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Page:Some recent developments in white pine weevil research in the northeast (IA CAT31009844).pdf/4

 loss was 13 percent in pole-size trees (5 to 8.9 inches d.b.h.), 40 percent in the sawlog portion (board-foot volume) of sawtimber trees (9 inches d.b.h. and over) and 70 percent in the portion above sawlog limits of merchantability (cubic volume).

White pine is not the only tree species attacked. Norway spruce plantations have been severely attacked by the weevil in the East, and jack pine plantations in the Lake States are also vulnerable. The weevil attacks all conifer trees except balsam fir and hemlock.

HE OBJECTIVE of our research program is to develop efficient methods of reducing losses of white pine due to the weevil. Although a great deal of valuable research has been done, many questions remain unanswered.

U.S. Forest Service research on the white-pine weevil has taken several courses. We are seeking more information about the insect itself. We are seeking more effective methods of control by spraying. We are also studying the tree species itself in its relationship to the insect.

The time in the spring when weevils emerge is an important factor in control. Godwin and Bean (3) have shown that there is a close correlation between emergence and average and maximum daily temperatures, and that weevil emergence can be predicted by using cumulative degree-hours above 40° F. A reasonably accurate estimate can be made of the degree and rate of weevil emergence in the spring. With this information, better spray treatments can be devised. This timing of spray applications is particularly important 2


text:
Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/47

 :* LCI shuttle service between Bikini and Kwajalein atolls

 * Evacuation of Rongerik Atoll population if necessary.

TG 1.8 was composed of the following six task units (Reference B.0.1, pp. 5 and 6).

 * TU 1.8.1 (Repair and Service Unit)
 * USS Ajax (AR-6)
 * ARD-29
 * ATA-124
 * ATA-187
 * USS Cebu (ARG-6)
 * USS Chikasia (AO-54)
 * USS Chowanoc (ATF-100)
 * USS Coasters Harbor (AG-74)
 * USS Creon (ARL-11)
 * USS Dixie (AD-14) (Flagship)
 * USS Enoree (AO-69)
 * USS Fulton (AS-11)
 * USS Hesperia (AKS-13)
 * USS Limestone (IX-158)
 * USS LST-388
 * USS LST-861
 * USS Munsee (ATF-107)
 * USS Phaon (ARB-3)
 * USS Pollux (AKS-4)
 * USS Quartz (IX-150)
 * USS Severn (AO-61)
 * USS Sioux (ATF-75)
 * USS Sphinx (ARL-24)
 * USS Telamon (ARB-8)
 * USS Tombigbee (AOG-11)
 * USS Wenatchee (ATF-118)
 * USS Wildcat (AW-2)
 * YC-1009
 * YF-385
 * YF-733
 * YF-734
 * YF-735
 * YF-752
 * YF-753
 * YF-754
 * YF-990
 * YF-991
 * YF-992
 * YO-132
 * YO-199
 * YOG-63
 * YOG-70
 * YW-92

 * TU 1.8.2 -- No units assigned

 * TU 1.8.3 (Dispatch Boat and Boat Pool)
 * USS Gunston Hall (LSD-5)
 * LCI(L)-977
 * LCI(L)-1091
 * LCI(L)-1062
 * LCI(L)-1067
 * LCT-1361
 * LCT-1461
 * PGM-23
 * PGM-24
 * PGM-25
 * PGM-29
 * PGM-31
 * PGM-32
 * USS Presque Isle (APB-44)
 * USS San Marcos (LSD-25)

42

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/47


text:
Page:Cariou v. Prince.pdf/15

 that Prince’s images, except for those we discuss separately below, have a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct from Cariou’s. Our conclusion should not be taken to suggest, however, that any cosmetic changes to the photographs would necessarily constitute fair use. A secondary work may modify the original without being transformative. For instance, a derivative work that merely presents the same material but in a new form, such as a book of synopses of televisions shows, is not transformative. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 148; Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir.1993). In twenty-five of his artworks, Prince has not presented the same material as Cariou in a different manner, but instead has “add[ed] something new” and presented images with a fundamentally different aesthetic. Leibovitz, 187 F.3d at 114.

The first fair use factor—the purpose and character of the use—also requires that we consider whether the allegedly infringing work has a commercial or nonprofit educational purpose. See, e.g., Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253. That being said, “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research … are generally conducted for profit.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (quotation marks omitted). “The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy concerns the unfairness that arises when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of copyrighted material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying the original work.” ''Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.'', 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1994). This factor must be applied with caution because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress “could not have intended” a rule that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Instead, “[t]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Although there is no question that Prince’s artworks are commercial, we do not place much significance on that fact due to the transformative nature of the work.

We turn next to the fourth statutory factor, the effect of the secondary use upon the potential market for the value of the copyrighted work, because such discussion further demonstrates the significant differences between Prince’s work, generally, and Cariou’s. Much of the district court’s conclusion that Prince and Gagosian infringed on Cariou’s copyrights was apparently driven by the fact that Celle decided not to host a Yes Rasta show at her gallery once she learned of the Gagosian Canal Zone show. The district court determined that this factor weighs against Prince because he “has unfairly damaged both the actual and potential markets for Cariou’s original work and the potential market for derivative use licenses for Cariou’s original work.” Cariou, 84 F.Supp.2d at 353.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the application of this factor does not focus principally on the question of damage to Cariou’s derivative market. We have made clear that “our concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 481–82 (2d Cir.2004). “The market for potential derivative uses

title: Page:Cariou v. Prince.pdf/15


text:
Page:Some recent developments in white pine weevil research in the northeast (IA CAT31009844).pdf/5

 for spray materials that have a brief residual effect.

The distances weevils may fly is very important when considering the degree of isolation required for small experimental spray plots, and also for large control operations. Barnes (1) has done considerable work on the flight habits of the weevil. To get more specific information on dispersal we tried tagging weevils with radioactive isotopes. We released 1,600 weevils tagged with Scandium-46 in September in a small plantation and traced them the following spring (4). While the lengths of individual flights were not measurable, the distinct stratification suggested that weevil movement of 300 to 400 feet was the result of direct uninterrupted flight from the release trees.

We feel that still further studies should be made of weevil dispersion. If weevils could be tagged in the spring, there would not be the loss of treated weevils during the winter. Present plans are to use Scandium-46 again but at a lower specific activity than was used in the fall, and to tag some 3,000 to 4,000 weevils for release in a large plantation in the spring.

E ARE also studying egg-laying habits. It has been reported that the weevils issuing in August do not mate until the following spring, and that insemination does not take place in the fall. In laboratory tests, 84 percent of the females isolated from male weevils in early November produced viable eggs in the spring.

To determine to what extent fall insemination occurs in the field, female weevils were collected in early October and were immediately placed in an overwintering cage by 3


text:
Page:Cariou v. Prince.pdf/16

 includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Our court has concluded that an accused infringer has usurped the market for copyrighted works, including the derivative market, where the infringer’s target audience and the nature of the infringing content is the same as the original. For instance, a book of trivia about the television show Seinfeld usurped the show’s market because the trivia book “substitute[d] for a derivative market that a television program copyright owner … would in general develop or license others to develop.” Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 (quotation marks omitted). Conducting this analysis, we are mindful that “[t]he more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that the secondary use substitutes for the original,” even though “the fair use, being transformative, might well harm, or even destroy, the market for the original.” Id.

As discussed above, Celle did not decide against putting on a Yes Rasta show because it had already been done at Gagosian, but rather because she mistakenly believed that Cariou had collaborated with Prince on the Gagosian show. Although certain of Prince’s artworks contain significant portions of certain of Cariou’s photographs, neither Prince nor the Canal Zone show usurped the market for those photographs. Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s, and there is no evidence that Prince’s work ever touched—much less usurped—either the primary or derivative market for Cariou’s work. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Cariou would ever develop or license secondary uses of his work in the vein of Prince’s artworks. Nor does anything in the record suggest that Prince’s artworks had any impact on the marketing of the photographs. Indeed, Cariou has not aggressively marketed his work, and has earned just over $8,000 in royalties from Yes Rasta since its publication. He has sold four prints from the book, and only to personal acquaintances.

Prince’s work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou’s. Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more dollars. The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous such as the musicians Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors Jonathan Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie, and Brad Pitt. Prince sold eight artworks for a total of $10,480,000, and exchanged seven others for works by painter Larry Rivers and by sculptor Richard Serra. Cariou on the other hand has not actively marketed his work or sold work for significant sums, and nothing in the record suggests that anyone will not now purchase Cariou’s work, or derivative non-transformative works (whether Cariou’s own or licensed by him) as a result of the market space that Prince’s work has taken up. This fair use factor therefore weighs in Prince’s favor.

The next statutory factor that we consider, the nature of the copyrighted work, “calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. 1164. We consider “ ‘(1) whether the work is expressive or creative, … with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where the work is factual or

title: Page:Cariou v. Prince.pdf/16


text:
Page:Everywoman's World, Volume 7, Number 7.djvu/12

PAGE 10 ''When he touched her hand he had not meant to retain it, but he did; then he captured the other. "I am going to marry you, you know," he said. "Are you?” she asked. She had not thought about marriage, but, of course, if he said so, they would be married.''

REAMY, and living much in the dreams she fashioned from the old romances she read, Hope Fielding lived in a world unreal, but real to her.

To her father's lonely ranch in Alberta came three strangers talking of the railroad which was coming through; one of these, Conroy Edgerton, who had a daughter about Hope's age, sent her a box of chocolates. When the railroad did come Mr. Fielding, who was a path-maker, and not a money-maker, moved back farther north.

Hope was ambitious and needed money to pay her way through the Normal School. She went to the city and engaged as housemaid in a hotel where Evan Hardy—one of the men—was boarding. Here Conroy Edgerton came and she recognized him instantly. He was interested and they met a few times.

Jim Sanderson—a boarder—had been pursuing Hope for months and finding her alone made himself so objectionable that she knocked him down with the butt end of a revolver. Then she left the hotel and went home.

Hope taught school and found life flat and unprofitable; she made friends with Mary Dark and Mrs. Patton, and with Allen Kirby who happened to be Edgerton's chauffeur. He took her motoring until Edgerton came—then Edgerton took her. Edgerton offered to send her to college, but Hope refused. Ned Angell took her to the Tennis Club dance where she met Tony Yorke. She also saw Jim Sanderson, but kept her self-possession and appeared not to recognize him.

FOOL'S paradise is quite as good as a philosopher's heaven—while it lasts. And while there is a vast difference in essence between mere credulity and the trust engendered of good faith, the result is too often quite the ones same. Julie de Lespinasse has not been reckoned wanting in wit, but she never, even on her death-bed, perceived the asses' ears of her utterly selfish and unmanly lover. Hope was not another Julie, but neither was she quite a fool. Indeed, she followed a very ancient wisdom, knowing that

But it is too true that there is no wisdom that will serve as a cloak for all weathers. And Hope was not weather-wise.

She and Mary Dark were living together. They took the half of a private house from an old friend of Mary's; Mrs. Hamilton, by name. They had three rooms, transformed into a separate apartment, furnished with grass chairs and cushions and bookcases mainly, with a rag rug on the floor, chintz curtains, and a desk and drawing-board. The desk Mary kept in her bedroom, so she might sit there and read and write if Hope had guests. They had a geranium in a pot and fussed over it with ineffectual pleasure. Hope settled herself in the new rooms like a cat on a hearthrug. Watching her darning stockings, or sketching, or running ribbons through her lingerie, Mary felt the same tender amusement one derives from the antics of a kitten or a puppy. But, sometimes, when the girl had one of her rare restless fits, and prowled about softly, touching things here and there or standing with her face pressed to the window-pane looking down the dusty street, Mary's heart misgave her. She connected it readily with Tony Yorke's visits. He had called, more than once. Ned Angell came much oftener, taught Hope the guitar, and sang to her, but Hope received him exactly as she did the three boisterous Hamilton children.

Mrs. Hamilton was, in a sense, a friend of the left hand. "A remarkable woman," said Mary briefly, and left Hope to discover the meaning of the phrase. It was not too difficult. Mrs. Hamilton, without a grain of intellect, possessed a steady intelligence, a deep simplicity, and that genuine sweetness of soul which St. Paul defines as charity. She knew no one in "Society" save Mary, and cared not at all; she went out but little, did her own housework, kept her own counsel and that of her friends, and was sincerely fond of the two girls without in the least desiring to regulate their conduct or inquire into their affairs. Her children were kept in order, and brought more pleasure than annoyance.

Mary had few callers, though she went out a good deal. Occasionally Hope was asked, also, but the thought of a gathering filled her with dumb misery. Eleanor Travers had been to call on both girls; there was a faint under-current of alarmed curiosity in her manner, struggling with an instinctive liking for Hope; Mary had watched her with a lazy smile. Hope felt baffled; then dismissed the remembrance, and was glad Miss Travers was out when she returned the call.

Once she asked Allen Kirby to the house. He came readily and was obviously ill at ease. She was "away off" indeed, It was not the same girl who received him in a trailing gown and offered him chocolate in a fragile little cup as she who came flying out through the dark, short-skirted and sweatered, to scramble into the big automobile and crowd the engine to the limit of its capacity through the adventurous dark. So they kept to that.

Tony caught her in yet another phase. He came unexpectedly, when she thought he had forgotten. If he had never come, he would in time have become a sort of private legend to her.

Mrs. Hamilton let him in, but did not trouble to announce him. He found Hope a little dishevelled and fatigued, in a ruffled print house-frock, holding the Hamilton baby on her knee, and telling him stories with a slightly absent air. She was hardly thinking of the stories; her mind was really occupied pleasantly with the aspect of the room which she had just dusted and set in order. The geranium glistened from a late watering, sitting in the window where it caught the last daylight. The baby, with an expression of serious rapture, repeated after her such phrases of the story as caught his ear, and pored attentively over certain pictures Hope had drawn to make it clear to his youthful mind. She and Mary amused themselves so at times. The stories, Mary wrote; and Hope sketched for them as they progressed. When they were finished, the girls tore them up, or allowed them to accumulate in odd corners, thinking of them merely as divertisement.

HE did not rise at his entrance, but offered him her hand, still clutching little Bobby with a kind of desperation, and terribly conscious of her tumbled hair. Bobby had pulled it down into her eyes, and her collar was unfastened, and she felt too confused to correct either negligence. It would have been like decking herself for his approval, and she wanted him, somehow, to accept her as "a poor thing, but his own," without garnishment.

"How domestic you look," he said, laughing.

"But I am horribly domestic," she assured him. He laughed more, and insisted on hearing the rest of the story, looking at her sketches with real interest and some amazement, such as most of us feel when one we know displays a talent, however slight. Achievement, to the majority of us, seems to be possible only to persons we do not know: super-beings, not accessible in daily life.

"But you're alarmingly clever," he said, to her great embarrassment. She clutched Bobby till he squirmed and murmured, "No, no," very positively. Then the baby insisted on being let go: she led him to the door, came back and sat down tentatively. She felt as though she must entertain Tony, and at the same time as though she herself did not require any entertainment, but merely to sit and see him opposite her. But she must have talked of something, for they laughed a great deal in the next half-hour, and at the end of it he was sitting beside her on the cushioned wicker settee. The awkwardness had passed.

Tony Yorke enjoyed life a great deal because he never knew exactly what he was going to do, and so suffered no disappointments, while at the same time everything had for him the flavour of novelty. He had not meant to make love to Hope when he set out to see her, but neither had he any resolution formed against it. When he touched her hand in taking a match from her fingers, he had not meant to retain it, but he did. It lay in his, submissive and yet uncertain; and then he captured the other and drew her toward him. It was dusk now; she had not put on the lights, but her clear yet clouded blue eyes, fixed on his, had an illumination of their own, and her hands were pearly white in his brown ones. She said nothing as he bent to her, but watched him, and hew waited on her word, ready to release her, even while he still drew her closer. Then her eyelids fell softly, and he knew he was going to kiss her.

And when he touched her cool, trembling lips he knew, however incredible it would have seemed but an hour earlier that he loved her,

He had been aware of a kind of charm that had fallen on them at their first meeting, but had afterward put it down to the music, the excitement of the dance, the exotic atmosphere of an assemblage of young and light-hearted pleasure-seekers. Now, with her in his arms, he knew she had sounded the depths of his nature—shallow water all, but all of him. He was essentially a lover of women, not of one woman, but, at the least, he loved them all for their fineness, and his own type of woman was not the type that touched him emotionally. Rather, perhaps he was all things to all women, but himself first—and last.

His tribute was the conventional one, but still again his best, and all he had, and even a little more. For he spoke of marriage, not that night, but the next time. And he knew quite well that, by his own standard, he could not afford to marry. Subconsciously, he had always expected to marry a girl with money. Not for her money, but it would just happen so. Yet he said, after Hope had come forward timidly, and put her hands in his:

"I'm going to marry you, you know?" (See opposite page)


text:
Page:The Scots Magazine and Edinburgh Literary Miscellany (vol 94, 1824).djvu/529

Extracts from the Portfolio of a Scholar, 1. Did the Scottish Generals and Commissioners at Newark, by and with the authority of the Scottish Parliament, sell Charles I. to the English Parliament, for the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling? 2. Theory of the Colonization of Italy, by a Led Captain of the Nineteenth Century; being a crumb from a Great Man’s table, 3. Were the Crusades productive of any advantages calculated to counterbalance the immediate evils which flowed from them? Walks in Edinburgh.—Walk IV. Eventual Disuse of War—Prospective Civilization, Bay Leaves; by T. C. Smith, A Defence of the Letter to the Editor of the Edinburgh Review, on Miracles Continued, The Pedestrian.—No. I. The Steam-Yacht, Sonnet,

Henri Quatre—Cromwell—Louis XIV—Buonaparte, The Twelve Nights. A Tale from the German, Singular Adventure, Sketches of the Early History of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.—No. VI. McCulloch’s Preliminary Discourse on Political Economy, Captain Medwin’s Conversations of Lord Byron, Byron,

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE. Works preparing for Publication, Monthly List of New Publications,

MONTHLY REGISTER. Foreign Intelligence, Proceedings in Parliament, British Chronicle, Appointments, Promotions, &c. Markets, Meteorological Table, Agricultural Report, Course of Exchange—Bankrupts, Obituary, Births—Marriages—Deaths,


text:
Page:Some recent developments in white pine weevil research in the northeast (IA CAT31009844).pdf/6

 themselves. Thirty-four percent of these females laid viable eggs the next spring, which indicates that fall insemination is high. The fact that many females are ready and able to oviposit immediately after emergence in the spring without further mating is important in the timing of sprays.

We are also studying various physical aspects of the tree such as the effect of bark thickness and leader diameter in relation to oviposition. To determine the possible existence of racial differences in eastern white pine to weevil resistance, an experimental planting of white pine trees from 12 different sources has been made. In this connection it will be necessary to study the effect of the various oleoresins, auxins, etc., on the insect, which means we need to know considerable about the chemistry and physiology of the tree and the physiology of the adult weevil.

XPERIMENTS and control projects since 1939 have proved conclusive]y that the white-pine weevil can be controlled to a height of 16 feet by using knapsack sprayer with concentrated lead arsenate spray (2). Spraying with lead arsenate can be done at any time from December until the buds start to expand about May 1. The upper half of each leader should be sprayed to the runoff point.

The knapsack-sprayer technique has now been used with excellent results for a number of the newer insecticides. The following materials and strengths may be depended upon to control the white-pine weevil when applied in late March or early April. Control in this case means that less than ½ percent of the trees become weeviled. 4


text:
Page:Some recent developments in white pine weevil research in the northeast (IA CAT31009844).pdf/7

 1.Lindane emulsion Vi percent plus Aroclor 5460. 2.Heptachlor emulsion 2 percent. 3.Heptachlor emulsion 1 percent plus Aroclor 5460. 4.Endrin emulsion 1 percent plus Aroclor 5460. 5.Malathion emulsion 2 percent plus Aroclor 5460. 6.DDT emulsion 2 percent.

With at least one of these materials, weevil control is now possible with fall applications. On October 24 and 25, 1956, and three blocks of trees were sprayed with ½-percent Lindane emulsion, with the addition of like percentages of Aroclor 5460, replicated three times. In 1957 only 1 tree out of the 10,000 trees sprayed was weeviled.

PRAYING large plantations with helicopter has given very good control. The most satisfactory results were obtained when a solution or emulsion containing 2 pounds of DDT in 2 gallons of liquid per acre was applied in the spring.

Spraying with fixed-wing aircraft has not been so satisfactory. However, with some of the newer materials, both types of aircraft may give good control with a smaller amount of insecticide and liquid per acre.

Preliminary tests of a 2-percent granular formulation of Endrin gave promising results for the control of hibernating weevils at a rate of 1 pound Endrin per acre (5). Last winter several additional materials at rates ranging from 1 pound active ingredient per acre to ¼ pound per acre confirmed the promising results obtained earlier. Two materials, Aldrin and Heptachlor, resulted in no emergence of 5


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 41

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 41


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 42

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 42


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 43

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 43


text: Category:Transcendentalists

title: Category:Transcendentalists


text:
Page:The spirit of the Hebrew poetry 1861.djvu/65

 if it be only an instant, the result of a mental process in the mind of the hearer, who—unconsciously perhaps—renders them into their well-known prosaic values. Such as they are when they meet the ear, they convey no meaning that is intelligible in relation to the subject. Unconditioned thought may be still further conditioned, if I employ, not merely figurative terms, but such as are suggested at the moment of speaking by vivid emotions, or by stormy passions; as if, in addressing a political meeting from a platform, I should affirm what I intend to say in a declamatory style, as thus—"The deadly miasma of republican doctrines, rising from the swamps of popular ignorance, is even now encircling the British polity:—year by year is it insidiously advancing toward the very centre of the State; nor can the time be distant when it shall have destroyed all life within the sacred enclosures of our ancient institutions." In this instance, not only are the words and phrases figurative, and are such therefore as need to be rendered into their literal equivalents, but they are such also as indicate an excited state of feeling in the speaker, which a calm philosophic mood will not approve; and the exuberances of which may well bear much retrenchment. Nevertheless, thus far, this conditioning of thought—as well of the impassioned style, as of that which is simply figurative—may properly be called natural; for it is natural to the human mind to utter itself


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 44

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 44


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 45

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 45


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 46

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 46


text:
Jones v. Flowers/Opinion of the Court

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to determine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner and returned undelivered, the government must take additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the owner's property.

I
In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. Jones paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the mortgage company paid Jones' property taxes. After Jones paid off his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent.

In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commissioner of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-301 (1997). The packet of information stated that unless Jones redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale two years later on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody was home to sign for [p224] the letter, and nobody appeared at the post office to retrieve the letter within the next 15 days. The post office returned the unopened packet to the Commissioner marked unclaimed. Pet. for Cert. 3.

Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted, which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of the property. See § 26-37-202(b). Several months later, respondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify him that his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also returned to the Commissioner marked "unclaimed." Pet. for Cert. 3. Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for $21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day period for postsale redemption passed, see § 26-37-202(e), Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. The notice was served on Jones' daughter, who contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11 (Exh. B).

Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner's failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones' right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property without due process. The Commissioner and Flowers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a–13a. It concluded that the Arkansas tax sale statute, which set forth the notice procedure fol- [p225] lowed by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due process requirements. Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 359 Ark. 443, 198 S.W.3d 520 (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that due process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held that attempting to provide notice by certified mail satisfied due process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark., at 453–54, 198 S.W.3d, at 526–527.

We granted certiorari, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered. Compare, e.g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F.3d 231, 236 (CA2 2004) ("In light of the notice's return, the County was required to use 'reasonably diligent efforts' to ascertain Akey's correct address"), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 789 N.E.2d 607, 611 (2003) ("[W]e reject the view that the enforcing officer's obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as undeliverable"), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N.W.2d 536, 541 (2000) (per curiam) ("The fact that one of the mailings was returned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose on the state the obligation to undertake an investigation to see if a new address could be located"). We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps were available to the State. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court. [p226]

A
Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have stated that due process requires the government to provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S., at 314. The Commissioner argues that once the State provided notice reasonably calculated to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale by mailing him a certified letter, due process was satisfied. The Arkansas statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice, the Commissioner continues, because it provides for notice by certified mail to an address that the property owner is responsible for keeping up to date. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997). The Commissioner notes this Court's ample precedent condoning notice by mail, see, e.g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); ''Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane, supra'', at 318–319, and adds that the Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional requirements by requiring the Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for Respondent Commissioner 14–15.

It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent. See, e.g., Dusenbery, supra, at 168–169; Mullane, 339 U.S., at 314. In each of these cases, the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry, and we stated that "[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected." Id., at 315; see also Dusenbery, supra, at [p227] 170. But we have never addressed whether due process entails further responsibility when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that the "notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions." Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956). The question presented is whether such knowledge on the government's part is a "circumstance and condition" that varies the "notice required."

The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most have decided that when the government learns its attempt at notice has failed, due process requires the government to do something more before real property may be sold in a tax sale. See, e.g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 576 (CA4 2005); Akey, supra, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S.E.2d 81, 85 (2003); Kennedy, supra, at 9, 789 N.E.2d, at 611; Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 38 (D.C. App. 1992) (per curiam); St. George Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326 Md. 90, 103, 603 A.2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P.2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778, 780–783 (Alaska 1986); Giacobbi v. Hall, [p228] 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P.2d 404, 408 (1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288, 296, 489 A.2d 1334, 1338–1339 (1985). But see Smith, 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N.W.2d, at 541; Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 23, 576 N.W.2d 535, 541–542; Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlantic City v. Block C-11, Lot 11, 74 N.J. 34, 39–40, 376 A.2d 926, 928 (1977). Many States already require in their statutes that the government do more than simply mail notice to delinquent owners, either at the outset or as a followup measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective. Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the property as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 3704.7 (West Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §§ 200/21-75(a), 200/22-10, 200/22-15 (West 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. § 14-836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 211.78i(3) (West 2005); Minn. Stat. § 281.23, subd. 6 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-18-212(1)(a), (2)(a) (2005); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 57-28-04(3) (Lexis 2005); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 10-25-5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004); Wis. Stat. § 75.12(1) (2003–2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B) (1997–2005). Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at the property owner's last known address either at the outset, see Del. Code Ann., Tit. 9, §§ 8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-78(d) (Supp. 2005); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 246-56 (2003); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. § 14-836(b)(6) (Lexis 2001); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A), or as a followup measure when personal service cannot be accomplished or certified mail is returned, see Fla. Stat. § 197.522(2)(a) (2003); Minn. Stat. § 281.23, subd. 6; S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-40(c) (Supp. 2005). And a few States require a diligent inquiry to find a property owner's correct address when mailed notice is returned. See Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-3 (1973–2002); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 361.595(3)(b) (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, § 5860.607a (Purdon 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-9-25.1 (2005).

See also 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (requiring the Internal Revenue Service to make a reasonable attempt to personally serve notice on a delinquent taxpayer before relying upon notice by certified mail); 28 U.S.C. § 3203(g)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (requiring written notice to tenants of real property subject to sale under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990); 12 U.S.C. § 3758(2)(A)(iii) (requiring written notice to occupants before [p229] foreclosure by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development); § 3758(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that notice be posted on the property if occupants are unknown).

[p229] In Mullane, we stated that "when notice is a person's due [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it," 339 U.S., at 315, and that assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the "interest of the State" against "the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," id., at 314. Our leading cases on notice have evaluated the adequacy of notice given to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, Mullane, supra; a mortgagee, Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791; owners of seized cash and automobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); creditors of an estate, Tulsa Professional, 485 U.S. 478; and tenants living in public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982). In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice prior to the State extinguishing a property owner's interest in a home.

We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner's office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again. No one "desirous of actually informing" the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared and say "I tried." Failure to follow up would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the postman.

[p230] By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was "no better off than if the notice had never been sent." Malone, 614 A.2d, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not what someone "desirous of actually informing" Jones would do; such a person would take further reasonable steps if any were available. In prior cases, we have required the government to consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner's home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison. 409 U.S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate when town officials knew that the property owner was incompetent and without a guardian's protection. Id., at 146–147.

The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the State was aware of such information before it calculated how best to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain why due process would have settled for something less if the government had learned after notice was sent, but before the taking occurred, that the property owner was in prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey, the government's knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government's part to take additional steps to effect notice. That knowledge was one of the "practicalities and peculiarities of the case," [p231] Mullane, supra, at 314–315, that the Court took into account in determining whether constitutional requirements were met. It should similarly be taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice in this case. The dissent dismisses the State's knowledge that its notice was ineffective as "learned long after the fact," post, at 246, n.5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), but the notice letter was promptly returned to the State two to three weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas statutory regime precludes the State from taking the property for two years while the property owner may exercise his right to redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-301 (Supp. 2005).

It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor General contend, that the failure of notice in a specific case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc. But if a feature of the State's chosen procedure is that it promptly provides additional information to the government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the government does with that information in assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure. After all, the State knew ex ante that it would promptly learn whether its effort to effect notice through certified mail had succeeded. It would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a procedure under which telephone calls were placed to owners, what the State did when no one answered. Asking what the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed is not substantively different.

The Commissioner has three further arguments for why reasonable followup measures were not required in this case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997). Second, "after failing to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a property holder is on [p232] inquiry-notice that his property is subject to governmental taking." Brief for Respondent Commissioner 18–19. Third, Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy. None of these contentions relieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice.

The Commissioner does not argue that Jones' failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address updated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n.5 ([A] party's ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S., at 799)). In Robinson, we noted that Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his address with the secretary of state, and that the State's vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the address listed in the secretary's records. See 409 U.S., at 38, n.1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95½, § 3-405 (1971), and ch. 38, § 36-1 (1969)). But we found that the State had not provided constitutionally sufficient notice, despite having followed its reasonably calculated scheme, because it knew that Robinson could not be reached at his address of record. 409 U.S., at 39–40. Although Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 provides strong support for the Commissioner's argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 717 North Bryan Street was reasonably calculated to reach him, it does not alter the reasonableness of the Commissioner's position that he must do nothing more when the notice is promptly returned "unclaimed."

As for the Commissioner's inquiry notice argument, the common knowledge that property may become subject to government taking when taxes are not paid does not excuse the government from complying with its constitutional obligation of notice before taking private property. We have previously stated the opposite: An interested party's "knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent [p233] to notice that a tax sale is pending." Mennonite, supra, at 800. It is at least as widely known that arrestees have the right to remain silent, and that anything they say may be used against them, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture"), but that knowledge does not excuse a police failure to provide Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State and redeem his property, so Jones' failure to pay his taxes in a timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice.

Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves his property in the hands of one who will inform him if his interest is in jeopardy. 339 U.S., at 316. But in this passage, Justice Jackson writes of "libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel[,] or entry upon real estate in the name of law"—such "seiz[ures]" of property, he concluded, "may reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner's attention." Ibid. An occupant, however, is not charged with acting as the owner's agent in all respects, and it is quite a leap from Justice Jackson's examples to conclude that it is an obligation of tenancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown content addressed to the owner. In fact, the State makes it impossible for the occupant to learn why the Commissioner is writing the owner, because an occupant cannot call for a certified letter without first obtaining the owner's signature. For all the occupant knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might write to certain residents about a variety of matters he finds important, such as state parks or highway construction; it would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner is in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street.

[p234] Jones should have been more diligent with respect to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes, and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14; Mennonite, supra, at 799.

B
In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones had not received notice that he was about to lose his property, the State did—nothing. For the reasons stated, we conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The question remains whether there were any such available steps. While "[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt," Greene, 456 U.S., at 455, n.9, if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.

We think there were several reasonable steps the State could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response to new information depends upon what the new information reveals. The return of the certified letter marked "unclaimed" meant either that Jones still lived at 717 North Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reasonable step primarily addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signature was not required. The Commissioner says that use of certified mail makes actual notice more likely, because requiring the recipient's signature protects against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong address. Otherwise, "[c]ertified [p235] mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail," United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual § 503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in some cases—the letter cannot be left like regular mail to be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time. Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice to Jones if—as it turned out—he had moved. Even occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owner (if any had been left) might scrawl the owner's new address on the notice packet and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify Jones directly.

Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he had simply not retrieved the certified letter, would have been to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise undeliverable mail to "occupant." Most States that explicitly outline additional procedures in their tax sale statutes require just such steps. See n.2, supra. Either approach would increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified that he was about to lose his property, given the failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person. That is clear in the case of an owner who still resided at the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who has moved: Occupants who might disregard a certified mail slip not addressed to them are less likely to ignore posted notice, and a letter addressed to them (even as "occupant") might be opened and read. In either case, there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the owner, if only because a change in ownership could well affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of the State's effort to sell his house when he was alerted by one of the occupants—his daughter—after she was served with an unlawful detainer notice.

Jones believes that the Commissioner should have searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook [p236] and other government records such as income tax rolls. We do not believe the government was required to go this far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones' mail marked "unclaimed" did not necessarily mean that 717 North Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it merely informed the Commissioner that no one appeared to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it would be returned to the sender. An open-ended search for a new address—especially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax collector, see Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997)—imposes burdens on the State significantly greater than the several relatively easy options outlined above.

The Commissioner complains about the burden of even those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Arkansas' current requirement that notice to homestead owners be accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned, § 26-37-301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact that Arkansas transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or the tax sale purchaser, § 26-37-104(a). The Commissioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters are returned, and no facts to support the dissent's assertion that the Commissioner must now physically locate "tens of thousands of properties every year." Post, at 248. Citing our decision in Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor General adds that posted notice could be taken down by children or vandals. But in Greene, we noted that outside the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real property is "a singularly appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person is actually apprised of proceedings against him." 456 U.S., at 452–453. Successfully providing notice is often the most efficient way to collect unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U.S., at 800, n.5 (more effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but rather [p237] than taking relatively easy additional steps to effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense of purchasing a newspaper advertisement, conducting an auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers.

The Solicitor General argues that requiring further effort when the government learns that notice was not delivered will cause the government to favor modes of providing notice that do not generate additional information—for example, starting (and stopping) with regular mail instead of certified mail. We find this unlikely, as we have no doubt that the government repeatedly finds itself being asked to prove that notice was sent and received. Using certified mail provides the State with documentation of personal delivery and protection against false claims that notice was never received. That added security, however, comes at a price—the State also learns when notice has not been received. We conclude that, under the circumstances presented, the State cannot simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and sell the owner's property—any more than it could ignore the information that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or that the owner in Covey was incompetent.

Though the Commissioner argues that followup measures are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that the State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones by publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before the public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed that "[c]hance alone" brings a person's attention to "an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper," Mullane, 339 U.S., at 315, and that notice by publication is adequate only where "it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning," id., at 317. Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate under the circumstances presented here because, as we have explained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax sale.

[p238] The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles about constitutionally required notice, principles from which we have no intention to depart. In particular, we disclaim any "new rule" that is "contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane." Post, at 244. In Dusenbery, the Government was aware that someone at the prison had signed for the prisoner's notice letter, and we determined that this attempt at notice was adequate, despite the fact that the State could have made notice more likely by requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter himself. 534 U.S., at 171. In this case, of course, the notice letter was returned to the Commissioner, informing him that his attempt at notice had failed.

As for Mullane, it directs that "when notice is a person's due [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." 339 U.S., at 315. Mindful of the dissent's concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of losing his house would do more when the attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be done.

As noted, "[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt." Greene, supra, at 455, n.9. In prior cases finding notice inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State's notice statute. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U.S., at 490–491; Robinson, 409 U.S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213–214 (1962); Walker, 352 U.S., at 116; Covey, 351 U.S., at 146–147. The State can determine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that notice was inadequate here, and the States have taken a variety of approaches to the present question. See n.2, supra. It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to employ before taking Jones' property. [p239]

There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs. The same cannot be said for the State's efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice before the State takes action against them. In this case, the State is exerting extraordinary power against a property owner—taking and selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt to let him know about it when the notice letter addressed to him is returned unclaimed.

The Commissioner's effort to provide notice to Jones of an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

title: Jones v. Flowers/Opinion of the Court


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 47

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 47


text:
Page:Some recent developments in white pine weevil research in the northeast (IA CAT31009844).pdf/8

 caged weevils in treated areas at ½ and ¼ pounds per acre of active ingredient. A larger scale test utilizing ¼-acre plots was conducted this fall (1957), using Aldrin and Heptachlor at these two rates.


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 48

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 48


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 49

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 49


text:
Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/48

 :TU 1.8.4 (Medical Unit)
 * USS Benevolence (AH-13)
 * USS Bountiful (AH-9)

 * TU 1.8.5 (Survey Unit)
 * USS Bowditch (AGS-4)
 * USS James K. Gillis (AGS-13)
 * USS John Blish (AGS-10)
 * YMS-354
 * YMS-358
 * YMS-413
 * YP-636

 * TU 1.8.6 (Construction Unit)
 * 53rd Construction Battalion (later, Construction Battalion Detachment 1156)

 * TU 1.8.7 (Rongerik Evacuation Unit)
 * USS LST-871
 * USS LST-989

POST-OPERATION ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

After 7 September all survey and construction activities at Bikini were rapidly brought to a close, and the atoll was evacuated by 26 September 1946. Following a meeting on the West Coast from 17 to 20 September concerning decontamination procedures, some officers from JTF 1 were ordered to temporary duty under Commander Western Sea Frontier to follow up and coordinate the decontamination, monitoring, and clearance of exposed ships. On 24 September, in a joint speedletter, the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery assumed responsibility for giving final radiological ship clearances and prescribed detailed decontamination and clearance procedures. JTF 1 was formally dissolved on 1 November; its successor was a JCS committee, the Joint CROSSROADS Committee, whose task it was to oversee the final test activities, publish the final reports, and supervise the Bikini Resurvey Operation of summer 1947, described in Chapter 6 (Reference C.9.206, pp. V-(D)-5 through V-(D)-7).

43

title: Page:Operation Crossroads 1946.pdf/48


text: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 50

title: A Hundred Verses from Old Japan/Poem 50


text: Some Recent Developments in White-Pine Weevil Research in the Northeast


text:
Page:The spirit of the Hebrew poetry 1861.djvu/66

 in figures; and also to indulge in that fervid style which is prompted by powerful emotions.

Beyond this stage, and quite of another sort, is that conditioning of Thought which we must designate as technical, and which is mainly factitious, or arbitrary; as, for instance;—let us take up the above example of political ill-augury, and bring—if not the very same words, yet their nearest equivalents,—into cadence, as blank verse: in this case some of the words must by necessity be rejected as unfit altogether for a place in verse; and substitutes must be found for others, because they are not easily reduced to cadence. Moreover, the position of every word must be determined by a rule which, in relation to the requirements of unconditioned thought, is arbitrary and artificial; the passage might thus run—

Thought, in this form, submits itself to the requirements of quantity and rhythm, by means of several substitutions of word for word; and also by deflections from the simpler and the more natural order of the words. A still further yielding of the original thought to the requirements of art would be needed if, in addition to cadence, we should demand rhyme; for in that case not only must another law of cadence be complied with; but also the


text:
Page:The spirit of the Hebrew poetry 1861.djvu/67

 fortuitous law of a jingle in the last syllable of each line must prevail. On these conditions the same meaning might thus be conveyed—

For any purposes of political instruction, or of warning, the Thought, whether it be that of the platform speaker, or that of a philosophical writer, may be fully expressed, either when made to conform itself to the laws of cadence, or when subjected to the still more technical necessities of rhyme. Nevertheless it must be granted, that, if the utterance of the orator—figurative and impassioned as it is—be the fittest possible for conveying his meaning, and if the words he uses, and the order in which he arranges these words, be the best possible, then the reduction of these same thoughts to the rules of blank verse, and, still more, their reduction to the conditions of rhyme, involve a disadvantage which must be of more or less consequence.

There are, however, instances in which Thought, embodied in the language of symbols, and of material images, is of a kind which sustains no damage under these conditions in truth, the poetic style may be the very fittest for giving utterance to feelings, or to moods of mind; or, as already


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Jones v. Flowers/Dissent Thomas

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.

When petitioner failed to pay his property taxes for several consecutive years, respondent Commissioner of State Lands in Arkansas, using the record address that petitioner provided to the State, sent petitioner a letter by certified mail, noting his tax delinquency and explaining that his property would be subject to public sale if the delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid. After petitioner failed to respond, the State also published notice of the delinquency and public sale in an Arkansas newspaper. Soon after respondent Linda K. Flowers submitted a purchase offer to the State, it sent petitioner a second letter by certified mail ex- [p240] plaining that the sale would proceed if the delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid.

Petitioner argues that the State violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in his view, the State failed to take sufficient steps to contact him before selling his property to Flowers. Petitioner contends that once the State became aware that he had not claimed the certified mail, it was constitutionally obligated to employ additional methods to locate him.

Adopting petitioner's arguments, the Court holds today that "when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so." Ante, at 225. The Court concludes that it was practicable for Arkansas to take additional steps here—namely, notice by regular mail, posting notice on petitioner's door, and addressing mail to occupant. Ante, at 235. Because, under this Court's precedents, the State's notice methods clearly satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, I respectfully dissent.

I
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." This Court has held that a State must provide an individual with notice and opportunity to be heard before the State may deprive him of his property. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Balancing a State's interest in efficiently managing its administrative system and an individual's interest in adequate notice, this Court has held that a State must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action." Id., at 313–314. As this Court has explained, "when notice is a person's due [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee [p241] might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id., at 315. "[H]eroic efforts," however, are not required. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002). To the contrary, we have expressly rejected "[a] construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way [of the State]." Mullane, supra, at 313–314. Thus, "none of our cases has required actual notice"; instead, "we have allowed the Government to defend the 'reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method  on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected. Dusenbery, supra, at 169–170 (quoting Mullane, supra, at 315).

The methods of notice employed by Arkansas were reasonably calculated to inform petitioner of proceedings affecting his property interest and thus satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The State mailed a notice by certified letter to the address provided by petitioner. The certified letter was returned to the State marked "unclaimed" after three attempts to deliver it. The State then published a notice of public sale containing redemption information in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette newspaper. After Flowers submitted a purchase offer, the State sent yet another certified letter to petitioner at his record address. That letter, too, was returned to the State marked "unclaimed" after three delivery attempts.

Arkansas' attempts to contact petitioner by certified mail at his "record address," without more, satisfy due process. [p242] Dusenbery, supra, at 169. See also Mullane, supra, at 318; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("We have repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice"); ''Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 792, 798 (1983) (holding that "notice mailed to [the affected party's] last known available address''" is sufficient where a State seeks to sell "real property on which payments of property taxes have been delinquent" (emphasis added)). Because the notices were sent to the address provided by petitioner himself, the State had an especially sound basis for determining that notice would reach him. Moreover, Arkansas exceeded the constitutional minimum by additionally publishing notice in a local newspaper. See Mullane, supra, at 318. Due process requires nothing more—and certainly not here, where petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to report any change of address to the state taxing authority. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997).

My conclusion that Arkansas' notice methods satisfy due process is reinforced by the well-established presumption that individuals, especially those owning property, act in their own interest. Recognizing that [i]t is the part of common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it, Mullane, supra, at 316 (quoting The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (1815)), this Court has concluded that "[t]he ways of an owner with tangible property are such that he usually arranges means to learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights," Mullane, 339 U.S., at 316. Consistent with this observation, Arkansas was free to "indulge the assumption" that petitioner had [p243] either provided the state taxing authority with a correct and up-to-date mailing address—as required by state law—"or that he left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that [his property was] being jeopardized." Ibid.

The Court does not conclude that certified mail is inherently insufficient as a means of notice, but rather that "the government's knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government's part to take additional steps to effect notice." Ante, at 230. I disagree.

First, whether a method of notice is reasonably calculated to notify the interested party is determined ex ante, i.e., from the viewpoint of the government agency at the time its notice is sent. This follows from Mullane, where this Court rested its analysis on the information the sender had "at hand" when its notice was sent. 339 U.S., at 318. Relatedly, we have refused to evaluate the reasonableness of a particular method of notice by comparing it to alternative methods that are identified after the fact. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S., at 171–172. Today the Court appears to abandon both of these practices. Its rejection of Arkansas' selected method of notice—a method this Court has repeatedly concluded is constitutionally sufficient—is based upon information that was unavailable when notice was sent. Indeed, the Court's proposed notice methods—regular mail, posting, and addressing mail to occupant, ante, at 234–235—are entirely the product of post hoc considerations, including the discovery that members of petitioner's family continued to live in the house. Similarly, the Court's observation that "[t]he Commissioner['s] complain[t] about the burden of additional steps  is belied by Arkansas' current requirement that notice to homestead owners be accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned," ante, at [p244] 236, is contrary to 's "conclusion that the Government ought not be penalized and told to 'try harder'  simply because [it] has since upgraded its policies," 534 U.S., at 172.

Second, implicit in our holding that due process does not require "actual notice," see id., at 169–170, is that when the "government becomes aware that its attempt at notice has failed," ante, at 227, it is not required to take additional steps to ensure that notice has been received. Petitioner's challenge to Arkansas' notice methods, and the Court's acceptance of it, is little more than a thinly veiled attack on Dusenbery. Under the majority's logic, each time a doubt is raised with respect to whether notice has reached an interested party, the State will have to consider additional means better calculated to achieve notice. Because this rule turns on speculative, newly acquired information, it has no natural end point, and, in effect, requires the States to achieve something close to actual notice. The majority's new rule is contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane.

The only circumstances in which this Court has found notice by mail and publication inadequate under the Due Process Clause involve situations where the state or local government knew at the outset that its notice efforts were destined to fail and knew how to rectify the problem prior to sending notice. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39 (1972) (per curiam) (intended recipient known to be in jail); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 145 (1956) (intended recipient known to be incompetent and without a guardian).

In Robinson, the State, having arrested petitioner and having detained him in county jail, immediately instituted forfeiture proceedings against his automobile and mailed notice of those proceedings to his residential address. 409 U.S., at 38. Robinson, who was incarcerated in the county jail during the entirety of the forfeiture proceedings, did not receive notice of the proceedings until after he was released [p245] and the forfeiture order had been entered. Id., at 38–39. Because the State knew beforehand that Robinson was not at, and had no access to, the address to which it sent the notice, this Court held that the State's efforts were not reasonably calculated to notify him of the pending proceedings. Id., at 40. Similarly, in Covey, the Court concluded that the methods of notice used by the town—mailing, posting, and publishing—were not reasonably calculated to inform Covey of proceedings adverse to her property interests because local officials knew prior to sending notice that she was "without mental capacity to handle her affairs" and unable to comprehend the meaning of the notices. 351 U.S., at 144, 146.

By contrast, Arkansas did not know at the time it sent notice to petitioner that its method would fail, and Arkansas did not know that petitioner no longer lived at the record address simply because letters were returned "unclaimed." Pet. for Cert. 3. "[U]nclaimed" does not necessarily mean that an address is no longer correct; it may indicate that an intended recipient has simply failed or refused to claim mail. See United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), § 507, Exh. 1.4.1, http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/507.htm. Given that the State had been using the address provided by petitioner and that petitioner had a legal duty to maintain a current mailing address with the state taxing authority, return of the mail as "unclaimed" did not arm Arkansas with the type of specific knowledge that the governments had at hand in Robinson and Covey. Cf. ante, at 234. The State cannot be charged to correct a problem of petitioner's own creation and of which it was not [p246] aware. Even if the State had divined that petitioner was no longer at the record address, its publication of notice in a local newspaper would have sufficed because Mullane authorizes the use of publication when the record address is unknown. See 339 U.S., at 316 ("[P]ublication traditionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other action which in itself may reasonably be expected to convey a warning").

II
The Court's proposed methods, aside from being constitutionally unnecessary, are also burdensome, impractical, and no more likely to effect notice than the methods actually employed by the State.

In Arkansas, approximately 18,000 parcels of delinquent real estate are certified annually. Tsann Kuen Enterprises Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 119–120, 129 S.W.3d 822, 828 (2003). Under the Court's rule, the State will bear the burden of locating thousands of delinquent property owners. These administrative burdens are not compelled by the Due Process Clause. See Mullane, supra, at 313–314; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U.S., at 489–490 (stating that constitutionally sufficient notice "need not be inefficient or burdensome"). Here, Arkansas has determined that its law requiring property owners to maintain a current address with the state taxing authority, in conjunction with its authorization to send property notices to the record address, is an efficient and fair way to administer its tax collection system. The Court's decision today forecloses [p247] such a reasonable system and burdens the State with inefficiencies caused by delinquent taxpayers.

Moreover, the Court's proposed methods are no more reasonably calculated to achieve notice than the methods employed by the State here. Regular mail is hardly foolproof; indeed, it is arguably less effective than certified mail. Certified mail is tracked, delivery attempts are recorded, actual delivery is logged, and notices are posted to alert someone at the residence that certified mail is being held at a local post office. By creating a record, these features give parties grounds for defending or challenging notice. By contrast, regular mail is untraceable; there is no record of either delivery or receipt. Had the State used regular mail, petitioner would presumably argue that it should have sent notice by certified mail because it creates a paper trail.

The Court itself recognizes the deficiencies of its proposed methods. It acknowledges that "[f]ollowing up with regular mail might increase the chances of actual notice"; "occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips  might scrawl the owner's new address on the notice packet," ante, at 235 (emphasis added); and "a letter addressed to [occupant] might be opened and read," ibid. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court justifies its redrafting of Arkansas' notice statute [p248] on the ground that "[its] approach[es] would increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified that he was about to lose his property " Ibid. That, however, is not the test; indeed, we rejected such reasoning in Dusenbery. See 534 U.S., at 171 (rejecting the argument that "the FBI's notice was constitutionally flawed because it was 'substantially less likely to bring home notice' than a feasible substitute" (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court's suggestion that Arkansas post notice is similarly unavailing. The State's records are organized by legal description, not address, which makes the prospect of physically locating tens of thousands of properties every year, and posting notice on each, impractical. See Tsann Kuen Enterprises Co., supra, at 119–120, 129 S.W.3d, at 828. Also, this Court has previously concluded that posting is an inherently unreliable method of notice. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453–454 (1982).

Similarly, addressing the mail to occupant, see ante, at 235, is no more reasonably calculated to reach petitioner. It is sheer speculation to assume, as the Court does, that although "[o]ccupants might disregard a certified mail slip ,  a letter addressed to them (even as 'occupant') might be opened and read." Ibid. It is at least as likely that an occupant who receives generically addressed mail will discard it as junk mail.

III
If "title to property should not depend on [factual] vagaries," Dusenbery, supra, at 171, then certainly it cannot turn on "wrinkle[s]," ante, at 227, caused by a property owner's own failure to be a prudent ward of his interests. The meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the antics of tax evaders and scofflaws. Nor is the self-created conundrum in which petitioner finds himself a legitimate ground for imposing additional constitutional obligations on the State. The State's attempts to notify petitioner by certified [p249] mail at the address that he provided and, additionally, by publishing notice in a local newspaper satisfy due process. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.

title: Jones v. Flowers/Dissent Thomas


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Page:Adam's reports on vernacular education in Bengal and Behar, submitted to Government in 1835, 1836 and 1838.djvu/34

20 As early as 1857 Mr. Woodrow’s labors in introducing the Circle system into general operation had been recognized in a despatch, No. 85 of 1857, dated the 18th February, from the Honorable Court of Directors:—

"“The plan of Mr. Woodrow for the improvement of the indigenous Vernacular Schools in his division is based on the retention of the existing schools, which are, however, to be formed into circles, to each of which a teacher of a higher class is to be appointed, who shall afford instruction to the upper boys in each school, superior to that which the Guru Mohashoy, or village master, is competent to impart. The Guru Mohashoys are to be conciliated by pecuniary rewards of small amount, proportioned to the number of boys of certain specified standards of attainment who may be found in their respective schools, and the tendency of the boys to leave school at an early age is to be overcome by small gratuities to those boys remaining at school who may possess a certain specified amount of knowledge in various branches of study.

“We approve Mr. Woodrow’s desire to make the utmost possible use of existing means of education, and to avoid as much as possible the supersession of the former teachers of indigenous schools, which seem, notwithstanding the small amount of instruction which they afford, to have naturally a considerable hold on the minds of the people. It is hoped by Mr. Woodrow, and seems not improbable from the result of the limited experiment which has already been made, that the plan may have the effect of stimulating the conductors of indigenous schools—the Guru Mohashoys—to self-improvement: and, on the whole, we agree with you in thinking the scheme well deserving of a trial on an enlarged scale, and accordingly approve the sanction given to the recommendation of the Bengal Government.'"

The details of the scheme are set forth in the Bengal Government Education Report for October 1855, and are published at pages 33 to 36, Appendix A. of the Report of 1855-56.

It is stated in Mr. Woodrow’s last Report for 1867-68, there were in the 24-Pergunnahs, in 40 Government Circles, 124 schools containing 4,844 pupils, at a total cost of Rupees 8,645, or 1 Rupee 12 annas yearly a head for each boy.

This system is extending wider and wider in Bengal; in 1863 it was adopted in Bengal by the Christian Vernacular Education Society for India at the suggestion of Sir J. Logan, and there are about 4,000 pupils in connection with it.

A despatch was forwarded by Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for India in 1859, in which it is observed—

"“If it must be admitted that previously to 1854 the subject of Vernacular Education had not received in every part of India the full amount of attention which it merited, there can be no doubt that since the wishes of the Home Authorities have been so plainly declared, the Officers of the Department of Education, acting under the orders of the several Governments, have spared no pains to bring into operation, throughout the districts entrusted to their superintendence, such measures as appeared most likely to place within reach of the general population the means of obtaining an education suited to their circumstances in life.”"


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Page:Adam's reports on vernacular education in Bengal and Behar, submitted to Government in 1835, 1836 and 1838.djvu/35

Rh It notices that Mr. Woodrow’s plan of Circle Schools on the basis of the existing indigenous schools, was found very successful, while the grant-in-aid system was not found to answer with them—

"“Mr. Pratt was in consequence forced to the conclusion that the grant-in-aid system, as carried out under the existing rules, could not be made the basis of any extended system of popular education, these rules being regarded by him as ‘out of place in a country where the value of education is utterly unfelt by the mass of the people, based as they are on the supposition that the people of this country are so desirous of an improved description of instruction, that they will actually pay not only schooling-fees, but contributions from their private resources.’ The following remarks of Mr. Woodrow are sufficient to show the concurrence of that gentleman in Mr. Pratt’s conclusion. ‘The poorest classes do not want schools at all, because they are too poor to pay schooling-fees and subscriptions, and because the labor of the children is required to enable them to live. The middle and upper classes will make no sort of sacrifice for the establishment of any but English schools. Yet the rules in force presume the highest appreciation of education, because based on the supposition that the people everywhere pay not only schooling-fees, but subscriptions for schools. In fact, we expect the peasantry and shop-keepers of Bengal to make sacrifices for education which the same classes in England often refuse to make.”"

It approves of an Educational cess on land—

"“The appropriation of a fixed proportion of the annual value of the land to the purpose of providing such means of education for the population immediately connected with the land, seems, per se, unobjectionable, and the application of a percentage for the construction and maintenance of roads appears to afford a suitable precedent for such an impost. In the North-Western Provinces, the principle has already been acted on, though the plan has there been subjected to the important modification that the Government shares the burden with the landholder, and that the consent of the latter shall be a necessary condition to the introduction of the arrangement in any locality. The several existing Inspectors of Schools in Bengal are of opinion that an education rate might without difficulty be introduced into that Presidency, and it seems not improbable that the levy of such a rate under the direct authority of the Government would be acquiesced in with far more readiness and with less dislike than a nominally voluntary rate proposed by the local officers.”"

Lord Stanley’s despatch of 1859 led to enquiries into Vernacular Education on the part of the Bengal Government, and the eliciting opinions on the point from a variety of individuals. We shall quote a few.

, Esquire, Judge of Jessore, remarks:—

"' I think that we cannot be far wrong if we enable a ryot to write a letter of business or congratulation to his patron or friend, to draw out a bond, to understand the terms of a mortgage, to cast up his accounts, to know if his receipts for rent are correctly signed, and to understand the scope of Act X. of 1859.”"

Dr. Mouat, so long the able Secretary of the Council of Education, states:—

“The existing village schools may be to the last degree inefficient, and the Gooroomohashoys may be, as many of them are, as ignorant as owls. But they are old-established, time-honored Institutions, deeply grafted in


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