text: Talk:For Geraldine's Career

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Talk:For Geraldine's Career


text:
Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/19

Rh {| class="wikitable" ! Year of first involvment !! Country !! Nature of involvment !! Further information
 * 2021 || Chad || Unknown|| We have medium confidence that since 2021 the Prigozhin- linked entity, FZNC (sanctioned by the US Government), has conducted questionable polling in which it asked Chadians if they would be willing to participate in demonstrations. This polling was accompanied by commentary from Maxim Shugaley, an individual sanctioned for his links to Wagner in some jurisdictions (see Appendix 1). There are rumours that FACT has been trained by Wagner but these have not been verified.
 * Unknown || Serbia || Durable || In January 2023, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic denied Wagner’s involvement in the country. We have high confidence that the network advertised in Serbia in January 2023 for fighters in the war against Ukraine. There have been reports of connections between the Serbian ‘People’s Patrol’ organisation and the Wagner Network
 * Unknown || Zambia || Unknown|| We have medium confidence that FZNC has conducted polling, even though this was not publicly released. PDF reports on polling in Chad that were released on 25 March 2021 contained the following title (translated) in their metadata: “Qualitative research on public opinion in Zambia”.
 * }
 * Unknown || Zambia || Unknown|| We have medium confidence that FZNC has conducted polling, even though this was not publicly released. PDF reports on polling in Chad that were released on 25 March 2021 contained the following title (translated) in their metadata: “Qualitative research on public opinion in Zambia”.
 * }
 * }

Additionally, we have seen some evidence that Wagner operatives have been physically present in other countries since 2014. Due to our low confidence in the accuracy of this information, we have not named these countries.

13. '''The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. The network subsequently expanded to several other countries in Africa and the Middle East. It has undertaken offensive military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. There are 10 further countries where we have medium or high confidence that it has been involved in a non-military capacity since 2014, and many more countries where the network’s presence is rumoured.'''


text:
Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/48

Rh Russia which continue to have close and intimate relationships with Russian officials300 We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government should do all within its power to restrict the flow of arms and other military equipment to the Wagner Network, to reduce the viability of future combat operations. The UK Government should also share intelligence with host Governments to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Wagner Network and to demonstrate how it is a tool of enrichment for the Russian state.

75. Our report focused on the Wagner Network as an obvious example of a ‘PMC’—also often called PMSC301 —that poses a threat to the UK’s interests and values. We acknowledge that many dispute the applicability of this term. It is not the only Russia-aligned PMC,302 even if it is unique.303 Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, warned of an “extremely concerning” increase in the use of ‘PMCs’ as proxies by Russia and others.304 Some drew attention to the significant growth of China’s private sector industry in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative,305 and warned that countries may consider using proxies in future in a similar way to Russia, as we have seen in Iran.306 As we watch the fallout of the Wagner Network and where it continues to have influence, we should be particularly looking at Syria and whether Iran