text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/89

. Evidently he is a great friend of yours. If he had been Emperor, he would have kept you always at his side like…

. You intended to say like a fool?

. A rather sad fool.

. English fools are always sad. They might pass for diplomatists in other countries.

. All fools are sad. A smile is the most efficient grave-digger. We cry over what lives, what suffers, what we still carry in our hearts; but when we laugh at a thing—love, faith, memory, hope—it is dead. Shakespeare's fools are the most tragic figures in his tragedies. Hamlet shrivels up in the presence of the grave-diggers, singing and jesting among the graves. Their spades grit in the earth, and out comes the skull of Yorick, the King's jester, to leer and scoff with that horrible grin of his bony jaws. Everything dies, but we still smile. What is life, eternally renewing itself, but the triumphant smile of love as it conquers death?

. But death is the end of all things, and then…

. Hell then. Fortunately, you Italians have a most alluring Inferno. I see you, Countess, in the same circle as Francesca, always in the best society.

. You must not joke about such things. I am a believer; I hope to be saved.

. Why not? The lives of all the saints have two parts—even the best of them. You are still in the first.

. Let us talk of something else. Often, I leap out of bed, shrieking, in the middle of the night, mad with terror, because the idea of death creeps into my mind as I am falling asleep. Sometimes when it is day, one of those days all holiday and sunshine, in the midst of the crowds and the festival, suddenly I stop and think that within a few years all those people will no longer be there, that they will all be dead, and


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/90

 it seems to me that I must cry out to them and warn them, as if some terrible calamity were impending! Then, all at once a dark veil of silence descends before my eyes—I am not well; I have consulted physicians.

. What do they say?

. They advise me to distract myself, to sleep always with a light, with some one near.

. A simple prescription for you to follow.

. Ah, gentlemen! What! The Countess? It is a long time since I have had the pleasure—although I have not forgotten her.

. The Signore Prefect is very kind. Whenever I have had the pleasure before, it has always been because of some experience that was disagreeable. The last time I lost my jewels.

. Well, you had no reason to complain. Do you remember that night you heard rumblings in your villa? And the time that escroc tried to make you dance to the tune of those letters?

. They were forgeries.

. I suppose those anonymous articles were forgeries which revealed such intimate knowledge of the details of your life? But I was on hand to protect you.

. You protected me, Signore. [To ] I wish I could remember the man's name.

. As he never tells the truth, nobody knows his real one. Call him the Signore, and you will make no mistake.

. I had no idea that the Countess was one of your clients.

. One of the best of them. That theft of her jewels—a trick to make people think they were genuine.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/11

 undefined

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/11


text:
Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/52

32

Golden fabrics she shall weave you,

And shall bake you cakes of honey.”

Then the aged Väinämöinen,

Heard his words, and grew full joyful,

Since to tend his age was promised

Joukahainen’s lovely sister.

On the stone of joy he sat him,

On the stone of song he rested,

Sang an hour, and sang a second,

And again he sang a third time:

Thus reversed his words of magic,

And dissolved the spell completely.

Then the youthful Joukahainen

From the mud his chin uplifted,

And his beard he disentangled,

From the rock his steed led forward,

Drew his sledge from out the bushes,

From the reeds his whip unloosing.

Then upon his sledge he mounted,

And upon the seat he sat him,

And with gloomy thoughts he hastened,

With a heart all sad and doleful,

Homeward to his dearest mother,

Unto her, the aged woman.

On he drove with noise and tumult,

Home he drove in consternation,

And he broke the sledge to pieces,

At the door the shafts were broken.

Then the noise alarmed his mother,

And his father came and asked him,

“Recklessly the sledge was broken;

Did you break the shafts on purpose?

Wherefore do you drive so rashly,

And arrive at home so madly?”

Then the youthful Joukahainen

Could not keep his tears from flowing;

Sad he bowed his head in sorrow,

And his cap awry he shifted,

And his lips were dry and stiffened,

O’er his mouth his nose was drooping.

title: Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/52


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/91

 They were imitation. She valued them at three million francs. The anonymous articles she wrote herself, so that she could truthfully say they were slander.

. Very clever of her.

. An extreme measure.

. [To ] The Signore bows with a mysterious air, as if he were doing one the favor to keep a secret.

. I hardly think he would go so far. I hear he is about to publish his memoirs.

. Gracious! I shall have to buy up the edition. Will you see me home?

. As far as you like.

. You do not wish to wait for Imperia?

. Not in the least. I shall retire with you.

. Highness, I was delighted to receive your invitation.

. Are you leaving so soon? Imperia may be here at any moment. Now we are only the intimates, the inner circle.

. I have decided that it is best not to be too intimate. I had supposed that there was only a garden between your villa and that of Imperia—a garden with a gate; but I realize now that you have erected an impenetrable wall.

. Don't be vindictive! It isn't my fault. Princess Etelvina admits but few to her acquaintance.

. And she is very wise to do so. Hereafter, I shall imitate her example. Good evening, Highness.

. Highness, good evening.

. Sinister poet! Dark courier of infernos like Virgil! Be mindful of Prince Florencio; his health is precarious.

. I shall endeavor to be as mindful of


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/92

 him as your Highness. You deprived him of his mistress—entirely for his good. I shall do the same whenever I have the opportunity.

. Good evening.

. To what am I indebted for this honor, Signore?

. I have a difficult duty to perform—believe me, solely in your Highness's interest. Positively, this intrusion is most disagreeable.

. Not to me; I am glad to see you.

. No, but it is to me; I am the one who finds it disagreeable. You will appreciate that the meeting here of two Princes is regarded with suspicion in Suavia. You are both immediate heirs, in direct succession to the throne.

. I beg your pardon—were, were until to-day. Haven't you seen the telegram?

. Another heir? I am delighted! That is, I am disappointed—upon your account, although I am relieved.

. Do not trouble yourself upon my account. You are at liberty to be relieved or disappointed quite as may suit your convenience.

. Then I am relieved, because a conspiracy had been anticipated and I had been retained to keep you under surveillance. Of course, knowing as I do the sort of life that you lead here

. To avoid being Emperor I would have conspired all my life! Do you suppose that I would exchange my liberty for an empire?

. No, no! I beg of you, do not insist. I should not have spoken unless I had been sure. The government of Suavia subsists upon conspiracies. To-day it is an assas-


text:
Author:Richard Cleasby

Works

 * An Icelandic-English Dictionary

title: Author:Richard Cleasby


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/8

 CHAPTER I. THE LEGACY OF HISTORY: AN UNLIKELY STORY OF SURVIVAL

Each country’s strategic choices are shaped not only by its geography and its geopolitical environment, but also by its historical experience. What has worked or failed in the past in terms of collective security and defence, or indeed its absence, informs future options. This also applies to Finland, even if its experience has been exceptional in many regards.

After the strategic offensive by the Red Army in June–July 1944 failed to break the Finnish defences, Stalin opted for a political solution to force Finland out of the war. The Armistice of September 1944 required the rapid demobilisation of the army of 550,000 men plus 200,000 women with a population of less than four million at the time. Finland was also required to open its airports and naval facilities to the Allied (exclusively Soviet) Forces and to drive 200 000 German troops from Northern Finland. With the presence of an Allied (essentially Soviet) Control Commission in the country and the leasing to the Soviet Union of the naval base of Porkkala, just 30 km west of Helsinki, Finland was at its weakest and most vulnerable. But with Stalin’s mind concentrated on securing victory and reaching Berlin, the option to launch a new attack in order to occupy Finland was no more.

The ratification of the Peace Treaty of Paris in September 1947 marked a turning point and saw the Control Commission leave. A Friendship Treaty (Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) imposed on Finland in April 1948 defined the relationship with the Soviet Union for decades to come. Finland never considered the treaty to be a military pact. It did not establish a framework of permanent foreign policy consultations and narrowed the Finnish military obligations to repel an attack in cooperation with the Soviet Union “by Germany or powers allied to Germany through Finnish territory”. The treaty was renewed in 1955, as a precondition for the return of the Porkkala base, and several times thereafter. Only after becoming a Member of the United Nations in December 1955, and the evacuation of the Soviet base in January 1956, could Finland embark on pursuing a policy of neutrality. The preamble to the Friendship Treaty notes “Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great 8


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/93

 sination, to-morrow an insurrection. Last year we had a fellow suspected of anarchism, a Belgian who lived in the most extraordinary manner—in a wooden stockade which he built for himself. And there he was visited by the most singular people, the most outlandish in dress! We felt sure we had discovered a hotbed of sedition, and took measures to surprise it, with the result that it turned out to be a gallery for taking views for the cinematograph. Yes, sir! And such views! I had him indicted for an assault upon morality; but we have preserved the films. If some day your Highness would like to arrange a little entertainment for your friends, I should be delighted to lend them to you.

. Thank you, but I should not care to be surprised in a conspiracy of that nature.

. In my entire career I have never been guilty of a single indiscretion.

. You must have seen a great deal.

. I hold the key to a whole cabinet of mysteries. For the most part, people know as much about life as they do about the theatre—they see the play, that is all; the real show goes on behind the scenes.

. By the way, that reminds me; Prince Florencio

. Oh! I have him always under my eye! At times it is difficult; that Englishman knows some remarkable places. And what people! He would have made a good Prefect.

. No, you are quite inimitable.

. Inimitable? Am I not? I should like to see what this Babel would be without me, although upon the surface everything appears so quiet and so calm. The difficulty in my profession is not to inform myself about my business; it is to prevent myself from becoming informed


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/9

 Powers”. Moscow never truly accepted Finnish neutrality and regarded the Friendship Treaty as the basis of its relations with Finland.

With early elections in March 1945 – while the Allies were still allied and unanimous in their support of free elections – Finland secured its political institutions and parliamentary democracy. The reorganised Security Police (1949) focused successfully on counterespionage. The last train carrying war reparations crossed the border in September 1952, a month after the closing ceremony of the Helsinki Summer Olympics. The unbroken military tradition and universal conscription allowed the Defence Forces to continue training a reserve force focused on territorial defence. Participating in UN Peacekeeping operations since 1956 has provided the Defence Forces with military contacts and experience. In order to prevent provocations, a border zone of three to five kilometres was established. The Border Guards remained a military organisation under the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime. The first major procurements from the Soviet Union, Sweden and the United Kingdom forced Finland to define basic rules of conduct. No military instructors from the seller country were accepted on Finnish soil. Instead, Finnish officers were sent abroad for training. Since the late 1950s, Finnish officers have studied at military colleges in France, Britain, Sweden and subsequently the United States (1964) and the Soviet Union (1971). By reinterpreting stipulations through diplomacy, the Defence Forces were able to cope with the military restrictions imposed by the Paris Peace Treaty.

Accomplished diplomacy was required to stabilise Finland’s position with Stalin’s successors. The superior Finnish social and economic system played a decisive role. Although Finland had to tread a fine line politically, its market economy was able to turn the regulated bilateral trade with the Soviet Union to its favour. Becoming an associate member of the European Free Trade Association in 1961 and concluding a free trade agreement with the European Economic Community in 1972 were milestones in cementing Finland as a Western country and society. The regulated bilateral trade that required the licensing of exports to the Soviet Union also provided the instrument to indirectly adhere to COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) export restrictions, which again was the prerequisite for acquiring Western technology and equipment for the Defence Forces.

The build-up of the Defence Forces was a long and protracted low-key process eschewing the expression “armed neutrality”. The first jet fighter planes, Folland Gnats, were bought from Britain in 1958, to be later replaced by Soviet MiGs and Swedish Drakens. Only with a shift of the Finnish defence focus to THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:Völsunga Saga (1888).djvu/326

 —Iceland: its scenes and sagas. Smith, Elder, & Co, London, 1863, 8vo.

(Rev. M. R.).—See.

—A visit to Iceland. Summer 1834. J. Murray, London, 1835, 12mo.

(Rev., M.A.). The Song of the Sun, a poem of the Eleventh Century, from the Elder Edda, imitated by J. B. With preface, notes, and a short account of the author. Ice., Lat., and Eng. London, 1805, 8vo.

.—See.

.—See.

.—See.

.—Ultima Thule; or, a Summer in Iceland. W. P. Nimmo, Edinburgh, 1875, 2 vols., 8vo.

Illustrated Travels. ed., H. W. Bates. Cassell, London, 1869–74, 6 vols. in 3, 4to. Contains (Jon A.)—Notes on Iceland (v. ii.); Hekla (v. iii.); T. (J. E. H.)—Journey from Reikyavik to Kreisuvig (v. vi.); V. (Lt. von)—From end to end of Stromoe (v. vi.).

.—See.

and .—An Icelandic-English Dictionary. With introduction and life of R. Cleasby by G. W. Dasent. [Together with a grammar. ] Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1874, 4to.

—Summer Travelling in Iceland. With chapter on Askja by E. Delmar Morgan, and literal translation of three sagas: The story of Thórdr hreda—Banda-manna Saga—The story of Hrafnkell, Frey’s priest.) Murray, London, 1882, 8vo.

.—The place of Iceland in the history of European Institutions. Lothian prize essay. Parker and Co., Oxford and London, 1877, 8vo.

.—See.

—See.

.—Jest and Earnest. Chapman & Hall, London, 1878, 2 vols., 8vo.

The Story of Burnt Njal; or, life in Iceland at the end of the tenth century. From the Icelandic of the Njals Saga. Edmonston & Douglas, Edinburgh, 1861, 2 vols., 8vo.

The Story of Gisli the Outlaw. From the Icelandic. E. & D., Edin., 1866, sm. 4to.

The Norsemen in Iceland. In Oxford Essays. Parker, London, 1858, 4 vols, 8vo.

The Vikings of the Baltic. A tale of the north in the tenth century. 2 vols. Chapman, London, 1875, 8vo.

See also. See also.

(Miss C. A.).—Five weeks in Iceland. Bentley, London, 1880, 8vo.

(Hon. A. E. D.; Viscount).—A Winter in Iceland and Lapland. Colburn, London, 1840, 2 vols., 12mo.

title: Page:Völsunga Saga (1888).djvu/326


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/94

 about what is not my business. However, your Highness need have no concern. Pardon this intrusion…

. You are pardoned, you may be sure.

. Imperia! How are you? I have not seen you all day. I have not had one spare moment.

. I also have had guests.

. So I see.

. No, you must not judge by this. I do not dress for others; I dress for myself. I like to see myself in beautiful clothes. Your friends did not care to wait for me?

. They all had something for the evening. The Countess is terribly put out; I did not find it convenient to invite her.

. And so she invited herself? She was right. In a company which included Lady Seymour and Harry Lucenti, the Countess could scarcely have been out of place. Such hypocrisy is odious.

. In the first place, with regard to Lady Seymour, people say, they don't know. As far as the poet is concerned, he is the Prince's friend, and an artist.

. In her line, the Countess is also an artist.

. She is a fool. Now I hear that she is in love with an acrobat. Not only does she frequent the circus every evening, but she actually goes behind the scenes and mingles with the performers.

. Yes, I have seen her there myself.

. You? You at the circus!

. Yes, the last four nights, without missing one.

. But you said nothing about it.

. You didn't ask.


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/95

. What infatuation is this?

. It isn't infatuation. I go to see my daughter.

. Your daughter! What daughter? I didn't know you had a daughter.

. You never asked. What do you know of my life? What other people have told you, who know no more about it than you do, what for some reason I may have seen fit to tell you myself—only I always tell you the truth.

. But this daughter?

. She is the child of the only man I ever loved.

. Thanks.

. And I still love him; I always shall.

. Where is he?

. In prison, reprieved from a death-sentence, serving for life.

. Romantic episode!

. He stabbed a foreigner in Rome, attempting to take his money. He killed him. He had been three days without food. We models could earn nothing then; the malaria had driven out the artists.

. Were you living with him at the time?

. No, he was living with his mother. I lived at home with my parents and my brothers and sisters, with my child. My father owned a house by the riverside, half tavern, half concert-hall. We children did a little of everything. During the day we went out as models; at night we danced tarantellas in the theatre and sang Neapolitan songs. Then Leonardo gave my father five hundred lire to let me come to live with him.

. But Imperia! This is horrible!

. It is the truth. What was my father to do? We had to live somehow.


text:
Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/53

Runo III]

Then his mother came and asked him

Wherefore was he sunk in sorrow.

“O my son, why weep so sadly?

O my darling, why so troubled,

With thy lips so dry and stiffened,

O’er thy mouth thy nose thus drooping?”

Said the youthful Joukahainen,

“O my mother, who hast borne me,

There is cause for what has happened,

For the sorcerer has o’ercome me.

Cause enough have I for weeping,

And the sorcerer’s brought me sorrow.

I myself must weep for ever,

And must pass my life in mourning,

For my very sister Aino,

She, my dearest mother’s daughter,

I have pledged to Väinämöinen,

As the consort of the minstrel,

To support his feeble footsteps,

And to wait upon him always.”

Joyous clapped her hands his mother,

Both her hands she rubbed together,

And she spoke the words which follow:

“Do not weep, my son, my dearest,

For thy tears are quite uncalled for.

Little cause have we to sorrow,

For the hope I long have cherished,

All my lifetime I have wished it,

And have hoped this high-born hero

Might akin to us be reckoned,

And the minstrel Väinämöinen

Might become my daughter’s husband.”

But when Joukahainen’s sister

Heard, she wept in deepest sorrow,

Wept one day, and wept a second,

At the threshold ever weeping,

Wept in overwhelming sorrow,

In the sadness of her spirit.

Then her mother said consoling,

“Wherefore weep, my little Aino?

Rh

title: Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/53


text:
Page:Lorna Doone - a romance of Exmoor (IA lornadooneromanc691blac).pdf/94

 found out; and it only made one the less inclined to work without white feather. So I laid the case before me in a little council; not for loss of time, but only that I wanted rest, and to see things truly.

Then says I to myself,—"John Ridd, these trees, and pools, and lonesome rocks, and setting of the sunlight, are making a gruesome coward of thee. Shall I go back to my mother so, and be called her fearless boy?"

Nevertheless, I am free to own that it was not any fine sense of shame which settled my decision; for indeed there was nearly as much of danger in going back as in going on, and perhaps even more of labour, the journey being so roundabout. But that which saved me from turning back was a strange inquisitive desire, very unbecoming in a boy of little years; in a word, I would risk a great deal to know what made the water come down like that, and what there was at the top of it.

Therefore, seeing hard strife before me, I girt up my breeches anew, with each buckle one hole tighter, for the sodden straps were stretching and giving, and mayhap my legs were grown smaller from the coldness of it. Then I bestowed my fish around my neck more tightly, and not stopping to look much, for fear of fear, crawled along over the fork of rocks, where the water had scooped the stone out, and shunning thus the ledge from whence it rose like the mane of a white horse into the broad black pool, softly I let my feet into the dip and rush of the torrent.


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/96

. How old is this daughter?

. Fourteen. I was fifteen when she was born.

. Where has she been all these years?

. At home with my parents.

. Has it never occurred to you to bring her here?

. Why should I? I always sent her money, so she wanted for nothing. Besides, she was better off there. I should have liked to see her, to have returned home—oh, so often! But to bring her here…

. What do you intend to do now?

. They have written me that she has fallen in love.

. At fourteen? Admirable precocity!

. No, not in Italy. We are not like you are. It is a young fellow who danced in the theatre with her. She ran off with him.

. Excellent!

. And now they are appearing together at Mr. Jacob's. Donina—her name is Donina, that was my name at home—is the star of the troupe. She is not beautiful, but she is attractive, oh, so attractive!—very much as I was, as I might have been. And the boy is a fine strapping fellow, bello, bello! He looks like one of the Madonna's angels, but they say he is a rogue. All the girls are mad over him, and Donina is jealous, oh, so jealous! As jealous as I was, as I should have been!

. But, Imperia! It makes my blood run cold to hear you. Do you consent to this? Do you abet it?

. Abet what? That my daughter should love a man, that she should be happy loving and suffering for him? That is life. I asked her: Would you like to come and live


text:
Page:Plays by Jacinto Benavente - Third series (IA playstranslatedf03benauoft).pdf/97

 with me in a beautiful villa, bella, bella!—and to have clothes like these? But she wouldn't; she didn't want to. It was only natural. She has no affection for me.

. No affection for her mother? This is horrible.

. It is the truth. Why should she love me? I left her when she was two years old. She knew that I was alive somewhere, a great way off, that I sent her presents and kisses, sometimes—in my letters. My brothers told her terrible things about me; so did my parents. No wonder! Whatever I sent seemed little enough to them.

. Is it possible to live like this?

. Why not? They are in love. If anything happens to one of us, we stand together for vengeance, without one thought of forgiveness, even after years. But with you, it is different. Have you any affection? It is impossible to insult you. If one could, you would never take to blows. Nobody gives you five hundred lire when he falls in love with or wants to marry your child. Nothing appears to you as it really is—nothing that you think, nothing that you do. But with us it is all truth, and that is the reason it seems so evil.

. It may be so. We face the truth too seldom in our lives.

. Now I am going to leave you. I am going to see my daughter.

. I should like to see her, too. I will meet you there.

. But you must not let yourself be known.

. Why not?

. She has been told that I am living with a Prince, and she imagines that he is like a prince in a fairy-tale—bello, bello!


text:
Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/12

vi

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/12


text:
Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/54

34

You have gained a valiant bridegroom,

And the home of one most noble,

Where you’ll look from out the window,

Sitting on the bench and talking.”

But her daughter heard and answered,

“O my mother, who hast borne me,

Therefore have I cause for weeping,

Weeping for the beauteous tresses,

Now my youthful head adorning,

And my hair so soft and glossy,

Which must now be wholly hidden,

While I still am young and blooming.

“Then must I through lifetime sorrow

For the splendour of the sunlight,

And the moonbeam’s charming lustre

And the glory of the heavens,

Which I leave, while still so youthful,

And as child must quite abandon,

I must leave my brother’s work-room,

Just beyond my father’s window.”

Said the mother to the daughter,

To the girl the crone made answer,

“Cast away this foolish sorrow,

Cease your weeping, all uncalled for,

Little cause have you for sorrow,

Little cause for lamentation.

God’s bright sun is ever shining

On the world in other regions,

Shines on other doors and windows

Than your father’s or your brother’s;

Berries grow on every mountain,

Strawberries on the plains are growing,

You can pluck them in your sorrow

Wheresoe’er your steps may lead you;

Not alone on father’s acres,

Or upon your brother’s clearings.”

title: Page:Kalevala (Kirby 1907) v1.djvu/54


text:
Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/62

 And he hath kissed the lips of Proserpine,

And sung the Galilæan's requiem,

That wounded forehead dashed with blood and wine

He hath discrowned, the Ancient Gods in him

Have found their last, most ardent worshipper,

And the new Sign grows grey and dim before its conqueror.

Spirit of Beauty! tarry with us still,

It is not quenched the torch of poesy,

The star that shook above the Eastern hill

Holds unassailed its argent armoury

From all the gathering gloom and fretful fight—

O tarry with us still! for through the long and common night,

Morris, our sweet and simple Chaucer's child,

Dear heritor of Spenser's tuneful reed,

With soft and sylvan pipe has oft beguiled

The weary soul of man in troublous need,

And from the far and flowerless fields of ice

Has brought fair flowers to make an earthly paradise.

We know them all, Gudrun the strong men's bride,

Aslaug and Olafson we know them all,

How giant Grettir fought and Sigurd died, 48

title: Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/62


text: Kalevala (Kirby 1907)/Runo 3

title: Kalevala (Kirby 1907)/Runo 3


text: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/13

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/13


text:
Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/63

 And what enchantment held the king in thrall

When lonely Brynhild wrestled with the powers

That war against all passion, ah! how oft through summer hours,

Long listless summer hours when the noon

Being enamoured of a damask rose

Forgets to journey westward, till the moon

The pale usurper of its tribute grows

From a thin sickle to a silver shield

And chides its loitering car—how oft, in some cool grassy field

Far from the cricket-ground and noisy eight,

At Bagley, where the rustling bluebells come

Almost before the blackbird finds a mate

And overstay the swallow, and the hum

Of many murmuring bees flits through the leaves,

Have I lain poring on the dreamy tales his fancy weaves,

And through their unreal woes and mimic pain

Wept for myself, and so was purified,

And in their simple mirth grew glad again;

For as I sailed upon that pictured tide

The strength and splendour of the storm was mine

Without the storm's red ruin, for the singer is divine, 49

title: Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/63


text: General Report on Public Instruction in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45)/Special Reports


text:
Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/64

 The little laugh of water falling down

Is not so musical, the clammy gold

Close hoarded in the tiny waxen town

Has less of sweetness in it, and the old

Half-withered reeds that waved in Arcady

Touched by his lips break forth again to fresher harmony.

Spirit of Beauty, tarry yet awhile!

Although the cheating merchants of the mart

With iron roads profane our lovely isle,

And break on whirling wheels the limbs of Art,

Ay! though the crowded factories beget

The blindworm Ignorance that slays the soul, O tarry yet!

For One at least there is,—He bears his name

From Dante and the seraph Gabriel,—

Whose double laurels burn with deathless flame

To light thine altar; He too loves thee well,

Who saw old Merlin lured in Vivien's snare,

And the white feet of angels coming down the golden stair,

Loves thee so well, that all the World for him

A gorgeous-coloured vestiture must wear,

And Sorrow take a purple diadem,

Or else be no more Sorrow, and Despair

Gild its own thorns, and Pain, like Adon, be

Even in anguish beautiful;—such is the empery 50

title: Page:The Poems of Oscar Wilde.pdf/64


text: General Report on Public Instruction in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45)/Special Reports/Hindoo College


text: General Report on Public Instruction in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45)/Special Reports/Sanscrit College


text: General Report on Public Instruction in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45)/Special Reports/Calcutta Mudrussa


text: Index:A HAND-BOOK OF LUGANDA.djvu

title: Index:A HAND-BOOK OF LUGANDA.djvu


text: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/14

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/14


text: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/15

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/15


text: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/16

title: Page:Poems McDonald.djvu/16


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/10

 the North after the mid-1960s did the Finnish defence posture acquire a stabilising regional role in Northern Europe, thus extending territorial defence over the entire country. The move to the North was accompanied by a deliberate policy of not building East-West roads in Finnish Lapland.

Unlike Sweden, which secretly enjoyed military guarantees from the US, Finland pursued a cautious policy towards the West. Despite intensive diplomatic contacts with leading NATO members, Finland did not establish official contacts with NATO before the end of the Cold War. The same characterised military co-operation with Sweden. Despite military diplomacy, including visits by top commanders and personal relations, intensive military co-operation between Finland and Sweden is a recent phenomenon. The mere existence of Sweden was of immense significance for post-war Finland as a neighbour, trade partner and a social model.

By unilaterally declaring the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty null and void in September 1990, the Finnish Government lifted the last restrictions on its sovereignty. Although the stipulations of the Peace Treaty had not prevented Finland from developing its defence forces, the restrictions were a liability and a reminder of an existing droit de regard. The abrogation of the Friendship Treaty in 1992 lifted the stigma that had cast a long shadow and restricted Finland’s freedom of action. Joining the European Union in 1995 marked the end of neutrality and the beginning of a policy of military non-alignment. The expression non-aligned was dropped in 2007 and calibrated as “no membership in military alliances”.

The restoration of independence of the Baltic States in 1990 brought about a fundamental change to the geopolitical situation around the Baltic Sea. Control of the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland and the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea reverted to the Baltic States.

Differences in the assessment of risk and military threats in the early 2000s led to diametrically different defence orientations in Finland and Sweden. Finland, a traditional force contributor to the UN since the beginning of blue-helmet operations in 1956 (UNEF Sinai), intensified its participation in NATO and EU operations, which provide additional training and even combat experience for the reserve force. But unlike Sweden, which placed a premium on developing an expeditionary capability forsaking territorial defence and suspending conscription from 2009 onwards, Finland neither gave up territorial defence nor contemplated abandoning conscription. Nor were the Border Guards turned into a police force. 10


text:
Author:James Aitchison

Works

 * Gloomy winter's come again

title: Author:James Aitchison


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/11

 CHAPTER II. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Since the drafting of the last assessment on the effects of possible NATO membership for Finland close to ten years ago, the strategic environment has undergone wrenching change. The post-Cold War era which began around 1990 has, in effect, been replaced by a multipolar dispensation which has yet to receive a name but some of whose main characteristics can be summarised as follows:
 * The shift away from an order in which the United States was the sole superpower – indeed, some called it a ‘hyperpower’ – and in which the West, broadly speaking, tended to set the rules of international conduct.
 * The rise of China as a potential peer competitor of the US, and the advent of East Asia as the main and most dynamic hub of a global economy in which the European Union has been underperforming.
 * The emergence of attempts, notably via the BRICS nations, to set international rules outside of the Western nexus and, in the case of Russia, to revise the legal bases of the post-Cold War order in Europe.
 * The limits of the ability of military power, mainly but not only Western, to secure decisive and desirable results in a broader Middle East in the throes of deep, sustained and often violent change.

These broad changes impose new constraints on America’s strategic reach, notably in Europe, and have thrown up new challenges for the European Union. This general “hardening” of the strategic context has specific implications for Finland and its security and defence choices. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/12

 1. Russia as a dynamic and unsatisfied power

Russia is not the Soviet Union, although old habits die hard. The Russian default of 1998 led to spectacular growth and a surprisingly quick recovery boosted by the rapid rise in the oil price. Following the Norwegian example, the windfall was channelled into Sovereign Wealth Funds. Optimism and the spirit of reform came to an abrupt halt with the expropriation of Russia’s largest oil company, Yukos, in 2003. It demonstrated arbitrariness and the lack of property rights in a country ruled by man, not by law. Subsequent tightening of the control of the political system and the media brought about fundamental changes to a society that had experienced an unprecedented period of individual and political liberty since the implosion of the Soviet Union. Russian political institutions remain weak and, unlike China or indeed the USSR, it has neither a system of succession nor a procedure to renew its leadership.

The essence of modernisation, structural reforms of the economy and the social system, were postponed and neglected. After a decade of unprecedented growth that saw a historic rise in living standards, Russia encountered the financial crisis in 2008 unprepared. With the help of the accumulated reserves, companies and banks were bailed out and the subsequent rise in the oil price stabilised the economy for a while, but no reforms were initiated. After the collapse of the oil price in 2014, Russia could not repeat the bail-outs of 2008–09 without risking depleting its reserves. The Government is clueless in the face of a continuing downslide. Without growth and investments, stabilising the rouble and securing the reserves will not suffice. It will eventually lead to budget sequestration with dire social consequences, which will ultimately affect military expenditure as well.

The implosion of the Soviet Union saw the territory directly controlled from Moscow shrink to pre-Petrine borders. Slavic and Orthodox lands from North Kazakhstan to Belarus and Ukraine became part of independent states.

The partnership with the West declined in stages until the war in Ukraine resulted in a sharp deterioration in relations. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the United States in 2001 alerted Russia to the need to safeguard its second strike capability as the foundation of its status as the other nuclear superpower. The war in Georgia in 2008 demonstrated Russia’s willingness to engage in wars beyond its borders. But the poor performance of the Russian Armed Forces during the war in Georgia also revealed that Russia’s military did not possess the required capabilities to support Moscow’s for- 12


text: Bible (Berean Standard)/Tiered Translation Structure


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/13

 eign and security policy. The subsequent reforms turned the Russian military around, as shown in the war in Ukraine starting in 2014 and in the large-scale projection of air power to Syria in late 2015.

The war in Ukraine and especially the annexation of Crimea is a transgression without precedent in Europe since the end of World War II. The violation of the fundamental principle of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that borders can only be changed through negotiations was resented by the EU and the US as political revisionism. The West closed ranks and imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia miscalculated the mood in Ukraine, and misread the reactions in the European Union (not least in Germany) and the United States. In turning to its single largest trading partner, China, Russia also misjudged the pragmatism of Beijing. China’s economy remains deeply involved with the American banking system and cannot circumvent financial sanctions imposed by Washington. The collapse of the oil price coupled with financial sanctions has weakened the Russian economy significantly and increased isolation. Through its air power and special forces in Syria, Russia has re-emerged as a key player in the Middle East and been partly able to break the isolation through direct negotiations with the United States.

In a political and military corollary to the war in Ukraine, Russia stepped up its manoeuvres and resumed flight patrols at levels not seen since the Cold War. Snap exercises and aggressive flight patterns plus suspected incursions of submarines into Swedish waters, combined with unprecedented hostile talk about nuclear weapons, startled the West and especially Russia’s neighbours. Despite the fact that the Russian nuclear doctrine, last updated in December 2015, has not changed in its fundaments since its initial formulation in 1993, provocative talk at high official levels about nuclear weapons and their demonstrative inclusion in major exercises and air patrolling, alerted the Western public. This is enhanced by Russia’s capacity for action and ability to take decisions quickly. It is a policy of ambiguity, even taking pride in a decision-making process as inscrutable and unpredictable as possible. The ability to make strategic decisions quickly and to implement them militarily and politically with great speed and agility sets Russia apart from the tsarist Empire or the USSR.

The strategic challenge for NATO remains its ability to reinforce the defence of the Baltic States. Russia’s strong air defence in vital hubs like Kaliningrad (as also deployed in Crimea) has created a state of affairs characterised by Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Baltic region THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/14

 (and in the Black Sea). These force NATO to consider prepositioning heavy materiel and increase the need for more persistent deployments of fighting units in the Baltic States. A premium is also placed on NATO’s ability to provide reinforcements to the Baltic States, either via Poland’s narrow (112 kilometre-wide) Suwalki corridor running between Kaliningrad and Belarus, or by circumventing Kaliningrad, possibly via Sweden and Finland.

Along with the access to and defence of St. Petersburg, the “Northern Capital”, the Russian threat perception in the Northwest is primarily centred on protecting tous azimuts its nuclear deterrent and the Northern fleet on the coast of Murmansk, including the shipyards of Arkhangelsk and the missile launch centre in Plesetsk. Air defence is concentrated against a transpolar threat. The Russian sea denial capability reaches far south into the Norwegian Sea. Land protection is the task of the new Arctic brigade being formed in Alakurtti, south of Murmansk and close to the Finnish border.

For Russia, the loss of a strategic buffer after the Baltic States joined NATO has been remedied by a build-up of a strong denial capability (A2/AD) around Kaliningrad, while the new-found agility of its armed forces compensates for reductions in the force structure, along with the new emphasis placed on nuclear weapons.

The return of nuclear weapons to the European theatre has caught the West by surprise. In a world where non-proliferation replaced nuclear disarmament, the sudden re-discovery that nuclear weapons could be brandished for political or strategic gain, and possibly even be used, came as a shock. Russia has systematically upgraded its nuclear triad, as has the United States. The same applies to the nuclear deterrents of Britain and France. But the rest of Europe, especially Germany, but also Finland and Sweden, has all but forgotten about nuclear strategy and its intricacies. The Russian investment in its nuclear deterrent remains its only claim to superpower status. Nuclear weapons are nevertheless weapons and reminding the United States and NATO about its nuclear potential is part of Russia’s deterrence in the war in Ukraine. In the annexation of Crimea, Russia ostensibly made the point that any territory passing under direct Russian control would ipso facto benefit from the extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Russia attaches particular importance to short-range nuclear weapons, both as battlefield weapons countervailing conventional imbalances and as tools for exerting psychological and political pressure, as evidenced in a number of exercises in the Western Military District, sometimes in conjunction with Belarus. 14


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/15

 The security and future of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is of vital significance for Finland and Sweden. The Baltic States have experienced unprecedented growth in economic and human contacts over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea during their twenty-five years of freedom and regained independence, plus subsequent membership of the European Union and NATO. In joining the eurozone, the Baltic States submitted proof of their economic proficiency. It is of strategic significance for Finland and Sweden that the Southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea remain free.

The war in Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive posture have unsettled the Baltic States. The deeply felt insecurity has stirred the debate in Finland and Sweden, too. NATO membership has not been debated with such seriousness in the two countries since the end of the Cold War. The likelihood that Russia would test NATO Article 5 in the Baltic States remains low, as this would trigger a response from the Alliance. Despite its proven ability to use military force and the prowess of its special operations forces and the capability to project power, Russian resources are stretched. The number of fighting forces remains limited. However, Russia’s new-found strategic and military agility maximises the utility of these forces. As a consequence, NATO has taken a set of measures to reassure its most exposed members and to constrain Russia’s dynamic conduct, which also imposes on Russia’s neighbours a requirement for higher degrees of military readiness. Furthermore, the lack of strategic depth of the Baltic States and the great difficulty in providing timely reinforcements as a result of Kaliningrad’s A2AD capability mean that NATO could be forced to resort to the threat of nuclear escalation in the event of an attack against the Baltic States – as was largely the case for the defence of West Berlin during the Cold War. Such a situation is inherently dangerous.

Russia has also acquired the ability to combine ambiguous or hybrid operations with the use of military means. It is therefore in both Finnish and Swedish interests that the security of the Baltic States is enhanced through adequate military means. In the light of the changed Russian posture and military activity, Sweden is re-building its territorial defence. The Finnish defence posture remains a policy of deterrence by denial. The unprecedented undertaking to jointly deepen Finnish and Swedish defence efforts is another result of the changed military environment.

Russia has fourteen contiguous neighbours and remains the country with the longest land border in the world. Russia’s border with Fin- THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text: Bible (Berean Standard)/Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic Sources and Abbreviations


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/16

 land and Norway has been the most stable and well managed of all. The Fenno-Soviet/Russian border regime has functioned flawlessly since the end of the 1950s and the numbers crossing it remain high. To the great surprise of Norway and Finland, in the autumn of 2015 Russia suddenly allowed third country nationals without proper visas to cross over, first to Norway and, as of December 2015, to Finland at two northern checkpoints. This called into question the long-established border regime while exacerbating the refugee problem. The sudden changes in the border regime look like yet another hybrid tool to convey messages. These ceased as suddenly as they began in late February 2016. A Russian-Finnish bilateral agreement was reached on 22 March 2016 to restrict, as an interim solution, the use of the two northern checkpoints to Finnish and Russian/Belarussian citizens only.

The end of the Cold War strengthened aspirations for a system of cooperative security. The CSCE was turned into an Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994 with a joint value basis enshrined in the Paris Charter (1990). A comprehensive concept of security was embodied in the permanent institutions established for the organisation, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities. These were meant to have some independent leeway in this strictly consensus-bound system. The OSCE was supposed to make security in Europe a common issue by preventing conflicts and establishing a permanent dialogue on issues of common interest. Its joint value basis aimed to consolidate respect for democracy and human rights in the post-Soviet states.

The vision for cooperative security, however, faded away along with the strengthened Russian assertiveness and power politics. Russia currently challenges the legitimacy of the post-Cold War international order, the governance of which (including the OSCE and the Council of Europe) it perceives as embodiments of Western hegemony. The model of international order promoted by Russia – and reflected, for instance, in the proposal by the then President Dmitry Medvedev for a new Euro-Atlantic treaty system from 2008 – is based on the balance of power between the main actors consolidating their right to spheres of interest. 16


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/17

 The Russian approach culminating in a violation of the basic norms and principles of the OSCE through the annexation of Crimea and military action in Eastern Ukraine has hampered the full-scale functioning of the organisation and challenged its future role. Added to this, the political development of Russia has led to a questioning of the concept of comprehensive security enshrined in the OSCE’s key values and principles and, in particular, its human dimension.

Reflecting the general weakening of cooperative security in Europe, the arms control regime has also started to fall apart. As a result of this development, all three pillars of European arms control – the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (VD 2011) and the Open Skies Treaty have either become outdated or been abandoned. Even though Finland and Sweden do not take part in the CFE Treaty, they have still been working actively within the framework of the Vienna Document. The inactivation of this system of norms and confidence-building measures has increased distrust.

As a consequence of a deepening distrust between Russia and the West (and with it the weakened legitimacy of the structures of cooperative security), political confrontation and military tension have increased. With the growing risk of military accidents and the escalation of military activities, the security of countries such as Finland located in the immediate vicinity of Russian strategic regions is becoming vulnerable.

Cooperative security. NATO’s transformation in the 1990s broadened its tasks from collective defence to crisis management and cooperation with third countries. In this context, NATO changed its threat conceptions and engaged in a special relationship with Russia. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) concept was launched in 1994 as a platform between NATO and non-member states to adjust cooperation to the very different starting levels of partner countries in terms of military capabilities. Finland joined at its creation and has also been a full ab initio participant in the PfP’s planning and review process (PARP) from 1995 onwards.

Since the early years of cooperative security, 12 partners have become full members of NATO and currently the organisation’s more than 40 partners cover regions from North Africa and the Middle East to Asia. In the organisation’s 13-year-long operation in Afghanistan, which was the largest and longest NATO operation ever, 22 partner countries took part. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


title: Page:Littleofficeofbl00newy.djvu/264


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/18

 NATO’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was a demanding political task which put its relationship with Russia to the test. Although the Russian leadership was never pleased with the continuing presence of NATO in the post-Cold War Europe – not to speak of its enlargement – Moscow’s reactions were political in nature, and did not lead to a strategic crisis or economic countermeasures. This was true for both the 1999 enlargement (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) and even for the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia). Although the Russian leadership used harsh language and threatened to impose sanctions if NATO expansion were to include the Baltic States, their accession did not cause any major worsening of their relationship with Russia.

However, Russia drew the line at Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. Although US efforts to force the issue of membership at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest met with European resistance, which put the issue on indefinite hold, Russia was determined to use all means to remove the option from the table completely.

This was in contrast to Russia’s prior conduct. Indeed, NATO concluded a PfP agreement with Russia in 1994 and Russia also participated in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia in 1995, and subsequently in Kosovo as part of KFOR in 1999–2000. To conciliate Russia with respect to NATO enlargement, the two parties raised their relationship to a new level through a specific Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security concluded in 1997. It established a permanent joint council with a coordination and consultation mechanism between Russia and NATO without, however, granting Russia a right to veto NATO decisions. The functioning of the permanent joint council was briefly suspended in spring 1999 due to disagreements over the Kosovo war but was resumed a couple of months later. The positive relations between the parties culminated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, when the scope of cooperation was furthermore enlarged and a new NATO-Russia council was established to provide Russia with a more equal status in its cooperation with NATO (“at 29”). Russia duly served as a major logistical supply line for NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.

The full range of activities created in the framework of the NATO-Russia council did not, however, prevent the continued presence of NATO as part of Russia’s “enemy picture” (Feindbild), even in its successive post-Cold War military doctrines (1993, 2000, 2010, 2015). The Russian war against Geor- 18


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/19

 gia in 2008 led to the suspension of all political and military cooperation among the parties in this framework until the “reset” of US-Russian relations in 2009. After the annexation of Crimea (2014), cooperation was suspended – and remains so.

NATO’s decision to focus back on collective defence (Article 5 tasks) was a direct consequence of the Russian take-over of Crimea and operation in the Donbass. In its Wales summit of 2014 the organisation adopted a new Readiness Action Plan to strengthen its collective defence. The plan included a continuous military presence that went well beyond air policing, established on a rotational basis in the eastern parts of the Alliance in the Baltics and subsequently Iceland, introduced from 2004 onwards. A very high readiness joint task force (VJTF) deployable within a few days was established. These initiatives together with an enlarged exercise programme were meant to consolidate NATO’s deterrence.

NATO’s renewed emphasis on Article 5 tasks has created the perception in Finland of a growing distinction between its members and partners, as the latter do not have equal access to activities taking place in the framework of Article 5, such as contingency planning and force planning.

To balance the consequences of a reinforced focus on Article 5 tasks, NATO offered strengthened forms of cooperation for its partners on the initiative of Finland and Sweden. The Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) programme deepens NATO’s cooperation with its most interoperable partners, including Finland and Sweden. The programme created by the 2014 NATO summit provides better possibilities for these partners to take part in NATO’s exercises and operations and strengthens their political dialogue with the Atlantic Alliance. In addition to this, better access to information and deepened cooperation in cyber defence have been among the Finnish priorities.

On issues relating more specifically to the Baltic Sea region, “28 (NATO) + 2 (Finland & Sweden)” meetings are also held.

Finland’s ever closer NATO partnership. After the initial years of domestic controversies, Finland’s partnership with NATO has become a legitimate part of its security policy. This is commonly understood to be a policy of increasing cooperation with NATO without full membership. The THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/20

 stated policy remains not to forsake the possibility to apply for membership. The political significance of the NATO partnership has been further strengthened due to the growing tension in Northern Europe and the slow progress of the EU’s common security and defence policy.

As a part of Finland’s security policy, the NATO partnership clearly has a political and military function. The military part revolves around enhancing interoperability with NATO forces, where significant steps have been taken since 1995 when Finland began to participate in the PfP’s Planning and Review Process (PARP). Finland has chosen a broad range of partnership goals and they currently cover the whole development programme of the Finnish Defence Forces. Interoperability created in NATO’s framework also supports military cooperation in the EU and NORDEFCO frameworks. According to NATO’s assessments, Finland currently reaches an overall high level of interoperability.

Interoperability is tested in practice in those military exercises that are open to partner countries as well as in NATO-led crisis management operations, which have formed the political core of Finland’s partnership. To signal this, on occasion Finland’s contribution to NATO-led operations reached a numerically higher level than its contribution to other multilateral operations. This activity started along with NATO’s IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, where Finland sent a construction battalion from 1996 onwards. To be able to do this, Finland’s legislation on international peace-keeping, however, had to undergo a number of principled changes as it did not allow participation in operations led by actors other than the UN and OSCE. Further, the mandate for the use of force in international operations had to be extended in this context. The Finnish contribution to the initial KFOR operation in Kosovo in 1999 reached some 800 soldiers whereas in ISAF, Afghanistan, its role remained at the company level. Another major step with the partnership was taken through participation in NATO’s Response Force (NRF), which has contained units from all the military branches and joint exercises.

The future of the PfP programme has been unclear ever since the major group of partners joined NATO. The most recent developments indicate NATO’s willingness to provide its most advanced partners with a special status which, to some extent, blurs the distinction between members and partners.

Irrespective of this, the Atlantic Alliance makes it clear that the organisation’s security guarantees apply to members only. Full access to collec- 20


text:
Page:Early western travels, 1748-1846 (1907 Volume 21).djvu/62

56 end of it across the river to the opposite bank by a man swimming with a rope in his mouth, from some distance above the spot he aimed to reach. We took a turn of it round a tree. Captain Sublet gave it as his opinion that the line would not be sufficient to command the raft. But our Leader was confident that it would; but when they had pulled about half way over, the rope broke, and the raft caught under the limbs of a partly submerged tree, and tipped it on one side so that we lost our iron articles, and damaged our goods and a number of percussion caps. This was a very serious calamity and absolutely irreparable. Almost every disaster has some benefit growing out of it. It was even so here. Two thirds of our company were sick, and that without any particular disorder that we can name, but from fatigue, bad water, scanty food, and eating flesh half raw. Add to this, worry of mind, and serious apprehensions of our fate when the worthy Captain Sublet should leave us; for he was, under Providence, the instrument of our preservation. Our own individual sufferings were enough for us to bear; but Captain Wyeth had to bear the like, and more beside, as the responsibility lay heavy upon him. Most men would have sunk under it. At this point of our journey we were sadly tormented by musquetoes, that prevented our sleep after the fatigues of the day. This little contemptible insect, which they call here a gnat, disturbed us more than bears, or wolves, or snakes.

The next day after we started form this unlucky place, we descried a number of men on horseback, approaching us at full speed. Various were our conjectures. Captain Sublet had an apprehension that they might be hostile Indians who fight on [36] horseback; he therefore ordered every man to make fast his horse as quick as possible, and prepare for battle on foot. But on their near approach,


text:
Page:The Necromancer, or, The Tale of the Black Forest Vol. 2.djvu/87

 in ambush, and to rob the first traveller he should see coming along the road.

Poor John was thunderstruck at the stern command of the Captain, fell at his feet, and entreated him to have mercy on him, but the ruffians laughed at him, and their leader repeated his order, swearing he would kill him on the spot, if he did not instantly comply with his desire. The hapless fellow seeing there was no alternative, but to be killed, or to prey on his fellow creatures, concealed himself in a thicket, and the robbers posted themselves opposite to him, behind some bushes, taking the three horses along with them.

The first travellers that passed by were two monks, and John thanked God in his heart that they were two. A little while after a ruddy countryman appeared, he was on horse-back, as it seemed returning from the market, carrying two empty sacks behind him, and counting money. That will be an easy task, thought John, but when he was going


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/21

 tive defence planning, decision-making and military structures can only be reached via full membership. This leads to the main paradox of the NATO partnership, namely that in the worst case it can be seen in the eyes of external actors to strengthen an ever-closer association with NATO without, however, supplying the deterrence provided by Article 5.

Finland, in effect, belongs today to the inner circle of the NATO partnership. With the exception of air surveillance and control (see ), Finland is close to the limit of what a non-member can achieve with NATO. In the event of NATO membership, Finland’s territorial defence would be coherent with the Article 5 defence of the country.

The relationship between the EU and NATO. During the last few years a number of issues have pushed the relationship between the EU and NATO towards complementarity instead of rivalry. The way the political and military relationship between these two organisations is arranged is of crucial importance for Finland as it is a member of one but not of the other.

A change in the US view on the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) has paved the way for complementarity being pursued between the EU and NATO. Since its inception in 1999 and notwithstanding its lack of progress in recent years, the CSDP has been perceived as an important framework for a stronger European military contribution to the transatlantic relationship. Although existing political and economic conditions preclude any large-scale functional overlap between the two organisations, the EU has been able to enter into fields such as the mutual defence and solidarity clauses. The fact remains, at least in the short and medium term, that the military structures and preparedness that exist in NATO will not be built within the EU.

Finland’s (and Sweden’s) possible membership of NATO would increase the overlap of membership between the EU’s and NATO’s respective membership But this would not significantly change the existing relationship between NATO and the EU. The situation would change basically only if a stable modus vivendi were established between NATO and the EU in terms of the exchange of classified information. Lack of agreement on this issue impairs even the most basic and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the CSDP as envisioned in the 1999 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. Any pro- THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/22

 gress here is, in turn, dependent on the resolution of the Cyprus question, which in turn is inextricably linked with Turkey-EU relations: Turkey, as a member of NATO, has been withholding the effective implementation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement.

The EU as an uncertain collective security and defence framework. The EU, however, is moving on with its common defence and security policy, which will be seen to complement and support the other fields of cooperation within the EU. This currently takes place within three major political processes, which will affect the EU’s position in the overall European security policy architecture, and its relationship with NATO accordingly.

The first is the ongoing drafting of the EU Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, which may be followed this time by a set of action plans and possible White Papers that will ensure a better transformation of the strategic guidelines into joint preparedness and capabilities in security and defence policy. If the process reaches its goal, the EU’s key security political needs should be supported with more focused planning and capabilities.

The second process of significant political importance relates to the construction of a European defence technological and industrial base. This is a Commission-driven project which aims to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence industry among other things through the extension of the single market to defence, and by establishing a funding instrument for defence- related research in the EU budget above and beyond the existing European Security Research Programme (ESRP). If it comes to fruition, this project could strengthen the ties between European defence policy and the Union’s general economic and industrial policies, and foster a more coordinated view among the member states about the needs in terms of defence capabilities.

The third process relates to the specification of the commitments for mutual assistance within the EU which have gained more relevance due to the changing political environment and a set of more multifaceted threats. The provisions of the solidarity clause (TEU, Art. 222), which includes the use of the EU’s instruments in the case of terrorist attacks or natural/manmade catastrophes, have already been complemented with rules concerning its implementation. The mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7), which directly relates to cases of armed aggression, has gained more political impor- 22


text:
Author:William Alexander (fl. 1843)

Works

 * "The Tweed", first published in The Book of Scottish Song (Blackie & Son, 1843)
 * "The years of Youth", first published in The Book of Scottish Song (Blackie & Son, 1843)

title: Author:William Alexander (fl. 1843)


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/23

 tance since its implementation in the context of the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015.

Despite the importance of the ongoing processes, the EU will, for an indefinite period of time, remain far from NATO in terms of its hard security capacities. The strengthened military tension in Europe stresses this relationship further. The Union’s command structure is tiny in comparison with NATO and its key foci in terms of planning and capabilities lie in tasks other than collective defence. With a significant number of EU members also being members of NATO, the Union’s role has been to attempt to advance European security through its comprehensive political and economic tools, rather than by operating primarily with military instruments.

In this respect, the EU’s mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7) has a different character, as it deals with hard security and obligates all EU members to defend an EU country in the event of armed aggression. The firm obligation is softened by its character as an obligation between the member states. As defence of a member state in such a situation is not conferred to the EU (as distinct from the solidarity clause, TEU, Art. 222) but to the partner states, the clause does not give rise to joint systems of planning and command. Any arrangements on aid and assistance will in these conditions remain on a bilateral basis between the targeted country and the others. The activation of the clause at the request of France after the terrorist attacks in November 2015, however, is likely to make it a living part of the EU and to lower the threshold for its use.

All in all, irrespective of their largely overlapping memberships and military resources, NATO and the EU will remain separate actors in the field of European hard security. Existing structures and cooperation allow the EU, and its member states, to respond to a wide range of low-intensity conflicts without NATO. When it comes to major military conflicts of a traditional or non-traditional character, it is still NATO with its military and political assets that would be the prime mover, and whose credibility would immediately be at stake in an Article 5 contingency.

On the other hand, it is equally unthinkable that the EU mutual defence clause would not become activated in a major European conflict. The main result of its activation together with NATO’s defence clause would concern the involvement of the EU’s six non-NATO countries (in particular Finland and Sweden) in the conflict. Their participation would require THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Necromancer, or, The Tale of the Black Forest Vol. 2.djvu/88

 to leave his hiding-place, his knees trembled, he was unable to stir, and the clown pursued his way without being disturbed.

The robbers began to hem, and poor John seized with terror, was going to run after the swain, but, thinking him too far advanced, resolved to wait for the next traveller, and to attack him vigorously.

He had waited a good while for another opportunity to acquit himself of his task, 'till at length a travelling journeyman appeared: John rushed out of his hiding place before his prey was near enough, and as soon as the frightened traveller saw a man running towards him with a pistol, he took to his heels and luckily got out of his reach.

The Captain and his companions, seized with a fit of roaring laughter, exhorted their awkward pupil, in a low accent, to have a little more patience in future.


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/24

 a political decision taken by them and, in principle, would take place outside NATO structures on a bilateral basis. It is obvious that experiences gained from NATO partnership activities would be relevant in organising their contribution. It is, however, NATO’s contingency planning and command structure that would play the leading role: by definition, non-members of NATO will not have been part of the corresponding planning preparations.

One further observation concerning the relationship between the EU and NATO concerns the way in which they are perceived by external actors such as Russia. Even as its attitude towards NATO became harsher over the years, Russia’s perception of the EU’s role as an actor in security and defence policy remained nonchalant. The situation, however, changed fundamentally during the run-up to the confrontation in Ukraine. Since then, the roles of NATO and the EU are hardly distinguishable as a part of the Russian enemy picture. In Russia’s December 2015 National Security Strategy, NATO and the EU are presented as companion parts of the West, with NATO and the United States at the forefront. Russia sees EU membership (or even associate status with the EU) as leading inexorably to NATO membership: it is this view which informed Russia’s policy in Ukraine from 2013 onwards.

Considerations of the EU as a security and defence framework remain in a state of flux. Uncertainty about the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU, the stresses placed on the Schengen regime, the difficulties in securing a resolution to the Cyprus problem, and the redefinition of EU-Turkey relations are all at play at the time of writing, and each one can have a significant effect on the future of the EU as a security and defence actor. The fact remains that EU membership and its implications in the field of security and defence have led, after due political deliberation, to the end of non-alignment as Finland’s policy of choice in 2007.

Finland’s policy within the CSDP. Security policy considerations played a key role in Finland’s decision to join the EU, and to do so with no legal or de facto opt-outs. Therefore, a functional and credible CSDP has always been of the utmost importance to the country. Finland has been in favour of deepening the CSDP, while putting the emphasis on concrete issues such as the development of common capabilities and better use of the Union’s comprehensive toolbox and civil-military cooperation. Finland has contributed to most EU-led 24


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/25

 civil and military operations. It also provides troops to the roster of EU Battle Groups. These have not been used since their creation in 2006, however.

The EU’s mutual defence clause (TEU, Art. 42.7) has had important consequences for Finland’s policies and legislation. The adoption of the clause led to the abandonment of non-alignment as Finland’s security policy. The corresponding legislative changes are currently being discussed, which would provide the legal framework for the reception and provision of international assistance, above and beyond the current legislation on crisis management and its provisions concerning the enlarged use of force. The mutual defence clause has been the driving force for these changes but their scope is of a much broader nature, since they also apply to non-EU contingencies as long as they are in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. They would be of direct relevance to Finland’s Bündnisfähigkeit, its ability to play its full role as an ally, if the country were to join NATO.

Nordic cooperation in security and defence policy: how much can it achieve? Nordic defence cooperation has had a pragmatic image since the Cold War. Differing positions towards the EU and NATO create obvious constraints for deeper security and defence policy cooperation between the Nordic states. Cooperation, therefore, has focused on crisis management, training and exercises, and armaments cooperation.

The Finnish and Swedish partnerships with NATO, and the Norwegian engagement in the EU’s crisis management policy, have provided larger frameworks for Nordic defence cooperation and platforms for the use of joint Nordic capabilities.

A couple of recent efforts have been made that go beyond the pragmatic character of cooperation, however. First came the so-called Swedish solidarity declaration of 2009. Confirming its commitment to the EU’s military assistance and solidarity clauses, Sweden extended its scope to the two Nordic states (Iceland and Norway) outside the EU. Later on, a similar declaration between the Nordic states was adopted in a ministerial meeting in 2011, focusing on cybersecurity, terrorist attacks and natural or manmade disasters. This Nordic Declaration stated that the intensified cooperation would be undertaken wholly in line with each country’s security and defence policy, and would complement existing European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/26

 The latter part of the declaration again serves as a reminder of the natural limits of defence cooperation between the Nordic states. Joint preparedness or planning to fully implement the solidarity clause in a collective defence setting will be hindered as long as the Nordic states have different positions with respect to NATO.

Finland and Sweden have deepened defence cooperation. Differences in the political climate of the two countries, including the issue of possible NATO membership, has not impaired this cooperation. In the Nordic context, the difference in status between NATO members (Denmark, Iceland and Norway) and non-NATO members (Finland and Sweden) has not in itself prevented deepening of cooperation, and the same could apply if Sweden and Finland made a different choice with regard to NATO membership. But there are clear limits further down the road: a true collective defence alliance between the two countries – including integrated capabilities and a mutual defence clause with joint structures and planning – would force them to adopt an identical position towards NATO membership as long as the bilateral union were in force. 26


text:
Page:Journal of Conversations with Lord Byron.pdf/98

 friendship, he could not resist the temptation of showing one up, either in conversation or by letter, though in half an hour after he would put himself to personal inconvenience to render a kindness to the person so shown up.

I remarked, that in talking of literary productions, he seemed much more susceptible to their defects, than alive to their beauties. As a proof, he never failed to remember some quotation that told against the unhappy author, which he recited with an emphasis, or a mock-heroic air, that made it very ludicrous. The pathetic he always burlesqued in reciting; but this I am sure proceeded from an affectation of not sympathizing with the general taste.

April. - Lord Byron dined with us to-day. During dinner he was as usual gay, spoke in terms of the warmest commendation of Sir Walter Scott, not only as an author, but as a man, and dwelt with apparent delight on his novels, declaring that he had read and reread them over and over again, and always with increased pleasure. He said that he quite equalled, nay, in his own opinion, surpassed Cervantes. In talking of Sir Walter's private character, goodness of heart, &c. Lord Byron became more animated than I had ever seen him; his color changed from its general pallid tint to a more lively hue, and his eyes be-


text:
Page:General report on the public instruction in the lower provinces of the Bengal Presidency (1844-45).djvu/35

Rh In the supplementary report submitted to the Council of Education in May, 1844, it was stated that the senior students of the College had been allowed to attend a course of Lectures on Law, delivered by the Advocate-General once a week, between the months of October 1843 and February 1844; and that an examination of the students of the institution who attended the Law Lectures had been held, the answers to the questions being examined by Sir, who adjudged the prize of a gold medal to Iswer Chunder Mittre. It was also mentioned that the prizes for proficiency in, given by the Hon’ble the President of the Council of Education, were contended for at this institution on the 11th March, and that the gold medal was awarded to Anundo Kissen Bose, and the silver medal to.

The prize of a gold medal awarded to Iswer Chunder Mittre upon the successful result of his examination in Law, and the prizes of gold and silver medals awarded to Anundo Kissen Bose and Rajnarayen Bose, for proficiency in Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments, alluded to in the preceding paragraph, were presented by the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General to the respective candidates, on the 9th October 1844.

The Advocate-General delivered a second course of Law Lectures at this institution between the months of May and August last. An examination of the students who attended that course has been held by him. The papers containing the questions and answers were submitted to the Hon’ble C. H. Cameron, who again assigned the first place in order of merit to Iswer Chunder Mittre.

But as a medal had been recently awarded to him, the Advocate-General proposed that a present of Books should be substituted on the present occasion, which has been approved of by Government. The Advocate-General further suggested that a present of books should be made to Jogace Chunder Ghose, whose performance was nearly equal to that of Iswer Chunder Mittre.

The scholarship examinations were held on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 7th October, under the immediate superintendence of the following gentlemen:—

E


text:
Page:Isis very much unveiled - being the story of the great Mahatma hoax (IA b24884273).pdf/36

32

It was not surprising that the Vice-President, finding the Mahatma so complaisant, should hasten to exploit him to the utmost. The resumption of the broken communication could not fail to restore the confidence of doubting disciples both in the society itself and in the favoured chela, who could not only, Glendower-like, “call spirits from the vasty deep,” but also, to the satisfaction of Theosophic Hotspurs, “make them come.” Forthwith letters began to be showered about among such persons as it was considered desirable to keep up to the mark, in which the sentiments of William Q. Judge were endorsed by the Mahatma. Of those two it might truly be said that “their unanimity was wonderful.”

One of the first recipients was Mr. Bertram Keightley, a gentleman whose services to Theosophy have been of a material kind, and whose zeal has been rewarded more than once by gratifying marks of approbation from Tibet. In fact, his experience, like that of Countess Wachtmeister and some other liberal friends of the society, suggests the formula: “Put a donation in the slot and you will receive a revelation.” For the Mahatma obligingly honours the bills of the society.

Under date May 29, 1891, the Vice-President wrote to Mr.


text:
Page:Isis very much unveiled - being the story of the great Mahatma hoax (IA b24884273).pdf/39

Rh Keightley from Avenue-road a Pauline epistle, in which he says:—

Close beside the signature of “William Q. Judge” appeared in solemn confirmation the M signature and seal impression—“precipitated,” doubtless, during transit among Her Majesty’s mails. As the recipient was at Adyar, Madras, and therefore, some thousands of miles nearer the home of the Mahatmas than Mr. Judge, it will be seen to what roundabout methods the Master was compelled in order to maintain his determination to have his messages ushered into the world in some connexion or other with the one favoured disciple.

Another recipient was important for other reasons than Mr. Keightley. Babula, a low-caste Hindu, formerly Madame Blavatsky’s personal servant, was at this time in a position of trust at the Theosophic quarters at Adyar. Since then he has got into trouble with his employers, like others of Madame’s former confidants. But in July, 1891, Babula was still in authority at Adyar, and the vice-president thought it worth while to convince him that he, Judge, was his friend. A letter, dated some weeks later than Mr. Keightley’s, from Avenue-road, terminated with the signature,

Under the words “Your friend,” the ever-officious Mahatma has drawn a line, at the end of which he has solemnly inscribed “YES,” and his signature and seal. The seal is, as usual, impressed in black carbon; the writing is in red pencil; and Judge’s signature is in ordinary ink.

Pity that the famous Mr. Codlin had not a Mahatma to back him thus conveniently in his asseverations that “Codlin’s the friend, not Short.”


text:
Page:The Necromancer, or, The Tale of the Black Forest Vol. 2.djvu/89

 Before John could reach his lurking place, a Jew made his appearance; the sight of the poor Israelite fired the novice in robbery with an unusual courage, he rushed upon the terrified Hebrew like lightning, and, having seized him by the collar, demanded his money with a thundering voice: The petrified Israelite feeling himself thus roughly handled, shrieked and lamented most ruefully, and stoutly refused at first to deliver up his mammon, but when he saw his life at stake, and John put his pistol to his breast, yielded at last, with a woful visage, to the uncouth demands of his aggressor, exclaiming in the height of fear and despair, "I will give—I will give—all the money I have about me." So saying, he untied a leathern bag with money, fastened round his waist, and offered it to the greedy robber, who, transported with joy at his success, was thrown off his guard, and the cunning Jew taking hold of an opportunity to recover his treasure, seized, with much adroitness, the pistol,


text:
Page:Isis very much unveiled - being the story of the great Mahatma hoax (IA b24884273).pdf/40

34

Parallel to this corroborative use of the Mahatma’s seal, though belonging to a different period of the story, was the case of another letter of Mr. Judge’s to a brother official, in which, after expressing certain views, Mr. Judge used these words:—

Plump on the written word came the seal. Inimitable Mahatma!

Mrs. Besant’s previous “communications,” as we have seen, did not come through the post. But during that July Mr. Judge seems to have left Mrs. Besant’s side for the express purpose of enabling his Mahatma to give her an exhibition of his powers in this special line of “precipitation” during postal transit.

July 21, 1891, was the date of one such performance; which included signature and seal complete. I pass over this and some equally commonplace missives, which Mrs. Besant received at various dates, all equally under Mr. Judge’s auspices, in order to deal more fully with one particular one in which she was favoured with a “test condition.”

For lo! on cutting the envelope open in the usual way, along the top edge, Mrs. Besant observed a line or so of pencilling inside written partly on the upper flap, partly on the under flaps, of the adhesive part of the envelope.

Here was proof indeed of powers occult! For this must obviously have been written or “precipitated” after the envelope was stuck up: and there it was inside! For a Mahatma, of course, it was as easy to produce it so as in any other way. He might do it in mere artless absence of mind.

Ingenuous Mrs. Besant! Unfortunately for the test, the feat is equally easy for any commonplace mortal—though in his case it would hardly be done quite artlessly. The trick was first shown me by a student of “occultism”—a Theosophist, in fact. But it is a very old affair, and can be found in any book of parlour magic. It might be called “Every Man his own Mahatma.”


text:
Page:Völsunga Saga (1888).djvu/327

 Scenes in Greenland and Iceland (Anon.). Van Voorst, London, 1850, 16mo.

(F. T. H. Blackwood, Earl of).—Letters from High Latitudes, being some account of a voyage to Iceland.  Murray, London (fifth edition), 8vo, 1867.

.—Icelandic poetry, or the Edda of Saemund, tr. into English verse, by A. S. Cottle. N. Briggs, Bristol, 1797, 8vo.

Edda Saemundar hins froda. The Edda of Saemund the learned; tr., etc., by Ben. Thorpe. Trübner, London, 1866, 2 vols., 8vo.

See also, and —See .—See (Sir G. W.).

See (Rev. )

.—The Prose Edda, tr. by J. A. Blackwell. In. Northern Antiquities. Bohn (Antiq. Lib.), London, 1847, 12mo.

The Prose or Younger Edda tr. by G. W. Dasent, Stockholm, 1842, 8vo.

The Younger Edda: also called Snorre’s Edda, or the prose Edda. Tr., with notes, etc., by R. B. Anderson. Griggs & Co., Chicago, 1880 [1879], 8vo.

See also.

.—See.

.—Iceland; its volcanoes, geysers, and glaciers. Murray, London, 1860, 8vo.

Galton (Fras.).—Vacation Tourists and notes of travel in 1860-61-62-63. Macmillan, London, 1861-4, 8vo. (contains, 1860, Journal of a Yacht voyage to the Faroe Islands and Iceland. By J. W. Clark, pp. 318–361.)

.—See.

.—See and.

.—Teutonic Mythology. Sonnenschein, London, 1880, 8vo.

.—See and.

for travellers in Denmark and Iceland. Murray, London, 1858, 12mo.

(Sir ).—Viga Glums Saga. The story of Viga Glum, tr. from the Icelandic. Williams & Norgate, London, 1866, 8vo.

.—The Island of Fire. Lee & Shepard, Boston, 1875, 12mo.

—Iceland; the journal of a resident, 1814 and 1815. Oliphant, Edinburgh, 1818, 2 vols., 8vo.

.—Select Icelandic poetry; tr., with notes. 2 parts. London, 1804–6, 8vo.

(An) and descriptive account of Iceland, etc. (Anon.) Edinbro’ Cabinet Library, vol. 28, 1830, 12mo; and Harper, New York, 1842, 16mo.

).—The 1000th Anniversary of the Norwegian Settlement in Iceland (a sketch of the colonisation and general history of Iceland). Reykjavik, 1874, 8vo.

See .—See .—See.

—See, etc.

title: Page:Völsunga Saga (1888).djvu/327


text:
Page:Isis very much unveiled - being the story of the great Mahatma hoax (IA b24884273).pdf/41

Rh An envelope has four flaps. Three of these are stuck together in manufacture, but with a much less adhesive sort of gum than that which is put on the remaining flap to be stuck up by the user.

It is generally quite easy to insert a penknife behind the bottom flap, as in the accompanying cut, and so make entrance and exit for a slip of paper. On this slip you write the words backwards, as they would appear in a looking-glass, using a black pencil of the “copying” kind. You then pass the slip in, push and shake it into the right position, press till you feel sure the inside flaps have taken the impression, and then out with your slip by the door it came in at. Moisten and fix the flap again, and the “precipitation” is complete. A child can do it.

A Mahatma, of course, produces the result by mere psychic effort. But it is a curious coincidence that M on this occasion abandoned his usual red pencil for the black one which you or I would use if we were playing just the trick described.

No doubt he felt that a more satisfactory test would have been wasted on Mrs. Besant.

Others, however, were a little more exacting. The story enters here on a less smooth course.


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/27

 CHAPTER III.

THE MEANING OF MEMBERSHIP

«NATO Membership» is not as straightforward a proposition as it may appear at first blush. Historically, legally and practically, the Alliance came about in two distinct parts. First came the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 by the twelve founding members, which entered into force on 24 August of that year. Since then, sixteen additional states have signed and ratified the Treaty. None of the parties to the Treaty has chosen to renounce it since it has been in existence.

The creation of a military organisation was not a treaty commitment, nor had it been planned for ab initio. The move from a legally-binding political association of nations to a broad-spectrum politico-military organisation came about as a result of the sharp rise in international tension caused by the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953). The decision to study the establishment of a centralised command structure was taken in September 1950, followed in December by the designation of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The basic military structures for the Alliance in Europe and the political decision-making machinery, with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) at its centre, were in place by mid-1951, and the entity has been known since then as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

France chose, from 1966 to 2009, to withdraw from the military part of NATO for the most part, removing all of its forces from the integrated command structure, while remaining a party to the Treaty and represented on the NAC as well as in a number of technical bodies. As a budding nuclear power located in a crucial geographical position, France could retain this policy despite the reluctance of her NATO allies. This is not on offer to putative new members of NATO: membership means both becoming a party to the Treaty and a full participant in the organisation. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT


text:
Page:The Necromancer, or, The Tale of the Black Forest Vol. 2.djvu/90

 wrested it from poor John's trembling hand, and ordered the affrighted fellow, who was almost petrified, to return him his money instantly, if he would not have his brains blown out; John hesitated not a moment to submit to the Jew's demand, restored him his bag, and took to his heels, but the two robbers sallying forth from their hiding-place, retook him soon, while the cunning Israelite got clear off with his money and John's pistol.

The unfortunate fellow was instantly carried back to the robbers den, and shut up again in the subterraneous dungeon which he had but lately left. Having been confined there some weeks the robbers took him one day out of his hole, and gave him his liberty, and a small sum of money, after he had sworn a dreadful oath never to reveal the least thing of what he had heard and seen in the cavern during his stay with them, and to leave the country as soon as possible.


text:
Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/28

 Greece withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure from 1974 to 1980, in the aftermath of the invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 by fellow member state Turkey.

Another country, Spain, joined the Treaty and the political organs of NATO in 1982, but did not become a full participant in the command structure until 1999. However, a tight and long-standing bilateral military treaty with the US made this posture acceptable to NATO, while Spain’s geographical location made it an unlikely candidate for an armed attack from the outside. Finland’s geostrategic situation is different.

THE TREATY. The basic Treaty commitment is clear: the parties “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” (preamble). These two goals are materialised in the corresponding operative Articles around which the others tend to revolve.

Article 5 states “that an armed attack against one…in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against…all”, adding that assistance to the attacked taken “individually and in concert with the other Parties” can include “the use of armed force”.

The wording is unambiguous in the ‘all for one, one for all’ aspect. It is less clear on the mandatory nature of the assistance proffered: the wording adopted was aimed at avoiding an isolationist reaction in the US Senate during the ratification debate. It can be argued that other treaty commitments are more straightforward, such as the 1954 Brussels Treaty between the Western European states (“…the Parties will…afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”) or the more recent Lisbon Treaty of European Union, in Article 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power”. Finland is naturally bound by this commitment, which sets a distinct precedent vis-à-vis its previous policies of neutrality and non-alignment.

What makes the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 uniquely powerful in comparison to the examples that have been cited is the United States’ membership of 28