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'''FIGURE 14. St. Vitus Cathedral in Prague (U/OU)'''

of St. Vitus Cathedral, a famous landmark in Prague (Figure 14). Saints were the subject of the 128 celebrated panel paintings of Master Theodoric in the Chapel of the Holy Rood. Also inspired by religious beliefs, Master Paul of Levoca, a great sculptor of the 14th century, is noted for his masterpiece, the large altar at Levoca.

Religion was still an important subject for art during the Bohemian Renaissance of the 16th century and the Baroque period of the 18th century, but secular motifs also became more important. Among the major works were the monumental Church of St. Nicholas in Prague by K.I. Diezenhofer, and the highly regarded altar paintings of K. Skreta and P. Brandl. During the same period, rich decoration and articulated, painted gables, inspired by Italian secular design were popular additions to housing. The sculpture of the period was noted for the worldly, realistic forms of F.M. Brokoff and M. Braun.

Art turns from religious subjects to people, everyday life, landscapes, and historical events during the national revival of the 19th century. Best remembered are the realistic paintings of Josef Manes, Nicholas Ales, and Max Svabinsky, and the sculptures of Josef Vaclav Myslbek. Later in the 20th century before World War II, Czech artists, influenced by new ideas from Western Europe, were concerned with new forms of expression in painting and sculpture. Examples were the impressionism of Antonin Slavicek, the symbolism of J. Preisler, the abstractionism of Frantisek Kupka, and the cubism of Emil Lilla and O. Gutfreund. Also recognized are Alfons Mucha for his decorative and symbolic avant-garde paintings and Oskar Kokoschka for his psychological portraits and allegorical paintings.

After the Communist takeover, experimentation, abstractionism, and expressionism were officially discouraged. Studies of still life and nudes were no longer acceptable. Instead, intelligibility, monumentality, and nationalism were stressed. The art produced was generally unimaginative, sterile, and mannered. Limited experimentation in style and formed returned after 1955, and has more or less continued in contemporary Czechoslovakia despite the tightening of restrictions on artistic expression in the late 1960's and 1970's. Although sometimes cynical and macabre and not as dynamic as in earlier periods, Czechoslovakian fine arts and architecture still exhibit originality and individuality. A noted artist is Libor Fara who stresses simple planes with accented contours, sealed in tones of white, gray, and black. Architecture has become modern but somewhat sterile. No true innovations are permitted, even those that are functional. Noted architects are Karel Honzik and Zdensk Plesnik.

b. Folk and applied art

Originating in pre-Christian times, folk woodcarving is one of the earliest forms of cultural expression in Czechoslovakia. Wooden household gods and decorated wooden posts, marking sacred groves, served religious functions. After the arrival of Christianity, holy figures and tall wooden crosses were richly carved with both pre-Christian symbols of life, such as the sun

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 the father, mother, guardian, custodian, or curator, as the case may be, and the approval of the court:

refusal of an inheritance;

acceptance of an inheritance encumbered with charges or conditions.

Refusal of an inheritance must be made through an explicit expression of intention in writing deposited with a competent authority or through a contract of compromise.

Refusal of an inheritance cannot be made in part or subject to a condition or time clause.

Refusal of an inheritance is irrevocable.

If a heir refuses an inheritance by any means which he knows would disadvantage his own creditor, the creditor has the right to request revocation of such refusal. But this shall not apply if it appears that, at the time of the refusal, the person enriched thereby did not know the fact which contributed to such disadvantage of the creditor. Nevertheless, in the event of gratuitous refusal,

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 the ghost haunted him, and intended to run away, when his fright threw him down.

This story and discovery so shocked Ferdinand, that he could hardly keep himself from fainting, but he assured the man of his protection, if he would repent of his past life.—This he faithfully promised; but his fears of the ghost having subsided, and his terrors of murder being done away, he already regretted the confession which horror and the fright of the moment had drawn from him.

Ferdinand told him by what means he entered the lobby, and the steps they intended to take that night, to surprise the whole gang, when at table. It was fortunate for him, perhaps, that the two men of the house now entered, and were a check upon the villain, who was inwardly cursing his stars for making him such a terrified coward.

He told Ferdinand they assembled together earlier than usual the last evening, to celebrate his return, but would hardly meet


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he Shoshones who had once peopled the Land of Many Rivers had called this season the Short Blue Moon.

The lordly blacktail bucks were preparing to renew acquaintance with their wives and must beautify themselves accordingly. They had discarded the long, faded hair of last year’s coat, and the new one had not yet deepened into the dark gray of early winter.

For one brief span the short new hair was a glistening blue-gray.

Moran pointed across a gulch to where a big buck grazed placidly in a little open park.

“The deer are in the short blue,” he said. “This is the best season of all the year, Flash. It’ll soon be love making time for the antlered tribes. Wait until all the old bull elk tune up. We’ve stayed too long now but it’s worth waiting another week to hear. You’ve never heard one of those old boys blow off—but you will.”

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 'till one or two in the morning on this night; that he thought it best for himself to return, as he could account for his absence, and then he would take care to put aside all instruments of destruction against their appearing, to prevent any harm to Ferdinand and his party.

The unsuspecting Ferdinand praised the man's humanity, and advised him to depart immediately, and expect him about one o'clock. Away he went, cured of his fears, and like a true rogue, finding it most for his interest, he would make a merit of being true to his accomplices, and establish an opinion of his own courage and integrity.

The steward returned, properly accompanied for their intended expedition, and was astonished when informed of the visitor they had in his absence, and not sorry that they should have a friend to prevent mischief.

At the appointed hour, they silently proceeded through the passages, and ascending the stairs, reached the lobby; all was still;—-


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 not a voice heard.—This appeared extraordinary; however, two resolute men went before up the stairs to the apartment where Ferdinand had heard them the preceding evening; the door was open; the room empty; chairs, tables, and trunks, all in disorder.—They looked at each other.

"What can this mean?" cried Ferdinand

They run from room to room, on that floor which was the lower one; then ascended, searched the house through; it was entirely empty, not only of its inhabitants, but of the vast riches the man had boasted of.

"The villain has betrayed us," said Ferdinand; "they are all off."

They descended to the cellars, and there found the little door wide open, and all clear. "Twas now plain they had all taken their flight; and to have discovered and irritated such a band of ruffians, was a very serious business. The steward lamented his interference; he had no doubt but that they would return, and murder every one at the castle.


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 Ferdinand was not quite easy, though he seemed to make light of the fears of others, and they returned extremely disconcerted.

That the robbers could not be at any great distance was certain; but there were so many caves and subterranean passages in the hills and rocks adjacent, that it was judged both fruitless and dangerous to trace them, even if they had any clue to guide their search.—They had taken their riches with them; the informer had said, they intended to leave the place, therefore they were now reduced to hope they never might return.

Ferdinand bore all the vexation and mortification of this disappointment, since, had he not been too credulous, he never would have permitted the man to return back, but have retained him as a necessary evidence. He accused his own imprudence, and execrated the wretch whose feigned penitence had deceived him.


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 Flash raised his head and listened to a distant call. There is no animal sound in the world so distinctive—so impossible to describe or imitate—as the clear, silvery bugle of a bull elk.

“There!” Moran exclaimed. “What do you think of that? He’s a small one, a five pointer, and he’s rushing the season some. He’ll prance around the cows now because he knows the old herd bulls will come down out of their bachelor nooks in a few days and drive him off.”

Each day the pealing bugles of the younger bulls grew more insistent. Then there sounded the fuller, rounder notes of the old herd bulls, the big six pointers. Every band of cows now had a tyrannical male who herded them jealously and bugled his defiance to the less fortunate bulls who tried to cut out a few stragglers from his harem.

The blacktail bucks, casual free lovers of the hills, made no pretense of holding their own bunch of does but kept ever on the move, philandering from one love to the next.

Rams with great, curling horns traveled with every bunch of ewes in the rough peaks above the the timberline.

One night when the running season was in full swing, Flash lay listening to the bugling of dis-

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 tant bulls when his nose detected the first sign of the proximity of man since the night at Two Ocean Pass, almost three months before.

Twice he trotted a short way into the wind, then came back to Moran.

“You old rascal,” said Moran. “You’re planning a midnight raid. After I’m asleep you’ll slip away and interrupt the courting of some old bull. You’re a queer mixture, Flash, but you’re more wolf than dog after all.”

Two hours later Flash stood in a little valley across a ridge from where Moran was camped. The wind was heavy with the odor of a dead camp fire and living men. He followed it up the valley until he knew that they were less than a hundred yards away.

He shifted back and forth across the wind to catch each different angle from the camp. There was something that was unlike any thing he had chanced across before, and it aroused an intense desire to investigate.

Little by little, shifting silently from tree to tree, he approached to within twenty feet of three sleeping figures. They lay in a little open park with the moonlight streaming down on them.

Flash did not know that when men slept their

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 minds were not at work, but he did know that at such times their scent was negative. He could identify those he had met before but that was all—he could not classify them with nose and ear as when they thought and spoke.

One of these he knew was Dad Kinney whom he had often met with Moran. The other was a stranger to him, but neither of them interested him in the least.

The third was of a kind he had never seen. He knew unerringly that this was the female of the species man—the first woman he had known. She radiated bubbling vitality and health and a wholesome, friendly interest in all things—and from this Flash knew that she was not asleep.

She was lying awake, enjoying the silvery bugle chorus of challenging bulls that came from far and near—in love with the spell of the Short Blue Moon.

Flash was irresistibly drawn to her. He wanted to creep close and investigate this strange being. He knew she was watching him and he stepped from under the trees into the moonlit open space and stopped.

Then the girl spoke.

“Come here,” she said.

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 At the sound of her voice the two men beyond her opened their eyes instantly but made no move. Flash knew they were awake.

“Come here,” she said again, and extended her hand.

Flash took one more step and for one brief instant his big bushy tail flipped aloft, then dropped again. Inch by inch he edged up to her, keeping a wary eye on the two silent spectators beyond. His nose barely touched the tips of the extended fingers.

The girl reached out still farther and stroked his head.

“Come on up here—don’t be afraid of me—I won’t hurt you,” she coaxed.

He crept closer, thrilling to the soft touch of her hand. His nose brushed her cheek and pressed against the mass of brown hair, breathing deep of its fragrance; then he abruptly raised his head and peered across her at the two men as one of them spoke.

“That’s the first time he ever let a soul touch him but Moran,” Kinney said.

“You know him then,” said the stranger.

“It’s Flash,” Kinney answered. “He belongs

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 to Clark Moran. Did it make you nervous to watch a wolf crawl up to her that way?”

“No,” said the other man. “A wolf wouldn’t come that close to us in a thousand years. Then I saw him swing his brush up in the air when Betty spoke to him. A wolf never cocks his tail up in the air—and I knew he was a dog.”

This stranger with the close-clipped gray beard and close-clipped accent of the east evidently knew the animals of the hills.

Their voices had a friendly ring and Flash lay flat beside the girl.

“Who is Moran?” she asked. “I’m going to buy his dog.”

Kinney chuckled and shook his head.

“You can’t,” he said.

“But I want him,” she insisted. “Surely he’ll sell him at some price.”

“Not him,” said Kinney. “Moran seems to have enough money of his own to worry along. It don’t mean as much to him as Flash. He wouldn’t consider any sum.”

Kinney gave them a brief history of the wolf.

“Moran’s a queer one—and a good one too,” he said. “He puts in his time visiting around

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CHAP. VII.

night was past without rest by any part of the family at the Castle. Every breath of wind, the least motion of the trees, was magnified into the sound of feet, and murmuring of voices. Day-light at last came, and their terrors began a little to subside; they met dejected and unrefreshed; Ferdinand, ashamed of his credulity, tortured by the recollection of the man's information, and grieved at the painful situation his imprudence had thrown the family into, who had so kindly attended to him, with many other additional causes of inquietude, appeared with a countenance so truly dejected, an


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 air of such anxious concern for them, that instead of affording them any comfort, he more completely alarmed their fears.

He found it impossible to raise his own spirits, or recall to his friends that cheerfulness his folly had deprived them of. On that day or the next, the passage boat was expected; but could he leave them in such a perilous situation, forsake them in the prospect of danger they incurred by complying with his wishes? Impossible, neither honour nor humanity would permit it.

He had written to his friends at Vienna, he had little doubt but that some of them would come to him, at any rate he must remain where he was a few days, and share the danger, or, if contrary to their apprehensions, the robbers should have fled the country, he would then have the satisfaction of leaving them as happy as he found them.

Waving therefore all considerations of self-interest, and repelling the extreme solicitude he felt for returning into Suabia, he frankly


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 told the steward, "he would not leave them until he saw the event of what they so much dreaded. A day or two (said he) will, I hope, do away all your fears; there is nothing in this Castle to tempt their avarice, and surely they will scarcely neglect their own safety, and hazard a discovery, solely from a desire of revenge." They heard him, and were pleased at the moment; but when fear has taken absolute possession of the mind, hope is but a temporary guest, and is soon clouded with redoubled terrors at the slightest circumstance that justifies their first emotions.

Thus it happened to them, for soon after he had succeeded in raising them from their dismal apprehensions of death and murder, one of the men came in with a small box he had found in the wood just behind the Castle. This box was opened, and, to their infinite surprise, contained a gold watch, three diamond rings, of no very great value, a purse with thirty Louis-d'ors, and two embroidered handkerchiefs.


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 after first one animal and the next—studying how they act and all. He even claims they talk among themselves in sounds and smells.”

“A naturalist,” said the girl.

“That’s him. He’s a naturalist sure enough. He came in through Sunlight Gap and hit this country near three months ago. No one’s seen him since. He’s camped around here close. But you can’t buy Flash, Betty. Moran keeps him for company when he’s out alone.”

“Then I won’t try to buy him,” the girl generously decided.

Kinney chuckled as he rolled over and prepared to resume his interrupted slumbers.

The two men slept but Flash lay motionless beside the girl. Her hand rested on his head and held him. Her regular breathing soon announced that she too was asleep.

Flash heard their horses moving around farther up the valley. He slipped away and went up to look them over. One horse was picketed and the rest were grazing near. He went back to the girl.

Twice during the night she half woke.

“Flash,” she said sleepily each time. “Flash, old fellow, are you still here?” And stretched out her hand to touch him.

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 "This box was certainly dropped by the robbers," exclaimed the steward; "they are hid in the wood, and when they have secured all their property they will come and be revenged on us." His wife instantly caught the alarm; she cried, and wrung her hands, "lamented the day that ever they had indulged people's curiosity to be their own destruction."

Ferdinand was obliged to give way to the torrent, and remained silent till the turbulence of grief and passion had exhausted itself; then he told them, "he had no doubt but that the gang had dropped the box; at the same time he still believed they were gone from that neighbourhood without any intention of returning, and advised sending the two men at the different post towns to gain intelligence.

But their fears would not let them part with the men beyond sight of the house, and they passed that day and the succeeding night under the same horrors, and with as little


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 rest as the former ones. When the second morning came, it brought a return of spirits, and a glimmering of hope, which Ferdinand encouraged, as indeed his own apprehensions were now done away, and therefore the serenity of his aspect gave weight to his words, and had the desired effect of restoring some degree of tranquillity to their minds.

In the course of the day the steward's wife was capable of admiring the contents of the box, and asked, with some little earnestness, what was to be done with them, and to whom they must belong?

"To you, undoubtedly," said Ferdinand; "it is impossible to guess at, or to find the owner, as they may have been years in the robber's possession; nor is the value of that magnitude to make them of any mighty consequence to a person, such as we may suppose the owner to have been. The watch and rings you will keep; should any inquiry be made, you can restore them; but the money you may use without scruple."


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 This opinion of Ferdinand's so exactly corresponded with her's, that in a moment her countenance cleared, and if she had any fears, the loss of her riches was the most predominant one. A tolerable quiet night succeeded, and the third day restored them all to so much composure, that the good woman now praised Ferdinand for his courage in "routing the robbers, and convincing the neighbourhood that no ghosts had lived there."

She was one of those very prudent persons, who, feeling their own interest concerned, choose always to judge by the event of things in their own favour, without considering the causes of the fit, or the unfit.

Matters being thus returned into the accustomed channel with the steward and his family, Ferdinand was impatient to leave them, particularly as he had no letters from Vienna. He wrote a second time to the Count, declaring his intention of going immediately to Baden, and to remain in the house of Mr. Dunloff, until apprised of the Count's and


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 There was something in her voice when she spoke his name that brought a thrill which was only second to his love for Moran. He waited until almost dawn, hoping that she would wake again.

Then he grew nervous—Moran would soon be awake and waiting for him to bring the horses into camp.

Half an hour before the first streak of light showed in the east, he slipped away under the trees, stopped and looked back, then started for Moran. There was a crisp cool in the air. As he crossed the open places the tail grass was coated white with frost and bent stiffly under his feet.

He had never been away from Moran for so long a time and once free of the spell of the girl his desire to get back to him and see that all was well amounted to almost a panic and he covered the miles with all his speed.

He found Moran already up and lighting a fire.

“Where are the horses, Flash?” Moran greeted. “Go get ’em, boy. Go bring ’em in.” He waved his arm toward a meadow below. “We’re going to make an early start to-day. It’s back to the flats for us, Flash. Do you want to go back?”

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 Mr. D'Allenberg's arrival at their seats.That same evening he had the satisfaction to hear, he might embark the next morning for Ulm. He took leave of his hospitable friends with much kindness, and requested to hear from them, should they gain any information of the robbers.

With an eager desire to return, but with the most tormenting ideas and suspicions, that wrung his very soul with sorrow, he entered that boat which was to convey him to his own country, where he was to investigate such events as must realize those suspicions, or involve him in a cloud of doubt for the remainder of his days.

So many, and so various, were the causes that produced sorrow and misery to Ferdinand, that there existed no possibility of future comfort, or any cure for those wounds severally inflicted by those he had loved.

The weather was favourable, and he was soon landed at Ulm, where, on application to a Gentleman who knew his family, he


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 as furnished with money to pay his passage, and carry him on his journey.

Without meeting any accident on the road, he at length arrived at Baden; but as he drew near to the spot inhabited by his brother, once in the possession of a beloved and revered father, he turned his head from the Castle of Renaud, shrunk with horror from the ideas that crowded on his mind, and, as if blasted by the view, almost flew on to the city, and arrived at the house of Mr. Dunloff sick and breathless.

The good man flew out to receive him: "Heaven be praised!" said he, and seeing his situation he conducted him to a room, making him drink a bumper of wine, which a little restored him.

"Oh! Sir," cried Mr. Dunloff, "Heaven has sent you in a critical minute, Providence often permits the wicked man to triumph for a time, only to make its justice more conspicuous in the punishment of the offender."


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 Late in the afternoon they stopped on the crest of a mighty divide, and Moran turned for one last look at the country over which they had wandered alone for the last three months.

In a narrow valley below, a file of moving specks caught his eye and he focused his glasses on the spot. Two men were wrangling a string of a dozen packhorses along a game trail.

Two cream colored buckskins and a calico pinto in the outfit identified the string as Brent’s.

Moran knew that the other man would be the same one Brent guided to this seed for a hunting trip each fall.

There’s Brent, Flash,” he said. “They’re just coming in so it’s just as well we’re going out. You’d stumble across their camp some night and hell would be to pay. I wouldn’t give two cents for Brent’s chance to go on living if you found him curled up some place asleep.”

“That man with him is a New York lawyer—Luther Nash. I’d like to have you sniff him over and hear his voice. I’m curious to know what your verdict would be on Nash.”

Every fall Nash came for a two weeks’ trip into the hills with Brent, and Moran had met him several years before. On one of Moran’s trips

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 "What do you mean?" said Ferdinand:—"Tell me, how are my dear children?"

"Do not grieve to be told, Sir, that your little daughter is in Heaven. Master Charles is well, and every thing the fondest father can wish him to be. Your little girl has been recalled to its native skies about a fortnight since, no care was wanting, but a weak constitution sunk under the malady of the measles, and—she is at rest."

Seeing Ferdinand was affected, he went on to divert his ideas into another source.—"You must prepare your mind, Sir, for a shocking and interesting discovery, my uncle -"

"The good Ernest?" cried Ferdinand.—"I am ungrateful not to have asked for him." "He is wonderfully recovered, Heaven has heard his prayers, and prolonged his life to see the completion of his wishes. Ah! Sir, your brother"—"What of him?" said Ferdinand, starting at the name—"is in a state of distraction; for this week past he raves in-


text: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 1

title: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 1


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 to the east Nash had looked him up—and as far as Moran was concerned that once had been enough.

Moran’s healthy outdoor sense of the fitness of things had revolted at this man’s mode of life. Human weakness he could understand but not the ugly, perverted pleasures which Nash had reveled in. Even his oaths were not mere profanity but putrid slime.

“He showed me around one time, Flash,” said Moran. “He’s one hell of a fellow—that Nash. I like him the same way you like stale meat.”

He swept his glasses over the country, searching the grassy slopes of the peaks in search of a bunch of mountain sheep. Another file of horses showed way off to the right above the timberline, heading for the Rampart Pass. Three people walked behind the pack animals, leading their horses up the steep divide.

Moran rested his elbows on a rock to steady them for a better view. He looked long before he finally swung to his horse and headed down the opposite slope.

“One of that outfit was a woman, Flash—a girl,” he said after a while. “Now whatever do you suppose she was doing away off up in here?”

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text: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 2

title: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 2


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 Far below them they could see tiny green spots that broke the solid brown of the foothills; little cultivated fields of the squatters that were beginning to settle the range.

They made camp in a little side hill meadow.

“I wonder if she was young and pretty,” Moran said as he sat smoking one last pipeful before going to sleep.

“The spell of the Short Blue Moon is working on me too, Flash,” he went on. “After all, a man can live too much alone.

“All this we’ve been listening to—that’s what it means. The bucks polishing their horns on the trees, and all those bugling bulls. That note you listen for every night and don’t know what it is. The wolf season doesn’t start for a few months yet—when it does come you’ll know what all that means. It’s the same way with us all, even men. Every living creature needs one thing to round out his life—a mate.”

Moran slept, and Flash climbed back to the crest of the divide.

A light gleamed from a ridge above the valley where Brent’s pack outfit had halted late in the afternoon. It swayed back and forth as if suspended in the air. Far off among the bald ridges

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 cessantly; he has deeply injured you, and now all is discovered."

"Has he then confessed, is it possible it can be true, that he hired a villain to murder me? But before I hear more (said he) let me see my poor Charles." Mr. Dunloff, who stood in an attitude of wild amazement, started, and rung the bell. The lovely boy soon appeared, and flew into the arms of his father. His features were too like the deceased Claudina's not to make Ferdinand's heart bleed at the recollection; he pressed him to his bosom, and for a few moments the tender feelings of nature precluded speech.

Dunloff, who was impatient to explain every thing of so much importance, besought him to let Charles retire for the present.—The other consented in silence, when the tutor said, "Your last words, Sir, overpowered me! Is it possible the Count can have proceeded to such terrible lengths as your question seemed to imply?"


text:
Letter from the Emperor of China to H.R.H.The Prince Regent

The Supreme Potentate, who has received from Heaven and revolving Nature (the govemment of the world), issues an Imperial Mandate to the King of England with which let him be thoroughly acquainted.

Your country situated remotely, beyond a vast ocean, tenders an offering ofsincere devotedness, and turns with ardent affection to the transforming influences (which emanate from this land).

Formerly, in the 58th year of Keen-Lung, when the reign of the exalted, the honorable, and the immaculate Emperor approached its close, you sent an Embassadoracross the seas to (our) Palace.

At that time your Embassador with veneration and respect performed the ceremony without excess or defect, and in the observance of the forms of decorum, he was enabled to look up and receive (imperial) favor and affection; to see His Majesty; to be entertained at a banquet; and to have gifts, numerous and elegant, conferred upon him.

This year, you O King！again sent an Embassador, to present a written representation, and who was provided with the productions of (your) territory to introduce (to me).

I the Emperor considering that you, O King, were truly sincere in feelings of respect and obedience, was exceedingly pleased, caused forthwith former records to be examined; and regularly enjoined a great number of officers to wait for your Embassador, that on the day of his arrival he might respectfully see the Imperial person, and be entertained with a banquet, in all things exactly according to the ceremonies ofthe preceding reign.

Your Embassador began to hold intercourse at Teen-tsin. I appointed officers to be there to confer an Imperial banquet. Behold！When your Embassador was to return thanks for the banquet, he would not be obedient to the prescribed ceremonies.

I, the Emperor in reference to a petty officer of state, from a remote country, did not deem forms and ceremonies of great worth; it was a matter in which indulgence and compassionate forbearance might be shewn; and therefore especially orderedgreat officers of State to be accommodating with your Embassador, and when he arrived at Pekin to tell him that in the 58th year of Keen-Lung, your Embassador in performing the ceremony, completely (or always) knelt and bowed the head to the ground, according to the stated forms; upon this occasion how could a change be admitted？

Your Embassador told my Great Officers, face to face, that when the time came, he would obey, and would perform the kneeling and bowing the head to the ground; that no excess or falling short of the established forms should occur.

My Great Officers, in conformity to and in reliance upon this declaration, reported it to me, and I sent down my pleasure that on the 7th day of the 7th moon, your Embassador should be ordered to see the Imperial person; that on the 8th, in the great hall of light and splendor, a banquet should be conferred, and rewards bestowed; and again that in the garden of mutual pleasure, food should be conferred; that on the 9th, leave should be taken; and on the same day, it should be granted to ramble amongst the hills of ten thousand ages; that on the 11th, at the gate of great concord, rewards should be conferred, after which（he) should repair to the board of rites to abanquet; and that on the 12th, he should be sent to proceed on his journey.The dayof performing the ceremony and the etiquette to be observed, my Great Officers all previously stated to your Embassador.

On the 7th, the appointed time for your Embassador to see the Imperial Person, hehad arrived at the Palace, and I the Emperor was about to enter the Hall of Audience. The Embassador suddenly affirmed that he was exceedingly ill and could not movea step.I thought it a possible case that the Embassador was taken suddenly ill, and therefore ordered the Assistant Embassador to enter and see me; but both the Assistant Embassadors also affirmed they were ill. This was rudeness which was never exceeded.I did not inflict severe chastisement, but sent them away the same day with an order to return to their country.

As your Embassador did not see the Imperial Person, it was also inexpedient to send in the written representation brought from you O King. It is, in the state it was, carried back by your Embassador.

It is considered that you O King, from the distance of several times ten thousand lee, respectfully presented a written representation, and duly offered up presents; that your Ambassador's inability to communicate in your behalf with profound veneration and sincere devotedness, is his fault.The disposition of profound respect and obedience felt by you O King, I indeed really perceive.

I took from amongst the articles of tribute only maps, landscape prints, and portraits, and highly commend your feeling of sincere devotedness just the same as if Ihad received them all.There were conferred upon you O King, a white corundum Joo-ee（an emblem of prosperity); a string of Court beads; two large purses and eight small ones, to manifest tender and indulgent treatment.

Your country is distant from the central and flourishing Empire (China) too remotely.To send an Embassador such a distance over the waves of the sea is not an easy business. Further, your Embassador cannot understand and practice the rites and ceremonies of China. The subject involves a severe labour of the lips and tongue, to hear which is by no means pleasant.

The celestial empire does not value things brought from a distance. All the extraordinary and ingenious productions of your country also it does not look upon as rare pearls.

That you O King should preserve your people in peace, and be attentive to strengthen the limits of your territory, that no separation of that which is distant from that which is near, should take place, is what I the Emperor in truth highly commend.

Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an Embassador so far, and to be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing seas. If you can but pour out the heart in dutiful obedience, it is not necessary at stated times, to come to court, eer it be pronounced that you turn towards the transforming influences, which emanate from this land.

This Imperial Mandate is now given that you may for ever obey it.

Kea-King 21st year, 7th moon, 20th day. (Sept.11th, 1816).


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 near Two Ocean Pass Flash could see a tiny point of fire twinkling through the clear air. This too, made sweeps to the right and left.

Flash could not read the message, but he watched until the lights disappeared. From below him on one side sounded the wild, pealing bugle of an old bull elk, and the whistling snort of a blacktail buck; from the other came the occasional stroke of a horse bell. This reminded him of his trust.

He turned his back on the Land of Many Rivers and trotted down the opposite slope to Moran and the world of men.

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text: The Cross Pull/Chapter 5

title: The Cross Pull/Chapter 5


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 the knowledge on the part of the refusing heir alone suffices to request the revocation.

When the refusal has been revoked, the creditor may request the court to order him to receive the inheritance instead of the heir and by the right of such heir.

In this event, once the debts of the heir have been paid to the creditor, if there remains any portion which belongs to that heir, it shall pass to the descendants of the heir or to the other heirs of the inheritance owner, as the case may be.

Refusal of an inheritance by an heir takes retroactive effect from the time of the death of the inheritance owner.

When any statutory heir refuses an inheritance, his descendants can succeed to the inheritance by virtue of their own rights and are entitled to the share equal to that which the refuser would receive, but those descendants must not be ones in whose names the fathers, mothers, guardians, or custodians, as the case may be, have validly refused the inheritance.

If the descendants of the refuser have received the inheritance as stated in section 1615, the refuser

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 has no right of management and enjoyment as mentioned in Chapter 3 of Title 2 of Book 5 of this Code in regard to the property received by his descendants, and section 1548 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Any legatee who refuses the inheritance, as well as his descendants, loses the right to receive the inheritance refused.

If an inheritance has been refused by a statutory heir who has no descendant eligible to receive it, or by a legatee, the share which belongs to the refuser shall be distributed to the other heirs of the inheritance owner.

No person shall, by any means, waive or alienate a contingent right to succeed to the inheritance of a living person.

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text:
Letter from the Prince Regent to the Emperor of China

George Prince Regent in the name and in behalf of His Majesty George the Third by the Grace of God King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the Christian Faith, King of Hanover, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, etc. to the most high mighty and glorious Prince the Emperor of China our Brother and cousin health and true happiness.

Most HIGH AND MIGHTY PRINCE.

The lamented and continued illness of my Royal and venerable Father having called me to the exercise of the functions of sovereignty I have felt anxious to communicate the important occurrence to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty, and to cultivate and improve by every means in my power the friendship, that so happily subsisted between our Royal Fathers and their respective Empires. The present time when under the favour of the Almighty the Blessings of Peace have been diffused over the Dominions of my Royal Father and the several states of Europe has appeared to me the most auspicious Season for addressig myself to your Imperial Majesty, and I have accordingly dispatched to your presence our Right Trusty and well beloved councillor William Pitt Lord Amherst, Peer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and one of the Lords of His Majesty's Bedchamber, who has been employed in diverse important Missions, and in whom we repose entire confidence with the Rank of His Majesty's Embassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary who with every asurance of my profound regard and attachment will deliver this Letter to Your Imperial Majesty. His Majesty's Embassador will also present certain articles the produce and manufacture of the Territories of my Royal Father, which will I trust as tokens of my veneration and esteem prove acceptable to your Imperial Majesty. Conceiving, that in the spirit of that wise and benevolent Policy, which has distinguished your Imperial Majesty's reign you may possibly direct the confidential Ministers of your Illustrious Government to communicate with His Majesty's Embassador upon matters relating to the mutual interests and prosperity of both Empires, I have instructed and empowered the Embassador to receive the same and on his part to make certain representations, which have appeared to me connected with these important subjects, and so we wish Your Imperial Majesty Health Peace and true Felicity.

Given at our Court at Carlton House the 19th Day of January 1816 in the 56th year of His Majesty's Reign-1816.1.19

Your Imperial Majesty's Most affectionate Brother and cousin

signed/GEORGE P.R.


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If any person dies without having made a will or he has made a will but it is ineffective, all his inheritance property shall be distributed to his statutory heirs according to the law.

If any person dies having made a will but the will only disposes of or takes effect as to certain parts of the inheritance property, the parts not disposed of or governed by the will shall be distributed to the statutory heirs according to the law.

Save where the testator has expressed a different intention in his will, any statutory heir, although having already received any property by virtue of the will, shall still have the right to claim in full his statutory share in the parts of the inheritance property not disposed of by the will.

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 No bhikshu shall claim an inheritance as a statutory heir, save where he leaves the priesthood to enforce his claim within the limitation period under section 1754.

But a bhikshu can be a legatee.

The property obtained by a bhikshu whilst in the priesthood shall, upon his death, be devolve upon the temple where he was domiciled, save where he has disposed of it during his life or by a will.

Any property owned by a person prior to being ordained as a bhikshu shall not devolve upon any temple and shall become part of the inheritance which devolves upon his statutory heirs or may be disposed of by him in any manner according to the law.

If the deceased is a married person, the determination of shares and the distribution of property between him and his surviving spouse shall be as follows:

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text:
Author:Edward Sedgwick

Film directed

 * The Cameraman (1928)

title: Author:Edward Sedgwick


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 the plot of these values in terms of frequency shows how closely their relation fits the function expressing a rectangular hyperbola, having an equation:

$$(530-f) (f_e-608) = 220$$,

f being the given frequency and /, its complementary.

In order to secure reliable conditions for complete color vision even in the normal observer, it is necessary to restrict the stimulus to the retinal cones, excluding the rods, which yield only achromatic colors. Pure cone vision can be secured by satisfying the following requirements.

A. .—Recent investigations by Abney indicate that a considerable number of individuals possess rods in the center of the retina as well as in the periphery, so that before relying upon the restriction of the stimulus to a central field, the observer should be tested for the Purkinje phenomenon in central vision.

B. .—The normal retina possesses no rods in an area slightly greater than three degrees in diameter, surrounding the intersection of the line of sight with the retina (, 10). Consequently, in the case of an observer known to be normal in this respect, a field of three degrees, with fixation on the center of the field, insures pure cone vision at all intensities.

C. .—With all observers and all field sizes, pure cone vision is obtainable at intensities above approximately one hundred photons, provided the eye has not previously been exposed for a considerable time to a much lower intensity or assuming a condition of equilibrium adaptation to the given intensity level, which should be reached within ten minutes (; 34). One hundred photons represents an external stimulus surface brightness of one hundred candles per square meter, used with a pupillary opening of one square millimeter, or equivalent conditions as regards retinal illumination.

It is the function of the present Part of this Report to consider some physical standards which are of importance in colorimetrics.

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260


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text:
Dunn v. Blumstein/Opinion of the Court

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Various Tennessee public officials (hereinafter Tennessee) appeal from a decision by a three-judge federal court holding that Tennessee's durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The issue arises in a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by appellee James Blumstein. Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. With an eye toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he attempted to register to vote on July 1, 1970. The country registrar refused to register him, on the ground that Tennessee law authorizes the registration of only those persons who, at the time of the next election, will have been residents of the State for a year and residents of the county for three months.

After exhausting state administrative remedies, Blumstein brought this action challenging these residence [p332] requirements on federal constitutional grounds. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that Tennessee's durational residence [p333] requirements were unconstitutional (1) because they impermissibly interfered with the right to vote and (2) because they created a "suspect" classification penalizing some Tennessee residents because of recent interstate movement. 337 F. Supp. 323 (MD Tenn. 1970). We noted probable jurisdiction, 401 U.S. 934 (1971). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision below.

I
[p334] The subject of this lawsuit is the durational residence requirement. Appellee does not challenge Tennessee's power to restrict the vote to bona fide Tennessee residents. Nor has Tennessee ever disputed that appellee was a bona fide resident of the State and county when he attempted to register. But Tennessee insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and three months in the county. It is this additional durational residence requirement that appellee challenges.

Durational residence laws penalize those persons who have traveled from one place to another to establish a new residence during the qualifying period. Such laws divide residents into two classes, old residents and new residents, and discriminate against the latter to the extent [p335] of totally denying them the opportunity to vote. The constitutional question presented is whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a State to discriminate in this way among its citizens.

To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). In considering laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court has evolved more than one test, depending upon the interest affected or the classification involved. First, then, we must determine what standard of review is appropriate. In the present case, whether we look to the benefit withheld by the classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude that the State must show a substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements.

A
[p336] Durational residence requirements completely bar from voting all residents not meeting the fixed durational standards. By denying some citizens the right to vote, such laws deprive them of "'a fundamental political right,... preservative of all rights.'" Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). There is no need to repeat now the labors undertaken in earlier cases to analyze this right to vote and to explain in detail the judicial role in reviewing state statutes that selectively distribute the franchise. In decision after decision, this court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421-422, 426 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-628 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. This "equal right to vote," Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 426, is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 91; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 144 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.), 241 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 294 (opinion of STEWART, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined). But, as a general matter, "before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny." Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 422; see Bullock v. Carter, ante, p. 134, at 143.

[p337] Tennessee urges that this case is controlled by Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). Drueding was a decision upholding Maryland's durational residence requirements. The District Court tested those requirements by the equal protection standard applied to ordinary state regulations: whether the exclusions are reasonably related to a permissible state interest. 234 F. Supp. 721, 724-725 (Md. 1964). We summarily affirmed per curiam without the benefit of argument. But if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute that "place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to vote." Bullock v. Carter, supra, at 143. This development in the law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra. There we canvassed in detail the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing the franchise, 395 U.S., at 626-630, noting inter alia that such statutes "constitute the foundation of our representative society." We concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id., at 627 (emphasis added); Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 704; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205, 209 (1970). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra, at 670. This is the test we apply here.

B
[p338] This exacting test is appropriate for another reason, never considered in Drueding: Tennessee's durational residence laws classify bona fide residents on the basis of recent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period. Thus, the durational residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel.

"[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 634 (1969); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 237 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 285-286 (STEWART, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined). And it is clear that the freedom to travel includes the "freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union," id., at 285. Obviously, durational residence laws single out the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such travelers directly. We considered such a durational residence requirement in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, where the pertinent statutes imposed a one-year waiting period for interstate migrants as a condition to receiving welfare benefits. Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements could be used to determine voting eligibility, [p339] id., at 638 n. 21, we concluded that since the right to travel was a constitutionally protected right, "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id., at 634. This compelling-state-interest test was also adopted in the separate concurrence of MR. JUSTICE STEWART. Preceded by a long line of cases recognizing the constitutional right to travel, and repeatedly reaffirmed in the face of attempts to disregard it, see Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), and Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972), Shapiro and the compelling-state-interest test it articulates control this case.

Tennessee attempts to distinguish Shapiro by urging that "the vice of the welfare statute in Shapiro... was its objective to deter interstate travel." Brief for Appellants 13. In Tennessee's view, the compelling-state-interest test is appropriate only where there is "some evidence to indicate a deterrence of or infringement on the right to travel..." Ibid. Thus, Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear command of Shapiro by arguing that durational residence requirements for voting neither seek to nor actually deter such travel. In essence, Tennessee argues that the right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally relevant sense.

This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other "right to travel" [p340] cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-interest test would be triggered by "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel]..." Id., at 634 (emphasis added); see id., at 638 n. 21. While noting the frank legislative purpose to deter migration by the poor, and speculating that "[a]n indigent who desires to migrate... will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk" the loss of benefits, id., at 629, the majority found no need to dispute the "evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred [from moving] by residence requirements." Id., at 650 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also id., at 671-672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been deterred. Only last Term, it was specifically noted that because a durational [p341] residence requirement for voting "operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration..., [it] may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 238 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) (emphasis added).

Of course, it is true that the two individual interests affected by Tennessee's durational residence requirements are affected in different ways. Travel is permitted, but only at a price; voting is prohibited. The right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote is absolutely denied. But these differences are irrelevant for present purposes. Shapiro implicitly realized what this Court has made explicit elsewhere: "'It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution... 'Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be... indirectly denied'...' Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)."

See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and cases cited therein; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). The right to travel is an "unconstitutional personal right," a right whose exercise may not be conditioned. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 643 (STEWART, J., concurring) (emphasis added); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 292 (STEWART J., concurring and dissenting, [p342] with whom BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN J., joined). Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have recently exercised that right. In the present case, such laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-583 (1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way.

C
In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634 (first emphasis added); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S., at 627. Thus phrased, the constitutional question may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal "tests" do not have the precision of [p343] mathematical formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes.

It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements further a very substantial state interest. In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967), and must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 631. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

II
We turn, then, to the question of whether the State has shown that durational residence requirements are needed to further a sufficiently substantial state interest. We emphasize again the difference between bona fide residence requirements and durational residence requirements. We have in the past noted approvingly that the States have the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision. E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). An appropriately defined and uniformly applied [p344] requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny. But durational residence requirements, representing a separate voting qualification imposed on bona fide residents, must be separately tested by the stringent standard. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 636.

It is worth noting at the outset that Congress has, in a somewhat different context, addressed the question whether durational residence laws further compelling state interests. In § 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress outlawed state durational residence requirements for presidential and vice-presidential elections, and prohibited the States from closing registration more than 30 days before such elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1. In doing so, it made a specific finding that durational residence requirements and more restrictive registration practices do "not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections." 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(6). We upheld this portion of the Voting Rights Act in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. In our present case, of course, we deal with congressional, state, and local elections, in which the State's interests are arguably somewhat different; and, in addition, our function is not merely to determine whether there was a reasonable basis for Congress' findings. However, the congressional finding which forms the basis for the Federal Act is a useful background for the discussion that follows.

[p345] Tennessee tenders "two basic purposes" served by its durational residence requirements: "(1) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX—Protection against fraud through colonization and inability to identify persons offering to vote, and

"(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER—Afford some surety that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the community and that as such, he has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government and is, therefore, more likely to exercise his right more intelligently. Brief for Appellants 15, citing 18 Am. Jur., Elections, § 56, p. 217.

We consider each in turn.

A
Preservation of the "purity of the ballot box" is a formidable-sounding state interest. The impurities feared, variously called "dual voting" and "colonization," all involve voting by nonresidents, either singly or in groups. The main concern is that nonresidents will temporarily invade the State or county, falsely swear that they are residents to become eligible to vote, and, by voting, allow a candidate to win by fraud. Surely the prevention of such fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal. But it is impossible to view durational residence requirements as necessary to achieve that state interest.

Preventing fraud, the asserted evil that justifies state lawmaking, means keeping nonresidents from voting. But, by definition, a durational residence law bars newly arrived residents from the franchise along with nonresidents. The State argues that such sweeping laws are necessary to prevent fraud because they are needed to identify bona fide residents. This contention is [p346] particularly unconvincing in light of Tennessee's total statutory scheme for regulating the franchise.

Durational residence laws may once have been necessary to prevent a fraudulent evasion of state voter standards, but today in Tennessee, as in most other States, this purpose is served by a system of voter registration. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-301 et seq. (1955 and Supp. 1970); see State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 122 S.W. 465 (1909). Given this system, the record is totally devoid of any evidence that durational residence requirements are in fact necessary to identify bona fide residents. The qualifications of the would-be voter in Tennessee are determined when he registers to vote, which he may do until 30 days before the election. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-304. His qualifications—including bona fide residence—are established then by oath. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-309. There is no indication in the record that Tennessee routinely goes behind the would-be voter's oath to determine his qualifications. Since false swearing is no obstacle to one intent on fraud, the existence of burdensome voting qualifications like durational residence requirements cannot prevent corrupt nonresidents from fraudulently registering and voting. As long as the State relies on the oath-swearing system to establish qualifications, a durational residence requirement adds nothing to a simple residence requirement in the effort to stop fraud. The nonresident intent on committing election fraud will as quickly and effectively swear that he has been a resident for the requisite period of time as he would swear that he was simply a resident. Indeed, the durational residence requirement becomes an effective voting obstacle [p347] only to residents who tell the truth and have no fraudulent purposes.

Moreover, to the extent that the State makes an enforcement effort after the oath is sworn, it is not clear what role the durational residence requirement could play in protecting against fraud. The State closes the registration books 30 days before an election to give officials an opportunity to prepare for the election. Before the books close, anyone may register who claims that he will meet the durational residence requirement at the time of the next election. Although Tennessee argues that this 30-day period between registration and election does not give the State enough time to verify this claim of bona fide residence, we do not see the relevance of that position to this case. As long as the State permits registration up to 30 days before an election, a lengthy durational residence requirement does not increase the amount of time the State has in which to carry out an investigation into the sworn claim by the would-be voter that he is in fact a resident.

Even if durational residence requirements imposed, in practice, a pre-election waiting period that gave voting officials three months or a year in which to confirm the bona fides of residence, Tennessee would not have demonstrated that these waiting periods were necessary. At the outset, the State is faced with the fact that it must defend two separate waiting periods of different lengths. It is impossible to see how both could be "necessary" to fulfill the pertinent state objective. If the State itself has determined that a three-month period is enough time in which to confirm bona fide residence in the State and county, obviously a one-year period cannot also be justified as "necessary" to achieve the same purpose. [p348] Beyond that, the job of detecting nonresidents from among persons who have registered is a relatively simple one. It hardly justifies prohibiting all newcomers from voting for even three months. To prevent dual voting, state voting officials simply have to cross-check lists of new registrants with their former jurisdictions. See Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 364 and n. 34, 374 (1970); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 637. Objective information tendered as relevant to the question of bona fide residence under Tennessee law—places of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's license, property owned, etc. —is easy to doublecheck, especially in light of modern communications. Tennessee itself concedes that "[i]t might well be that these purposes can be achieved under requirements of shorter duration than that imposed by the State of Tennessee..." Brief for Appellants 10. Fixing a constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of degree. It is sufficient to note that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or three months, too much. This was the judgment of Congress in the context of presidential elections. And, on the basis of the [p349] statutory scheme before us, it is almost surely the judgment of the Tennessee lawmakers as well. As the court below concluded, the cutoff point for registration 30 days before an election "'reflects the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature that thirty days is an adequate period in which Tennessee's election officials can effect whatever measures may be necessary, in each particular case confronting them, to insure purity of the ballot and prevent dual registration and dual voting.' 337 F. Supp., at 330."

It has been argued that durational residence requirements are permissible because a person who has satisfied the waiting-period requirements is conclusively presumed to be a bona fide resident. In other words, durational residence requirements are justified because they create an administratively useful conclusive presumption that recent arrivals are not residents and are therefore [p350] properly barred from the franchise. This presumption, so the argument runs, also prevents fraud, for few candidates will be able to induce migration for the purpose of voting if fraudulent voters are required to remain in the false locale for three months or a year in order to vote on election day.

In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, this Court considered and rejected a similar kind of argument in support of a similar kind of conclusive presumption. There, the State argued that it was difficult to tell whether persons moving to Texas while in the military service were in fact bona fide residents. Thus, the State said, the administrative convenience of avoiding difficult factual determinations justified a blanket exclusion of all servicemen stationed in Texas. The presumption created there was conclusive—"'incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character.'" Id., at 96, citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 324 (1932). The [p351] Court rejected this "conclusive presumption" approach as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. While many servicemen in Texas were not bona fide residents, and therefore properly ineligible to vote, many servicemen clearly were bona fide residents. Since "more precise tests" were available "to winnow successfully from the ranks... those whose residents in the State is bona fide," conclusive presumptions were impermissible in light of the individual interests affected. Id., at 95. "States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State." Id., at 96.

Carrington sufficiently disposes of this defense of durational residence requirements. The State's legitimate purpose is to determine whether certain persons in the community are bona fide residents. A durational residence requirement creates a classification that may, in a crude way, exclude nonresidents from that group. But it also excludes many residents. Given the State's legitimate purpose and the individual interests that are affected, the classification is all too imprecise. See supra, at 343. In general, it is not very difficult for Tennessee to determine on an individualized basis whether one recently arrived in the community is in fact a resident, although of course there will always be difficult cases. Tennessee has defined a test for bona fide residence, and appears prepared to apply it on an individualized basis in various legal contexts. That test [p352] could easily be applied to new arrivals. Furthermore, if it is unlikely that would-be fraudulent voters would remain in a false locale for the lengthy period imposed by durational residence requirements, it is just as unlikely that they would collect such objective indicia of bona fide residence as a dwelling, car registration, or driver's license. In spite of these things, the question of bona fide residence is settled for new arrivals by conclusive presumption, not by individualized inquiry. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96. Thus, it has always been undisputed that appellee Blumstein is himself a bona fide resident of Tennessee within the ordinary state definition of residence. But since Tennessee's presumption from failure to meet the durational residence requirements is conclusive, a showing of actual bona fide residence is irrelevant, even though such a showing would fully serve the State's purposes embodied in the presumption and would achieve those purposes with far less drastic impact on constitutionally protected interests. The Equal Protection Clause places a limit on government by classification, and that limit has been exceeded here. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 636; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S., at 542-543; Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

[p353] Our conclusion that the waiting period is not the least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud is bolstered by the recognition that Tennessee has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared. At least six separate sections of the Tennessee Code define offenses to deal with voter fraud. For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-324 makes it a crime "for any person to register or to have his name registered as a qualified voter... when he is not entitled to be so registered... or to procure to induce any other person to register or be registered... when such person is not legally qualified to be registered as such..." In addition to the various criminal penalties, Tennessee permits the bona fides of a voter to be challenged on election day. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1309 et seq. (1955 and Supp. 1970). Where a State has available such remedial action [p354] to supplement its voter registration system, it can hardly argue that broadly imposed political disabilities such as durational residence requirements are needed to deal with the evils of fraud. Now that the Federal Voting Rights Act abolishes those residence requirements as a precondition for voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1, it is clear that the States will have to resort to other devices available to prevent nonresidents from voting. Especially since every State must live with this new federal statute, it is impossible to believe that durational residence requirements are necessary to meet the State's goal of stopping fraud.

B
The argument that durational residence requirements further the goal of having "knowledgeable voters" appears to involve three separate claims. The first is that such requirements "afford some surety that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the community." But here the State appears to confuse a bona fide residence requirement with a durational residence requirement. As already noted, a State does have an interest in limiting the franchise to bona fide members of the community. But this does not justify or explain the exclusion from the franchise of persons, not because their bona fide residence is questioned, but because they are recent rather than longtime residents.

The second branch of the "knowledgeable voters" justification is that durational residence requirements assure that the voter "has a common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community's] government..." By this, presumably, the State means that it may require a period of residence sufficiently lengthy to impress upon [p355] its voters the local viewpoint. This is precisely the sort of argument this Court has repeatedly rejected. In Carrington v. Rash, for example, the State argued that military men newly moved into Texas might not have local interests sufficiently in mind, and therefore could be excluded from voting in state elections. This Court replied: "'But if they are in fact residents,... they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation... 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.' 380 U.S., at 94." See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(4).

Similarly here, Tennessee's hopes for voters with a "common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community's] government" is impermissible. To paraphrase what we said elsewhere, "All too often, lack of a ['common interest'] might mean no more than a different interest." Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 423. "[D]ifferences of opinion" may not be the basis for excluding any group or person from the franchise. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S., at 705-706. "[T]he fact that newly arrived [Tennesseans] may have a more national outlook than longtime residents, or even may retain a viewpoint characteristic of the region from which they have come, is a constitutionally impermissible reason for depriving them of their chance to influence the [p356] electoral vote of their new home State." Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (dissenting opinion).

Finally, the State urges that a longtime resident is "more likely to exercise his right [to vote] more intelligently." To the extent that this is different from the previous argument, the State is apparently asserting an interest in limiting the franchise to voters who are knowledgeable about the issues. In this case, Tennessee argues that people who have been in the State less than a year and the county less than three months are likely to be unaware of the issues involved in the congressional, state, and local elections, and therefore can be barred from the franchise. We note that the criterion of "intelligent" voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of abuse. But without deciding as a general matter the extent to which a State can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise, cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S., at 632; Cipriano v. City [p357] of Houma, 395 U.S., at 705, we conclude that durational residence requirements cannot be justified on this basis.

In Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, we held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited New York State from limiting the vote in school-district elections to parents of school children and to property owners. The State claimed that since nonparents would be "less informed" about school affairs than parents, id., at 631, the State could properly exclude the class of nonparents to limit the franchise to the more "interested" group of residents. We rejected that position, concluding that a "close scrutiny of [the classification] demonstrates that [it does] not accomplish this purpose with sufficient precision..." Id., at 632. That scrutiny revealed that the classification excluding nonparents from the franchise kept many persons from voting who were as substantially interested as those allowed to vote; given this, the classification was insufficiently "tailored" to achieve the articulated state goal. Ibid. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 706.

Similarly, the durational residence requirements in this case founder because of their crudeness as a device for [p358] achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise. The classifications created by durational residence requirements obviously permit any longtime resident to vote regardless of his knowledge of the issues—and obviously many longtime residents do not have any. On the other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise many other, admittedly new, residents who have become at least minimally, and often fully, informed about the issues. Indeed, recent migrants who take the time to register and vote shortly after moving are likely to be these citizens, such as appellee, who make it a point to be informed and knowledgeable about the issues. Given modern communications, and given the clear indication that campaign spending and voter education occur largely during the month before an election, the State cannot seriously maintain that it is "necessary" to reside for a year in the State and three months in the county in order to be knowledgable about congressional, state, or even purely local elections. There is simply nothing in the record to support the conclusive presumption that residents who have lived in the State for less than a year and their county for less than three months are uninformed about elections. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson,, 394 U.S., at 631. These durational residence requirements crudely exclude large numbers of fully qualified people. Especially since Tennessee creates a waiting period by closing registration books 30 days before an election, there can be no basis for arguing that any durational residence requirement is also needed to assure knowledgeability.

It is pertinent to note that Tennessee has never made an attempt to further its alleged interest in an informed electorate in a universally applicable way. Knowledge [p359] or competence has never been a criterion for participation in Tennessee's electoral process for longtime residents. Indeed, the State specifically provides for voting by various types of absentee persons. These provisions permit any longtime residents who leave the county or State to participate in a constituency in which they have only the slightest political interest, and from whose political debates they are likely to be cut off. That the State specifically permits such voting is not consistent with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent, informed use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure intelligent use in the ballot, it may not try to serve this interest only with respect to new arrivals. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 637-638.

It may well be true that new residents as a group know less about state and local issues than older residents; and it is surely true that durational residence requirements will exclude some people from voting who are totally [p360] uninformed about election matters. But as devices to limit the franchise to knowledgeable residents, the conclusive presumptions of durational residence requirements are much too crude. They exclude too many people who should not, and need not, be excluded. They represent a requirement of knowledge unfairly imposed on only some citizens. We are aware that classifications are always imprecise. By requiring classifications to be tailored to their purpose, we do not secretly require the impossible. Here, there is simply too attenuated a relationship between the state interest in an informed electorate and the fixed requirement that voters must have been residents in the State for a year and the county for three months. Given the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes affecting constitutional rights, we cannot say that durational residence requirements are necessary to further a compelling state interest.

III
Concluding that Tennessee has not offered an adequate justification for its durational residence laws, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

title: Dunn v. Blumstein/Opinion of the Court


text:
Page:Romance of the Rose (Ellis), volume 1.pdf/295

Rh


text:
Page:The Royal Book of Oz.djvu/157

 be." He stared through the long dim empty hall, with its shimmering silver screens and vases. "I wonder what little Dorothy is doing," sighed the Scarecrow wistfully.

title: Page:The Royal Book of Oz.djvu/157


text: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 3

title: Romance of the Rose (Ellis)/Chapter 3


text: Index:The argonauts Translated from the Polish by Jeremiah Curtin.djvu


text:
Author:Eliza Orzeszkowa

Works

 * Eli Makower, 1875
 * Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, 1880
 * Lost Souls, 1886
 * On the Niemen, 1888
 * Cham, 1888
 * Meir Ezofovitch, 1898
 * The Argonauts (Orzeszkowa), 1901, index

title: Author:Eliza Orzeszkowa