text:
Clinton v. Jones/Concurrence Breyer

Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that the Constitution does not automatically grant the President an immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct. Nor does the "doctrine of separation of powers require federal courts to stay" virtually "all private actions against the President until he leaves office." Ante, at 705–706. Rather, as the Court of Appeals stated, the President cannot simply rest upon the claim that a private civil lawsuit for damages will "interfere with the constitutionally assigned duties of the Executive Branch without detailing any specific responsibilities or explaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit." 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (CA8 1996). To obtain a postponement the President must "bea[r] the burden of establishing its need." Ante, at 708.

In my view, however, once the President sets forth and explains a conflict between judicial proceeding and public duties, the matter changes. At that point, the Constitution permits a judge to schedule a trial in an ordinary civil damages action (where postponement normally is possible without overwhelming damage to a plaintiff) only within the constraints of a constitutional principle—a principle that forbids a federal judge in such a case to interfere with the President's discharge of his public duties. I have no doubt that the Constitution contains such a principle applicable to civil suits, based upon Article II's vesting of the entire "executive Power" in a single individual, implemented through the Constitution's [p711] structural separation of powers, and revealed both by history and case precedent.

I recognize that this case does not require us now to apply the principle specifically, thereby delineating its contours; nor need we now decide whether lower courts are to apply it directly or categorically through the use of presumptions or rules of administration. Yet I fear that to disregard it now may appear to deny it. I also fear that the majority's description of the relevant precedents de-emphasizes the extent to which they support a principle of the President's independent authority to control his own time and energy, see, e.g., ante, at 693, 694 (describing the "central concern" of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), as "to avoid rendering the President 'unduly cautious); ante, at 695, 696, and n. 23 (describing statements by Story, Jefferson, Adams, and Ellsworth as providing "little" or "no substantial support" for the President's position). Further, if the majority is wrong in predicting the future infrequency of private civil litigation against sitting Presidents, ante, at 702, acknowledgment and future delineation of the constitutional principle will prove a practically necessary institutional safeguard. For these reasons, I think it important to explain how the Constitution's text, history, and precedent support this principle of judicial noninterference with Presidential functions in ordinary civil damages actions.

I
The Constitution states that the "executive Power shall be vested in a President." Art. II, § 1. This constitutional delegation means that a sitting President is unusually busy, that his activities have an unusually important impact upon the lives of others, and that his conduct embodies an authority bestowed by the entire American electorate. He (along with his constitutionally subordinate Vice President) is the only official for whom the entire Nation votes, and is the only elected officer to represent the entire Nation both domestically and abroad.

[p712] This constitutional delegation means still more. Article II makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch in much the same way that the entire Congress is responsible for the actions of the Legislative Branch, or the entire Judiciary for those of the Judicial Branch. It thereby creates a constitutional equivalence between a single President, on the one hand, and many legislators, or judges, on the other.

The Founders created this equivalence by consciously deciding to vest Executive authority in one person rather than several. They did so in order to focus, rather than to spread, Executive responsibility thereby facilitating accountability. They also sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the Constitution divides among many. Compare U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1 (vesting power in "a President"), with U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1 (vesting power in "a Congress" that "consist[s] of a Senate and House of Representatives"), and U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1 (vesting power in a "supreme Court" and "inferior Courts").

The authority explaining the nature and importance of this decision is legion. See, e.g., J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 144 (J. Gough ed.1947) (desirability of a perpetual Executive); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *242–*243 (need for single Executive); The Federalist No. 70, p. 423 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (Executive "[e]nergy" needed for security, "steady administration of the laws," "protection of property," "justice," and protection of "liberty"); Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, in Essays on the Constitution 161, 163 (P. Ford ed. 1892) ("supreme executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698–699, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2623, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing history); id., at 705 (describing textual basis); [p713] id., at 729 (describing policy arguments). See also The Federalist No. 71, at 431 (A. Hamilton); P. Kurland, Watergate and the Constitution 135 (1978) (President is "sole indispensable man in government" and "should not be called" from his duties "at the instance of any other branch of government"); Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 37–47 (1995). Cf. T. Roosevelt, An Autobiography 372 (1913).

For present purposes, this constitutional structure means that the President is not like Congress, for Congress can function as if it were whole, even when up to half of its members are absent, see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 1. It means that the President is not like the Judiciary, for judges often can designate other judges, e.g., from other judicial circuits, to sit even should an entire court be detained by personal litigation. It means that, unlike Congress, which is regularly out of session, U.S. Const., Art. I, §§ 4, 5, 7, the President never adjourns.

More importantly, these constitutional objectives explain why a President, though able to delegate duties to others, cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it. And the related constitutional equivalence between President, Congress, and the Judiciary means that judicial scheduling orders in a private civil case must not only take reasonable account of, say, a particularly busy schedule, or a job on which others critically depend, or an underlying electoral mandate. They must also reflect the fact that interference with a President's ability to carry out his public responsibilities is constitutionally equivalent to interference with the ability of the entirety of Congress, or the Judicial Branch, to carry out its public obligations.

II
The leading case regarding Presidential immunity from suit is Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Before discussing Fitzgerald, it is helpful to understand the historical precedent on which it [p714] relies. While later events have called into question some of the more extreme views on Presidential immunity, the essence of the constitutional principle remains true today. The historical sources, while not in themselves fully determinative, in conjunction with this Court's precedent inform my judgment that the Constitution protects the President from judicial orders in private civil cases to the extent that those orders could significantly interfere with his efforts to carry out his ongoing public responsibilities.

A
Three of the historical sources this Court cited in Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749, 750–752, n. 31—a commentary by Joseph Story, an argument attributed to John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, and a letter written by Thomas Jefferson—each make clear that this is so.

First, Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries:

"There are incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among those, must necessarily be included the power to perform them, without any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418–419 (1833) (emphasis added), quoted in Fitzgerald, supra, at 749.

As interpreted by this Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the words "for this purpose" would seem to refer to the President's need for "official inviolability" in order to "perform" the duties of his office without "obstruction or impediment." As so read, Story's commentary does not explicitly define the [p715] contours of "official inviolability." But it does suggest that the "inviolability" is timebound ("while in the discharge of the duties of his office"); that it applies in private lawsuits (for it attaches to the President's "person" in "civil cases"); and that it is functional ("necessarily implied from the nature of the [President's] functions").

Since Fitzgerald did not involve a physical constraint, the Court's reliance upon Justice Story's commentary makes clear, in the Court's view, that the commentary does not limit the scope of "inviolability" to an immunity from a physical imprisonment, physical detention, or physical "arrest"—a now abandoned procedure that permitted the arrest of certain civil case defendants (e.g., those threatened by bankruptcy) during a civil proceeding.

I would therefore read Story's commentary to mean what it says, namely, that Article II implicitly grants an "official inviolability" to the President "while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office," and that this inviolability must be broad enough to permit him "to perform" his official duties without "obstruction or impediment." As this Court has previously held, the Constitution may grant this kind of protection implicitly; it need not do so explicitly. See Fitzgerald, supra, at 750, n. 31; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–706, n. 16 (1974); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406 (1819).

Second, during the first Congress, then-Vice President John Adams and then-Senator Oliver Ellsworth expressed a view of an applicable immunity far broader than any currently asserted. Speaking of a sitting President, they said that the President, personally, was not the subject to any process whatever For [that] would  put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over him and stop the whole machine of Government. 457 U.S., at 751, n. 31 (quoting Journal of William Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890) (Sept. 26 journal entry reporting exchange between Sen. Maclay, Adams, and Ellsworth)). They [p716] included in their claim a kind of immunity from criminal, as well as civil, process. They responded to a counterargument—that the President "was not above the laws," and would have to be arrested if guilty of crimes—by stating that the President would first have to be impeached, and could then be prosecuted. 9 Documentary History of First Federal Congress of United States 168 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds. 1988) (Diary of William Maclay). This Court's rejection of Adams' and Ellsworth's views in the context of criminal proceedings, see ante, at 703–704, does not deprive those views of authority here. See Fitzgerald, supra, at 751–752, n. 31. Nor does the fact that Senator William Maclay, who reported the views of Adams and Ellsworth, "went on to point out in his diary that he virulently disagreed with them." Ante, at 696, n. 23. Maclay, unlike Adams and Ellsworth, was not an important political figure at the time of the constitutional debates. See Diary of William Maclay xi–xiii.

Third, in 1807, a sitting President, Thomas Jefferson, during a dispute about whether the federal courts could subpoena his presence in a criminal case, wrote the following to United States Attorney George Hay:

"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties?" 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905) (letter of June 20, 1807, from President Thomas Jefferson to United States Attorney George Hay), quoted in Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 751, n. 31.

[p717] Three days earlier Jefferson had written to the same correspondent:

"To comply with such calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean that it should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate authority." 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson, at 401 (letter of June 17, 1807, from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay).

Jefferson, like Adams and Ellsworth, argued strongly for an immunity from both criminal and civil judicial process—an immunity greater in scope than any immunity, or any special scheduling factor, now at issue in the civil case before us. The significance of his views for present purposes lies in his conviction that the Constitution protected a sitting President from litigation that would "withdraw" a President from his current "constitutional duties." That concern may not have applied to Mr. Fitzgerald's 1982 case against a former President, but it is at issue in the current litigation.

Precedent that suggests to the contrary—that the Constitution does not offer a sitting President significant protections from potentially distracting civil litigation—consists of the following: (1) In several instances sitting Presidents have given depositions or testified at criminal trials, and (2) this Court has twice authorized the enforcement of subpoenas seeking documents from a sitting President for use in a criminal case.

I agree with the majority that these precedents reject any absolute Presidential immunity from all court process. But they do not cast doubt upon Justice Story's basic conclusion that "in civil cases," a sitting President "possess[es] an official inviolability" as necessary to permit him to "perform" the duties of his office without "obstruction or impediment."

[p718] The first set of precedents tells us little about what the Constitution commands, for they amount to voluntary actions on the part of a sitting President. The second set of precedents amounts to a search for documents, rather than a direct call upon Presidential time. More important, both sets of precedents involve criminal proceedings in which the President participated as a witness. Criminal proceedings, unlike private civil proceedings, are public acts initiated and controlled by the Executive Branch; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 693–696; they are not normally subject to postponement, see U.S. Const., Amdt. 6; and ordinarily they put at risk, not a private citizen's hope for monetary compensation, but a private citizen's freedom from enforced confinement, 418 U.S., at 711–712, and n. 19; Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 754, n. 37. See also id., at 758, n. 41. Nor is it normally possible in a criminal case, unlike many civil cases, to provide the plaintiff with interest to compensate for scheduling delay. See, e.g., Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d 1069, 1073 (CA8 1991); Foley v. Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 17–18 (CA1 1991); Wooten v. McClendon, 272 Ark. 61, 62–63, 612 S.W.2d 105, 106 (1981).

The remaining precedent to which the majority refers does not seem relevant in this case. That precedent, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952), concerns official action. And any Presidential time spent dealing with, or action taken in response to, that kind of case is part of a President's official duties. Hence court review in such circumstances could not interfere with, or distract from, official duties. Insofar as a court orders a President, in any such a proceeding, to act or to refrain from action, it defines, or determines, or clarifies the legal scope of an official duty. By definition (if the order itself is lawful), it cannot impede, or obstruct, or interfere with the President's basic task—the lawful exercise of his Executive authority. Indeed, if constitutional principles counsel caution when judges consider an order that directly requires the President properly [p719] to carry out his official duties, see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 827 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (describing the "apparently unbroken historical tradition implicit in the separation of powers" that a President may not be ordered by the Judiciary to perform particular Executive acts); id., at 802–803 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.), so much the more must those principles counsel caution when such an order threatens to interfere with the President's properly carrying out those duties.

B
Case law, particularly, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, strongly supports the principle that judges hearing a private civil damages action against a sitting President may not issue orders that could significantly distract a President from his official duties. In Fitzgerald, the Court held that former President Nixon was absolutely immune from civil damages lawsuits based upon any conduct within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibilities. 457 U.S., at 756. The holding rested upon six determinations that are relevant here.

First, the Court found that the Constitution assigns the President singularly important duties (thus warranting an "absolute," rather than a "qualified," immunity). Id., at 750–751. Second, the Court held that "recognition of immunity" does not require a "specific textual basis" in the Constitution. Id., at 750, n. 31. Third, although physical constraint of the President was not at issue, the Court nevertheless considered Justice Story's constitutional analysis, discussed supra, at 1654, "persuasive." 457 U.S., at 749. Fourth, the Court distinguished contrary precedent on the ground that it involved criminal, not civil, proceedings. Id., at 754, and n. 37. Fifth, the Court's concerns encompassed the fact that "the sheer prominence of the President's office" could make him "an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages." Id., at 752–753. Sixth, and most important, the Court rested its conclusion in important part upon [p720] the fact that civil lawsuits "could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve." Id., at 753.

The majority argues that this critical, last-mentioned, feature of the case is dicta. Ante, at 694, n. 19. In the majority's view, since the defendant was a former President, the lawsuit could not have distracted him from his official duties; hence the case must rest entirely upon an alternative concern, namely, that a President's fear of civil lawsuits based upon his official duties could distort his official decisionmaking. The majority, however, overlooks the fact that Fitzgerald set forth a single immunity (an absolute immunity) applicable both to sitting and former Presidents. Its reasoning focused upon both. Its key paragraph, explaining why the President enjoys an absolute immunity rather than a qualified immunity, contains seven sentences, four of which focus primarily upon time and energy distraction and three of which focus primarily upon official decision distortion. Indeed, that key paragraph begins by stating:

"Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government." 457 U.S., at 751.

Moreover, the Court, in numerous other cases, has found the problem of time and energy distraction a critically important consideration militating in favor of a grant of immunity. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–818 (1982) (qualified immunity for Presidential assistants based in part on "costs of trial" and "burdens of broad-reaching discovery" that are "peculiarly disruptive of effective government"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976) (absolute immunity of prosecutors based in part upon concern about "deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties"); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (absolute immunity [p721] for legislators avoids danger they will "be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial"). Indeed, cases that provide public officials, not with immunity, but with special protective procedures such as interlocutory appeals, rest entirely upon a "time and energy distraction" rationale. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306, 308 (1996) ("[G]overnment official['s] right to avoid standing trial [and] to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery" are sufficient to support an immediate appeal from "denial of a claim of qualified immunity" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) ("[E]ntitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation  is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial" (citing Harlow, supra, at 818)).

It is not surprising that the Court's immunity-related case law should rely on both distraction and distortion, for the ultimate rationale underlying those cases embodies both concerns. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (absolute judicial immunity is needed because of "burden" of litigation, which leads to "intimidation"); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 349 (1872) (without absolute immunity a judge's "office [would] be degraded and his usefulness destroyed," and he would be forced to shoulder "burden" of keeping full records for use in defending against suits). The cases ultimately turn on an assessment of the threat that a civil damages lawsuit poses to a public official's ability to perform his job properly. And, whether they provide an absolute immunity, a qualified immunity, or merely a special procedure, they ultimately balance consequent potential public harm against private need. Distraction and distortion are equally important ingredients of that potential public harm. Indeed, a lawsuit that significantly distracts an official from his public duties can distort the content of a public decision just as can a threat of potential future liability. If the latter concern can justify an "absolute" immunity in the case of a Pres [p722] ident no longer in office, where distraction is no longer a consideration, so can the former justify, not immunity, but a postponement, in the case of a sitting President.

III
The majority points to the fact that private plaintiffs have brought civil damages lawsuits against a sitting President only three times in our Nation's history; and it relies upon the threat of sanctions to discourage, and "the court's discretion" to manage, such actions so that "interference with the President's duties would not occur." Ante, at 708. I am less sanguine. Since 1960, when the last such suit was filed, the number of civil lawsuits filed annually in Federal District Courts has increased from under 60,000 to about 240,000, see Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary 27 (1995); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—1960, p. 224 (1961); the number of federal district judges has increased from 233 to about 650, see Administrative Office of United States Courts, Judicial Business of United States Courts 7 (1994); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—1960, supra, at 205; the time and expense associated with both discovery and trial have increased, see, e.g., Bell, Varner, & Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush To Reform, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 9–11 (1992); see also S. Rep. No. 101-416, p. 1 (1990); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089; anincreasingly complex economy has led to increasingly complex sets of statutes, rules, and regulations that often create potential liability, with, or without fault. And this Court has now made clear that such lawsuits may proceed against a sitting President. The consequence, as the Court warned in Fitzgerald, is that a sitting President, given "the visibility of his office," could well become "an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages," 457 U.S., at 753. The threat of sanctions [p723] could well discourage much unneeded litigation, ante, at 709, but some lawsuits (including highly intricate and complicated ones) could resist ready evaluation and disposition; and individual district court procedural rulings could pose a significant threat to the President's official functions.

I concede the possibility that district courts, supervised by the Courts of Appeals and perhaps this Court, might prove able to manage private civil damages actions against sitting Presidents without significantly interfering with the discharge of Presidential duties—at least if they manage those actions with the constitutional problem in mind. Nonetheless, predicting the future is difficult, and I am skeptical. Should the majority's optimism turn out to be misplaced, then, in my view, courts will have to develop administrative rules applicable to such cases (including postponement rules of the sort at issue in this case) in order to implement the basic constitutional directive. A Constitution that separates powers in order to prevent one branch of Government from significantly threatening the workings of another could not grant a single judge more than a very limited power to second-guess a President's reasonable determination (announced in open court) of his scheduling needs, nor could it permit the issuance of a trial scheduling order that would significantly interfere with the President's discharge of his duties—in a private civil damages action the trial of which might be postponed without the plaintiff suffering enormous harm. As Madison pointed out in The Federalist No. 51: "The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack." Id., at 321–322 (emphasis added). I agree with the majority's determination that a constitutional defense must await a more specific showing of need; I do not agree with what I [p724] believe to be an understatement of the "danger." And I believe that ordinary case-management principles are unlikely to prove sufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits for damages unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the President's ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.

IV
This case is a private action for civil damages in which, as the District Court here found, it is possible to preserve evidence and in which later payment of interest can compensate for delay. The District Court in this case determined that the Constitution required the postponement of trial during the sitting President's term. It may well be that the trial of this case cannot take place without significantly interfering with the President's ability to carry out his official duties. Yet, I agree with the majority that there is no automatic temporary immunity and that the President should have to provide the District Court with a reasoned explanation of why the immunity is needed; and I also agree that, in the absence of that explanation, the court's postponement of the trial date was premature. For those reasons, I concur in the result.

title: Clinton v. Jones/Concurrence Breyer


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Page:Manual of the New Zealand Flora.djvu/579

Veronica.] Marlborough—Lower Wairau, Travers, Monro; Macrae's Run, Monro; Awatere Valley, ''MacMahon! Kirk! Kaikoura Mountains, Sinclair, Buchanan! Kirk! Canterbury—Hills in the northern part of the province, Armstrong!'' Var. oblonga; Marlborough—Awatere Valley, ''Kirk! J. H. MacMahon! Mount Fyfe, Cockayne!'' Sea-level to 3000 ft. November–December.

A handsome species, better known in cultivation than in a wild state. Mr. H. J. Matthews informs me that the var. Fairfieldii, which was descrioed as a distinct species by Hooker, originally appeared in the Fairfield Gardens, near Dunedin, where many species of Veronica are cultivated, and has never been found in a wild state. It is probably a hybrid between V. Hulkeana and V. Lavaudiana.

67. V. Lavaudiana, ''Raoul, Choix Pl. Nouv. Zel.'' 16, t. 10.—A small sparingly branched shrub 3–9 in. high; branches rather stout, decumbent at the base, then erect, leafy, terete, glabrous below, puberulous above. Leaves rather crowded, spreading, ⅓–1 in. long, broadly obovate or obovate-spathulate, rounded at the tip, gradually narrowed into a short stout petiole, crenate-serrate, very coriaceous, dark-green usually margined with red. Spikes short. ¼–¾ in. long, arranged in a broad hemispherical many-fiowered corymb sometimes 2 in. diam. or more; peduncle rather long, erect, and with the pedicels glandular-pubescent; bracts ovate or ovate-lanceolate, pilose and ciliate. Flowers small, sessile, ¼–⅓ in. diam. Calyx 4-partite; segments ovate-lanceolate, acuminate, pubescent. Corolla-tube rather longer than the calyx; lobes 4, spreading, unequal, obtuse. Capsule exceeding the calyx, oblong, obtuse, pubescent.—''Hook. f. Fl. Nov. Zel. i. 195; Handb. N.Z. Fl. 214; Bot. Mag. t. 7210; Armstr. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiii. (1881) 350.

68. V. Raoulii, ''Hook. f. Handb. N.Z. Fl.'' 214.—A stout much-branched woody little shrub 4–12 in. high; branches often procumbent below, terete, ringed with the scars of the fallen leaves, leafy above, pubescent. Leaves spreading or suberect, ⅓–¾ in. long, oblong-spathulate, obtuse or acute, gradually narrowed into a rather long petiole, crenate-serrate, very thick and coriaceous, yellow-green, flat, veinless. Spikes very short, either arranged in a broad terminal panicle or corymb 1–2 in. across, or forming smaller lateral corymbs or heads; peduncles and pedicels puberulous; bracts ovate, ciliolate. Flowers small, sessile, ⅕–¼ in. diam. Calyx 4-partite; segments ovate-oblong, obtuse, ciliolate. Corolla-tube short; lobes 4, broadly oblong, rounded. Capsule exceeding the calyx, oblong, obtuse.—''Armstr. in Trans. N.Z. Inst. xiii. (1881) 350; Cockayne in Trans. N.Z. Inst. xxxi. (1899) 379 (development of seedling).''

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text: The Strand Magazine/Volume 30/Issue 175/The Wire-Pullers


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540

69. V. pulvinaris, Hook. f. and Benth. Gen. Plant. ii. 964.—A small densely tufted hoary moss-like plant, forming soft rounded cushions 1–3 in. diam.; branches closely compacted, ⅛ in. diam. Leaves very densely imbricate, $1⁄10$ in. long, linear-oblong or linear–spathulate, obtuse or subacute, not coriaceous, quite entire, the margins and both surfaces above the middle hispid with copious long white hairs. Flowers terminal, solitary, very shortly pedicelled, about ⅛ in. long, white. Calyx deeply 5-partite; segments linear, ciliate. Corolla salver-shaped; tube narrow, slightly longer than the calyx; limb flat, spreading, 5-lobed. Stamens included; filaments very short. Ovary pilose at the tip. Capsule not seen.—Pygmea pulvinaris, ''Hook. f. Handb. N.Z. Fl. 217; Ic. Plant. t. 1047; Buch. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiv. (1882) 352, t. 32, f. 2.

70. V. Thomsoni, Cheesem.—Very similar in most respects to V. pulvinaris, but rather larger and stouter. Leaves very densely imbricate, $1⁄10$ in. long, rhomboid-obovate or obovate-oblong, obtuse or subacute, somewhat thick and fleshy towards the tip, membranous towards the base, quite entire, usually copiously hispid on the margins and back above the middle, upper surface often glabrous. Flowers solitary, terminal, rather larger than in V. pulvinaris. Calyx deeply 5-partite; segments linear, obtuse, ciliate. Corolla-tube much longer than the calyx; limb spreading, 5-lobed. Stamens included; filaments very short. Ovary pilose at the tip. Capsule narrowly obcordate, turgid, about as long as the calyx.—Pygmea Thomsoni, ''Buch. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiv. (1882) 353, 4. 32, f. 3.

71. V. ciliolata, Hook. f. and Benth. Gen. Plant. ii. 964.—A small densely tufted moss-like plant, forming rounded cushions


text: The Strand Magazine/Volume 30/Issue 177/The Lost Bowlers


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Veronica.] 1–3 in. diam.; branches rather stout, ½–1 in. high, rarely more, with the leaves on ⅕–¼ in. diam. Leaves densely imbricate, ⅛ in. long, broadly obovate-spathulate, rounded at the tip, coriaceous, quite entire, both surfaces glabrous or nearly so, margins ciliate from below the middle with long stiff white hairs. Flowers solitary, terminal, sessile or nearly so, $1⁄10$–$1⁄8$ in. long, white. Calyx deeply 5-partite; segments linear-spathulate, ciliate. Corolla salver-shaped; tube cylindrical, rather longer than the calyx; limb flat, spreading, 5- or rarely 6-lobed; lobes oblong, obtuse. Stamens usually included; filaments short; anthers large. Ovary glabrous. Capsule not seen.—Pygmea ciliolata, ''Hook. f. Handb. N.Z. Fl. 217; Ic. Plant. t. 1047; Buch. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiv. (1882) 352, t. 32, f. 1.

72. V. loganioides, Armstr. in Trans. N.Z. Inst. xiii. (1881) 359.—A dwarf shrub 6–14 in. high; stems woody, decumbent at the base, erect above; branches numerous, slender, terete, leafy above, ringed with the scars of the fallen leaves below, pubescent or almost villous with lax soft greyish-white hairs. Leaves decussate, in rather close-set opposite pairs, erecto-patent, sessile, ⅛–⅙ in. long, ovate-lanceolate, acute, entire or sometimes with one or two small teeth on each side, dull-green, coriaceous, keeled. Racemes near the tips of the branches, forming a small corymb-like head, short, few-flowered, rhachis and pedicels pubescent or almost villous. Flowers ¼ in. diam., white or white with pink veins. Calyx deeply 4-partite; segments ovate-oblong, acute, ciliolate. Corolla-tube broad and short, not equalling the calyx; limb 4-lobed; dorsal and lateral lobes subequal, orbicular-oblong, obtuse; anticous lobe narrower, oblong. Capsule elliptical-oblong, didymous, turgid, notched at the tip, rather shorter than the calyx.—''Hook. f. Bot. Mag.'' t. 7404.


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542 73. V. linifolia, ''Hook. f. Handb. N.Z. Fl.'' 214.—A small much and diffusely branched procumbent herb; branches slender, often rooting below, ascending at the tips, terete, glabrous, 2–9 in. long or more. Leaves numerous, closely placed, spreading, ⅓–1 in. long, $1⁄10$–$1⁄6$ in. broad, linear, obtuse at the tip, narrowed into a rather long broad petiole, flat, subcoriaceous, quite entire; margins of petiole ciliate. Racemes 1–3 towards the ends of the branches, 1–2 in. long, slender, naked below, 2–5-flowered; bracts ⅛–⅓ in. long, linear, obtuse; pedicels long, ¼–1 in., slender, curved. Flowers large, ⅓–½ in. diam., white or pale-rose. Calyx ⅙ in. long, deeply 4-partite; segments linear-oblong, obtuse. Corolla-tube very short; limb broad, spreading, 4-lobed; lobes broad, rounded, veined. Stamens equalling the corolla-lobes. Capsule broadly obcordate, rather shorter than the calyx.—''Armstr. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiii. (1881) 349.

74. V. catarractæ, Forst. Prodr. n. 9.—Stems slender, terete, sparingly branched, suberect, or prostrate below and then ascending, 6–24 in. long, glabrous or bifariously pubescent, woody at the base. Leaves rather distant, shortly petiolate, spreading, 1–4 in. long, lanceolate or ovate-lanceolate, acuminate, coarsely and sharply serrate, coriaceous or submembranous, flat, 1-nerved, paler beneath. Racemes few or many towards the tips of the branches, solitary and axillary, slender, curved or erect, 3–9 in. long, many-flowered; pedicels slender, puberulous, ⅓–1 in. long; bracts linearsubulate. Flowers ⅓–½ in. diam., white or pale-rose. Calyx deeply 4-partite; segments ovate-lanceolate or oblong-ovate, acute or acuminate. Corolla with a very short tube and 4 rounded spreading lobes. Capsule broadly oblong, turgid, emarginate or almost 2-lobed, usually about ⅓ longer than the calyx.—''A. Rich. Fl. Nouv. Zel. 189; A. Cunn. Precur. n. 380; Raoul, Choix, 43; Hook. f. Fl. Nov. Zel. i. 195; Handb. N.Z. Fl.'' 216. V. irrigans, Kirk in Trans. N.Z. Inst. ii. (1870) 94.

Var. lanceolata, ''Hook. f. Fl. Nov. Zel.'' i. 195.—Stems shorter and more slender. Leaves ½–1½ in. long, $1⁄12$–$1⁄8$ in. broad, linear or narrow linear-lanceolate.—''Handb. N.Z. Fl.'' 216. V. lanceolata, ''Benth. in. D.C. Prodr.'' x. 462.

Var. diffusa, ''Hook. f. Handb. N.Z. Fl.'' 216.—Procumbent, diffusely branched. Leaves ½–1½ in. long, ovate or ovate-oblong, acute. Calyx-segments ovate, acute.—V. diffusa, ''Hook. f. Ic. Plant. t. 645; Fl. Nov. Zel.'' i. 195.

From the Thames goldfields to the south of Otago, but often local. Most plentiful on the west coast of the South Island. Sea-level to 3000 ft. November–January.


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4 Part 2—Arrest and delivery of persons 5Proceedings for delivery order

(1) A person arrested under a section 2 warrant shall be brought before a competent court as soon as is practicable.

(2) If the competent court is satisfied—
 * (a) that the warrant—
 * (i) is a warrant of the ICC and has been duly endorsed under section 2(3), or
 * (ii) has been duly issued under section 2(4), and
 * (b) that the person brought before the court is the person named or described in the warrant,

it shall make a delivery order.

(3) A “delivery order” is an order that the person be delivered up—
 * (a) into the custody of the ICC, or
 * (b) if the ICC so directs in the case of a person convicted by the ICC, into the custody of the state of enforcement,

in accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary of State.

(4) In the case of a person alleged to have committed an ICC crime, the competent court may adjourn the proceedings pending the outcome of any challenge before the ICC to the admissibility of the case or to the jurisdiction of the ICC.

(5) In deciding whether to make a delivery order the court is not concerned to enquire—
 * (a) whether any warrant issued by the ICC was duly issued, or
 * (b) in the case of a person alleged to have committed an ICC crime, whether there is evidence to justify his trial for the offence he is alleged to have committed.

(6) Whether or not it makes a delivery order, the competent court may of its own motion, and shall on the application of the person arrested, determine—
 * (a) whether the person was lawfully arrested in pursuance of the warrant, and
 * (b) whether his rights have been respected.

(7) In making a determination under subsection (6) the court shall apply the principles which would be applied on an application for judicial review.

(8) If the court determines-
 * (a) that the person has not been lawfully arrested in pursuance of the warrant, or
 * (b) that the person’s rights have not been respected,

it shall make a declaration or declarator to that effect, but may not grant any other relief.

(9) The court shall notify the Secretary of State (and, where the proceedings are in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers) of any declaration or declarator under subsection (8) and the Secretary of State shall transmit that notification to the ICC.


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Veronica.] An exceedingly variable plant. Forster's type, judging from the description given by A. Richard, is a rather small-leaved state, with lanceolate leaves 1–2 in. long; and according to Mr. N. E. Brown corresponds to the var. minor of the "Flora Novæ-Zealandiæ." But it passes insensibly into a much more luxuriant state, with leaves sometimes over 4 in. long, and with longer racemes. This again varies into var. lanceolata, Mr. Kirk's V. irrigans being about half-way between the two. Var. diffusa is also connected by numerous intermediates.

75. V. Lyallii, Hook. f. Fl. Nov. Zel. i. 196.— Stems slender, prostrate and rooting, much and diffusely branched, 3–18 in. long, more rarely suberect from a prostrate base; branches terete, usually bifariously pubescent, sometimes conspicuously so, rarely almost glabrous. Leaves shortly petioled, spreading, ¼–½ in. long, broadly ovate or almost orbicular to oblong-ovate, obtuse or subacute, with 2 or 3 coarse blunt serratures on each side, thick and coriaceous, glabrous, often reddish on the midrib beneath and on the petiole. Racemes several, few- or many-flowered, on slender erect peduncles 2–6 in. long usually springing from near the ends of the branches but sometimes lateral, glabrous or more or less pubescent; pedicels slender, the lowest ½ in. long or more. Flowers ⅓ in. diam., white with pink veins. Calyx deeply 4-partite; segments ovate-oblong, acute, margins ciliolate. Corolla-tube very short; limb broad, spreading, with 4 rounded lobes. Stamens shorter than the corollalobes. Capsule broadly obovate-oblong, turgid, 2-lobed or emarginate, exceeding the calyx.—''Handb. N.Z. Fl. 215; Armstr. in Trans. N.Z. Inst.'' xiii. (1881) 349.

76. V. Bidwillii, ''Hook. Ic. Plant.'' t. 814.—Stems slender, prostrate and rooting, much branched, woody at the base, 3–12 in. long; branches creeping, often matted, glabrous or pubescent. Leaves rather distant, shortly petioled or almost sessile, minute, $1⁄10$–$1⁄4$ in.


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An Act to provide for the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and for related purposes

Note: An electronic version of this Act is available on the Federal Register of Legislation (https://www.legislation.gov.au/)


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No. 88, 2022

An Act to provide for the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and for related purposes

[Assented to 12 December 2022]

The Parliament of Australia enacts:


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1 Short title

This Act is the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022.

2 Commencement

(1) Each provision of this Act specified in column 1 of the table commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect according to its terms. Note: This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of this Act.


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Author:Ludwig Benedict Franz von Bilderbeck

Works

 * Cyanna of Athens: A Grecian Romance (1792)


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 (2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this Act. Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it may be edited, in any published version of this Act.

3 Objects of this Act

The objects of this Act include the following:

 * (a) to facilitate:

 * (i) the detection of corrupt conduct; and

 * (ii) the timely investigation of corruption issues that could involve corrupt conduct that is serious or systemic;

 * (b) to enable, after investigation of a corruption issue, the referral of persons for criminal prosecution, civil proceedings or disciplinary action;

 * (c) to prevent corrupt conduct;

 * (d) to educate and provide information about corruption and the detrimental effects of corruption on public administration and the Australian community.

4 Simplified outline of this Act


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5 Application of this Act

This Act applies both within and outside Australia and extends to the external Territories.

6 Crown to be bound

(1) This Act binds the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, of each of the States, of the Australian Capital Territory and of the Northern Territory.

(2) This Act does not make the Crown liable to a pecuniary penalty or to be prosecuted for an offence.


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 7 Definitions

accountable authority has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act.

AFP means the Australian Federal Police.

AFP Commissioner means the Commissioner of Police (within the meaning of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979).

agency head: see subsection 11(1).

annual report: see subsections 198(1) and 271(1).

Australia, when used in a geographical sense, includes the external Territories.

Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation means that part of the Defence Department known as the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation.

Australian travel document has the same meaning as in the Australian Passports Act 2005.

authorised discloser: see subsection 227(1).

authorised officer means:
 * (a) the Commissioner; or
 * (b) a Deputy Commissioner; or
 * (c) a person appointed under section 267 (appointment of authorised officers).

CEO means the Chief Executive Officer of the National Anti-Corruption Commission.

civil penalty proceeding means a proceeding for a civil penalty in relation to a contravention of a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.

Commissioner means the National Anti-Corruption Commissioner.


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 Committee means the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Anti-Corruption Commission for the time being constituted under Division 1 of Part 10.

Commonwealth agency: see section 11.

Commonwealth company has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act.

Commonwealth contract: see subsection 13(2).

Commonwealth entity has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act.

Commonwealth integrity agency: see section 15.

completion report: see paragraph 52(b).

confiscation proceeding: see section 136.

constable means:
 * (a) a member or special member of the AFP; or
 * (b) a member of the police force or police service of a State or Territory.

container includes:
 * (a) a trailer or other like receptacle, whether with or without wheels, that is used for the movement of goods from one place to another; and
 * (b) any baggage; and
 * (c) any other thing that is or could be used for the carriage of goods, whether or not designed for that purpose. contract includes any arrangement, agreement, deed or understanding.

contracted service provider: see section 13.

contravenes:
 * (a) for a certificate issued under section 235—see subsection 235(9); and
 * (b) for an international relations certificate—see subsection 236(8).


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 conveyance includes an aircraft, vehicle or vessel.

corporate Commonwealth entity has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act.

corrupt conduct: see section 8.

corruption investigation: see subsection 41(2).

corruption issue: see section 9.

criminal proceeding means a prosecution for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.

Defence Department means the Department administered by the Minister administering Part III of the Defence Act 1903.

Defence Intelligence Organisation means that part of the Defence Department known as the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

Deputy Commissioner means a National Anti-Corruption Deputy Commissioner.

derivative material: see section 133.

detriment: see subsection 29(2).

direction to produce: see subsection 57(3).

entrusted person: see subsection 227(2).

exempt secrecy provision means any of the following secrecy provisions:
 * (a) Part 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006;
 * (b) section 34 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986;
 * (c) a secrecy provision under the My Health Records Act 2012;
 * (d) a secrecy provision in Part VIIIA of the Privacy Act 1988;
 * (e) sections 45 and 45B of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004;


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 :(f) a secrecy provision that is a provision of a taxation law within the meaning of the Taxation Administration Act 1953;
 * (g) sections 63 and 133 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979;
 * (h) a secrecy provision that is expressed by another law of the Commonwealth to have effect despite this Act;
 * (i) anything done under a provision referred to in paragraphs (a) to (h).

Federal Court means the Federal Court of Australia.

finance law has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act.

Foreign Affairs Department: see subsection 240(3).

head:
 * (a) of a Commonwealth agency—see subsection 11(1); and
 * (b) of a State or Territory government entity—means the person holding, or performing the duties of, the principal office in respect of the entity.

hearing means a hearing held under this Act.

IGIS means the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

IGIS official means:
 * (a) the IGIS; or
 * (b) any other person covered by subsection 32(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

imminent: for when a charge for an offence, or a confiscation proceeding, is imminent, see subsections 132(1) and (2).

inquiry report: see subsection 164(1).

Inspector means the Inspector of the National Anti-Corruption Commission.


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 Inspector-General of Biosecurity means the Inspector-General of Biosecurity appointed under section 566A of the Biosecurity Act 2015.

Inspector-General of Live Animal Exports means the Inspector-General of Live Animal Exports referred to in section 9 of the Inspector-General of Live Animal Exports Act 2019.

Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force means the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force referred to in section 110B of the Defence Act 1903.

Inspector-General of Water Compliance means the Inspector-General of Water Compliance referred to in section 215B of the Water Act 2007.

intelligence agency means:
 * (a) the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation; or
 * (b) the Australian Secret Intelligence Service; or
 * (c) the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; or
 * (d) the Australian Signals Directorate; or
 * (e) the Defence Intelligence Organisation; or
 * (f) the Office of National Intelligence.

intelligence information: see subsection 239(6). international relations has the meaning given by section 10 of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004.

international relations certificate: see subsection 236(2).

investigation material: see section 99.

investigation report: see subsection 149(1).

law enforcement agency means:

 * (a) the AFP; or
 * (b) a police force or police service of a State or Territory; or
 * (c) any other authority or person responsible for the enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.


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 law of the Commonwealth includes a law in force in an external Territory or the Jervis Bay Territory, so far as the law is so in force because of an Act providing for the acceptance, administration or government of that Territory.

legal aid officer: see subsection 98(5).

legal practitioner means a barrister, a solicitor, a barrister and solicitor or a legal practitioner of the High Court or of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory.

magistrate: see subsection 112(5).

medical practitioner means a person registered or licensed as a medical practitioner under a law of a State or Territory that provides for the registration or licensing of medical practitioners.

NACC means the National Anti-Corruption Commission.

NACC Act process means:
 * (a) a corruption investigation; or
 * (b) a NACC complaint investigation; or
 * (c) a NACC corruption investigation; or
 * (d) a public inquiry.

NACC Commissioner means:
 * (a) the Commissioner; or
 * (b) a Deputy Commissioner.

NACC complaint investigation: see subsection 212(2).

NACC corruption investigation: see subsection 210(2).

NACC corruption issue: see section 201.

NACC disclosure: see section 23.

NACC investigation report: see subsection 215(1).

non-disclosure notation: see subsection 95(1).


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 '''273. Grants in lieu of export duty on jute and jute products.'''—(1) There shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India in each year as grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States of Assam, Bihar, [Odisha] and West Bengal, in lieu of assignment of any share of the net proceeds in each year of export duty on jute and jute products to those States, such sums as may be prescribed.

 * (2) The sums so prescribed shall continue to be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India so long as any export duty on jute or jute products continues to be levied by the Government of India or until the expiration of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution whichever is earlier.

 * (3) In this article, the expression “prescribed” has the same meaning as in article 270.

274. Prior recommendation of President required to Bills affecting taxation in which States are interested.—(1) No Bill or amendment which imposes or varies any tax or duty in which States are interested, or which varies the meaning of the expression “agricultural income” as defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian income-tax, or which affects the principles on which under any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter moneys are or may be distributable to States, or which imposes any such surcharge for the purposes of the Union as is mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, shall be introduced or moved in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President.

 * (2) In this article, the expression “tax or duty in which States are interested” means—
 * (a) a tax or duty the whole or part of the net proceeds whereof are assigned to any State; or
 * (b) a tax or duty by reference to the net proceeds whereof sums are for the time being payable out of the Consolidated Fund of India to any State.

275. Grants from the Union to certain States.—(1) Such sums as Parliament may by law provide shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India in each year as grants-in-aid of the revenues of such States as Parliament may determine to be in need of assistance, and different sums may be fixed for different States:

 * Provided that there shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India as grants-in-aid of the revenues of a State such capital and recurring sums as may be necessary to enable that State to meet the costs of such schemes of development as may be undertaken by the State with the approval of the Government of India for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in that State or raising the level of administration of the Scheduled Areas therein to that of the administration of the rest of the areas of that State:

 * Provided further that there shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India as grants-in-aid of the revenues of the State of Assam sums, capital and recurring, equivalent to—
 * (a) the average excess of expenditure over the revenues during the two years immediately preceding the commencement of this Constitution in respect of the administration of the tribal areas specified in [Part I] of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule; and
 * (b) the costs of such schemes of development as may be undertaken by that State with the approval of the Government of India for the purpose of raising the level of administration of the said areas to that of the administration of the rest of the areas of that State.

 * [(1A) On and from the formation of the autonomous State under article 244A,—

 * (i) any sums payable under clause (a) of the second proviso to clause (1) shall, if the autonomous State comprises all the tribal areas referred to therein, be paid to the autonomous State, and, if the autonomous State comprises only some of those tribal areas, be apportioned between the State of Assam and the autonomous State as the President may, by order, specify;
 * (ii) there shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India as grants-in-aid of the revenues of the autonomous State sums, capital and recurring, equivalent to the costs of such schemes of development


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 "I will, Ma'am, with the greatest pleasure," replied Mr. Pickwick.

"Instantly, sir," said the lady.

"Certainly, Ma'am," interposed Mr. Pickwick very quickly.

"Certainly, Ma'am. I—I—am very sorry, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, making his appearance at the bottom of the bed, "to have been the innocent occasion of this alarm and emotion; deeply sorry, Ma'am."

The lady pointed to the door. One excellent quality of Mr. Pickwick's character was beautifully displayed at this moment, under the most trying circumstances. Although he had hastily put on his hat over his night-cap, after the manner of the old patrol; although he carried his shoes and gaiters in his hand, and his coat and waistcoat over his arm; nothing could subdue his native politeness.

"I am exceedingly sorry, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, bowing very low.

"If you are, sir, you will at once leave the room," said the lady.

"Immediately, Ma'am; this instant, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, opening the door, and dropping both his shoes with a crash in so doing.

"I trust, Ma'am," resumed Mr. Pickwick, gathering up his shoes, and turning round to bow again: "I trust, Ma'am, that my unblemished character, and the devoted respect I entertain for your sex, will plead as some slight excuse for this "—But before Mr. Pickwick could conclude the sentence the lady had thrust him into the passage, and locked and bolted the door behind him.

Whatever grounds of self-congratulation Mr. Pickwick might have for having escaped so quietly from his late awkward situation, his present position was by no means enviable. He was alone, in an open passage, in a strange house, in the middle of the night, half dressed; it was not to be supposed that he could find his way in perfect darkness to a room which he had been wholly unable to discover with


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 "Gracious Heaven!" said the middle-aged lady, "what's that?"

"It's—it's—only a gentleman, Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick from behind the curtains.

"A gentleman!" said the lady with a terrific scream.

"It's all over!" thought Mr. Pickwick.

"A strange man!" shrieked the lady. Another instant and the house would be alarmed. Her garments rustled as she rushed towards the door.

"Ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick, thrusting out his head, in the extremity of his desperation, "Ma'am!"

Now, although Mr. Pickwick was not actuated by any definite object in putting out his head, it was instantaneously productive of a good effect. The lady, as we have already stated, was near the door. She must pass it, to reach the staircase, and she would most undoubtedly have done so by this time, had not the sudden apparition of Mr. Pickwick's night-cap driven her back into the remotest corner of the apartment, where she stood staring wildly at Mr. Pickwick, while Mr. Pickwick in his turn stared wildly at her.

"Wretch," said the lady, covering her eyes with her hands, "what do you want here?"

"Nothing, Ma'am; nothing, whatever, Ma'am;" said Mr. Pickwick earnestly.

"Nothing!" said the lady, looking up.cored hole "Nothing, Ma'am, upon my honour," said Mr. Pickwick, nodding his head so energetically that the tassel of his nightcap danced again. "I am almost ready to sink, Ma'am, beneath the confusion of addressing a lady in my night-cap (here the lady hastily snatched off hers), but I can't get it off, Ma'am (here Mr. Pickwick gave it a tremendous tug, in proof of the statement). It is evident to me, Ma'am, now, that I have mistaken this bed-room for my own. I had not been here five minutes, Ma'am, when you suddenly entered it."

"If this improbable story be really true, sir," said the lady, sobbing violently, "you will leave it instantly."


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 poor Mr. Pickwick, the cold perspiration starting in drops upon his night-cap. "Never. This is fearful."

It was quite impossible to resist the urgent desire to see what was going forward. So out went Mr. Pickwick's head again. The prospect was worse than before. The middle-aged lady had finished arranging her hair; had carefully enveloped it in a muslin night-cap with a small plaited border; and was gazing pensively on the fire.

"This matter is growing alarming," reasoned Mr. Pickwick with himself. "I can't allow things to go on in this way. By the self-possession of that lady it is clear to me that I must have come into the wrong room. If I call out she'll alarm the house; but if I remain here the consequences will be still more frightful."

Mr. Pickwick, it is quite unnecessary to say, was one of the most modest and delicate-minded of mortals. The very idea of exhibiting his night-cap to a lady overpowered him, but he had tied those confounded strings in a knot, and, do what he would, he couldn't get it off. The disclosure must be made. There was only one other way of doing it. He shrunk behind the curtains, and called out very loudly:

"Ha—hum!"

That the lady started at this unexpected sound was evident, by her falling up against the rushlight shade; that she persuaded herself it must have been the effect of imagination was equally clear, for when Mr. Pickwick, under the impression that she had fainted away stone-dead from fright, ventured to peep out again, she was gazing pensively on the fire as before.

"Most extraordinary female this," thought Mr. Pickwick, popping in again. "Ha—hum!"

These last sounds, so like those in which, as legends inform us, the ferocious giant Blunderbore was in the habit of expressing his opinion that it was time to lay the cloth, were too distinctly audible to be again mistaken for the workings of fancy.


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 "Ah, to be sure," said Mr. Pickwick; "I never thought of that. When I am in town, you'll always have somebody to sit with you. To be sure, so you will."

"I'm sure I ought to be a very happy woman," said Mrs. Bardell.

"And your little boy—" said Mr. Pickwick.

"Bless his heart!" interposed Mrs. Bardell, with a maternal sob.

"He, too, will have a companion," resumed Mr. Pickwick, "a lively one, who'll teach him, I'll be bound, more tricks in a week than he would ever learn in a year." And Mr. Pickwick smiled placidly.

"Oh you dear—" said Mrs. Bardell.

Mr. Pickwick started.

"Oh you kind, good, playful dear," said Mrs. Bardell; and without more ado, she rose from her chair, and flung her arms round Mr. Pickwick's neck, with a cataract of tears and a chorus of sobs.

"Bless my soul," cried the astonished Mr. Pickwick;—"Mrs. Bardell my good woman—dear me, what a situation—pray consider.—Mrs. Bardell, don't—if anybody should come—"

"Oh, let them come," exclaimed Mrs. Bardell, frantically; "I'll never leave you—dear, kind, good, soul;" and, with these words, Mrs. Bardell clung the tighter.

"Mercy upon me," said Mr. Pickwick, struggling violently, "I hear somebody coming up the stairs. Don't, don't, there's a good creature, don't." But entreaty and remonstrance were alike unavailing: for Mrs. Bardell had fainted in Mr. Pickwick's arms; and before he could gain time to deposit her on a chair, Master Bardell entered the room, ushering in Mr. Tupman, Mr. Winkle, and Mr. Snodgrass.

Mr. Pickwick was struck motionless and speechless. He stood with his lovely burden in his arms, gazing vacantly on the countenances of his friends, without the slightest attempt at recognition or explanation. They, in their turn, stared at him; and Master Bardell, in his turn, stared at everybody.


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 on the table—"that depends a good deal upon the person, you know, Mr. Pickwick; and whether it's a saving and careful person, sir."

"That's very true," said Mr. Pickwick, "but the person I have in my eye (here he looked very hard at Mrs. Bardell) I think possesses these qualities; and has, moreover, a considerable knowledge of the world, and a great deal of sharpness, Mrs. Bardell; which may be of material use to me."

"La, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell; the crimson rising to her cap-border again.

"I do," said Mr. Pickwick, growing energetic, as was his wont in speaking of a subject which interested him, "I do, indeed; and to tell you the truth, Mrs. Bardell, I have made up my mind."

"Dear me, sir," exclaimed Mrs. Bardell.

"You'll think it very strange now," said the amiable Mr. Pickwick, with a good-humoured glance at his companion, "that I never consulted you about this matter, and never even mentioned it, till I sent your little boy out this morning—eh?"

Mrs. Bardell could only reply by a look. She had long worshipped Mr. Pickwick at a distance, but here she was, all at once, raised to a pinnacle to which her wildest and most extravagant hopes had never dared to aspire. Mr. Pickwick was going to propose—a deliberate plan, too—sent her little boy to the Borough, to get him out of the way—how thoughtful—how considerate!

"Well," said Mr. Pickwick, "what do you think?"

"Oh, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell, trembling with agitation, "you're very kind, sir."

"It'll save you a good deal of trouble, won't it?" said Mr. Pickwick.

"Oh, I never thought anything of the trouble, sir," replied Mrs. Bardell; "and, of course, I should take more trouble to please you then, than ever; but it is so kind of you, Mr. Pickwick, to have so much consideration for my loneliness."


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 reigned throughout the house; and in it Mr. Pickwick's will was law.

To any one acquainted with these points of the domestic economy of the establishment, and conversant with the admirable regulation of Mr. Pickwick's mind, his appearance and behaviour on the morning previous to that which had been fixed upon for the journey to Eatanswill, would have been most mysterious and unaccountable. He paced the room to and fro with hurried steps, popped his head out of the window at intervals of about three minutes each, constantly referred to his watch, and exhibited many other manifestations of impatience very unusual with him. It was evident that something of great importance was in contemplation, but what that something was, not even Mrs. Bardell herself had been enabled to discover.

"Mrs. Bardell," said Mr. Pickwick, at last, as that amiable female approached the termination of a prolonged dusting of the apartment.

"Sir," said Mrs. Bardell.

"Your little boy is a very long time gone."

"Why it's a good long way to the Borough, sir," remonstrated Mrs. Bardell.

"Ah," said Mr. Pickwick, "very true; so it is."

Mr. Pickwick relapsed into silence, and Mrs. Bardell resumed her dusting.

"Mrs. Bardell," said Mr. Pickwick, at the expiration of a few minutes.

"Sir," said Mrs. Bardell again.

"Do you think it a much greater expense to keep two people, than to keep one?"

"La, Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Bardell, colouring up to the very border of her cap, as she fancied she observed species of matrimonial twinkle in the eyes of her lodger; "La, Mr. Pickwick, what a question!"

"Well, but do you?" inquired Mr. Pickwick.

"That depends—" said Mrs. Bardell, approaching the duster very near to Mr. Pickwick's elbow, which was planted


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 "One week."

"You will have enough to do," said Mr. Pickwick, smiling, "to gather all the materials you want, in that time."

"Eh, they are gathered," said the Count.

"Indeed!" said Mr. Pickwick.

"They are here," added the Count, tapping his forehead significantly. "Large book at home—full of notes—music, picture, science, poetry, poltic; all tings."

"The word politics, sir," said Mr. Pickwick, "comprises, in itself, a difficult study of no inconsiderable magnitude."

"Ah!" said the Count, drawing out the tablets again, "ver good—fine words to begin a chapter. Chapter forty-seven. Poltics. The word poltic surprises by himself—" And down went Mr. Pickwick's remark, in Count Smorltork's tablets, with such variations and additions as the Count's exuberant fancy suggested, or his imperfect knowledge of the language, occasioned.

"Count," said Mrs. Leo Hunter.

"Mrs. Hunt," replied the Count.

"This is Mr. Snodgrass, a friend of Mr. Pickwick's, and a poet."

"Stop," exclaimed the Count, bringing out the tablets once more. "Head, potry—chapter, literary friends—name, Snowgrass; ver good. Introduced to Snowgrass—great poet, friend of Peek Weeks—by Mrs. Hunt, which wrote other sweet poem—what is that name?—Fog—Perspiring Fog—ver goodver good indeed. And the Count put up his tablets, and with sundry bows and acknowledgments walked away, thoroughly satisfied that he had made the most important and valuable additions to his stock of information.

"Wonderful man, Count Smorltork," said Mrs. Leo Hunter.

"Sound philosopher," said Mr. Pott.

"Clear-headed, strong-minded person," added Mr. Snodgrass.

A chorus of by-standers took up the shout of Count Smorltork's praise, shook their heads sagely, and unanimously cried "Very!"


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 ::as may be undertaken by the autonomous State with the approval of the Government of India for the purpose of raising the level of administration of that State to that of the administration of the rest of the State of Assam.]

 * (2) Until provision is made by Parliament under clause (1), the powers conferred on Parliament under that clause shall be exercisable by the President by order and any order made by the President under this clause shall have effect subject to any provision so made by Parliament:

 * Provided that after a Finance Commission has been constituted no order shall be made under this clause by the President except after considering the recommendations of the Finance Commission.

276. Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 246, no law of the Legislature of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions, trades, callings or employments shall be invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.

 * (2) The total amount payable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or other local authority in the State by way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall not exceed [two thousand and five hundred rupees] per annum.

 * (3) The power of the Legislature of a State to make laws as aforesaid with respect to taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall not be construed as limiting in any way the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to taxes on income accruing from or arising out of professions, trades, callings and employments.

277. Savings.—Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the State, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law.

278. [Agreement with States in Part B of the First Schedule with regard to certain financial matters.]–Omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s. 29 and Sch.(w.e.f. 1-11-1956).

279. Calculation of “net proceeds”, etc.—(1) In the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, “net proceeds” means in relation to any tax or duty the proceeds thereof reduced by the cost of collection, and for the purposes of those provisions the net proceeds of any tax or duty, or of any part of any tax or duty, in or attributable to any area shall be ascertained and certified by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, whose certificate shall be final.

 * (2) Subject as aforesaid, and to any other express provision of this Chapter, a law made by Parliament or an order of the President may, in any case where under this Part the proceeds of any duty or tax are, or may be, assigned to any State, provide for the manner in which the proceeds are to be calculated, for the time from or at which and the manner in which any payments are to be made, for the making of adjustments between one financial year and another, and for any other incidental or ancillary matters.

['''279A. Goods and Services Tax Council.'''—(1) The President shall, within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, by order, constitute a Council to be called the Goods and Services Tax Council.

 * (2) The Goods and Services Tax Council shall consist of the following members, namely:—
 * (a) the Union Finance Minister—Chairperson;
 * (b) the Union Minister of State in charge of Revenue or Finance—Member ;


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 "Why now, my dear Mrs. Hunter," said Mr. Pott, who was trumpeter in ordinary at the Den, "you know that when your picture was in the Exhibition of the Royal Academy, last year, everybody inquired whether it was intended for you, or your youngest daughter; for you were so much alike that there was no telling the difference between you."

"Well, and if they did, why need you repeat it, before strangers?" said Mrs. Leo Hunter, bestowing another tap on the slumbering lion of the Eatanswill Gazette.

"Count, Count," screamed Mrs. Leo Hunter to a well-whiskered individual in a foreign uniform, who was passing by.

"Ah! you want me?" said the Count, turning back.

"I want to introduce two very clever people to each other," said Mrs. Leo Hunter. "Mr. Pickwick, I have great pleasure in introducing you to Count Smorltork." She added in a hurried whisper to Mr. Pickwick—"the famous foreigner—gathering materials for his great work on England—hem!—Count Smorltork, Mr. Pickwick."

Mr. Pickwick saluted the Count with all the reverence due to so great a man, and the Count drew forth a set of tablets.

"What you say, Mrs. Hunt?" inquired the Count, smiling graciously on the gratified Mrs. Leo Hunter, "Pig Vig or Big Vig—what you call—Lawyer—eh? I see—that is it. Big Vig"—and the Count was proceeding to enter Mr. Pickwick in his tablets, as a gentleman of the long robe, who derived his name from the profession to which he belonged, when Mrs. Leo Hunter interposed.

"No, no, Count," said the lady, "Pick-wick."

"Ah, ah, I see," replied the Count. "Peek—christian name; Weeks—surname; good, ver good. Peek Weeks. How you do Weeks?"

"Quite well, I thank you," replied Mr. Pickwick, with all his usual affability. "Have you been long in England?"

"Long—ver long time—fortnight—more."

"Do you stay here long?"


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 "Here," said Mr. Pickwick.

"Is it possible that I have really the gratification of beholding Mr. Pickwick himself!" ejaculated Mrs. Leo Hunter.

"No other, ma'am," replied Mr. Pickwick, bowing very low. "Permit me to introduce my friends—Mr. Tupman—Mr. Winkle—Mr. Snodgrass—to the authoress of 'The Expiring Frog.

Very few people but those who have tried it, know what a difficult process it is, to bow in green velvet smalls, and a tight jacket, and high-crowned hat: or in blue satin trunks and white silks: or knee-cords and top-boots that were never made for the wearer, and have been fixed upon him without the remotest reference to the comparative dimensions of himself and the suit. Never were such distortions as Mr. Tupman's frame underwent in his efforts to appear easy and graceful—never was such ingenious posturing, as his fancy-dressed friends exhibited.

"Mr. Pickwick," said Mrs. Leo Hunter, "I must make you promise not to stir from my side the whole day. There are hundreds of people here, that I must positively introduce you to."

"You are very kind, ma'am," said Mr. Pickwick.

"In the first place, here are my little girls; I had almost forgotten them," said Minerva, carelessly pointing towards a couple of full-grown voung ladies, of whom one might be about twenty, and the other a year or two older, and who were dressed in very juvenile costumes—whether to make them look young, or their mamma younger, Mr. Pickwick does not distinctly inform us.

"They are very beautiful," said Mr. Pickwick, as the juveniles turned away, after being presented.

"They are very like their mamma, sir," said Mr. Pott, majestically.

"Oh you naughty man," exclaimed Mrs. Leo Hunter, playfully tapping the Editor's her fan (Minerva with a fan!)


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 walked solemnly up the entrance. Never were such shouts heard, as those which greeted Mr. Tupman's efforts to fix the sugar-loaf hat on his head, by way of entering the garden in style.

The preparations were on the most delightful scale; fully realising the prophetic Pott's anticipations about the gorgeousness of Eastern Fairy-land, and at once affording a sufficient contradiction to the malignant statements of the reptile Independent. The grounds were more than an acre and a quarter in extent, and they were filled with people! Never was such a blaze of beauty, and fashion, and literature. There was the young lady who "did" the poetry in the Eatanswill Gazette, in the garb of a sultana, leaning upon the arm of the young gentleman who "did" the review department, and who was appropriately habited in a field marshal's uniform—the boots excepted. There were hosts of these geniuses, and any reasonable person would have thought it honour enough to meet them. But more than these, there were half a dozen lions from London—authors, real authors, who had written whole books, and printed them afterwards—and here you might see 'em, walking about, like ordinary men, smiling, and talking—aye, and talking pretty considerable nonsense too, no doubt with the benign intention of rendering themselves intelligible to the common people about them. Moreover, there was a band of music in pasteboard caps; four something-ean singers in the costume of their country,—and a dozen hired waiters in the costume of their country-and very dirty costume too. And above all, there was Mrs. Leo Hunter in the character of Minerva, receiving the company, and overflowing with pride and gratification at the notion of having called such distinguished individuals together.

"Mr. Pickwick, ma'am," said a servant, as that gentleman approached the presiding goddess, with his hat in his hand, and the Brigand and Troubadour on either arm.

"What! Where!" exclaimed Mrs. Leo Hunter, starting up, in an affected rapture of surprise.


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 and Grecian helmet: which everybody knows (and if they do not, Mr. Solomon Lucas did) to have been the regular. authentic, every-day costume of a Troubadour, from the earliest ages down to the time of their final disappearance from the face of the earth. All this was pleasant, but this was as nothing compared with the shouting of the populace when the carriage drew up, behind Mr. Pott's chariot, which chariot itself drew up at Mr. Pott's door, which door itself opened, and displayed the great Pott accoutred as a Russian officer of justice, with a tremendous knout in his hand—tastefully typical of the stern and mighty power of the Eatanswill Gazette, and the fearful lashings it bestowed on public offenders.

"Bravo!" shouted Mr. Tupman and Mr. Snodgrass from the passage, when they beheld the walking allegory.

"Bravo!" Mr. Pickwick was heard to exclaim, from the passage.

"Hoo—roar Pott!" shouted the populace. Amid these salutations, Mr. Pott, smiling with that kind of bland dignity which sufficiently testified that he felt his power, and knew how to exert it, got into the chariot.

Then there emerged from the house, Mrs. Pott, who would have looked very like Apollo if she hadn't had a gown on: conducted by Mr. Winkle, who in his light-red coat, could not possibly have been mistaken for anything but a sportsman, if he had not borne an equal resemblance to a general postman. Last of all came Mr. Pickwick, whom the boys applauded as loud as anybody, probably under the impression that his tights and gaiters were some remnants of the dark ages; and then the two vehicles proceeded towards Mrs. Leo Hunter's Mr. Weller (who was to assist in waiting) being stationed on the box of that in which his master was seated.

Every one of the men, women, boys, girls, and babies, who were assembled to see the visitors in their fancy dresses, screamed with delight and ecstasy, when Mr. Pickwick, with the Brigand on one arm, and the Troubadour on the other,


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 ::(c) the Minister in charge of Finance or Taxation or any other Minister nominated by each State Government—Members.

 * (3) The Members of the Goods and Services Tax Council referred to in sub-clause (c) of clause (2) shall, as soon as may be, choose one amongst themselves to be the Vice-Chairperson of the Council for such period as they may decide.

 * (4) The Goods and Services Tax Council shall make recommendations to the Union and the States on—
 * (a) the taxes, cesses and surcharges levied by the Union, the States and the local bodies which may be subsumed in the goods and services tax;
 * (b) the goods and services that may be subjected to, or exempted from the goods and services tax;
 * (c) model Goods and Services Tax Laws, principles of levy, apportionment of Goods and Services Tax levied on supplies in the course of inter-State trade or commerce under article 269A and the principles that govern the place of supply;
 * (d) the threshold limit of turnover below which goods and services may be exempted from goods and services tax;
 * (e) the rates including floor rates with bands of goods and services tax;
 * (f) any special rate or rates for a specified period, to raise additional resources during any natural calamity or disaster;
 * (g) special provision with respect to the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand; and
 * (h) any other matter relating to the goods and services tax, as the Council may decide.

 * (5) The Goods and Services Tax Council shall recommend the date on which the goods and services tax be levied on petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (commonly known as petrol), natural gas and aviation turbine fuel.

 * (6) While discharging the functions conferred by this article, the Goods and Services Tax Council shall be guided by the need for a harmonised structure of goods and services tax and for the development of a harmonised national market for goods and services.

 * (7) One-half of the total number of Members of the Goods and Services Tax Council shall constitute the quorum at its meetings.

 * (8) The Goods and Services Tax Council shall determine the procedure in the performance of its functions.

 * (9) Every decision of the Goods and Services Tax Council shall be taken at a meeting, by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the weighted votes of the members present and voting, in accordance with the following principles, namely:—
 * (a) the vote of the Central Government shall have a weightage of one-third of the total votes cast, and
 * (b) the votes of all the State Governments taken together shall have a weightage of two-thirds of the total votes cast, in that meeting.

 * (10) No act or proceedings of the Goods and Services Tax Council shall be invalid merely by reason of—


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 ::(a) any vacancy in, or any defect in, the constitution of the Council; or
 * (b) any defect in the appointment of a person as a Member of the Council; or
 * (c) any procedural irregularity of the Council not affecting the merits of the case.

 * (11) The Goods and Services Tax Council shall establish a mechanism to adjudicate any dispute—
 * (a) between the Government of India and one or more States; or
 * (b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other side; or
 * (c) between two or more States, arising out of the recommendations of the Council or implementation thereof.]

280. Finance Commission.—(1) The President shall, within two years from the commencement of this Constitution and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth year or at such earlier time as the President considers necessary, by order constitute a Finance Commission which shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President.

 * (2) Parliament may by law determine the qualifications which shall be requisite for appointment as members of the Commission and the manner in which they shall be selected.

 * (3) It shall be the duty of the Commission to make recommendations to the President as to—
 * (a) the distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes which are to be, or may be, divided between them under this Chapter and the allocation between the States of the respective shares of such proceeds;
 * (b) the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India;

 * [(bb) the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State;]

 * [(c) the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Municipalities in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State;]

 * [(d)] any other matter referred to the Commission by the President in the interests of sound finance.

 * (4) The Commission shall determine their procedure and shall have such powers in the performance of their functions as Parliament may by law confer on them.

281. Recommendations of the Finance Commission.—The President shall cause every recommendation made by the Finance Commission under the provisions of this Constitution together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon to be laid before each House of Parliament.

282. Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenues.—The Union or a State may make any grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may make laws.


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 '''283. Custody, etc., of Consolidated Funds, Contingency Funds and moneys credited to the public accounts.'''—(1) The custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by or on behalf of the Government of India, their payment into the public account of India and the withdrawal of moneys from such account and all other matters connected with or ancillary to matters aforesaid shall be regulated by law made by Parliament, and, until provision in that behalf is so made, shall be regulated by rules made by the President.

 * (2) The custody of the Consolidated Fund of a State and the Contingency Fund of a State, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by or on behalf of the Government of the State, their payment into the public account of the State and the withdrawal of moneys from such account and all other matters connected with or ancillary to matters aforesaid shall be regulated by law made by the Legislature of the State, and, until provision in that behalf is so made, shall be regulated by rules made by the Governor *** of the State.

284. Custody of suitors’ deposits and other moneys received by public servants and courts.—All moneys received by or deposited with—
 * (a) any officer employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in his capacity as such, other than revenues or public moneys raised or received by the Government of India or the Government of the State, as the case may be, or
 * (b) any court within the territory of India to the credit of any cause, matter, account or persons, shall be paid into the public account of India or the public account of State, as the case may be.

285. Exemption of property of the Union from State taxation.—(1) The property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State.

 * (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which such property was immediately before the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that tax continues to be levied in that State.

286. Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods.—(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on [the supply of goods or of services or both, where such supply takes place]—
 * (a) outside the State; or
 * (b) in the course of the import of the 3[goods or services or both] into, or export of the [goods or services or both]out of, the territory of India.

 * [(2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a [supply of goods or of services or both] in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1).]


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 *****

287. Exemption from taxes on electricity.—Save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity (whether produced by a Government or other persons) which is—
 * (a) consumed by the Government of India, or sold to the Government of India for consumption by that Government; or
 * (b) consumed in the construction, maintenance or operation of any railway by the Government of India or a railway company operating that railway, or sold to that Government or any such railway company for consumption in the construction, maintenance or operation of any railway,

and any such law imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale of electricity shall secure that the price of electricity sold to the Government of India for consumption by that Government, or to any such railway company as aforesaid for consumption in the construction, maintenance or operation of any railway, shall be less by the amount of the tax than the price charged to other consumers of a substantial quantity of electricity.

288. Exemption from taxation by States in respect of water or electricity in certain cases.—(1) Save in so far as the President may by order otherwise provide, no law of a State in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax in respect of any water or electricity stored, generated, consumed, distributed or sold by any authority established by any existing law or any law made by Parliament for regulating or developing any inter-State river or rivervalley.

Explanation.—The expression “law of a State in force” in this clause shall include a law of a State passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.

(2) The Legislature of a State may by law impose, or authorise the imposition of, any such tax as is mentioned in clause (1), but no such law shall have any effect unless it has, after having been reserved for the consideration of the President, received his assent; and if any such law provides for the fixation of the rates and other incidents of such tax by means of rules or orders to be made under the law by any authority, the law shall provide for the previous consent of the President being obtained to the making of any such rule or order.

289. Exemption of property and income of a State from Union taxation.—(1) The property and income of a State shall be exempt from Union taxation.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent the Union from imposing, or authorising the imposition of, any tax to such extent, if any, as Parliament may by law provide in respect of a trade or business of any kind carried on by, or on behalf of, the Government of a State, or any operations connected therewith, or any property used or occupied for the purposes of such trade or business, or any income accruing or arising in connection therewith.

(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall apply to any trade or business, or to any class of trade or business, which Parliament may by law declare to be incidental to the ordinary functions of Government. 290. Adjustment in respect of certain expenses and pensions.—Where under the provisions of this Constitution the expenses of any court or Commission, or the pension payable to or in respect of a person who has served before the commencement of this Constitution under the Crown in India or after such commencement in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of a State, then, if—