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 534

lilSTOltY OF INDIA.

[iJOOK IJl.

A.D. IT&O,

Attempts to pacify Siirajali

Tlie gover- nor's letter of explana- tion.

Its effect on the nabob.

The presidency, after they liad thas committed tliemselves, appear not to have been perfectly sati.siied with the propriety of their proceeding, and in- structed Mr. Watts to give explanations which might prevent any evil conse- quences. He was thought to have .succeeded ; for, when his vaqueil or agent appeared at the durbar, and stated the grounds on which Kamrantsing's brother had been treated as an impostor, Sui-ajah Dowlali gave no sign of emotion or displeasure. He acted, indeed, as if the matter had pa.s.sed entirely from his mind, and made no further communication to Mr. Watts or the presidency respecting Kissendass and his trea-sures.

At this very time letters arrived from England stating a rupture with France was inevitable, and ordering the .settlement to be put in a .state of defence. The work was immediately commenced ; but a.s the fort was in such a dilapidated state as to make it neces.sary rather to rebuild than repair it, a considerable number of labourers were employed, in the first instance, to repair a line of guns which were placed atong the brink of the river opposite to the west side of the fort. When these repaii-s were begun, Surajah Dowlah was proceeding at the head of an army of 50,000 men for Purneah, to encounter his cousin and rival claimant, Shokut Jung. It was known that he had a number of spies in Calcutta, and though the presidency had used every effort to discover and expel them, enough still remained to carry tidings to him of the operations in which they were engaged. Their nature and extent were of course exag- gerated, and a letter arrived from the nabob, in which, after stating that he had been informed that the English were building a wall and digging a large ditch around the town of Calcutta, he peremptorily ordered them to desist, and restore the fortifications to the state in which they were before. Mr. Drake, the gover- nor, answered this letter 'ith more candour than good policy ; he explained the full extent to which the operations had been canied, and. the motives which, as they originally dictated their commencement, rendered it expedient to continue and complete them. "The nabob," he said, "had been misinformed by those who had represented to him that the English were building a wall round the town ; they had dug no ditch since the invasion of the Mahrattas, at which time such a work was executed with the knowledge and approbation of Ali Verdy ; in the late war between England and France, the French had attacked and taken the town of Madras, contrary to the neutrality which it was expected would have been preserved in the Mogul's dominions ; and that there being at present great appearance of another war between the two nations, the English were under apprehensions that the French would act in the same manner in Bengal ; to prevent which they were repairing their line of guns on the bank of the river."

Tliis answer was received by the nabob on the 17tli of May, at Rajamahal, and threw him into a transport of rage, which astonished even those of his attendants who were most familiar with the violence of his temper. It is not


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 ClIAP. IX. 1

SURA J AH DOWLAH.

OOO

%M

RflNS OF THK Ha.IAU'3 rALACE, UaJAMAHAI, From nil oriictnHl ilrawiiiK by Cuplain Smith, forty- foiirth Regiment.

I

easy to see why it should have had such an effect. His dignity may have been offended at the very suppo.sition that Europeans should presume to make war within his territories without his sanction ; and still more at the assumption, that if they did so, the party attacked would be obliged to trust to their own resom-ces, instead of leaving it to him to repel and punisli the aggi-essor. Beyond this, there was nothing in the answer to provoke an outburst of passion even in the ])roudest and most sen- sitives of tyrants. The rage, if real, and not merely assumed to give a coloui' to further pro- ceedings, was probabl}' provojced by perceiving that a plan which he had long been meditating, and. a revenge which was rankling in his mfnd, were in danger of being frustrated. Were Calcutta put into such a state of defence as would enable it to resist the attacks of the French, whose skill in siege operations had been rendered famous throughout India, by the capture of for- tresses previously deemed imj)regnable, how could he be able to make himself master of it, and ritle it of the fabulous wealth which was believed to be treasured up within its precincts ? Npw, therefore, was the decisive moment. Calcutta, if not forthwith attacked, would set him at defiance, and both the fam^ whiiih he anticipated as its conqueror, and the plunder on which his heart was set, would be lost to him for ever.

Instigated by some such m6tives as. these, the expedition to Punieah was immeaiately postponed, and the anny began its march back to Moorshedabad. Its movements were too slow for the nabob's impatience, and a detachment of 8000 men was pushed foi-ward to invest the Company's fi^ctory at Cossimbazar. Though the garrison consisted only of twenty -two Europeans and twenty topasses, no attempt was made to carry it by a sudden onset, and the .detach- ment were contented to remain for nine days after their arrival, merely watch- ing it so as to preclude either egress or ingi'ess.

On the 1st of June, the nabob came up with the main body of the anny The idea of resistance seems not to have been entertained, as the fortifications, undeserving of the name, consisted only of a brick wall, three feet thick, with small bastions at the angles, but without ditch or paUsade. Part of the curtain formed the outer wall of a series of chambers looking inward, and affording, b}'

AD. 1756.

The factory of Cossini bazar at- tack t'd anil jiillageU

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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 y

o.'K) ' JJJSTOl'tV or INDIA. fHooK III.

A.D 17.16. their roofs, a terrace resembling ramparts. These, however, were complett^ly overlooked from without by Vjuildings at the di.starice of only 100 yanJfl. The

Mr Watts cannoii were still more defective than the works, most of them b -ing honey-

by tiio combed, and the ammunition was sufficient for^only GOO charges. The nab^jb, immediately on arriving, sent a mes.sage for Mi-. W'^atts, who oVjeyed, after obtaining assurance of personal protection. He was received with insfjlena; and invectives, and ordered to sign a j)aper, importing that the pr&sidency of Calcutta should, within fifteen days, level any new works they had raised, deliver up all government tenants under their protection, and refund whatever the revenue might have lost by the granting of dustuks or pas.sports of trade to parties not entitled to them. Mr. Watts, alarmed for his life, signed the paper, and the two other members of the council being sent for, imitated his example. No terms of capitulation were made, and a party of the nabob's

• troops took possession of the place without opposition. Their orders were to

seal up what effects they found ; but they disobeyed, and stole the greater, part. The soldiers in the factory, after enduring three days of such contumely, that the ensign in command of them went mad and shot himself, were imprisoned at Moorshedabad. One of the members of council, and the junior servants of the factory, were allowed to retire to the Dutch and French factories; but Mr. Watts ^d the other member, instead of being sent, as they expected, to communicate the nabob's resolves to the presidency, were detained in the camp, and told that they were to accompany the nabob himself to Calcutta. This was the first intimation they received of his determination to attack it.

Dilatory The extreme violence and injustice exhibited by the nabob at the very outset

prepara- o %i

tioiisofthe must havc made it almost palpable to the minds of the presidency that nothing less than the complete destruction of the settlement was aimed at ; and yet, in the vafei hope of deprecating his wrath, before the final step was taken, letters were daily despatched to Mr. Watts, instructing him to express their readiness to demolish everything that could be considered a recent addition to their forti- fications. The letters were probably intercepted by the nabob, as they never reached Mr. Watts ; but the presidency, while writing them, could not well act at variance with the offer they contained, and thus nearly three weeks passed away without any preparation against the coming danger. Had a proper use been made of this intervening period, by applying for reinforcements to the other presidencies, and making the most of the means of defence at their disposal, the governor and council might have set the nabob at defiance, and given the first example of what a mere handful of our countrjTnen can achieve, when true heroism inspires them, against mjTiads of native Indians. Unfortunately neither the Eiu"opean soldiers nor civilians in Bengal were, at that period, ani- mated by that spirit which in our own times has been so illustriously displaced. Wlien, at length, the struggle arrived they were far less di.sposed to face it than to flee from it.


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 CiiAr. IX.] SUEAJAH DOWLAH. 537

The letter which filled the nabob with so much rage, and whs the ostensible a.d. 1756. cause of his abandoning the expedition to Purneah, was received by him at Rajamahal on the 17th of May, and though his intention then announced was never revoked, and he from that day continued his march southwards, evidently Applications bent on mischief, the 7th of June arrived before the fiist note of alarm was Dutch and despatched to Madras and Bombay. The passage by sea, as the south monsoon '^'"' ' was then blowing, was impossible, and an overland message could not be carijed in less than thirty days. It was therefore evident that long before any answer could be received tlie nabob would have ample time to do his worst. Conscious of the desperate predicament in which they were thus placed, the presidency . • applied to the Dutch at Chinsurah, and tlie French at Chandernagore, and endeavoured to persuade them that they ought to unite their forces as in a com- mon danger. The former simply refused — the latter, as if in mockery, proposed that they should abandon Calcutta, and place themselves a ith their effects under their protection. What that protection would have been may be infeiTed from the fact that the nabob in passing Chandernagore was pi opitiated by a present of 200 barrels of gunpowder. The presidency, now tin own entirely on their own resources, began to display some activity. Works ( f defence, such as the shortness of the time would admit, were erected, provisions were laid in, and the number of Indian matchlock-men was augmented to 1500. The regular garrison consisted of 2G4 men, and the inhabitants enrolled as militia amounted to 250, forming an aggi-egate of 51 -i, but of these two-thirds were topasses, Armenians, and Portuguese, on whom no reliance could be placed, and of the remaining third, mustering in all 174, not more than ten had seen service.

With such feeble resources a successful defence was more than doubtful, and The fort of

^ c ^ • c • (» 1 • Tanna

therefore the attention of the presidency was, first of all, directed to the means tivkcn .md

of escape. On the opposite side of the river Hooghly, about five miles below

Calcutta, the native fort of Tanna, mounting thirteen guns, commanded the

narrowest part of the channel. The necessity of secuinng this fort, so as to give a

free outlet to the sea, seemed so in-gent, that it was determined, while the nabob

was only advancing, to assume the offensive and endeavour to gain possession of

it. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th of June, two vessels of 300 tons, and

two brigantines anchored before it, and opened a fire which at once dislodged

the garrison, consisting of not more than fifty men. A party immediately

landed, spiked some of the guns, and threw the rest into the river. If it was

intended to retain the fort, the true plan would have been not to destroy the

guns but point them so as to repel any attack on the land side. The mistake

was soon apparent, for the very next day a detachment of the enemy, 2000 strong,

arrived from Hooghly, drove the few Europeans and lascars within the fort id

their boats, and resisting any attempt to dislodge them by a cannonade, obliged

the ships to weigh anclior and return to Calcutta.

The same day when the ships sailed against Tanna a letter was intercepted, Vol. I. 68


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 538

Jll.S'JOl'.V OF JNlJJA

[Book III.

Sir:ijali Dciwlah's

•iilvance uDon Cal- cutta.

AD, 1756. afldressed to Ortiicliund, Ly the hetid 8py, and advi.sing liiin to put liis effects out of danger. This confirmuig tlie .suspicion ])reviouHly entertained, Oniiehund was immediately put under strict confinement in the fort. Kissendass wa.s, in lik« manner, confined; but when an attempt was made toappreliend (^michundw brother-in-law, a serious fray took place. He had concealed himself in the female apartments, and not only did all the peons and armed domestics in Omichunds seiB/ice resolutely resist a forcible entrance into them, but the person at their head, a native of high caste, to save the women from the dishonour of being exposed to strangers, rushed in, slew thirteen of them with Ids own hand, and tlien stabbed himself Meanwhile the nabob was ha.stening forward with such expedition that many of his troops died of fatigue and .sun-stroke. On the 1 otii of June he reached Hooghly, and immediately after transported his army to the Calcutta side, by means of an immense fleet of boats. The militia and rnilitai-}-

A ^

n-a. T e n t s

^°^^'

A a

THE TEPPtTORr

CALCUTTA

IN 1757

fiis first operations.

immediately repaired to their posts, and all the natives took to flight, with the exception of about 2000 Portuguese, whose claim as Christians was so far recog- nized as to procm'e them admission into the fort.

At noon of the 16th the nabob was seen approaching from the north. His first movement showed that he had not taken any means to acquaint himself with the locality. Had he turned eastward he would have arrived 'where the Mahratta Ditch had not been completed, and met with no obstacle. Instead of this he came directly in front of a deep ri^Tilet, where it enters the Hooghly, and formed of itself so strono- a defence as to render the ditch unnece.ssarv. There was indeed a bridge over it, but this was defended by a redoubt, which had recently been erected, and the approach to it was, moreover, flanked by a 'ship of eighteen guns, which had been stationed there for that purpose. When the point of attack was perceived the greater part of the Company's matchlock- men were posted near the banks of the riviilet. The first of the nabob's oj^e rations was to send forward a detachment of 4000 men, with four pieces of


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 (iiAr. IX. 1 SURAJAH DOWLAH. " 539

•

cannon, into the adjoining thickets. Here, from tliree in the afternoon till a.d. irse. (lark, an incessant fire was kept up by both sides without any result. At mid- iiiglit all was still, and Ensign Pischard, whq commanded the redoubt, suspecting from what he had learned on the Coromandel coast of the Indian mode of war- fare, that the enemy were buried in sleep, crossed the rivulet with his party, seized and spiked their four guns, cleared the thickets, and returned without the loss of a man. '

On the following day the nabob chanfjed his tactics. Omidiund's chief peon state of Fort 'had not stabbedjiimself piortally; and, still breathing indignation and revenge, had caused himself to be carried to. the enemy's camp. By his advice the attack on the north was abandoned, and an entrance was easily effected from the east, through various passages where there were no defenders. The suburbs were thus in the hands of the enemy, who set fire to the great bazaar, and took pos- session of the quarter which had been inhabited 1 y the principal Indian mer- chants. An unavailing attempt 'was made to dislodge them, and the space left to the defenders became gi'adually morfe and more contracted. Had the fort been considered tenable they would probably have at once retired into it, and by thus concentrating their efforts made them more efficient. Fort William, however, like that of Cossimbazar, scarcely deserved the name. It stood near the river, about half-way between the north and i-outh extremities of the Com- pany's territory, and formed nearly h parallelogram, of which the longest sides, the east and west, were each 200 yards; the breadth on the south side was 130, and on the north only 100 yards. The walls, not more than four feet thick, formed the outer side of chambers, and were in several places pierced with windows; the terraced roofs of these chambers supplied the place of ramparts. The four bastions, one at each angle, were e.ach mounted with ten guns, but the two on the south side were rendered useless to each other by a line of ware- houses which had been built contimious to the wall. The roofs of the warehouses were, however, strong enough to bear the firing of three-pounders, which were mounted on them. The east gateway, forming a considerable projection, was mounted witii five guns, three in front and one on each flank. Besides these, which formed the proper works of the fort, a line of heavy cannon, mounted in embrasures of solid masonry, was placed outside, on the brink of the river, under the west wall.

It is plain from this description how very little engineering skill had been work.sof employed in the construction of the fort. In addition to other disadvantages it defectiM was overlooked by the English Church, opposite to the north-east bastion, and several other houses belonginff to the English town, which consisted for the most part of spacious detached inclosures, and occupied the gi'ound 000 j-ards towards the east and half-a-mile to the north and south of the fort. Taking all these things into consideration, it is easy to understand the reluctance of the defenders to allow themselves to be cooped u]> within the fort, and their consequent anxiety


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 lO

IllS'IOKY or INDIA.

[Book 111

The enemy's progress.

AD, irso. to dispute every inch of ground an they were oljliged to recede. They accord- ingly erected three batteries, each mounting two eighteen-poiinders and two field-pieces, one at the di.stance of 300 yards from the east gate, so as Uj c<5ni- mand the i)rincipal avenue leading due east from it to the Mahratta Ditch; the second in a street commencing about 200 yards north of the fort, and continuing in that direction with one of its sides bordering on the river; and the third 300 yards to the south of the fort, at a point where a road leading north and south was bridged over to give passage to a rivulet. The principal approaches being thus secured, breast-works with palisades were erected in the smaller inlets, and trenches were dug in the more open gi'ounds.

It soon appeared that the defence of these outworks required a far greater force than the garrison could afford. Even had they been sufficiently defended, many points remained by which the enemy could penetrate ; and, availing them- selves of the houses and inclosures, advance, without once lo.sing shelter, near to the walls. The contest thus became too unequal to be long succe.ssfully main- tained. Post after post was necessarily abandoned, and the whole tlu-ee batteries were taken the very first day they were attacked. This result spread general consternation, and, with the exception of the comparatively few Europeans, all were stupified with fear. The enemy were of com'se proportionably embold- ened, and not only kept up an incessant firing, but made attempts to escalade. On one of these attempts, made at midnight, the governor ordered the drums to beat the general alarm, but the summons, though thrice repeated, did not bring forward a single man except those on 'duty. In such a state of matters it was impossible for the bravest and most sanguine not to feel that a fatal Lssue could not be long delayed. It was some consolation, however, to know that, if the worst should happen, the means of escape had been provided A ship, and seven smaller vessels, and numerous boats, with the natives who plied them, were lying before the fort. As night approached all the European women were embarked ; and at two in the morning a council of war, to which all the British, except the common soldiers, were admitted, met, to deliberate whether escape to the ships should take place immediately or be deferred to the following night. The council broke up without any formal resolution; but, as the immediate abandonment was not carried, the natural conclusion was that the other alter- native had been adopted.

In the morning, when it was intended to embark the Portuguese women and children, a scene of inextricable confusion arose. Many of the boats had deserted in the night, and not a few of those which remained were upset by overcrowding. The enemy in the meantime were not idle. Having gained possession of all the hoiises and inclosures on the banks of the river, they shot down the helpless fugitives and endeavoured to bm'n the ship and other vessels by means of fire- arrows. In the panic which now began to prevail many became more intent on their own personal safety than on any united effort for the general benefit. Two

General con stemation.


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 CiiAP. IX. j SUKAJAII DOWLAH. 541

members of council, attended by several of the militia, in superintending the ad. irse.

embarkation of the'European women, had accompanied them to the ship, and for- gotten or been unable to return. Nor was this the worst. The ship suddenly weighed anchor, and the other vessels, following in her wake, sailed down to Govindpore, about three miles below. Many of the militia, believing themselves ^s* "^ '•'« abandoned, rushed to the boats and quitted the shore. Not long after Mr. Drake, "»J '«"'

niamlaiit.

the governor, seeing only two boats remaining at the wharf, and several of his acquaintance preparing to escape in them, followed the disgraceful example. He was indeed only a civilian, and might have some shadow of excuse when he entirely forgot himself under the influence of momentary terror; but what can be said for Captain Minchin, the military commander, who, valuing his own precious person more than honour and duty, sailed off in the same boat with the governor? Can we wonder that for a time those thus foully and mercilessly abandoned could do nothing but vent execrations against the fugitives ?

The soldiers and militia within the fort now numbered only 190. On re- covering in some degree from their astonishment and indignation, they pro- ceeded to deliberate. Then- position, though fearful, was not yet altogether desperate, and it might therefore be possible by acting with piiidence and energy to keep the enemy at bay till the}' could provide themselves with some means of escape. Their first step was to appoint a new governor. Mr. Pearkes, as the i"'"-' g""'*"" eldest member of council present, was entitled to the office, but he waived his lef' t.. theii

flit.:

right, and Mr. Holwell was appointed. The task which thus devolved upon him was difficult in the extreme, and he appears to have performed it with judgment. On the return of two or tliree boats to the wharf he took the precaution of locking the western gate, in order to prevent any more desertions. At the same time he ordered the ship, which was originally stationed opposite to the northern redoubt, and still remained there, to come down immediately to the fort, and made preparations for continuing a vigorous defence till it should become possible to get on board of her. The ship immediately weighed anchor, and all were buoj^ed with the hope of a speedy rescue when she struck on a sandbank, and stuck so fast that the crew at once abandoned her. This was a fearful disappointment, but there was still another resource. The ves.sels were still at Govindpore, and it was not to be imagined that the highest civil and military authorities on board of them, after feeling themselves secure, would not recover from their unmanly panic, and leave no means untried to bring off their abandoned companions. Indeed no great effijrt was required, for the ship, once again before the fort, could ea^sily have repelled any attempt of the enemy to prevent the gan-ison from embarking. It was strange that the anticij)ated relief from Govindpore was not volunteei-ed ; and still stranger that it w;xs not in a manner extorted by all the signals of flags by day, and fires by night, which the garrison continuall}- threw out. With a cowardice and heartlessness almost unexampled, the ships at Goand- pore beheld the signals unmoved, and the ganison were abandoned to their fate.


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 51-- lll.STOUY !• INDIA. [Book III.

AD. 1756. The (Icay on which the shameful desertions from the ^jiniw»n took place the enemy warmly attacked the fort, but were so vigorously met that they desisted

Atioiiiptsto about noon, and contented themselves during the rest of the day and the suc- ceedmg niglit with setting fire to all the adjacent houses, except those which gave them a command of the ramparts. On the following morning their efforts became more determined than ever, while the mejms of resistiince were raj^idly becoming feebler and feebler.' While some of the defenders were resisting with the courage of despair, others were entreating or clamouring for a capitulatioiL To calm the latter class Mr. Holwell caused Omicl.und, who wa.s still a prisoner in the fort, to write a letter to Monichund, the g(A'ernor of Hooghly, who was commanding a considerable body of the besieging army, and threw it over the wall. This letter requested him to intercede with the nabob for a ces.sation of hostilities, as the garrison were ready to submit, and were onl}' resisting in order to preserve their lives and honour. The only an.-.wer the letter received was a determined attempt to escalade, . It was repulsed, but at a fearful los.s. In the course of a few hours. twenty- five of the garrison were kiUed or desperately wounded, and seventy more had received slighter hurts. The common soldiers, moreover, had intoxicated themselves by breaking into the arrack store, and were

Tiie foit no longc r under control. Mr. Holwell prepared anothei- letter of similar import,

captured. ., ,.

addressed to RoyduUub, and threw it over the north-east bastion, and at the same time hung out a flag of truce, in answer to one with which a man was advancing on the part of the enemy. A parley ensued, and was not finished when the fort was taken. The drunken soldiers, endeavouring to escape, had forced open the western gate. Part of the entmy when the}- saw it opening rushed in, while others gained admission by tscalading the wall where, by a most absurd arrangement, it formed the abutment of warehouses. Fm-thei resistance was impossible, and the garrison surrendering their arms were made prisoners. siirajah The capturc being thus effected on the 21. st of June, the nabob, at five in the

Dowlah in *• ®

the fort. afternoon, entered Fort William, and seating himself in state, surroimded by his general, Meer Jaffier, and his principal officers, received their congi-atulations on the great achievement which he had peiformed. Omichund and Ki.ssenda.ss, on being presented to liim, were received with ciAolity. Mr. Holwell was then sent for, and, after a severe reprimand for the presumption which had been manifested in even daring to defend the fort, was told to divulge the place where the wealth of the Company was concealed. The treasury had already been searched, and, to the nabob's infinite disappointment, only 50,000 rupees (£.5000) had been found in it. Could this be all which he was to receive, instead of the countless sums which had inflamed his imagination and provoked his rapacity ? In two other conferences which he had with ^Ir. Holwell before seven o'clock he returned to the same subject, and then dismissed him with. repeated assurances of personal safety. Mr. Holwell, from whose narrative the


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 5it

HISTOIiy OF INJ>1A.

[Book III.

AP

Horril)le KulferingB.

Heartless- iiess of the nabob.

place till they found themselves crammed within it and had th& door shut behind them. Their whole number wm 1 1-6.

It was about eight o'clock when they entered, and in a very few minutes the dreadful consequences began to appear. Attempts were first ma/le to force the door, but it opened inwards and could not bt- made to yield Mr. Hoi well, who had secured a place at one of the windows, seeing an old officer " who seemed to carry some compassion in his countenjince," offered him 1000 rupees to get them separated into two apartments. He went off, but soon returned saying it was impossible. The offer was increased to 2000 rupees, but the answer was the same. Tlie nabob, without whose orders it could not be done, was asleep, and no man diu-st awake him. Mernwhile suffocation was doing its woik. First, profuse perspiration, then ragii g thirst, and lastly, in not a few instances, raving madness followed, before death relieved the sufferer. The general cry was — Water ! water ! and several .'■kins of it were furnished by the natives outside, some apparently from compassion, but others from brutal merriment, holding up torches to the windows to enjoy the desperate struggles which l^ok place among the unhappy prisoners as each supply was handed in. From nine to eleven this dreadful scene continued. After this the number who had already fallen victims was so great that the sui-vivors began to breath more freely. At six in the morning an order arrived to open the prison. It was not easily executed, for so many dead bodies were lying behind the door that twenty minutes elapsed before it could be forced back so as to leave a passage. Of the 146 who had been thrust into the dungeon only twenty-three came out, and these more dead than alive. Strange to say, one of these was a woman, a native of India though of English parentage, and of such personal attractions that Meer Jaffier carried her off as a trophy to his harem.

Surajah Dowlah must have been well aware of the barbarity perpetrated, at least in his name, if not by his authority, and yet was so far fi'om showing any signs of humanity and contrition, that when Mr. Holwell, stiU unable to stand, was carried before him, he rudely interrogated him as to concealed treasures, threatened new injuries if he refused to disclose them, and ordered him to be kept a prisoner ; he was accordingly put in fetters, along with two others of the survivors who were supposed to know something of the imaginary treasures; the rest were set at liberty. Most of them, unwilling to remain within the nabob's reach, proceeded to Govindpore, bit found guards stationed to prevent any communication between the shore and the Company's vessels still lying there. Two or three, however, managed to get on board, and brought tidings which must have wrung the hearts of those who had been instrumental in bringing such a catastrophe on their comrades by a double cowardice — first, by deserting them, and then leaving them to perish unsuccovu-ed. "Never, perhaps," as Mr. Orme justly remarks,^ " was such an opportunitj" of performing

' History of MilUanj Transactions in Hindoostan, vol. ii. page 78.


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Chap. IX]

SURAJAH DOWLAH.

54-;5

a. heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single sloop, with fifteen brave ad ksc men on board, might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, liave come up, and, anchoring under the fort, have carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."

The plunder of Calcutta fell far short of the nabob's expectations. No treasures were foi-thcoming except those of Omichund, who, in consequence of the hard measure dealt out to him

by the presidency, had not been .— *^_-,.^

permitted to remove them, and is said to have been pillaged of £4,0 in money, besides many valual)les. Even the quantity and value of the Company's merchandise were less than might have been anticipated. The capture had been made at the wrong season. The investments provided had been shipped off before the previous April, when the mon- soon made navigation impossible; the imports of the past year had

been mostly disposed of, and no new monument to those wlio penshea in the Black Hole, Calcutta—

the WriUrj Buildings in the background. i—Danielli Oriental Scenerj

cargoes had yet anived from Eng- land. Owing to these causes the Companv's loss in goods was estimated at not tI'o nai.oi) s

° i ^ D ^ disapi«>iiit

more than £200,000. Even of this only a small portion escaped the hands of ment. the soldiers, or the embezzlement of the officials, who should have accounted for it to the treasury. The nabob therefore had made, on the whole, only a barren conquest, and consoled himself for the disappointment in the maunei- suitable to his character, by pompously changing the name of Calcutta to Alinagore, or the Port of God, in commemoration of his victor}^ and by mal- treating Mr. Hoi well and his two companions, who were sent as prisonei"s ti ' Moorehedabad, and subjected to nuich hardship and indignity. The nabolj, flattering himself that the British would never dare to show themselves again in Bengal, left Monichund in command of Calcutta, with a gamson of 3000 men, and proceeded homewards to cany out the expedition against Punieah, which "'* '*"!'"'' he had so suddenly abandoned. After crossing the Hooghly Avith his army he determined to make the Dutch and French factories feel the weigiit of his dis- pleasure. In passing southward he had imperiously ordered them to join his standard with all their forces. They declined; and he now sent a message threatening them with extirpation if they did not forthwith send him a large contribution by way of fine. Ultimately the Dutch compounded for £45,000,

ture

' This obelisk was erected by Governor Holwell,

in 1756. It is not undeserving of notice, that Mr.

Holwell himself survived the catastrophe more than

ferry years, and died in 1798, aged eighty-seven. The

Vol. I.

Writers' Buildings were so called from being the residence of the junior officers of the East India Com- pany. Immediately beyond this edifice is the old court-house ; the road leads on to the Lall Bazaar.

69


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 r)l llLSTOliY (>]• INIHA. (Ho(,K III

AD. 1750. and the French for £85, 000. Tlie difference in favour of tlie latter was prohahly

made in consideration of the present <A' gunpowder already mentioned- piiHiiiaiii- The vessels at Govindpore had not remained there with the intention of

inity of the

Bhipsat rendering any assistance to the Calcutta garrison. On the contrary, yielding only to their fears, they had continued to sfiil down the river, and would will- ingly have quitted it altogether, had they not encountered a new danger, which friglitened them so that they were glad to return to their former anchorage. When they were endeavouring to pass the fort of Tanna the cannon, with which it had again been mounted, opened upon them, and drove two of the smaller vessels ashore. This sufficed to spread a panic through the whole fleet. That the danger was magnified by excessive timidity was proved a few days after, when two ships from Bombay came up the river and sustained the fire of the fort without injury. Thvus reassured the fleet again weighed anchor, passed Tanna without any loss of the least consequence, and reached the town of Fulta, the station of all the Dutch shipping. Here it was determined to remain, at least till the monsoon should change, provided the nabob did not inteifere. Not long after their arrival they were joined by several other ships, and the agents from the subordinate factories of Dacca, Balasore, &c., who naturally anticipated a similar fate to that which had befallen Cossimbazar and Calcutta. In this opinion they were not mistaken, for the nabob had no sooner reached Moorshedabad than he issued orders for the confiscation of all the English pro- perty within his dominions. Sufferings of Thougli the uabob did not molest the fugitives at Fulta their sufierings were at Fuita° not over. Ever dreading that they might be attacked they did not venture to sleep on shore, and crowded the vessels, where they lay, most of them on the decks, without shelter, exposed to the inclemencies of one of the worst climates in the world, dm-ing its unhealthiest season. Numbers were in consequence carried off by malignant fever, which infected the whole fleet. The evils thus produced by natiu-al, were greatly aggravated by moral causes. Many, conscious of the light in which their conduct would generally be viewed, and unable to reflect on it without shame and remorse, endeavoiu-ed to excidpate themselves at the expense of their neighbours. Much time was thus spent to no purpose in mutual recrimination, and no course of united action was possible. At last, however, after a course of wrangling, the authority of the governor and the other members of council was acknowledged, and one of their number, with a military officer, set out for Madi'as, to represent theii' condition and solicit the necessary assistance.


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 Chap. X.] DELIBERATIONS AT MADRAS. -3+7

I

CHAPTER X.

Deliberations at Madras — Armament sails for Bengal — Recapture of Calcutta — Naval and military operations — Treaty of peace with the nabob — Capture of the French factory at Chandernagore — Recommencement of hostilities — Conspiracy to depose the nabob — The battle of Plassey.

"^ ' '' HE first intelligence of the danger impending over the Com- ..d. nse. pany's settlements in Bengal reached Madras on the loth of July. It was not sent off till after the capture of the factory at Cossimbazar, and consequently left room only for conjecture ^ as to what might have happened subsec^uently to that event. Judging by what had happened on other occasions, the Madras presidency did cjt«te of not view the matter in a very serious liglit. Native governors had repeatedly Madras. threatened as much, and even done more violence, and yet allowed themselves to be bought oft' at last by a sum of money before proceeding to extremities. . Why might not the same thing be repeated now ? These and similar consi- derations had the more weight at Madi'as, because that settlement had then full employment for the force at its command. An application had been made l)y Salabut Jmig for assistance to throw oft" his connection with the French, and it had been resolved to gi-ant it. A war with France was also regarded as inevi- table, and it was known that the French government in the prospect of it were preparing a ]iowerful armament for the East. In such an event Admiral Wat- son's squadron, then lying in the roads, would scarcely be able when united to maintain its ground, and therefore nothing but the direst necessity would justify the despatch of any portion of it to Bengal. The same argument applied to the land force. It was impossible, however, after the intelligence which had l)een received, to ignore it entirely, and a detachment of 230 men, mostly Europeans, was despatched for Bengal in the Company's ship Delaware, which had recently arrived from England. It sailed on the 20th of July, and arriving in the Hooghly on the 2d of August, found the fugitives pining away at Fulta. Sickly and dispirited as they were no co-operation was to be expected from them, and the detachment, far too feeble to venture unaided on offensive ope- rations, had no alternative but to encamp in the vicinity of Fulta, whose deadly sM-amps soon made fearful havoc among them.

On the 5th of Aug-ust the full extent of the Bengal cata.stro})iie became An exjwdi known at Madras. There was now no room for conjecture. The nabob had not gai re»->ive.i been bought off", as many had too readily and com})lacently assumed, but had, "'*"" under circumstances of ineffable barbarity, inflicted on the Company a heavier blow than had ever been sustained before. The most flourishing and productive


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 oH

lllS'JOIiV or INJMA.

[lUxiK lil.

Admiral Watson. — From print after T Hudiion.

Previous

A D. 1766. of all the presidencies wa,s, in fact, anniiiilated, an<l nothing but itH recovery could save the Company from ruin. It is lather strange that, with tliis fact before them, members of tiie Mudraa council were found to argue that the

claims of Salabut Jung sliouhl still have the preference, and that the chums of Bengal would be satisfied by sending a fifty-gun ship, and deputies to treat with the nabol*. Tliis view, absurd as it now appears, would iiave been adopted had not one of the mem- bers, possessed of sounder judgment and more enlarged experience, put the ) natter in its true light, and succeeded, after a long war of words, in bringing over the whole council to his opinion. The resolution ultimately adopted, and assented to by Admiral Watson, after obtaining the sanction of a council of war, was that the whole squadron, having on board an adequate land force, should proceed to Bengal.

Before the armament could sail several periDlexing points remained to be

([Uestions to i i o i

be solved, decided. Who should command the land forces ? What should be the extent of his authority both in acting and in negotiation? In what relation ought he to stand to the late governor and council of Calcutta? Was he to be subject to them, or to act independent of them? The last of these questions was first considered. The members of the late Calcutta council, not satisfied with wrangling at Fulta, had each sent separate lettei's to the Madras presidency, and deemed it necessary for their own exculpation to charge each other Mith the grossest misconduct. Taking the matter as they represented it, they had proved unworthy of the authority with which they had been invested, or were so divided by mutual animosities as to be incapable of exercising it. Still, what right had the Madras presidency to sit in judgment on them ( The three pre- sidencies were co-ordinate, and accoimtable only to the court of directors. So long, therefore, as the appointment of the Calcutta council remained uncancelled their jurisdiction within theiv presidenc}', notwithstanding the ^•iolence which had deprived them of it, was unquestionable. Mr. Pigott, the governor of Madras, proposed to solve the difficulty by proceeding in jjerson to Bengal with the united powers of commander-in-chief, and general representative of the Company in all other affairs. This was mere extravagance. How could his council invest him with such powers? and if he had them, what kind of a com- mander was he likely to prove, when his only qualification was the opinion he had of his own sufficiency? This proposal havinsr fivllen to the ground, a kind


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 Chap. X.] EXPEDITION FROM MADUAS TO BENGAL. 549

of middle course was adopted by acknowledging Mr. Drake and his council as a ad. nco.

presidency, with full powers in civil and commercial atlairs, and reserving to themselves, or the officer whom they might appoint, independent power in all things military.

The next point was the choice of the commander, to whom tliis independent choicoofa j)0wer was to be intrusted. There were only three pereons in the presidency on whom this choice could fall. Colonel Adlercron, as the first in rank, had the most legitimate claim, and was by no means disposed to forego it. To him, however, there were strong objections. He had never seen service in India, and as a king's officer, not dependent on the Company, showed little deference to their agents. It seems, however, from his letter, inserted by Sir John Malcohn in his Life of Clive (vol. i. p. 137, 138), that the presidency had at one time requested him "to imdertake this service with the whole of his majesty's troops," and pressed him "to give the necessary orders accordingly." A change of mind afterward took place, and they justified it mainly on the ground that "he could not engage to return hither upon our request, and that the Company shoiild not have any part of the plunder that may be taken, towards reim- bursement of the immense loss they have .sustained." Colonel Lawrence had all the Indian experience which Adlercron wanted, and had, as we have seen by his exploits in the Carnatic, proved both an able and a successful warrior. He deserved the utmost confidence, and had he obtained the appointment would undoubtedly have added to his laurels. It may have been fortunately ; but the unceremonious manner in which he appears to have been set aside, required a stronger justification than Orme adduces, wlien he says, "The climate of Bengal was so adverse to an asthmatic disorder with which Colonel Lawrence was afi'ected, that it was thought he would be disabled from that incessant activity recpiisite to the .success of this expedition, of which the tennination was limited to a time."

After Adlercron and Lawi'ence were rejected, Clive, now installed as governor ciive ap- of Fort St. David, was the only officer whose claims were worthy of a moment's consideration. He had early brought them imder the notice of the presidency, who had probably from the very first turned to him as the most eligible com- uiander. The following letter, written to the com-t of directors, October 11 th, 175G, after his appointment and arrival at Madras, gives so good an account of his feelings when preparing to set out on the expedition which was destined to crown his own fame and found the British Indian emph'e, that it deserves to be quoted entire : —

" Honourable Gentlemen, — From many hands you will hear of the captiu-e ush leciingK of Calcutta by the Moors, and the chain of misfortunes and losses which have happened to the Company in particidar, and to the nation in general ; every breast here seems filled with grief, horror and resentment ; indeed, it is too sad a tale to unfold, and 1 must beg leave to refer you to the general letters, con-


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 ■^■^^' HISTORY i)y IMJiA. [Book J II.

A D 17SC. ■sultation.s, and connnittees, which will give you a full account of this catnAtroj^he. Upon this melancholy occasion the governor and council thought projjer to

viow*. my service, which was at last accepted, and 1 am now upon the point of em- barking on board his majesty's squadron, with a fine body of Europeans, full of spirit and resentment for the insults and barbarities inflicted on so many Biitish subjects. I flatter myself that this expedition will not end witii the taking of Calcutta only, and that the Company's estate in those parts will be settled in a better and more lasting condition than ever. There Is less reason to ai)prehend a check from the nabob's forces than from the nature of the climate and country. The news of a war may likewise interfere with the success of this expedition ; however, should that happen, and ho.stilities be commenced in India, I hope we shall be able to dispossess the French of Chandemagore, and leave Calcutta in a state of defence. I have a true sense of my duty to my country and the Company ; and I beg leave to assure you that notiiing shall be wanting on my part to answer the ends of an undei'taking on which so very much depends. Success on this occasion will fill the measure of my joy, as it will fix me in the esteem of those to whom I have the honour to subscribe, with great respect. R. Clive."
 * in^"amr' ''*'"""^*-'" "^^ ^^ ^^"'"^ P^^^ce. As soon a.s an expedition was resolved upon, I offered

In another letter to a director he says — "A few weeks ago I was happily seated at St. David's, pleased with the thoughts of obtaining your confidence and esteem, by my application to the civil branch of the Company's affairs, and of improving and increasing the investment ; but the fatal blow given to the Company's estate at Bengal has superseded all other considerations, and I am now at this presidency upon the point of embarking on board his majesty's squadr-on, with a very considerable body of troops, to attempt the recovery of Calcutta, and to gain satisfaction from the nabob for the losses which the Com- pany have sustained in those parts. The recapture of Calcutta appears no ver}' difficult task, but om- further progress for reducing the nabob to such terms as the gentlemen of Calcutta may think satisfactory, is precarious and doubtful, from the prospect of a war which may not allow time for such an undertaking. You may be assured I will never turn my back to Bengal, if not oidered from thence, without trying my utmost efforts towai'ds obtaining the desired succes.s."

n.e squa Two months havins: been spent in debate, the expedition did not sail till

.iron and o I ir

land force, the 16th of Octobcr. The squadi-on consisted of the Kent, of sixty- four, bearing Admiral Watson's flag ; the Cumberland, of seventy, bearing Admii-al Pococke s flag; the Tiger, of sixty; the Salisbury, of fifty; the Bridgewater, of twenty guns, and a fire-ship ; together with three Company's ships, and two smaller vessels as transports. The land force, under Colonel Clive, consisted of 900 Europeans, 250 of them belonging to Adlercron's regiment, and 1500 sepoys. The instructions recommended the attack of Moorshedabad itself, if the nabob refused redress, and the capture of Chandemagore if war with France should


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 I

Chap. X.] ARRIVAL OF THE EXPEDITION IN THE HOOGHLY. 5^1

be declared Tlie lateness of the season nearly proved fatal to the fleet. The a.d. itsh. northern monsoon was setting in, and the currents from the nortli were so strong that during the first twelve days, instead of making progress, it was canied six degrees of latitude to the south of Madras. As the only ])racticable Tiie voyage passage it was necessary to cross the Bay of Bengal, and then ])roceeding north along the eastern coast, where the currents are less felt, recro.ss when opposite to Balasore, and thus gain the entrance to the Hooghly. The fire-ship, unable to stem the violence of the monsoon, bore away to Ceylon ; the Marl- borough, sailing heavily, fell behind; and the Cumberland and Salisbury, in making for Balasore Roads, struck on a sandliank, which stretches out several miles from Point Palmyras. Both got off, but the Cumberland, unable to continue her course, was driven south to Vizagapatam. Ultimately, on the 20th of December, more than two months after leaving Madras, and exactly half a year from the day when Calcutta was taken, Fulta was reached by the whole squadron, except the Cumberland and Marlborough. Their absence was a serious loss, as 250 of the European troops were on board the one, and most of the heavy artillery had been shipped in the other. Little addition to their strength was obtained at Fulta, for half of the detachment imder Major Kilpatrick were dead, and the remainder so sickly that not more than thirty were fit for duty. Some degree of order, however, had been restored by a despatch from the court of directors, appointing Mr. Drake and three other members of council a select committee for the conduct of all political and military affairs. M.ajor Kilpatrick, previously associated with them, and Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive now added, increased the whole number to seven.

Letters had been procured at Madras from Mr. Pigott, the governor, Mahomed oiwr.itions Ali, Nabob of Arcot, and Salabut Jung, Soubahdar of the Deccan, exhorting """"'""^ Surajah Dowlah to give recb*ess for the wrongs he had inflicted; and these, along with others, written by Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, were sent open to Monichund, governor of Calcutta. On receiving for his answer that he durst not forward to his master letters couched in such menacing terms, it was resolved to commence hostilities forthwith. Accordingly the whole fleet, includ- ing the vessels previously at Fulta, quitted it on the 27th December, and next day anchored ten miles below the fort of Budge Budge. This fort, situated on a commanding point on the same side of the river as Calcutta, and only twelve miles south-west from it by land, though double that distance by water, was the first object of attack. It was not expected to oflfer any resistance, and the only anxiety felt was to make prisoners of the garrison while they were making their escape. With this view an ambuscade was devised. At sunset Clive landed with 500 men of the battalion, and all the sepoys, and proceeded, under the direction of Indian guides, across a country full of swamps, and intersected by numerous deep rivulets. The mere march must have been full of hardship, but this was greatly increased by the neglect to provide any bullocks for draught


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 '>32 ULSKjUY Ol' INDIA. [liooK 111

A. It. i7Mi. or })unlen. Their place was necoasaiily sujijditMl by the men themselves, who had to drag along two field-pieces and a timlird of ammunition. They set out

lih.i.iierH j^i^ fi^m- ijj ^]jg afternoon, and did not reach the vicinity of Budge Budge till eight next moniing. The whole march by land looks like a Ijlunder; and, indeed, is so characterized by Clive himself, who says, in a private letter to Mr. Pigott, tliat it was much against his inclination, and that he applied to the admiral for boats to land them at the very place where they arrived, after suffering " liard- ships not to be described."^ This blunder, therefore, was not his; but there was another of a still more serious nature from which he cannot be so easily excul- pated. The place occupied on arriving was a large hollow, probably a lake in the rainy season, as it was ten feet below the level of the plain. It was a mile and a half north-east of the fort, a mile from the river, and half-a-mile east of a highroad leading to Calcutta. The eastern and part; of the southern banks of the hollow were skirted by a village, which seemed to have been recently aban- doned. The two field-pieces were placed on the north side of this ^■illage. The plan of the ambuscade was as follows : — The grenadiers and 300 sepoys were detached to take possession of a village on the bank of the river adjoining the wall of the fort. The company of volunteers were posted in a thicket on the west side of the road. Clive with the rest of the troops continued in the hol- 1 nv. It was expected that when the garrison in the fort discovered the troops in possession of the village adjoining the north wall, they would mistake them for the whole of the attacking force, and vmder that impression endeavoured to escape by making for the highroad. While they were hastening along it the volunteers, opening upon them from the thicket, would drive them towards the hollow, whei-e their slaughter or captiu-e would be easily effected.

Asui-prise. The idea of dano-er to themselves seems never to have entered the mind of

the commander or his soldiers. They were all worn out with fatigue, and to make their rest more easy were allowed to quit their arms. Even the ordinary precaution of .stationing sentinels was neglected, and in a few minutes they were all asleep. Not so the enemy. The previous day Monichund had anived from Calcutta with 1 500 horse and 2000 foot. He was now encamped with them within a distance of two miles, and having by means of .spies made himself acquainted with all Clive's arrangements, was only watching the oppoi-tunity to turn them against himself. The troops, huddled in the hollow or scattered in the village, had not lain down above an hour when a volley from the east side of the village suddenly broke their slumbers. The soldiers rushed in alarm to that part of the hollow where their arms were grounded. Had a retreat out of the reach of the enemy's fire been ordered a fatal panic would probably have ensued ; but Clive, whose presence of mind never forsook him, made his men stand firm, and detached two platoons which forced their way into the ^^llage at the point of the bayonet. This gave time to the artillerymen, who on the firet

' Malcolm's Memoirs of Lord Clive, vol. i. page 153.


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 (HAP. X • ADVA^X'E UPON CALCUTTA. 553

tilarm had rushed into tlie hollow, to regain their guns and open a fire, under a.d. ivse. which that of the enemy soon slackened. Fortunately for Clive, Monichund was a coward, and on receiving a hall through the turban was so frightened that he thought only of flight. According to Orme, " had the cavalry advanced and charged the troops in tlie hollow at the same time that the infantry began to fire upon the village, it is not improbable that the war would have been concluded on the very first trial of hostilities."' This is questioned by Sir John Malcolm, who says that, owing to the thick jungle, cavalry "had no means of advancing, except through openings where they must have been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated." Sir John, from his profession, must be ad- mitted to be the more competent authority of the two; but, in liis zeal to defend the honour of his hero, forgets the time and manner of the surprise. If, as he admits, there were openings through which cavalry might have penetrated, how could they have been seen in the dark, and by men who were fast asleep? A gross mistake was undoubtedly committed ; and though Clive did all that could be done to repair it, it cannot be denied that his .success on this occasion was due far less to conduct than to good fortune.

Immediately on Monichund's retreat the whole of the troops were marched BudgeBudge

taken.

to the village adjoining their fort, and there found the Kent, which had outsailed the other vessels, anchored in front of it. The assault was deferred till next day, and to assist in it 250 sailors were landed. One of these, who had got drunk, straggled up to the ditch, crossed it, scrambled over the rampart, and seeing no sentinels, hallooed to the advanced guard that he had taken the fort. It was indeed evacuated by the enemy, who had only waited till it was dark enough to conceal their retreat.

The impression produced by the affair at Budge Budge was somewhat Results of

the captun.

singular. The British, astonished at the resolution displayed in venturing to attack them, began to think that they had underrated the Bengal troops, and even Olive was dispirited. In the letter to Mr. Pigott, already referred to, he says, " You will find by the return that our loss in the skirmi.sh near Budge Budge was greater than could well be spared. If such .skirmishes were to be often repeated," he afterward adds, " I cannot take upon me to give my senti- ments about our future success against the nabob in the open field ; the little afi'air above mentioned was attended with every disadvantage on our side. . . . . Indeed, I fear we shall labour under many of these disadvantages when attacked by the nabob; and I take it for granted he will be down before the Cumberland and Marlborough can aiTive." On the other hand, Monichund, who had formed rather a contemptible opinion of the British, from the facility with which Calcutta had been taken, now magnified their prowess in order to palliate his own defeat; and no sooner reached Calcutta than lie quitted it, leaving only 500 men in the fort, and proceeded northward to com-

' Omie's Militarii Transactions, vol. ii. page 124. Vol. I. •. F b ^^


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 554

HISTOKY OF INDIA.

[Book III.

Calcutta recovered

A.D. 1756. niunicate his terror, first at Hoo^lily, and afterwards to the nabob hiiiLself at Moorshedabad.

To prevent the fleet from coming up the river, Monichund ha^l prepared a number of ships, laden with bricks, intending to sink tiiem in the narrowest part of the channel, near Tanna. The appearance of tlie sloop-of-war frustrated the execution of this scheme ; and the rest of the fleet, leavin;^ Budj^e Budrje on the 30th of December, anchored on New-year's Day opposite to Tanna, which was abandoned without firing a shot. Tlie next morning Clive, with the greater part of the troops, landed at Aligur, a fort opposite to Tanna, and advanced by the highroad on Calcutta. Admiral Watson, with the Kent and Thjer, an'ived before him opposite Fort William, and by the force of their can- nonade compelled the enemy, in little more than two hours, to evacuate both the fort and the town. A detachment sent ashore, under command of Captain Coote, immediately took possession. When Clive anived he naturally expected to be recognized as military governor of Calcutta, and was mortified above measure when Coote showed a commission from Admiral Watson, by which he was himself appointed governor, and specially instructed not to dehver up the place till further orders. This was another of the many instances of collision arising from jealousies and misunderstandings between his majesty's and the Company's ofiicers. At first, as neither party would give way, the aff'air assumed a very threatening appearance. Clive, admitted into the fort, insisted on retain- ing the command of it, wdiile the admiral threatened if he did not evacuate to fire upon him. Before such extremities were resorted to explanations took place, and a compromise was effected, by which Clive waived his claim to the command on the assurance that it would afterwards be given him. In accordance wnth this arrangement Admiral W^atson remained in possession, and the next day delivered up the fort to the Company's representatives in the king's name.

This last proceeding throws some light upon the quarrel, and shows that more was involved in it than at first sight appears. From the very first, before it was known what view the court of directors would take, Mr. Drake and his colleagues insisted that, notwithstanding the loss of Calcutta, tlieir authority remained entire, and hence Mr. Manningham, the member of council whom the}' had sent as their deputy to Madras, formally protested against the independent powers with which Clive was invested by this presidency. The case was still stronger now, for a new commission had arrived from England expressly em- powering Mr. Drake and three of the council to conduct all the political and military affairs of the presidency. It is not to be supposed that if the govern- ment of IMadras had been aware of this commission they would have made Clive independent of it, and therefore it was not unreasonable to expect that when he arrived and found them regularly installed in office, he would either resign his independent powers, or at least keep them in abeyance. Such was not his view, but it seems to have been Admii-al Watson's; and hence theii* quarrel.

Misunder- standinga


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 ( HAi'. X.| ATTACK UN HOOGIILY. 555

which had nothing personal in it, originated in a determination on the part of ad. 1757. the one to uphold the authority of the Calcutta coniniittee, and on the part of the other to give effect to the instructions which he had received at Madras. How bitterly Clive felt at the treatment he had received appears from several passages in a private letter to Mr. Pigott: — "Between friends," he says, "Iciivesin-

. II- f • mi Uignation.

cannot help regrettmg that I ever imdertook this expedition. The mortifications 1 have received from Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the squadron in point of prerogative, are such that nothing but the good of the service could induce me to submit to them." Speaking of the commission granted to Captain Coote, he characterizes it as a " dirty underhand contrivance, carried on in the most secret manner, under a pretence that I intended the same thing, which, I declare, never entered my thoughts." Again, referring to the true cause of all the mis- understandings and heartburnings, he observes, " The gentlemen here seem much dissatisfied at the authority I am vested with. It would be contradicting my own sentiments, if I was not to .acknowledge that 1 still possess the opinion that the gentlemen of Madras could not have taken a step more prudent, or more consistent with the Company's interests ; for, I am sorry to say, the loss of private property, and the means of recovering it, seem to be the only objects which take up the attention of the Bengal gentlemen." Farther on he gives utterance to the same opinion in still harsher and even rancorous terms — " I would have you guard against everything these gentlemen can say ; for, believe me, they are bad subjects and rotten at heart, and will stick at nothing to prejudice you and the gentlemen of the committee ; indeed, how should they do otherwise when they have not spared one another? I shall only add, their conduct at Calcutta finds no excuse, even among themselves ; and that the riches of Peru and Mexico should not induce me to dwell among them." Clive could not entertain an opinion without acting upon it ; and therefore, when the committee sent him a letter, demanding that he should place himself under them, he answered, "I do not intend to make use of ray power for acting separately from you, without you reduce me to the necessity of so doing ; but, as fai* as concerns the means of executing these powers, you will excuse me, gentlemen, if I refuse to give these up; I cannot do it without forfeiting the trust reposed in me by the select com- mittee of Fort St. George."

Intelligence havinor been received that the recapture of Calcutta had thrown Attack < m

14 1 1 •

the enemy into great consternation, and that the nabob's army would not be ready for some time to march from Moorshedabad, it was determined to take advantage of the interval by assuming the aggi-essive and attacking Hooghly. This place, situated on the right bank of the river, twenty-seven miles above Calcutta, was regarded as the royal port of Bengal, and had thus an adven- titious importance in addition to that which it derived from its wealth and population. As the object now was to bring the nabob to terms as speedily as possible, the capture of it was good strategy, as nothing seemed better calcu-


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 o.3(i UlSTOKY OF INDIA. [Book- III

A.D. 1757. lated to convince liim of the disasters which he mi^^ht bring upon hinis<:;lf hy continuing obstinate. The town, though open, was guarded by 3000 rnen, and, moreover, defended by a fort with a garrison of 2000 men. Considering the importance of the meaiLS of defence, the force employed in the attack seems very inadequate. It consisted of only a twenty-gun ship, a sloop of war, and three other vessels, having on board 1 50 Europeans and 200 sepoys, under tlie command of Major Kilpatrick and Captain Coote. It was expected to reach Hoogldy in one tide, but a delay of five days took place in coasequence of the ship having struck upon a sandbank. The intended sui-prise was thus a failure, and the enemy, forewarned, had ample time to prepare their means of resistance. Such, however, was their pusillanimity or dismay, that the 3000 men in the town only saw the British troops landed, and then made off without risking an encounter. The foii was battered by the vessels till night, and then attacked in two divisions ; one of them by feint on the main gate, while the other, con- sisting of a party of troops and sailors, under Captain Coote, stormed at the

c ipture of breach. The garrison, seeing their assailants on the ramparts, fled out precipi-

Hooglily. o o 111

tately at the lesser gate. These easy successes made the British over-confident, and Captain Coote, who had proceeded three miles to the north with only fifty Europeans and 100 sepoys, and destroyed several granaries of rice, narrowly escaped as he was returning, from being ovei^whelmed by the fugitive troops, who, unknown to him, were lying in the neighbourhood watching his move- ments. By singular good fortune and dexterity he disengaged himself without the loss of a single man. If, as Mr. Mill gratuitously asserts, without adducing any authority, the capture of Hooghly was undertaken '" solely with a 'iew tlunder,"^ the result must have been disappointment, as the value of all that was obtained was estimated only at £15,000. vvarbetweeii DuHng the cxpcditiou to Hooghly, intelligence arrived that the long tain and expccted War between Great Britain and France was actually declared. Tlie

Fr.ince. • -n l l i • rm -n

state 01 matters m Bengal thus assumed an ominous appearance. Tlie French had 300 Europeans and a train of artillery at C handernagore, and it was feared that they would at once join the nabob. In that case the British would in all ])robability be overmatched. The whole force then in Bengal would scarcely enable them to keep the field, and to all appearance the larger part of it was about to be withdi'awn, as the Madras presidency, alarmed for their own safety, had dii'ected Clive to return as early as possible with what troops could be spared. A vigorous and successful prosecution of the war against the nabob being, in consequence, deemed hopeless, the tone of the Bengal select committee was immediately lowered, and they resolved to lose no time in endeavouring to negotiate a peace. With this view they opened a communication with the banker, Juggut Seat, and condescended to request him to mediate in their behalf The nabob's fears had formerly inclined him to come to terms, but the

' Mill's Bi-itish India, vol. iii. page 175.


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 Chap. X.) ATTEMPTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NABOB. o.37

attack on Hooghly made him furious, and his army was immediately ordered ad its: to march southward and avenge it. Juggut Seat, aware that the time for nego- tiation had passed, and afraid to imphcate himself by interceding in behalf of -^"«n'i'< *" those whom the nabob had again doomed to destruction, ventured no further «ith the than to instruct Runjeet Roy, his ablest agent, to accomjjany the army, and at the same time correspond with Olive. Omichund was also in the nabob's train. During the nabobship of Ali Verdy Khan, he obtained the far largest share of [| the contracts by which the Company provided their shipments. This lucra- tive employment he had lost, because the Company, imputing a deterioration in the quality of the goods to his avarice, had determined, instead of em})loving contractors, to deal at first hand with the producers themselves. His ottence at this change was the main ground of the suspicion by which the presidency thought themselves ju.stified in imprisoning him, and ]>reventing the removal of his goods from Calcutta, when it was attacked. His fortunes had in conse- (luence been shattered, for besides the large sum of money found in his trea- smy, his loss by the destruction of houses and other property was immense. His whole thoughts and efforts were now employed in obtaining compensation. For this purpo.se the ftivour of the nabob and of the Company were equal 1}' necessary to him. The former he had secured by ingTatiating himself with Mohun Loll, the principal favourite at the court of Moorshedabad ; the latter he now hoped to recover by aiding their endeavours to procure a peace. The Company has thus two influential agents in the nabob's canq For the time, however, they seemed to have failed, and the nabob continued to advance.

In the eagerness to negotiate, the necessity of providing against the onl- Hetoini-.i

izes. ami

alternative had not been overlooked. About a mile to the north of Calcutta, continues and half that distance from the bank of the river, a camp had been fortified. The spot was well chosen, for having the river on the west, and a large lake and extensive marshes about two miles beyond the Mahratta Ditch on the east, an enemy from the north could not enter the Company's territory without coming in sight of it. The artillery, which had hitherto been the great want, iiad at length been supplied by the arrival of the Mdvlborough. On the 30th of January the nabob's anny began to cross the river, about ten miles above Hooghly. Yevy fortmiately it had not been joined by the French, who threv away an excellent opportunity of crip])ling, if not crushing their rivals, by reviving the chimerical idea of neutrality between the two companies, while war Avas raging between their respective nations. Even without the French as auxiliaries, the nabob seemed so formidable that even after his anny had began to cross, proposals of peace were forwarded to him. He received them with gi'eat apparent cordiality, and at the same time continued his march. On the 2d of February he propo.sed a conference with deputies, but failed to keep his promise of sending them passports. The very next morning the van of his arm}' was seen advancing at full march from the north-ea.st. From the nature


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 558 HISTOKY OF INl^IA. [Book III.

AD. 1767. of the ground tlieir progi-ess might eawily have been 8t<")pped; Vjut Clive, unwill- ing either to divide liis force or to conirnence hostilities while the lea«t lioj)e of accommodation remained, allowed them tf) pa«.s. Most of them sprea^l them- selves along the ground outside the ditch, but a predatory horde, anned only with clubs, entered the Company's teiritory, and were engaged in pillaging the houses of the natives in the north part of the town, when a detachment posted at Perring's Redoubt sallied out and expelled them. New bodies of the enemy continued to arrive, and coolly began to entrench themselves in a large garden midway between the head of the lake and the ditch, and about a mile and a half from the British camp. This in.sult was not to be borne, and yet the only punishment which it provoked was an ineffective cannonade. The uaiK.bs Next momiug the main body of the enemy appeared, following the direction to the of the van, but so eagerly was the hope of a possible accommodation still clung deputies, ^o, that ou tlic nabob again proposing a conference at a village six miles to the north, two deputies were sent. On arriving they found, as might have been anticipated, that the nabob had started some hours before. They followed on his track, and found him seated in quarters which he had taken up in Omichund's garden, in the north-east part of the Company's territory, within the ditch. It is difficult to account for the inertness manifested b}' Clive on this occa- sion. All the advantages derived from his fortified camp were apparently lost without any attempt to turn them to account, and at least part of the enemy had without molestation interposed between him and Calcutta. The deputies might now have considered their business at an end. Tlie nabob by hastening on with his army, without waiting for them, had given the most significant intimation of his designs. They were determined, however, not to be balked of an interview, and succeeded in obtaining it. P.oydullub, the dewan, on their introduction to him by Runjeet Roy, deemed their application for an interview, under the circumstances, so strange, that he suspected them of being assassins, and insisted on having their swords. They refused to be so insulted, and were conducted to the durbar or coimcil. Besides the nabolj and his principal officers, many others of inferior degree were present. These had apparently been selected for the largeness of their stature, and the ferocity ot their coimtenances. To give them a still more terrific appearance they were cb'essed in thick stuffed dresses, with enormous turbans, and kept scowHng at the deputies, as if they only waited the signal to miu"der them. After expostu- lating with the nabob for entering the Company's limits, while amusing them with offers of peace, the deputies produced a paper of proposals. The nabob, after reading them and refen-ing to the dewan, dismissed the assembly. The deputies, on leaving, were whispered by Omichund to take care of themselves. Alanned before, they now set no limits to their fears, and, ordering then- attendants to extinguish the lights, that the path they took might not be seen, hastened off without waiting to confer with the dewan.


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 I

Chap. X.] ATTACK ON THE NABOB'S CAMP. o5I»

The report of the deputies left no room for further negotiation, and Clive a.d. ns;. determined to attack the nabob's camp in the morning. His force consisted of 650 men, forming the European battaUon, 100 artillerymen with six tield- pieces, 800 sepoys, and GOO sailors, wlio had been landed at midnight, and Attack t.y

clive on the

armed with firelocks. Ihe enemy mustered about 40,000 men, most of them ..iiw/s encamped between the ditch and the lake, but a considerable part with the *^'""'* general, Meer Jaftier, within the ditch, to protect the nabob in his quarters in Oinichund's garden. The attack was made, but proved far less successful than had been anticipated. Clive, in a letter addressed to the secret committee at home, gives this summary account of the matter: — "About three o'clock in the morning, I marched out with nearly my whole force, leaving only a few Euro- peans, with 200 new raised bucksarees, to guard our camp. About six we entered the enemy's camp, in a thick fog, and crossed it in about two horn's, doing considerable execution. Had the fog cleared up, as it usuall}' does about eight o'clock, when we were entire masters of the camp without the ditch, the action must liave been decisive ; instead of which it thickened, and occasioned our mistaking the way." The loss on his part was severe, amounting to 120 Europeans, 100 sepoys, and two field-pieces; and his troo})s were not only dispirited, but blamed the attack as ill-concerted. Orme is decidedly of this opinion, and says that "the men ought to have assembled at Perring's Redoubt, which is not half a mile from Omichund's garden, to which they might have marched in a spacious road, capable of admitting twelve or fifteen men abreast." This seems plausible, but an obvious objection is, that, by that an-angement, facility of attack would have been purchased by leaving the nabob an easy outlet to join the main body of his army, and thus escape. By beginning with the main body, and proceeding gi-jidually towards the nabob's head-quarters, he took the best means to secui-e his person, and, to all appearance, would have succeeded but for a natural event of unusual occurrence, and therefore not anticipated. The moral effect, however, was as gi'eat as if the success had been complete. The nabob, having received a practical specimen of the kind of enemy he had to deal with, was much more disposed to be pacific.

The very next day after the attack he employed Runjeet Roy to write a The luib-.i..

.. ^ p 111 r • 1 ' iutiiiii(late<l,

letter contaming proposals oi peace, and under the pretext oi proving his concludes a sincerity, though probably more with a view to his own personal safety, retired '**"^^ with his whole army, and encamped about three miles north-east of the lake. Here, after various measages of negotiati(ni brought and cairied by Runjeet Roy and Omichmid, a treaty was concluded on the 9th of Febniary. Its lead- ing terms were — that the nabob should restore the Company's factories, but with only such of the plundered eflects as had been regularly brought to account in the books of his government — permit them to fortify Calcutta in any wa}' the}' should think expedient — exempt all merchandise with their dustuks from fee or custom — and confirm all the ])rivileges granted to them since their fii-st


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 "HAP. X.] ATTACK ON CHANDERNAGOKE. 561

t ) keep up a respectable force in tliis province for the future.' If so, it follows a.d. 1757. as an obvious inference that, in treating with such princes, obligations written or verbal are in themselves worthless, and that, to give them any value, they ought always to be accompanied with a material guarantee, which would operate as a penalty in the event of their being violated. It will be seen that Clive at a later period of his career both saw this necessity and acted upon it.

Next to peace with the nabob, the object nearest Clives heart was the rrei)ai-ation.. destruction of the French interest in Bengal. It seemed to follow from the terms ciianuer of the offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies, that the nabob could no longer continue to give any countenance to the French ; and therefore, on the very day when the alliance was ratified, Clive told Omichund to sound iiim on the subject, and endeavour to obtain his consent to an attack on Chander- nagore. He detested the very idea, and with good reason, for not only did the revenue gain considerably by the French trade, but good policy dictated that the rival companies might be employed as mutual checks on each other, and prevent the danger to which the native government might be exposed, if one of them were allowed to gain an entire ascendency. The nabob therefore made no secret of his unwillingness to withdraw his protection from the French ; but as he only temporized, and did not expressly prohibit the attack, Clive deter- mined to carry it into effect. With this view, on the 18th of February, he •Tossed the river with his troops, a few miles above Calcutta. The French had no difficulty in penetrating his design, and immediately claimed the nabob's protection. Their messengers found him on his return homewards at Auga- deep, about forty miles south of Moorshedabad ; and having succeeded in con- vincing him that their destruction would endanger his own safety, induced him to write a letter, peremptorily forbidding the attack. Not satisfied with thus interfering in their behalf, he made them a pre.sent of 100,000 rupees, gave orders to Nimcomar, now governor of Hooghlj', directly to assist them if his prohibition was disregarded, and even made preparations for sending back Meer Jaffier, with half his army, to encamp at Chandernagore. On seeing the nabob thus decided, Clive made a merit of necessity, and, in conjunction with Admiral Watson, gave both verbal and wi'itten assurances that the nabob's wishes in the matter would be strictly attended to, and that the attack would not be made without his sanction. As it thus appeared that the French were not to be crushed by violence, the next best thing was to secure their neutrality; and with this view, not only were negotiations resumed, but a treaty was ''

actually drawn up, and only waited to be signed when at the last moment a

I demur took place. The French commissioners, when the question was put to them, admitted that they were acting only in their own name, and could not bind the government of Pondicherry. Though it must be admitted that a treaty made under such circumstances would have been futile, the conduct of the British was not ingenuous. It is difficult to believe that they were not from Vol. I. 71


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 562 JIISTOKV OF IN1>L. (Rkjk III.

A.D. 17^7. the first aware of the defect of powers which they now pretended to have discovered, or that they had ever intended to do more than amase the French, r.itii., wiiile they were employing all kinds of influence U) overcome the nabob's negotiate leluctancc to the proposed attack. In this intrigue the principal parts were French. performed by Mr. Watis, who had become the Company's representative at Moor- shedabad, and Omichund, who, having succeeded in effacing the suspicions under which he suffered so severely at Calcutta, was now become one of the Company's most active and confidential agents. So zealous was Omichund, that when the nabob — suspecting an intention of attacking Chandemagore, notwithstanding his express prohibition — indignantly asked him to answer stric-tly whether tljey intended to maintain or to break the treaty, he answered, that the English were famous throughout the world for their good faith, insomuch, " that a man in England who on any occasion told a lie was utterly disgraced, and never after admitted to the socid:.y of his former friends and acquaintance." After this rather apocryphal declaration, he called in a Brahmin, and took what was re- garded as a most solemn oath, by putting his hand imder the Brahmin's foot, and swearing that the English would never break the treaty. Admiral Xhc prcssure brought to bear upon the nabob by intrigues with his ministers

letters to and favourites was much increased by an alarm which reached him from a different quarter. Ahmed Shah Abdalee, haA-ing again invaded Hindoostan. had entered Delhi, and was understood to contemplate an incursion into the eastern pro^dnces. The nabob was, in consequence, more anxious than ever to secure the British alliance, from which he anticipated important aid, in the event of an Afghan invasion, and became less and less decided in his refusals to sanction the attack of the French settlements. Taking advantage of this feeling, Admiral Watson thus addressed him : — " You are going to Patna. You ask our assistance. Can we, with the least degree of prudence, march with you and leave our enemies behind us? You will then be too far off to support us, and we shall be unable to defend ourselves. Think what can be done in this situation. I see but one way. Let us take Chandemagore and secm-e ourselves from any apprehensions from that quarter, and then we will assist you with every man in oui- power, and go with you even to Delhi, if you will. Have we not sworn reciprocally that the friends and enemies of the one should be regarded as such by the other? And will not God, the avenger of perjurj', pimish us if we do not fulfil our oaths? What can I say more? Let me request the favour of yom- speedy answer." The answer was not speedy; and proof having been obtained that the nabob was intriguing with the French, the admiral assumed a harsher tone, and sent a letter concluding with the following menace: — "I now acquaint you that the remainder of the troops, which should have been here long ago, and which I hear the colonel told you he expected, win be at Calcutta in a few days ; that in a few days more I shall despatch a vessel for more ships and more troops ; and that I will kindle such a flame in


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 ATTACK ON CHANDERNAGOEE. 5C3

your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish. ..i). itst. Farewell ! Remember that he who promises you this never yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever."

This was rather strange language to address to an ally, an independent prince, i'i'« " -^^'^

evoKivo

with whom a treaty offensive and defensive had been concluded only a few answer, weeks before. The nabob, however, was a cowai'd at heart; and, though foaming with rage, sent two letters in reply. In the one, quietly pocketing the menace, he contented himself with excusing the delay which had taken place in the payment of the compensation due under the treaty ; in the other, rather evading than facing the subject of Chandernagore, he used the following expression: — " You have understanding and generosity ; if your enemy with an upright heart claims your protection, you will give him his life ; but then you must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intentions ; if not, whatsoever you think right that do." This expression, which may be variously interpreted, becomes still more enigmatical in the work of Mr. Orme, who gives it thus: — "If an enemy comes to you and implores yom' mercy, with a clean heart, his life should be spared; but, if you mistrust his sincerity, act according to the time and occasion." At this time Clive considered himself and the admiral so completely bound not to attack Chandernagore "contrary to the expressed order of the nabob," that he says they could not do it without being 'guilty of a breach of faith ;" and yet, with no better authority than they managed to extract from the above dubious expression, they felt relieved of all their scruples. They might at least, in a case of so much dubiety, have asked the nabob to give his own explanation. They refrained, and it must have been purposely, for when they were proceeding with their preparations the explanation arrived unasked, and amounted to an expressed retractation of any assumed previous assent. So far, however, from giving effect to the prohibition, they treated it as "an indig- nity."' Perhaps the best explanation of the resolution to proceed at all hazards maybe found in the fact that three ships had just arrived from Bombay, having on board three companies of infantry, and one of artillery, and that the Cinn- berland, which parted from the squadi'on on the voyage from Aladras, had at length reached Balasore Roads.

The capture of Chandernagore was an enterprise not unattended with diffi- i^efences. f

^ ... Cliander-

cvdty. The settlement, situated on the right bank of the river, and a little south nagore. of the toA^Ti of Hooghly, extended two miles along the bank, and a mile and a lialf inland. The fort, standing about thirty yards from the water, and nearly equidistant from the south and north extremities of the settlement, formed a square of about 130 yards, inclosed by a wall and rampart, with a bastion at each angle mounting ten gims. Several more gvms were mounted on the ram- parts, and eight on a raveUn on the banks of the river opposite to the western gateway. Beside these cannon, which were all from twenty- four to thirty-

' Memoirs of Lord Clive, vol. i. p. ]91.


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 5G4

ULSTOHV OF INDIA.

[Book III.

A.I). irr.T.

Defences of

C'liaudei-

nagore.

Clive advances against it.

two pounders, six of leas calibre stood on the terrace of a church within th*- fort. and overlooking its wali.s. The French, on learning the declaration of war, ha/1. as we have seen, endeavoured to ward off the danger to which it exposed them, hy proposing a neutrality, hut, with much more wi.sdora and foresight than had been exhibited at Calcutta, continued in the meanwhile to make the best ase of the time in strengthening their defences. They demolished the buildings within 100 yards of the walls, using the materials to fonn a glaci.s, and began t^) dig a ditch. Neither of these works was completed, but their defects were in some measm-e supplied by batteries without the verge of the glacis, and in positions commanding the principal streets and approaches by land. The aj)proach by water had not been overlooked, for not only had a battery been erected about 150 yards south of the foi-t, to command the narrowe.st part of tlie channel, but a number of vessels had been sunk in it. The garri.son mustered GOO Europeans, of whom only a half were regular troops, and 300 sepoys. Some assistance was also expected from Nuncomar, who was encamped with a body of troops in the vicinity ; but Omichund had succeeded in bribing him not to interfere.

Clive, having been joined by the Bombay reinforcement, commenced ho.stilitie.- on the 14th of March. To avoid four batteries facing the south, he made his approach from the west, along a road leading to the north face of the fort. The French made the most of their position ; and, by means of detachments i)laced in the thickets, continued skirmishing till three in the afternoon, when they retired into a battery under the protection of the north bastion. This pro^^ng un- tenable, in consequence of a fire of musketry kept up from some adjoining houses, they sj^iked the cannon, and retired into the fort. The abandonment ol this battery necessaiily involved that of those to the southward, as they might now be attacked in rear. Their defenders were therefore recalled next morning. All the batteries without the works had thus been rendered useless except the one on the brink of the river. The 15th was employed in effecting a lodg- ment near the southern esplanade, by taking possession of the adjoining houses, under the shelter of which the besiegers suffered little from the fire of the garrison. The 1 6th was employed in bringing up the artillery and stores, and the 1 7th and 18th were chiefly occupied by the besiegers in keeping up a fire of musketr}' from the tops of houses, shelling the fort fi-om a thirteen-inch mortar and some coehorns. No decided progress, however, was made. On the 19th, the ships Kent, Tiger, and Salisbury arrived, after a very difficult navigation, and anchored about a mUe below the fort. The narrow channel in which the ships had been sunk was now the main obstacle, as the ships so long as they remained outside of it could not act with effect. Fortunately it was ascertained by dili- gent soundings, and the information of a deserter, that a practicable passage still remained. It was therefore determined that the effect of a bombardment, by the ships should be forthwith tried. Indeed, every delay was attended with the greatest danger ; for the nabob, on finding that remonstrances had jH-oved


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 CnAr. X.] CAPTURE OF CHANDERNAGORE. 565

unavailing, was no longer satisfied with sending tln-eatening messages, but had a.d 1757. ji ;tually sent forward part of his army, as if lie had at L'ust resolved to make common cause with the French. RoyduUub, the dewan, advanced with this (L;tachment within twenty miles of Hooghly, and would have been in time to jittempt the relief of Chandernagore had not Nuncomar treacherously assured him of the contrary.

Tiie attack was fixed for the 24!th. At sunrise on that day two batteries -^ttsok ai.j

capture of

which had been completed on shore opened their fire. The fort returned it cinindei- vigorously, and for a time established a decided su])eriority. At seven o'clock, when the ships were first brought into action, a marked change took place. The Tiger, in passing to the north-east bastion, which was her station, and where she finally anchored at the distance of only fifty yards, fired her first i)roadvside at the ravelin with such effect that that defence was immediately abandoned. The Kent was less fortunate. Her allotted station was the ravelin before the middle of the curtain ; but in proceeding to occupy she encountered such a deadly fire, that some degree of confusion ensued, during which the cable, instead of being stopped, was allowed to run to its end. The consequence was, tliat the ship fell back so far that she lay just beyond the south-east, and at the same time exposed to a flank of the south-west bastion. It was too late to make a change, and the Salisbury, to which this ver}' position had been assigned, was entirely thrown out of the action, the whole brunt of which was borne by the Tiger and the Kent. Notwithstanding these disadvantages the fire of the besiegers was so telling that at nine o'clock the fort hung out a flag of truce At three in the afternoon the capitulation was concluded. Though the defence ■was of short duration, its efficiency, while it lasted, is proved by the state in which it left the Kent. She had received six shot in her masts, and 142 in her liull : her casualties also were severe, amounting to nineteen killed and seventy- two wounded. Among the latter were the commander, Cai)tain Speke, and his son, who were both struck down by a single shot. The captain ultimately recovered, bixt his son died. Ives, who was surgeon of the Kent, profession- ally attended both of them, and gives such an interesting account of the heroism displayed by the son, a youth of onl}' sixteen years of age, that it would be unpardonable to omit it.'

When he was carried down into the after-hold his leg was hanging only by Heroism of the skin. Great as his suffering must have been, he was thinking (mly of his gpeke father, whose wound he feared had been mortal. On l)eing assured of the con- trary he became calm ; but when it was proposed to examine his own wound, he earnestly asked the surgeon if he had dressed his father, " for he could not think of being touched till his father had been taken care of" Being told that this was already done, " then," replied the generous youth, pointing to a fellow-sufferer "pray, sir, look to and dress this poor man, who is groaning so sadly beside

' Ives, .4 Voyage from England to India, p. 132-1.^4.