back of her were asked to provide only her room and washing and a dollar a day for carfare and the like. "I trust to the Lord for the rest," she explained, "the Lord and Mrs. Laidlaw's cook. I'll keep the work going because it's worth doing, and though they've put a price on my head, I'll keep it up until they kill me. I hope I'll be working at least until the women get the vote and some of these conditions can be remedied. Don't think it's so far away from you. It may be that some day I'll have a chance to save your own daughter or your own sister. You can't tell in a city like New York." This view of the omnipresence of the danger was emphasized by Mr. Laidlaw. "I know the Arnold family well," he said. "I knew Dorothy Arnold since she was a little bit of a girl. You all know of her disappearance. Well, her own family realize that the worst may have happened to her, and their only hope is that she has teen killed, that she is no longer alive. I tell you no home in this city is absolutely safe."


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/391

 360 demands upon him, that he was reduced to poverty, and when released, forced to beg from his friends the means of living. To add to his misfortune, his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, whom he had left to succeed him in Spain, was assassinated, as is supposed, but without sufficient grounds, by secret orders from Damascus; and the heartless Suleimān sent his head to the father with an insulting message:—"a grievous error on the Caliph’s part," justly adds the Arabian annalist. Ṭāriḳ also must have retired into private life, for we hear no more of him. It is sometimes said that Al-Welīd leaned towards Ḳeis and Suleimān towards the Yemenis; but their treatment of Mūsa and his son, who were Yemenis, shows that their partisanship was not very deep. The fall of both resembles that of Khālid—an ungrateful end for the three great conquerors of their age.

The era of Al-Welīd was glorious both at home and abroad. There is no other reign, not excepting even that of


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/392

 705–15] ʿOmar, in which Islām so spread abroad and was consolidated. We may safely accept the judgment of the impartial Weil, who tells us that, "although Muslim historians, because of his supporting Al-Ḥajjāj, call Al-Welīd a tyrant, he is in our eyes the greatest, and in every respect the most powerful and illustrious, ruler amongst all the Commanders of the Faithful." From the borders of China and the banks of the Indus to the Atlantic, his word was law. In his reign culture and the arts began to flourish. He enlarged the Mosque of Damascus by taking in the Church of St John from the Christians. From a church in Baalbek he took a gilded dome of brass and set it over the rock in ʿAbd al-Melik's Mosque in Jerusalem. He rebuilt and enlarged the Mosque of Medīna and the Aḳṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. He established schools and hospitals, and made provision for the aged, blind, and lame. He frequently visited the markets; and so encouraged manufacture and design, that people began to take an interest in their advancement. Roads, with wells at convenient stations, were made throughout the kingdom, and the comfort of travellers, notably of pilgrims to the Holy Places, specially cared for. More perhaps than any other Caliph, he knew how to hold the balance between the Arabian tribal rivalries, and ruled at large with a powerful hand. If Al-Ḥajjāj be an exception, Al-Welīd, at the least, held him in better check than did his predecessor. Looking at it from first to last, we shall not find in the annals of the Caliphate a more glorious reign than that of Al-Welīd.

As a proof of his mildness and consideration, it is told of him that when in 91 on pilgrimage, he visited Medīna and made large presents to the people, the court of the Mosque was cleared of worshippers, that in company with ʿOmar he might inspect at leisure the improvements he had made. One old man alone would neither rise up nor salute the Caliph. ʿOmar tried to divert the attention of his cousin from the uncourtly worshipper; but Al-Welīd saw, and at once recognised him, "How art thou, Saʿīd?" cried the Caliph. Without the slightest movement or salutation, the aged man replied:—Very well, I am thankful to say, and


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Rousey v. Jacoway

Several years after petitioners deposited distributions from their pension plans into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), they filed a joint petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. They sought to shield portions of their IRAs from their creditors by claiming them as exempt from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), which provides, inter alia, that a debtor may withdraw from the estate his "right to receive a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of  age." Respondent Jacoway, the Bankruptcy Trustee, objected to the Rouseys' exemption and moved for turnover of the IRAs to her. The Bankruptcy Court sustained her objection and granted her motion, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel agreed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that, even if the Rouseys' IRAs were "similar plans or contracts" to the plans specified in § 522(d)(10)(E), their IRAs gave them no right to receive payment "on account of age," but were instead savings accounts readily accessible at any time for any purpose.

Held: The Rouseys can exempt IRA assets from the bankruptcy estate because the IRAs fulfill both of the § 522(d)(10)(E) requirements at issue here—they confer a right to receive payment on account of age and they are similar plans or contracts to those enumerated in § 522(d)(10)(E). Pp. 325–335.

(a) The Court reaffirms its suggestion in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762–763, that IRAs like the Rouseys' can be exempted from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 522(d)(10)(E). Pp. 325–326.

(b) The Rouseys' IRAs provide a right to payment "on account of age" within § 522(d)(10)(E)'s meaning. The quoted phrase requires that the right to receive payment be "because of" age. ''Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership'', 526 U.S. 434, 450–451. This meaning comports with the common, dictionary understanding of "on account of," and § 522(d)(10)(E)'s context does not suggest another meaning. The statutes governing IRAs persuade the Court that Jacoway is mistaken in arguing that there is no causal connection between that right and age or any other factor because the Rouseys' IRAs provide a right to payment on demand. Their right to receive payment of the entire balance is not in dispute. Because their accounts qualify as IRAs under 26 U.S.C. § 408(a), they have a nonforfeitable [p321] right to the balance held in those accounts, § 408(a)(4). That right is restricted by a 10-percent tax penalty on any withdrawal made before age 59½, § 72(t). Contrary to Jacoway's contention, this 10-percent penalty is substantial. It applies proportionally to any amounts withdrawn and prevents access to the 10 percent that the Rouseys would forfeit should they withdraw early. It therefore effectively prevents access to the entire balance in their IRAs and limits their right to "payment" of the balance. And because this condition is removed when the accountholder turns age 59½, the Rouseys' right to the balance of their IRAs is a right to payment "on account of" age. Pp. 326–329.

(c) The Rouseys' IRAs are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" to the "stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, [or] annuity plan[s]" listed in § 522(d)(10)(E). To be "similar," an IRA must be like, though not identical to, the listed plans or contracts, and consequently must share characteristics common to them. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define the listed plans, the Court looks to their ordinary meaning. E.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757. Dictionary definitions reveal that, although the listed plans are dissimilar to each other in some respects, their common feature is that they provide income that substitutes for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation. That the income the Rouseys will derive from their IRAs is likewise income that substitutes for wages lost upon retirement is demonstrated by the facts that (1) regulations require distribution to begin no later than the calendar year after the year the accountholder turns 70½; (2) taxation of IRA money is deferred until the year in which it is distributed; (3) withdrawals before age 59½ are subject to the 10-percent penalty; and (4) failure to take the requisite minimum distributions results in a 50-percent tax penalty on funds improperly remaining in the account. The Court rejects Jacoway's argument that IRAs cannot be similar plans or contracts because the Rouseys have complete access to them. This argument is premised on her view that the 10-percent penalty is modest, a premise with which the Court does not agree. The Court also rejects Jacoway's contention that the availability of IRA withdrawals exempt from the early withdrawal penalty renders the Rouseys' IRAs more like savings accounts. Sections 522(d)(10)(E)(i) through (iii)—which preclude the debtor from using the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption if an insider established his plan or contract; the right to receive payment is on account of age or length of service; and the plan does not qualify under specified Internal Revenue Code sections, including the section governing IRAs—not only suggest generally that the Rouseys' IRAs are exempt, but also support the Court's conclusion that they are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" under § 522(d)(10)(E). Pp. 329–335.

347 F.3d 689, reversed and remanded.

[p322] THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Pamela S. Karlan argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, Claude R. Jones, and G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.

Colli C. McKiever argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Jill R. Jacoway, pro se, Seth P. Waxman, Craig Goldblatt, and Jorian Rose.

title: Rousey v. Jacoway


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/393

 362 how doth the Commander of the Faithful?" "The last of his race!" exclaimed Al-Welīd, in admiration of the fast vanishing homeliness and simplicity which others might have rebuked as uncourtly rudeness.

It has been already noticed that Al-Welīd wished to displace his brother Suleimān from being heir-apparent, in favour of his own son. He died before the change could be accomplished; but the effect was, not the less, to create an intense feeling of resentment in the mind of Suleimān, especially towards Ḳoteiba and the adherents of Al-Ḥajjāj, both of whom had encouraged Al-Welīd in his design.

Al-Welīd was about forty years old at his death, and he had reigned nearly ten years.

By this time the Naval Administration of the Caliphate was fairly well organised. The fleet was divided into five squadrons, those of Syria with headquarters at Laodicea, Africa (that is, Tunis), Egypt (with Alexandria as starting-point), the Nile (with headquarters at Babylon), and a special squadron to guard the mouths of the Nile from descents upon the coast by Byzantines. For Egypt the chief arsenals and shipbuilding yards were at Babylon and Clysma. The superintendents of Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta were, at the end of the first century, Christians. The ships' companies were divided into sailors and marines. They were all Muslims. The former, who comprised the rowers and helmsmen, were mostly Mawāli or native converts to Islām, both Copts and Greeks. The latter were Arab settlers in the country, mainly of Ḳoreish and the Anṣār. Both were conscripts, but the latter certainly, and the former probably, received pensions out of the public revenues. It is noteworthy that the expeditions were made in winter.

Arab rule in Egypt appears to have come as a relief to the country as a whole. No doubt taxation was heavy, but it was probably less so than under Byzantine rule, and Egypt is capable of bearing heavy taxation. Moreover, when an Arab governor is denounced as rapacious and tyrannical, it is often, as the papyri show, because he vindicated the rights of the poor as against the great. This is especially shown to be so in the case of Ḳurra ibn Sharīk, who was governor about this time. The Arab historians themselves also, writing as they are under the ʿAbbāsids,


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Page:The House at Pooh Corner (1961).pdf/43

 up to Pooh and felt much braver, and said, “So you’re Tigger? Well, well!” in a careless sort of voice. But Tigger said nothing because his mouth was full of haycorns

After a long munching noise he said:

“Ee-ers o i a-ors.”

And when Pooh and Piglet said “What?” he said “Skoos ee,” and went outside for a moment.

When he came back he said firmly:

“Tiggers don’t like haycorns.”

“But you said they liked everything except honey,” said Pooh.

“Everything except honey and haycorns,” explained Tigger.

When he heard this Pooh said, “Oh, I see!” and Piglet, who was rather glad that Tiggers didn’t like haycorns, said, “What about thistles?”

“Thistles,” said Tigger, “is what Tiggers like best.”

“Then let’s go along and see Eeyore,” said Piglet. So the three of them went; and after they had walked and walked and walked, they came to the part of the Forest where Eeyore was.

“Hallo, Eeyore!” said Pooh. “This is Tigger.”

“What is?” said Eeyore.

“This,” explained Pooh and Piglet together, and Tigger smiled his happiest smile and said nothing.


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Page:William Muir, Thomas Hunter Weir - The Caliphate; Its Rise, Decline, and Fall (1915).djvu/394

 705–15] are apt to paint Umeiyad rule in dark colours, The insurrection of the Copts in the year 725–726 (107 ) was due to a defect in the system rather than to harshness in its administration. For as the Copts went over one by one to Islām, and so became legally exempt from taxation, the number of tax-payers was always dwindling whilst the amount to be raised was steadily increasing. The tolerance of the Arabs appears from the fact that the governor's rescripts are still written in Greek (as well as Arabic) and replies made in Coptic. Many of the Pagarchs were Christians and all the subordinate officials. The government clerks were not required to use Muslim formulæ in their letters, and the sign of the Cross was allowed. Indeed, how little the Arabs cared for the letter of their religion appears from the fact that the seal of ʿAmr bore the impress of a steer. There was no religious persecution; the raids of external foes from without ceased; and the cornering of wheat was made impossible.