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History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1939–1954)

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1939–1954) discusses the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its actions during World War II to its official dissolution by the Egyptian government.

The Second World War
In the late 1930s, in keeping with the Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis on actions rather than words, some members pushed for the organisation to form a military wing to take up armed struggle against British imperial rule, and some were already disobeying the Brotherhood's leadership and taking part in isolated clashes with the police. The Brotherhood's General Guide, Hassan al-Banna, felt that the Society was not ready to engage in military campaigns, and that those who wished to do so "might take the wrong course and miss the target". He advocated a more cautious, longer-term plan of forming groups of particularly dedicated members, called "Battalions", who would receive rigorous spiritual and physical training; once their numbers were sufficient, Banna felt, the Battalions would be prepared to engage in warfare. This would not involve terrorist or revolutionary action, which Banna rejected completely, but rather (and only as a last resort, if all peaceful strategies failed) openly declared war on imperial occupation. However, the Battalion system failed to develop on the scale Banna hoped for, and pressure from members for armed struggle against the British continued to increase. In 1939, this internal conflict developed into a major crisis, during which some of the most active cadres left the Society to form a rival organisation called Muhammad's Youth.

The following year, as a result of this conflict, the Brotherhood created a military wing called the secret apparatus, which nevertheless remained mostly inactive during the war years. The future Egypt president Anwar Sadat was an active member of the secret organization as a "Free officer" in the early 1940s.

The Society's official position was that Egypt should refrain from participating in the Second World War. In 1940, in order to ensure Egypt's support of the war effort, which initially seemed to be going very badly for the Allies, Britain replaced the Egyptian government with one whose cooperation it could be sure of. Martial law was imposed, and in 1941 some public figures that Britain considered subversive were arrested. Hassan al-Banna was imprisoned twice (only to be released within weeks), the Brotherhood's journals were suppressed, its meetings were banned and any reference to it in newspapers was forbidden.

The Brotherhood's leadership was keen to avoid confrontations that could give the government a pretext to suppress the Society altogether. During the war, the Society alternated between avoiding sensitive issues in the interest of self-preservation, and taking risky political positions such as calling for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. During the periods when it kept a low profile, it concentrated on maintaining and expanding its membership base and extending its social welfare programmes, which included humanitarian assistance to the victims of Axis bombings of Egyptian cities. In 1943, the Society replaced its Battalion system with a form of internal organisation called "families", a hierarchy of close-knit groups of five members each; members of a family met regularly, usually in their own homes, and assumed responsibility for one another's welfare.

Shortages and bombings contributed to political unrest; after a mass demonstration of students in February 1942, the government resigned. British troops then surrounded the king's palace and forced him to accept a government headed by the Wafd party (thus durably damaging the Wafd's credibility in the eyes of Egyptians). The Wafd remained entirely loyal to the British throughout the war, as did the Sa'dist government that followed it in February 1945.

The first act of the Wafd government installed by the British in 1942 was to dissolve parliament and call for elections. When Banna declared his candidacy, prime minister Nahhas Pasha pressured him to withdraw it. He agreed, but in return he obtained the prime minister's promise that the Brotherhood could resume its normal activities, and that the government would take action to curtail prostitution and the sale of alcoholic drinks. Shortly afterward, the government did indeed make prostitution illegal, and restricted the sale of alcohol, particularly on religious holidays. The Brotherhood was allowed to resume some of its work, but for the next several years the government alternated between repression and friendliness towards the organisation.

During the 1940s, the Brotherhood's membership continued to grow; by 1948, it had two thousand branches, and is thought to have had over a million members.

Postwar Nationalism
The candidacies of Banna and several other Brothers were defeated in the rigged 1945 elections, even in their stronghold of Isma'iliyya. The Society's exclusion from parliamentary politics tended to strengthen the position of those members who advocated a more radical confrontation with the state, and to make them increasingly unwilling to submit to Banna's insistence on nonviolent action.

The presence of Allied troops had created many jobs and led to the establishment of trade unions; after the war, the departure of most of those troops left many unemployed. Inflation rose, the gap between rich and poor widened and wages decreased. During the war, propaganda had poured into Egypt from all sides of the conflict: British and American propaganda about democracy and national independence from Nazi and Soviet aggression, German propaganda about Egyptian and Arab liberation from Western imperialism, and Soviet propaganda about Soviet economic power and social justice. Britain's occupation of Egypt and the conflict in Palestine remained unresolved. Frustration with the political and economic order was endemic, communist ideas were widespread, and activist groups in general found it easy to attract new members.

In September 1945 the Society adopted a new constitution which formally recognised the structures put in place during the 1938 reorganisation. It also submitted its records to the ministry of social affairs as required by law, and was classified as a "political, social and religious institution"; this meant that the government assistance given to charities would only be available for some of its activities. The organisation's social welfare activities were therefore split off into a separate section with its own director and hierarchy, in order to better protect them from political interference.

During the post-war years the Brotherhood grew rapidly. It continued to expand its social welfare activities, setting up hospitals, clinics and pharmacies; schools offering technical and academic courses for boys, girls and adults; and small factories to help remedy post-war unemployment.

Egypt's ruling elites were vehemently opposed to communism, and in this, the Brotherhood agreed wholeheartedly with them; the government therefore made attempts to use the Brotherhood as an instrument against its communist opponents. However, conflict between the elites and the Brotherhood was inevitable, because like the communists, the Brothers were activists who appealed to widespread dissatisfaction with the existing social order, and aspired to bring about profound changes to remedy the injustices of Egyptian society.

The Brotherhood's publications expressed unrelenting hostility towards the government and its policies, and the Brothers were a major force in strikes and nationalist demonstrations. In October 1945, the Society organised a "people's congress" on national liberation in Cairo and seven other cities. The Brotherhood and the Wafd were now the two main opposition parties; now that the Wafd was no longer in power, it was just as eager to champion the nationalist cause, and was supported on this issue by the communists. The Brothers therefore found themselves in direct competition with the Wafd for leadership of the nationalist movement. Despite their deep mutual distrust, the two groups joined in the same mass demonstrations on occasion. However, the Brotherhood's refusal to cooperate with communists led to the breakdown of a united front, and to accusations that the Brothers were tools of the government and of the ruling class. The Society strongly rebutted these charges, and indeed organised strikes of its own; this deeply strained its already poor relations with the government, and the Brotherhood became the target of police harassment and arrests. The youth of the two groups repeatedly came to blows in 1946, and Banna was nearly killed by a bomb attack. After these clashes, representatives of the Brotherhood and the Wafd held secret meetings in order to reach an understanding; this considerably reduced the tensions between the two groups.

In the same year, prime minister Sidqi Pasha returned from negotiations in London with a draft treaty that the nationalist groups found absolutely unacceptable. Violent student riots broke out. Members of the Brotherhood's secret apparatus started to carry out attacks on Britons as well as on Egyptian police stations, and continued to do so over the next few years. The government responded to this escalating violence with harsh repressive measures, including a wave of arrests among the Brothers and other nationalist groups. Rioting continued throughout 1946, and in December the government resigned.

In July 1947, having accompanied the new prime minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, to the United Nations, a representative of the Brothers, Mustafa Mu'min, interrupted the UN Security Council discussions on Egypt to make a speech from the spectator's gallery, rejecting all negotiations with Britain and calling for a complete and immediate British withdrawal from Egypt. However, the Security Council took no action.

In Egypt and among Arabs and Muslims generally, the cause of Palestine continued to inspire strong sympathies; the 1947 UN resolution on the partition of Palestine gave the issue a greater urgency. The Brotherhood sent volunteers to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. During the war, there were numerous bomb attacks on Jews in Cairo; in the "jeep case" discussed below, it emerged that members of the Society's secret apparatus had been responsible for at least some of these.

In March 1948, members of the secret apparatus assassinated judge, Ahmed El-Khazindar Bey, President of the Court of Appeal, who had given a prison sentence to a Muslim Brother for attacking British soldiers. Banna expressed his revulsion at the assassination.

In December 1948, the Egyptian government released a decree ordering the dissolution of the Society. The police had discovered caches of bombs and other weapons accumulated by the secret apparatus, and though the Brothers insisted that these were for use in the Arab-Israeli war, the government suspected that the Brothers were planning revolution; it was also keen to remove what it saw as one of the main causes of the general political unrest that had become increasingly violent, and increasingly threatening to its authority, since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, because the Brotherhood had its own hospitals, factories and schools, as well as an army in the form of the secret apparatus, the government saw it as a potential parallel state, which Egyptians might come to see as more legitimate than the official one.

Aside from charges of involvement in violent attacks against police and foreigners, the government accused the Society of encouraging workers and farmers to go on strike to demand higher wages and ownership of farmland. Many members of the Brotherhood were arrested, and Banna was kept under close police surveillance. Weeks later, with the organisation's hierarchy and communications thoroughly disrupted, a Muslim brother assassinated prime minister Nuqrashi.

Banna condemned this assassination, and tried without success to negotiate with the new government. In January 1949 the police foiled an attempt by a member of the secret apparatus to bomb a courthouse. Banna wrote an open letter repudiating this act, stating that the perpetrators were "neither Brothers nor Muslims", and called on members of the Brotherhood to refrain from violence and intimidation. The new prime minister, 'Abd al-Hadi, attempted to suppress all dissent by terrorising the population with brutal repressive measures, including the systematic use of torture in the prisons.

Banna wrote a pamphlet in which he rejected all the charges against the Brotherhood and condemned once again the acts of violence committed by its members, including the attacks on Jews; he said the Society's leaders would never have condoned this violence, and had been unable to prevent it because arrests and surveillance had made it impossible for them to exercise their authority. Nevertheless, he argued that these events were, in part, a result of the government's behaviour and the war in Palestine. He denied that the Society had been planning revolution, insisting that its arms had been intended for use only in Palestine in its legitimate partnership with the Arab League. In February 1949, Banna was assassinated by the political police, probably on the orders of the prime minister and the palace.

In May 1949, after a wave of arrests, a group of Brothers made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate prime minister 'Abd al-Hadi, leading to still more arrests. By July, some 4,000 Brothers were in prison, where they continued to maintain their organisation (Mitchell 1969, 80). Several trials followed; in one of these, Nuqrashi's assassin was condemned and put to death. The prosecution attempted to show that Banna had been responsible for the assassination, while the defence argued that he had been unable to maintain control over "extremists" in the secret apparatus; the court seems to have considered the latter view to be more plausible.

In the only other trial to reach a conclusion (the "jeep case"), thirty-two Brothers were accused of conspiring to overthrow the government by means of terrorism, using illegal stockpiles of weapons, and of organising the murders of judge Khazindar and prime minister Nuqrashi. The prosecution attempted to show that revolution was the Society's real objective, concealed by the façade of its other activities.

The defence acknowledged that members of the secret apparatus had formed a terrorist organisation, but maintained that in doing so, they had disobeyed the Brotherhood's leaders and violated its principles. It argued that the Society's activities and objectives were mainly peaceful, and that its weapons and military training were intended only for the legitimate defence of Arabs and Muslims against the British occupation of Egypt and against Zionism in Palestine. The court ruled in favour of the defence. Most of the defendants were acquitted, and the others were given lenient sentences.

After the Wafd returned to power in 1950, the Brothers attempted to negotiate with the new government to have the Society legalised again, but could not reach an agreement. Martial law was ended, and all its provisions were abrogated except those that applied to the Brothers. Parliament passed a "Societies Law" that specifically targeted the Brotherhood without mentioning it by name, requiring a description and photograph of every member to be given to the authorities. The ministry of the interior announced that it intended to buy the Society's headquarters and use the building as a police station. The Brotherhood resolved all these issues by means of a successful court case, gaining the right to operate legally and the return of its confiscated property.

Revolution and its Aftermath
While the Brotherhood was outlawed, competition to replace Hassan al-Banna became intense. Finally, in 1951, in a move that contravened the Society's constitution, an outsider was chosen as Banna's successor: Hassan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, an experienced judge known for his strong aversion to violence, who, it was felt, would give the Society greater respectability. Though not a member, Hudaybi had long been an admirer of Banna. He resigned from the bench in order to become the Society's General Guide, but soon realised that he was meant to be a mere figurehead, and that longstanding members resented his attempts to exercise authority. He spoke out against the secret apparatus and attempted to dissolve it, but only succeeded in alienating its members, who considered themselves fighters in a noble cause.

On 8 October 1951, the Egyptian prime minister, Nahhas Pasha, unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This triggered mass demonstrations in support of Egyptian independence; with the help of the army, large numbers of nationalist activists, including many members of the Brotherhood, began preparing for armed conflict with the British in the Canal Zone. Hudaybi, maintaining his opposition to violent action, publicly repudiated these preparations, and appeared to support the palace's intentions to stifle the nationalist movement. This deepened the conflict between Hudaybi and his opponents in the organisation, especially those within the secret apparatus.

Over the next few months, anti-government riots broke out, expressing the nationalist movement's frustration with the government's failure to follow up the abrogation of the treaty with decisive action. On 25 January 1952, British forces attacked an Egyptian police station in the Canal Zone and a pitched battle ensued. The next day, in Cairo, students, police and officers marched together to the parliament to demand a declaration of war against Britain; meanwhile thousands of rioters set fire to the city, leaving much of central Cairo in ruins. The Brotherhood did not participate as an organisation, and Hudaybi issued a statement repudiating the riots, but individual members were involved. Several new governments followed in rapid succession. On 23 July the Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib, took power, overthrowing the monarchy; the coup was greeted with enthusiasm throughout Egypt.

The Brotherhood played a supporting but not crucial role in the revolution. Members of the Free Officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser (who was to become the leader of the new regime) and Anwar al-Sadat, had had close contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1940s, and some were members of the Society (Nasser himself may have been one of these). Members of the Brotherhood had fought alongside the officers in Palestine, and had been armed and trained by them for deployment in the Canal Zone in the year preceding the revolution. Despite Hudaybi's ambivalence, the Brotherhood had agreed to assist the revolution, mostly by maintaining order, protecting foreigners and minorities and encouraging popular support for the army coup.

After the revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the junta were initially cordial but quickly soured. Among the reasons for this were the army's unwillingness to share political power, the Brotherhood's insistence on the promulgation of an Islamic constitution, and Hudaybi's deep distrust of Nasser. In 1953, the government abolished all political parties and organisations except the Muslim Brotherhood. It then created a new party, the Liberation Rally, intended to win over those Egyptians who remained sceptical about the revolution, and suggested that the Brotherhood should merge with the Liberation Rally. Having alienated all other political groups, the regime could not yet afford to dispense with the Brotherhood's support, but was unwilling to give it a greater role in government.

Hudaybi was then subjected to fierce criticism from within the organisation, partly because of the government's efforts to discredit him; his critics felt he had transformed the Society into "a party of aristocrats" and "a movement of words, not action". This led to a debate about the authoritarian character of the Society's institutions. Some felt that a system based on obedience and loyalty to the leader had been acceptable under Banna because he had won the members' trust; since Hudaybi had been unable to do so, they began to press for more democratic structures. Despite these criticisms, Hudaybi mustered strong support from the Brotherhood's leaders as well as from the rank and file. The secret apparatus was formally dissolved and its leaders expelled.

In January 1954, the regime sent members of the Liberation Rally to disrupt a Muslim Brothers student gathering using loudspeakers; the confrontation turned into a battle. The government then decreed that the Muslim Brotherhood was to be dissolved, on the grounds that Hudaybi and his supporters had been planning to overthrow the government; he was arrested along with hundreds of others. The junta's use of repressive measures to safeguard its power, which was seen as Nasser's policy in particular, caused its popularity to plummet; this led to anti-Nasser demonstrations and a power struggle between him and General Naguib, and appeared to threaten to end the revolution and restore the old political order. Hudaybi sided with Nasser and with the revolution, earning the release of most of the imprisoned Brothers and the restoration of the Society's authorisation to operate legally. However, the events of January had rankled many members, who now felt that the secret apparatus should not have been abolished after all; it was therefore rebuilt under a new leadership without Hudaybi's knowledge.

The regime's failure to keep some of the promises it had made to the Society (e.g. concerning the release of prisoners) soon caused their relations to deteriorate again. In a leaked letter to the government, Hudaybi called for the lifting of martial law, a return to parliamentary democracy and an end to press censorship. Meanwhile, Britain and Egypt had resumed negotiations regarding the Suez Canal. An agreement on the terms of a new treaty was announced; Hudaybi immediately criticised it as too generous towards the British and a threat to Egyptian sovereignty. The government then began using police to provoke violent confrontations with the Brotherhood at peaceful gatherings in mosques and other places; a Brotherhood clinic was raided and destroyed. In each case the government blamed the Brothers for instigating the clashes. Hudaybi went into hiding, and the official press launched a vitriolic campaign to discredit him. The government declared that several Brothers who were travelling abroad were guilty of treason, and stripped them of their Egyptian citizenship.

Disagreements within the Society over Hudaybi's criticisms of the government then came to the fore, and Nasser personally made strenuous efforts to persuade the Brotherhood's leaders to have Hudaybi removed from his position. This conflict had the effect of discrediting not only Hudaybi but the rest of the leadership as well. The treaty with Britain was signed on 19 October 1954. Hudaybi and other Brotherhood leaders felt it was much better than the previously announced terms, but according to one version of events, the secret apparatus, now invisible and unaccountable to those not involved in it, saw the treaty it as a betrayal of Egypt and decided to act on its own. On 26 October, a member of the secret apparatus fired shots at Nasser while the latter was making a speech; unharmed, Nasser stood firm and finished his speech, declaring that he was ready to die for his country. There are, however, some indications that Nasser and his close associates may have staged the assassination attempt; what is certain is that they had been considering doing so.

The attempt on Nasser's life gave his popularity a much-needed boost, enabled him to prevail in his power struggle with Naguib, and provided him with the perfect opportunity to eliminate the Brotherhood. The organisation was officially dissolved, its headquarters burned, and thousands of its members arrested. The government organised spectacular trials with little regard for due process of law, while the official press accused Hudaybi and his organisation of every conceivable sort of conspiracy. Six Brothers were hanged, and seven, including Hudaybi, were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour.


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Mechado

Mechado is a braised beef dish originating from the Philippines inspired by culinary methods of Spain, of which it was a former colony. Soy sauce and calamansi fruits are key ingredients to the braising liquid.

Etymology
The name mechado is derived from the Spanish verb mechar, meaning "to stuff" or, in this case, "to lard", i. e., inserting strips of fatback into the pieces of beef. The term was adopted as mitsa in accordance with Filipino orthographic conventions, though the spelling mitsado for the dish is unorthodox and rarely seen.

Preparation
The traditional version of the dish uses the Spanish culinary practice of inserting strips of pork fatback into thick cuts of inexpensive beef (specifically the chuck) to provide both succulence and flavor. The larded beef is then marinated in soy sauce, calamansi, and black pepper. They are then quickly browned on all sides in hot oil and then braised in the marinade with the addition of beef broth, onions, and bay leaves until tender, the liquid reducing to a thick gravy. Fish sauce is often added during the braise as seasoning. The dish can be cooked in tomato sauce in a clay pot.

Over the years, the name of the dish has increasingly come to encompass variations that use thinner slices or even bony cuts of beef and that have dispensed with the larding process altogether. Newer variations of the dish resemble more like a beef stew. A popular incarnation of mechado features tomatoes predominantly in the braising liquid, as well as cuts of potatoes.

Beef tongue can be similarly treated with little or no variation to produce another dish called lengua mechada.

title: Mechado


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FC Torpedo Kutaisi

FC Torpedo Kutaisi (Georgian: საფეხბურთო კლუბი ტორპედო ქუთაისი) is a Georgian professional football club based in Kutaisi, Georgia's third largest city. The team competes in the Erovnuli Liga, the first tier of the national football league system.

Being the all-time second most successful Georgian club, Torpedo have been a regular member of the top division apart from three seasons in the late 2000s. They have won the national league four times, the Georgian Cup five times and the Super Cup three times.

Torpedo play their home games at Ramaz Shengelia Stadium, known until 2015 as Givi Kiladze stadium.

The Soviet period
FC Torpedo Kutaisi were founded in 1946 on the base of Kutaisi Automotive Plant. In 1949 the club became the winner of the Georgian SSR Championship. In 1959 Torpedo merged with FC Locomotive Kutaisi, although preserved their name.

Three years later Torpedo Kutaisi took part in the Soviet Top League for the first time. Many famous Georgian football players began their career in this club, among them Revaz Dzodzuashvili, Anzor Kavazashvili, Sergo Kutivadze, Givi Nodia, Manuchar Machaidze, Murtaz Khurtsilava. In addition, when Dinamo Tbilisi won UEFA Cup Winners' Cup in 1980–81, five footballers were the ex-players of FC Torpedo Kutaisi - Tamaz Kostava, Otar Gabelia, Nodar Khizanishvili, Tengiz Sulakvelidze and Ramaz Shengelia.

Torpedo spent one season in the Soviet Second league in 1988. The club also was represented for twenty years in the First league and for 14 more seasons between 1971 and 1990 in the Top league, the first tier of the Soviet football.

1990s and 2000s: Ups and downs
When the Georgian National Championship started in 1990, the club changed its name into FC Kutaisi, but after three years restored the old name. The last years of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st were the most successful years in the club's history. During 1999–2002 the club won five domestic titles. Many players from "FC Torpedo Kutaisi" were represented in the Georgia national football team, including Valeri Abramidze, Sevasti Todua, Malkhaz Asatiani, Levan Silagadze, Revaz Kemoklidze. Besides, several famous managers such as Jemal Kherkhadze, David Kipiani, Revaz Dzodzuashvili, Otar Gabelia, Vladimir Gutsaev worked at the club both as a head coach and in the staff.

After the 2004–05 season, the three-times league champions and two-times cup winners went bankrupt. They sustained a heavy 5–0 defeat in their last game in Borisov, Belarus against BATE Borisov in the first qualifying round of 2005–06 UEFA Cup. Shortly afterwards, new football club "FC Kutaisi Torpedo" was founded, but not being the successor of FC Torpedo Kutaisi, they inherited no titles. "FC Kutaisi Torpedo" was participating in the Georgian Premier League during two seasons, 2005–06 and 2006–07, but due to financial reasons they left the top league and began playing in Pirveli Liga.

2010–2016: Road back to the success
Torpedo returned to Umaglesi Liga three years later, after winning the second division in 2009/10.

In June 2010 the newly promoted club signed a sponsorship deal with Wissol Petroleum, which was later renewed. The business relations between the sides lasted until December 2013.

In the first season Torpedo reached the final of David Kipiani Cup where the winner was decided in penalty shoot-out. Gagra better converted from the spot and won the title for the first time in their history.

In the next two seasons Torpedo added two bronze medals to their tally, but a big moment came in 2016 when they won a first Cup title in 15 years. The team eliminated four rivals, including Dinamo Tbilisi in the semifinal, and prevailed over Merani Martvili in the final stage.

In 2016, FC Torpedo was sold by the local municipality at auction, won by businessman Zaal Chachava, who was declared president of the club.

Two months before the Cup victory Kakha Chkhetiani, the ex-Torpedo player for six seasons and later assistant manager for three years, had taken charge of the club. Taking into account plans for new investments, he pledged to carry on with successful run and make a championship challenge next year.

2017–2018: More titles
Torpedo won the league for the first time in 15 years in the most emotional circumstances. A title battle continued until the dying seconds of the final game in late November. With two matches to go, Dinamo seemed comfortably sitting on the top, four points clear of second-placed Torpedo. While the former was held to a goalless draw at Saburtalo, Kutaisi won their game, and the rivals had their last fixture in Tbilisi with the gap reduced now to two points. Torpedo were supposed to win in order to secure the title, while their opponents needed just a draw. The team had a 1–0 advantage when Dinamo were awarded a spot kick in the last minute of the game. However, with the penalty saved by goalkeeper Roin Kvaskhvadze, the dramatic win saw Torpedo crowned champions of Georgia.

Six days later Torpedo had a chance to achieve the double by winning the Cup for the second time in a row, although they lost on penalties to Chikhura.

The Super Cup was another title claimed by Torpedo in an opening match of the new 2018 season in February. Chikhura Sachkhere took the lead in 76th min, but Kutaisi equalized ten minutes later with Levan Kutalia scoring in the stoppage time. This was their first Super Cup victory in history.

Torpedo retained 18 players from the champion's squad for the 2018 season. While the club finished 3rd in the league, they once again encountered Liga 2 side Gagra in the Cup final held in Batumi. Torpedo were behind by two goals, but Milos Lacny scored twice and eventually the team won on penalties.

As champions, Torpedo played eight games in UEFA competitions this season. They knocked out two opponents and advanced to Europa League play-off, where Ludogorets Razgrad claimed the victory.

Summing up the season in December, the Georgian Football Federation named Roin Kvaskhvadze the best goalkeeper, whilst Mamuka Kobakhidze and Mate Tsintsadze won nominations respectively as best defender and midfielder. In addition to them, Oleksandr Azatskyi, another central defender, was included in Erovnuli Liga team of the season.

2019–2022: Decline
2019 began with yet another success. In the Super Cup Torpedo defeated Saburtalo and won the fifth title within 26 months.

In March Torpedo's unbeaten run consisting of 27 games came to an end. Much worse was to come, though. Financial difficulties hit hard the club again, which led to the exit of twelve players by July. The fans held several rallies, demanding the resignation of Zaal Chachava. In an interview captain Roin Kvaskhvadze described the general situation around the team as unbearable and appealed for help. No wonder a fixture on UEFA Europe league turned out unsuccessful.

In the league one win in 15 matches brought Torpedo close to the drop zone. Unless the problem was solved, the relegation seemed one possibility with dissolution or expulsion to a lower league being other ones. In late August Zaal Chachava announced his departure from Torpedo, although an overall condition was so complicated that in October the club played against Saburtalo with eleven U18 players, including 13-year-old goalkeeper Soso Kopaliani.

Largely at the expense of points picked up earlier this season, Torpedo stayed in the league, but Kakha Chkhetiani, who had spent 39 months at the helm, bade farewell to the club in December.

After a series of negotiations with investors interested in buying the club, an agreement was reached in February 2020. New owner Fabrizio Mannini announced that a new era was about to begin in Torpedo's history, although his tenure lasted one season only.

For two more consecutive years Torpedo had to face the drop. In 2021, a massive fan support helped the team dramatically overturn a two-goal deficit after a first-leg play-off defeat from Merani Martvili.

Back on the rise: since 2022
In September 2021, Torpedo were purchased at auction by New Vision University. With financial stability restored and head coach Kakha Chkhetiani back for a third spell now, the team gradually improved its performance and in 2022 ended a four-year trophy drought by clinching the national Cup for the fifth time. In May 2023, Steve Kean was appointed as a head coach who led the team to a third-place finish six months later. The next year Torpedo had another reason for celebrations as the club secured their third Super Cup victory in seven years.

Georgian competitions

 * Erovnuli Liga
 * Winners (4): 1999–00, 2000–01, 2001–02, 2017
 * Erovnuli Liga 2
 * Winners (1): 2009–10
 * Georgian Cup
 * Winners (5): 1998–99, 2000–01, 2016, 2018, 2022
 * Georgian Super Cup
 * Winners (3): 2018, 2019, 2024

Soviet competitions

 * Georgian SSR Championship
 * Winners (1): 1949 (defunct)
 * Soviet First League
 * Winners (2): 1960, 1961 (defunct)
 * Soviet Second League
 * Winners (1): 1988 (defunct)

Other competitions

 * Commonwealth of Independent States Cup First Division
 * Winners (1): 2001 (Shared record) (defunct)
 * Turkmenistan President's Cup
 * Winners (1): 2002 (defunct)

Overall record

 * Accurate as of 18 July 2024

Legend: GF = Goals For. GA = Goals Against. GD = Goal Difference.

Seasons
Key

 * P = Played
 * W = Games won
 * D = Games drawn
 * L = Games lost
 * F = Goals for
 * A = Goals against
 * Pts = Points
 * Pos = Final position

 * UML = Umaglesi Liga
 * ERL = Erovnuli Liga
 * PIL = Pirveli Liga
 * STL = Soviet Top League
 * SFL = Soviet First League
 * SSL = Soviet Second League
 * STL = Soviet Third League
 * GSSR Cup = Georgian Soviet Society Republic Cup
 * DSSC = Dinamo Soviet Society Championship
 * GW = Group White
 * Z = Zone
 * TUR = Union republics

 * R1 = First round
 * R2 = Second round
 * GS = Group stage
 * PR = Preliminary Round
 * QR = Qualifying Round
 * 1Q = First Qualifying Round
 * 2Q = Second Qualifying Round

All seasons statistic

 * Accurate as of 28 June 2024

Legend: GF = Goals For. GA = Goals Against. GD = Goal Difference.

Managers

 * Revaz Dzodzuashvili (1978), (1988–89)
 * David Kipiani (1 July 1999 – Sept 17, 2001)
 * Revaz Dzodzuashvili (1 June 2001 – 1 Jan 2002)
 * Otar Gabelia (2004–05)
 * Revaz Dzodzuashvili (1 June 2005 – 1 June 2007)
 * Giorgi Kiknadze (1 Feb 2007 – 1 March 2007)
 * Nestor Mumladze (1 July 2010 – Sept 24, 2010)
 * Gia Gigatadze (3 Nov 2010 – 30 June 2011)
 * Giorgi Kiknadze (1 July 2011 – Sept 2011)
 * Zaza Zamtaradze (1 July 2011 – Sept 25, 2011)
 * Gia Geguchadze (1 Oct 2011 – 31 May 2013)
 * 🇪🇸 Gerard Zaragoza (31 May 2013 – 31 Dec 2013)
 * Revaz Dzodzuashvili (10 Jan 2014 – 7 Dec 2015)
 * Giorgi Daraselia (15 Dec 2014 – 5 Oct 2016)
 * Kakhaber Chkhetiani (Oct, 2016 – Dec, 2019)
 * Mikheil Ashvetia (7 Feb 2020 – 22 April 2021)
 * Shota Babunashvili (23 April - 20 June 2021)
 * Kakhaber Chkhetiani (21 Jun - 1 Nov 2021)
 * Giorgi Tsetsadze (18 Nov 2021 - 2 May 2022)
 * Kakhaber Chkhetiani (25 May 2022 - 8 May 2023)
 * 🏴 Steve Kean (19 May 2023)

Rivalry
In the Soviet times Torpedo Kutaisi was the second strongest Georgian club with most talented players regularly taken away by Dinamo Tbilisi. After the independence Torpedo became the first to break the ten-year hegemony of Dinamo in Umaglesi Liga. For four successive years between 1999 and 2002 they won five titles in the league and in the Cup combined. By this period the relationship between the best clubs of Eastern and Western Georgia had become tense. Fierce rivalry on the pitch was aggravated on the stands where skirmishes were not unusual. They resumed after Torpedo's reemergence among the leaders following roughly a decade-long absence.

In 2014 the match in Kutaisi was abandoned as a result of clashes between the fans. Some property was also damaged and the police reported ten detentions. The next year some disturbances erupted during the away game in Tbilisi.

Fans angrily react in cases when a player leaves one club for the other. In 2018–20 Levan Kutalia, Giorgi Kukhianidze, Roin Kvaskhvadze, Giorgi Kimadze, Tornike Kapanadze, Nodar Kavtaradze, Omar Migineishvili as well as managers Kakha Chkhetiani and Shalva Gongadze all moved to Dinamo. So did Budu Zivzivadze some time earlier, although he made a way back afterwards.

At any rate, most of the fans realize that Dinamo and Torpedo desperately need each other as strong rivals and healthy competition between them would only contribute to a better quality of the Erovnuli Liga.

title: FC Torpedo Kutaisi


text:
Gtkmm

gtkmm (formerly known as gtk-- or gtk minus minus ) is the official C++ interface for the popular GUI library GTK. gtkmm is free software distributed under the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL).

gtkmm allows the creation of user interfaces either in code or with the Glade Interface Designer, using the Gtk::Builder class. Other features include typesafe callbacks, a comprehensive set of graphical control elements, and the extensibility of widgets via inheritance.

Features
Because gtkmm is the official C++ interface of the GUI library GTK, C++ programmers can use the common OOP techniques such as inheritance, and C++-specific facilities such as STL (In fact, many of the gtkmm interfaces, especially those for widget containers, are designed to be similar to the Standard Template Library (STL)).

Main features of gtkmm are listed as follows:
 * Use inheritance to derive custom widgets.
 * Type-safe signal handlers, in standard C++.
 * Polymorphism.
 * Use of Standard C++ Library, including strings, containers, and iterators.
 * Full internationalization with UTF-8.
 * Complete C++ memory management.
 * Object composition.
 * Automatic de-allocation of dynamically allocated widgets.
 * Full use of C++ namespaces.
 * No macros.
 * Cross-platform: Linux (gcc, LLVM), FreeBSD (gcc, LLVM), NetBSD (gcc), Solaris (gcc, Forte), Win32 (gcc, MSVC++), macOS (gcc), others.

Hello World in gtkmm
The above program will create a window with a button labeled "Hello World". The button sends "Hello world" to standard output when clicked.

The program is run using the following commands:

This is usually done using a simple makefile.

Applications
Some notable applications that use gtkmm include:
 * Amsynth
 * Cadabra (computer program)
 * Inkscape Vector graphics drawing.
 * Horizon EDA an Electronic Design Automation package for printed circuit board design.
 * PDF Slicer A simple application to extract, merge, rotate and reorder pages of PDF documents.
 * Workrave Assists in recovery and prevention of RSI.
 * Gnome System Monitor
 * Gigedit
 * GParted disk partitioning tool.
 * Nemiver GUI for the GNU debugger gdb.
 * PulseAudio tools: pavucontrol, paman, paprefs pavumeter,
 * RawTherapee
 * GNOME Referencer document organiser and bibliography manager
 * Seq24
 * Synfig Studio
 * Linthesia
 * MySQL Workbench Administrator Database GUI.
 * Ardour Open Source digital audio workstation (DAW) for Linux and MacOS.
 * Gnote desktop notetaking application.
 * VisualBoyAdvance
 * VMware Workstation and VMware Player both use gtkmm for their Linux ports.

title: Gtkmm


text:
Kazakh

Kazakh, Qazaq or Kazakhstani may refer to someone or something related to Kazakhstan:

 * Kazakhs, an ethnic group
 * Kazakh language
 * Kazakh alphabets, Alphabets used to write the Kazakh language
 * Kazakh Braille, Braille alphabet of the Kazakh language
 * Kazakh Short U, Cyrillic letter used for Kazakh
 * Kazakh clothing, Clothing worn by the Kazakh people

Culture

 * Kazakh art
 * Kazakh cuisine
 * Kazakh literature
 * Kazakh wine, Wine making in Kazakhstan
 * Kazakh Khanate – Golden Throne, 2019 film

Places

 * Kazakh forest steppe
 * Qazakh Rayon, Azerbaijan
 * Qazax, Azerbaijan
 * Kazakh Uyezd, administrative district of Elisabethpol Governorate during Russian rule in Azerbaijan
 * Khazak, Iran, a village in Fars Province, Iran

Other uses

 * Kazakh Khanate, 1465–1847 Turkic state in Central Asia
 * Kazakh sultanate, Former state in the Caucasus
 * Kazakh horse, Horse breed developed by the Kazakh peoples of Asia
 * Kazakh famine of 1930–1933, 1931–1933 Holodomor that affected Soviet Kazakhstan
 * Kazakh Air Defense Forces, Aviation forces of Kazakhstan

title: Kazakh


text:
History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1928–1938)

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1928–1938) discusses the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from the Brotherhood's inception to its development into a viable political force.

Early development
In 1928, six Egyptian workers employed by British military camps in Isma'iliyya, in the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, visited Hassan al-Banna, a young schoolteacher whom they had heard preach in mosques and coffee-houses on the need for an Islamic renewal. "Arabs and Muslims have no status and no dignity," they said. "They are no more than mere hirelings belonging to the foreigners.... We are unable to perceive the road to action as you perceive it...." They therefore asked him to become their leader; he accepted, founding the Society of the Muslim Brothers.

Banna and his followers began by starting an evening school. In its first few years, the Society was focused on Islamic education, with an emphasis on teaching students how to implement an ethos of solidarity and altruism in their daily lives, rather than on theoretical issues. The General Inspector of Education was greatly impressed, particularly by the eloquent speeches of the working-class members of the Brotherhood. Banna's deputy was a carpenter, and the appointment of people from the lower classes to leading positions became a hallmark of the Brotherhood.

The Society's first major project was the construction of a mosque, completed in 1931, for which it managed to raise a large amount of money while carefully maintaining its independence from potentially self-interested donors. In the same year, the Society began to receive favourable attention in the press, and a Cairo branch was founded.

In 1932, Banna was transferred to Cairo at his request, and the organisation's headquarters were moved there. In addition to handling the administration of the Society, Banna gave evening lectures on the Qur'an for "the poor of the district around the headquarters who were 'without learning and without the will for it'".

Over the next decade, the Society grew very rapidly. From three branches in 1931, it grew to have 300 across Egypt in 1938; thanks to an unorthodox ideology with mass appeal, and to effective strategies for attracting new members, it had become a major political opposition group with a highly diverse membership.

Ideological innovations
The Brotherhood initially resembled an ordinary Islamic welfare society. In the early 1930s, its welfare activities included small-scale social work among the poor, building and repairing mosques and establishing a number of Qur'an schools (whose role in teaching children to read and write was important in a country where 80% of the population was illiterate), setting up small workshops and factories, and organising the collection and distribution of zakat (the Islamic alms tax). As the Society grew, it increasingly founded benevolent institutions such as pharmacies, hospitals and clinics for the general public, and launched a program to teach adults to read and write by offering courses in coffee-shops and clubs.

However, Banna's vision of a new sort of organisation, capable of renewing broken links between tradition and modernity, enabled the Brotherhood to gain a degree of popularity and influence that no welfare society enjoyed. He observed that, in the midst of a flourishing Egyptian civil society and a cultural environment marked by innovations in literature, science and education, religious education had been left behind: the ideas of Islamic religious reformers were not made accessible to the general public, and there was no serious effort to make the history and teachings of Islam comprehensible to the young. He was determined to fill this gap by training a cadre of young, highly motivated preachers equipped with modern teaching methods, independent from the government and the religious establishment, and supported by an effective use of the new mass media.

The Brotherhood's second General Conference, in 1933, authorised the creation of a publishing company and the purchase of a printing press, which was used to print several newspapers during the next decade. Funds were raised by creating a joint stock company in which only members were allowed to buy shares. This approach, which protected the Society's independence from government and from the wealthy by ensuring that its institutions were owned by its members, became its standard means of financing new projects.

During the 1930s, Banna formulated, and the Society began to put into practice, an Islamic ideology that was unusual in several respects. It was, first of all, an ideology of disenfranchised classes. In a country where most political movements, including liberal and modernist ones, were products of the landed aristocracy and the urban elite, the Brotherhood became the voice of the educated middle and lower middle classes (and to a lesser extent of workers and peasants) and the means by which they demanded political participation. Throughout the decade, the Society placed increasing emphasis on social justice; closing the gap between the classes (and thus restoring the egalitarianism of the early Muslims) became one of its main objectives, and Banna voiced ever stronger criticisms of the upper class and the class system as a whole:

Islam is equal for all people and prefers nobody to others on the grounds of differences in blood or race, forefathers or descent, poverty or wealth. According to Islam everyone is equal... However, in deeds and natural gifts, then the answer is yes. The learned is above the ignorant... Thus, we see that Islam does not approve of the class system.

As this ideology took shape over the next two decades, in the absence of a strong socialist party, the Brotherhood called for nationalisation of industries, substantial state intervention in the economy, a greatly reduced maximum wage for senior civil servants, laws to protect workers against exploitation, an Islamic banking system to provide interest-free loans, and generous social welfare programmes, including unemployment benefits, public housing and ambitious health and literacy programmes, funded by higher taxes on the wealthy. By 1948 the Brotherhood was advocating land reform to enable small farmers to own land.

Secondly, Banna's ideology was an attempt to bringing about social renewal through a modern interpretation of Islam. In his view, Egypt was torn between two failed value systems: on the one hand, a doctrinaire religious traditionalism (represented by Al-Azhar University), which Banna saw as anachronistic and irrelevant to the urgent problems faced by ordinary people, and on the other hand, an abandonment of all moral values and an economic free-for-all that impoverished the masses and enabled foreign interests to take control of the economy. He argued that Islam should not be confined to the narrow domain of private life, but should rather be applied to the problems of the modern world, and used as the moral foundation of a national renaissance, a thoroughgoing reform of political, economic and social systems.

The Brotherhood has sometimes been incorrectly described as advocating a blanket rejection of everything Western; in reality, Banna did not hesitate to draw on Western as well as Islamic thought in the pursuit of this modern approach to Islam, using quotations from authors such as René Descartes, Isaac Newton and Herbert Spencer to support his own arguments. He proposed to send Brotherhood journalists to study journalism at the American University in Cairo, and suggested that another group of Brothers attend the School of Social Service, another Western school: "its scientific and practical programme will greatly facilitate the training [of the Brothers] in social welfare works". He was in favour of the teaching of foreign languages in schools: "We need to drink from the springs of foreign culture to extract what is indispensable for our renaissance." His formulation of the concept of nationalism, which was fundamental to the Brotherhood's appeal to young people, combined modern European political concepts with Islamic ones. At the same time, Banna and the Brotherhood decried what they saw as their compatriots' slavish adoration of everything Western and their loss of respect for their own culture and history.

Banna's concept of nationalism was emphatically Islamic, and its long-term goal was to see all humanity united by the Muslim faith. However, the Society had no clear definition of the sort of political system it wished for. The idea of reviving the Islamic caliphate (which had been abolished by Kemal Atatürk in 1924) was sometimes mentioned in the Brotherhood's publications, but Banna was not in favour of it. The chief practical consequence of the Brotherhood's Islamic nationalism was an energetic campaign against colonialism in Egypt and other Islamic countries; this was one of the main reasons for the Society's popularity.

The term jihad was a key concept in the Brotherhood's vocabulary: it referred not only to armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation, but also to the inner effort that Muslims needed to make in order to free themselves from an ingrained inferiority complex and from fatalism and passivity towards their condition. It encompassed the courage to dissent expressed in the maxim "The greatest jihad is to utter a word of truth in the presence of a tyrannical ruler" (a hadith reported by Abu Sa'id al-Khudri) as well as any productive activity that Muslims undertook, on their own initiative, to improve the well-being of the Islamic community.

In keeping with his call for unity among Muslims, Banna advocated tolerance and goodwill between different forms of Islam. Although the Brotherhood rejected the corruption of some Sufi orders and their excessive glorification of their leaders, a kind of reformed Sufi practice was an important part of the Society's structure. The Society thus tried to bridge the gap between the Salafiyya movement and Sufism, and in the 1940s it tried to promote a rapprochement between Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam. More generally, the Society insisted that its members must not try to impose their vision of Islam on others. Its General Law of 1934 stated that their actions must always reflect "friendliness and gentleness" and that they were to avoid "bluntness, crudeness and abuses in words or hints". Members who violated these principles (e.g. by pressuring unveiled women to veil themselves) were expelled.

The Brotherhood's openness to a diversity of Islamic belief and practice represented part of its appeal to young people. Banna deplored the rigid preoccupation of some Salafiyya societies with minor points of religious doctrine; he felt that Sufism and other traditional practices should be welcomed, and that the Brotherhood should focus on basic social and political issues rather than on theological hair-splitting.

A political organisation
In the early 1930s the Brotherhood started its Rover Scouts programme (jawwala), in which groups of young men were trained in athletics and an ascetic way of life, carried out charitable work, and toured branches of the Brotherhood to strengthen ties between them. The Rover Scouts, whose uniforms, banners and hymns attracted a great deal of attention, became an important means of recruiting new members, and Banna saw them as a way of introducing young men gradually to religion.

In 1931–32, the Brotherhood underwent an internal crisis; several members challenged Banna's control over the Society's treasury, his general stubbornness, and his insistence on having someone of low social status, a carpenter, as his deputy. Banna's candidate for deputy was overwhelmingly supported by a vote in the Society's General Assembly, and his offer to pay the Society's considerable outstanding debts further strengthened his position, but the conflict persisted until he threatened to expel his opponents from the Brotherhood, at which point they resigned. While some of their complaints about him were certainly justified, the conflict also reflected a more basic disagreement with his conception of the Brotherhood's mission. The secessionists felt that the Society should simply be a traditional Islamic welfare society that local notables could support, and should therefore have open accounts and socially respectable leaders.

In the aftermath of this conflict, Banna sought to clarify the basis of leadership in the Society, asserting that moral qualities and personal sacrifice were more important than titles, social standing and formal qualifications. In drafting the Society's General Law in 1934, he increased his own authority over the Brotherhood, insisting that authority within the organisation could only be based on complete confidence in the leadership, rejecting calls for increased consultation (shura) and expressing a deep scepticism towards elections, which he felt had shown their failings during the 1931-32 crisis. He also instituted mediation committees to help defuse conflicts as they arose.

Banna then began to place more emphasis on the Society's political responsibilities concerning a variety of issues such as prostitution, alcohol, gambling, inadequate religious education in schools, the influence of Christian missionaries and, most importantly, the struggle against imperialism. In response to critics who accused the Brotherhood of being a political group, Banna replied that involvement in politics was part of Islam: "Islam does have a policy embracing the happiness of this world." While other Islamic organisations remained studiously apolitical during the great upheavals that characterised the 20s and 30s in Egypt, the Brotherhood attracted large numbers of young, educated Egyptians, particularly students, by encouraging and supporting them in campaigning for political causes.

The Brotherhood's first foray into active involvement in politics concerned the conflicts in Palestine between Zionism, Palestinian Arab nationalism and British rule. Like many other Egyptian associations, the Society raised money to support Palestinian Arab workers on strike during the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine, and organised demonstrations and speeches in their favour. The Society also called for a boycott of Jewish shops in Cairo, on the grounds that Egyptian Jews were financing Zionist groups in Palestine. Articles hostile towards Jews (and not merely towards Zionism) appeared in its newspaper, though other articles upheld the distinction between Jews and Zionists.

In the mid-1930s the Brotherhood developed a formal hierarchical structure, with the General Guide (Banna) at the top, assisted by a General Guidance Bureau and a deputy. Local branches were organised into districts, whose administration had a large measure of autonomy. There were different categories of members, with increasing responsibilities: "assistant", "associate", "worker" and "activist". Membership fees depended on the means of each member, and poor members paid no fees. Promotion through the hierarchy depended on the performance of Islamic duties and on knowledge attained in the Society's study groups. This merit-based system was a radical departure from the hierarchies based on social standing that characterised Egyptian society at the time.

In 1938, Banna came to the conclusion that local conservative notables had gained too much influence in the Society, and that there were too many members with "empty titles" who did little practical work. To solve these problems, he introduced substantial organisational changes over the next few years; henceforth the branches' executive committees were chosen by the General Guidance Bureau rather than elected, and in 1941 the elected General Assembly was replaced by a smaller appointed body called the Consultative Assembly. However, the Society's structure remained decentralised, so that branches could continue to operate if the police arrested leading members.

Despite Banna's skepticism concerning elections, manifested in their diminishing role within the Brotherhood, he argued for a kind of democracy when he set out his view of the principles underlying a political Islam in 1938:

When one considers the principles that guide the constitutional system of government, one finds that such principles aim to preserve in all its forms the freedom of the individual citizen, to make the rulers accountable for their actions to the people and finally, to delimit the prerogatives of every single authoritative body. It will be clear to everyone that such basic principles correspond perfectly to the teaching of Islam concerning the system of government. For this reason, the Muslim Brothers consider that of all the existing systems of government, the constitutional system is the form that best suits Islam and Muslims.

Such a system would involve elections, but not political parties; Banna rejected party politics, pointing out that the Egyptian political parties of the time were closed off to all but the elites and had become instruments of British imperial rule.


text:
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (الإخوان المسلمون في سوريا) is a Syrian branch of the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization. Its objective is the transformation of Syria into an Islamic state governed by Sharia law through a gradual legal and political process.

The party strongly opposes Pan-Arabism, capitalism, communism, liberalism, and secularism in Syria. Founded at the end of World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria was seen as one of several important political parties in the 1950s. When Syria unified with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, the disbanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political party was a condition of union, one complicated by Gamal Abdel Nasser's conflict in Egypt with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was banned by the government of the Syrian Arab Republic starting after the 1963 coup by the secularist, pan-Arabist Ba'ath Party. The Muslim Brotherhood played a major role in dissent against the secular Ba'ath Party during the period 1976–1982, and membership in the Brotherhood in Syria became a capital offence in 1980.

Following the Hama uprising of 1982 in the wake of the wider Islamist insurgency in Syria (1979–1982), when thousands of armed insurgents and civilians were killed by the military the Brotherhood was effectively broken as an active political force inside Syria.

The Muslim Brotherhood in exile was among the 250 signatories of the Damascus Declaration of 2005, a statement of unity by Syrian opposition including the Arab nationalist National Democratic Rally, the Kurdish Democratic Alliance, the Committees of Civil Society, the Kurdish Democratic Front, and the Movement of the Future, and calling for "peaceful, gradual," reform "founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other".

The Muslim Brotherhood was considered the main opposition group in Syria to the government on the eve of the 2011 uprising, but failed to make a significant mark on the protests against the government. The Syrian uprising's core population of protesters came from a younger generation which had come of age in a Syria without significant Muslim Brotherhood presence. However, among the expatriated opposition, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has come to be seen by some as the "dominant group" or "dominant force" in the opposition during the Syrian civil war as of spring 2012.

History
Once the second most important branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian Ikhwan had two wings – the relatively moderate Damascus wing and the militant Aleppo wing. Becoming more revolutionary and radical in the 1960s and 1970s, they aimed to overthrow the Ba'athist government that controlled Syria. In Egypt, splinter groups inspired by Sayyid Qutb were growing more violent and militant than the mainline Brotherhood. In Syria, the entire organization was effected, as the internally divided leadership failed to contain the radicalization to the splinter groups. Even though the leadership publicly disavowed the radical elements, they were unable to contain the radicalization of the group because were mostly in exile due to the brutality and violent repression of the Syrian government.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was founded in the mid-1940s by Mustafa al-Siba'i and Muhammad al-Mubarak al-Tayyib, who were friends and colleagues of the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna. In the first years of Syrian independence the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was part of the legal opposition, and in the 1961 parliamentary elections it won ten seats. After the 1963 coup brought the secularist, pan-Arabist Ba'ath Party to power, it was banned. The Brotherhood played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based resistance movement that opposed the secular Ba'ath Party, (since 1971 dominated by the Alawite Assad family, adding a religious element to its conflict with the Brotherhood). This conflict developed into an armed struggle in the late 1970s that climaxed in the Hama uprising of 1982, when thousands were killed by the military.

Membership in the Syrian Brotherhood became a capital offence in Syria in the 1980 (under Emergency Law 49) and the Brotherhood was crushed, though it retained a network of support in the country, of unknown strength, and had external headquarters in London and Cyprus. In recent years it has renounced violence and adopted a reformist platform, calling for the establishment of a pluralistic, democratic political system. For many years the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was Ali Sadreddine Al-Bayanouni, who lives as a political refugee in London.

Origins
Towards the end of the 1930s, the ideas of Hassan al-Banna reached Syria as young Syrians, who had graduated from university in Cairo and participated in the Muslim Brotherhood there, returned home and founded associations called "Muhammad's Youth" (Shabab Muhammad), which were to become the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was founded in the 1930s (according to lexicorient.com) or in 1945, a year before independence from France, (according to journalist Robin Wright and the Brotherhood itself). The Brotherhood states its founder was Dr. Mustafa al-Siba'i. By 1954, the Syrian association led by Mustafa al-Siba'i offered assistance to its Egyptian sister organisation, which Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser was then subjecting to severe repression.

However, it was not until the 1960s that the Syrian Brotherhood came to play a major role in politics, as part of a broad-based resistance movement, which developed into armed struggle, against the secular government. After the secular Ba'athist military coup of 8 March 1963, the new administration drastically restricted political freedoms, and concentrated power in the hands of the military and awarded prominent positions to the country's Alawite minority. Sunni Syrian Islamists – from the majority faith – did not have representation in the government. From the start, Islamic political groups, of which the Brotherhood was the most prominent, represented the strongest opposition to the government. The outlawing of Brotherhood in 1964 resulted in its radicalisation. In 1964 and 1965, strikes and mass demonstrations spread throughout Syria's major cities, especially in Hama, and were crushed by the military. In 1971, General Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, seized power; in 1973 violent demonstrations broke out again in response to a proposed constitution that did not require the president to be a Muslim. Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 on the side of the Maronites sparked renewed agitation in Syria, and assassinations began to target members of the Syrian government and prominent Alawites; the Muslim Brotherhood later claimed responsibility for most of these.

1976–82 Islamist insurgency
On 16 June 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood carried out an attack on cadets at the Aleppo Artillery School, officially killing 83. Around this time, professor Yusef al-Yusef was assassinated in Aleppo. The Syrian government responded by sentencing to death about 15 prisoners, already accused of being Iraqi agents, for belonging to the Islamic resistance movement. Terrorist attacks then became a daily occurrence, particularly in Aleppo and other northern cities. The government tended to ascribe these attacks to the Brotherhood, but as the armed resistance gained widespread popular support and more loosely defined armed groups appeared, especially in poor neighborhoods, it became difficult to determine the extent of the Brotherhood's involvement.

In November 1979, a Brotherhood leaflet stated:

"We reject all forms of despotism, out of respect for the very principles of Islam, and we don't demand the fall of Pharaoh so that another one can take his place. Religion is not imposed by force...."

In the days leading to 8 March 1980 (the seventeenth anniversary of the Ba'thist coup), nearly all Syrian cities were paralysed by strikes and protests, which developed into pitched battles with security forces. Many organisations, both religious and secular, were involved, including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The government responded with overwhelming military force, sending in tens of thousands of troops, supported by tanks and helicopters. In and around Aleppo, hundreds of demonstrators were killed, and eight thousand were arrested. By April, the uprising had been crushed.

A newspaper article by the president's brother, Rifaat al-Assad, stated that the government was prepared to "sacrifice a million martyrs" (over a tenth of Syria's population at that time) in order to stamp out "the nation's enemies". On 7 July 1980, the government passed a law making membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Typically, however, the administration practiced indiscriminate, collective punishment: in August, the army executed 80 residents of a block of flats in response to an attack on soldiers stationed in Aleppo. In April 1981, the army executed about 400 of Hama's inhabitants, chosen among male loyalists over the age of 14. This was as a retribution after a failed terrorist attack on an Alawite village near Hama. During a 50-day moratorium on the application of the 7 July law, over a thousand Muslim Brothers surrendered to the authorities, hoping to escape the death penalty; information published about them in the official press may give some insight into the composition of the Brotherhood's membership at that time. Most of those who gave themselves up were students under twenty-five years of age, from Damascus and other large cities; others were schoolteachers, professors or engineers.

In August, September and November 1981, the Brotherhood carried out three car-bomb attacks against government and military targets in Damascus, killing hundreds of people, according to the official press. On 2 February 1982, the Brotherhood led a major insurrection in Hama, rapidly taking control of the city; the military responded by bombing Hama (whose population was about 250,000) throughout the rest of the month, killing between 10,000 and 30,000 people. The tragedy of the Hama Massacre marked the defeat of the Brotherhood, and the militant Islamic movement in general, as a political force in Syria.

Post-Hama era
Having suppressed all opposition, Hafez al-Assad released some imprisoned members of the Brotherhood in the mid-1990s. After his death in 2000, Assad was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who initially signalled greater openness to political debate. In May 2001, encouraged by a new political climate, the Muslim Brotherhood published a statement in London rejecting political violence, and calling for a modern, democratic state. Many political prisoners, including Muslim Brothers, were pardoned and released. However, this reform was short-lived; in the same year, the few political freedoms that had been granted were abruptly revoked.

Although its leadership is in exile, the Brotherhood continues to enjoy considerable sympathy among Syrians. Riyad al-Turk, a secular opposition leader, considers it "the most credible" Syrian opposition group. The Brotherhood has continued to advocate a democratic political system; it has abandoned its calls for violent resistance and for the application of shari'a law, as well as for Sunni uprisings against Alawites. Al-Turk and others in the secular opposition are inclined to take this evolution seriously, as a sign of the Brotherhood's greater political maturity, and believe that the Brotherhood would now be willing to participate in a democratic system of government.

In a January 2006 interview, the Brotherhood's leader, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, "said the Muslim Brotherhood wants a peaceful change of government in Damascus and the establishment of a 'civil, democratic state', not an Islamic republic." According to Bayanouni, the Syrian government admits having detained 30,000 people, giving a fair representation of the Brotherhood's strength.

According to leaked American cables, Syrian President Bashar al Assad allegedly called Hamas an "uninvited guest" and said "If you want me to be effective and active, I have to have a relationship with all parties. Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood, but we have to deal with the reality of their presence", comparing Hamas to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood which was crushed by his father Hafez al Assad. He then allegedly claimed Hamas would disappear if peace was brought to the Middle East.

2011–present Syrian civil war
Unlike the MB-led insurgency of 1976–1982, the civil uprising phase of the Syrian Civil War which started in March 2011 began as a secular and nonviolent youth-led movement. Protesters, mostly formerly apolitical Syrians in their twenties and thirties, came together on a local, grassroots basis and had affiliations to older political ideologies, calling instead for the release of prisoners of conscience, guarantees of democratic freedoms, and the fall of the Assad government. In August, 2011, expatriated Syrian oppositionists formed the Syrian National Council to seek international support for the uprising. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood officially held five seats in the Syrian National Council, the main opposition umbrella outside Syria, but created a network of alliances with other SNC members, and created a controlling influence on the council's relief committee. Since the formation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in November, 2012, the Syrian National Council has taken a backseat to the Coalition, which is recognized as the external political body of oppositionists "leading" the revolution.

In 2012, Brotherhood activists created the Commission for Civilian Protection (CCP). The CCP is considered to be a front for the Brotherhood, tasked with helping armed units inside Syria connect with each other and with sponsors abroad. Its website lists numerous affiliated factions, distributed across Homs, Damascus, Idlib, and elsewhere; however, most of these groups are small and generally self-identify as members of the Free Syrian Army or the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is believed to control, through funding, one-fourth to one-third of the disparate armed rebel brigades known collectively as the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Despite that, The Daily Telegraph reported in August 2012 that the Muslim Brotherhood had established its own militia not affiliated to the FSA inside Syria, called "Armed Men of the Muslim Brotherhood", with presence in Damascus and other places like Homs or Idlib. Durou al-Thawra Commission (Shields of the Revolution Council) created in 2012 with assistance from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood allegedly consisting of some 43 fighting units most of them in Idlib or Hama.

At the same time Brotherhood leaders have been reaching out to reassure leaders in neighboring Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon – as well as the West – that they "have no intention of dominating a future Syrian political system" and have "played down" their "growing influence" in the Syrian opposition. The Syrian MB has assured outsiders that it is "going to great lengths to ensure" that its donated weapons "don't fall into the hands of extremists".

According to Hassan Hassan writing in The Guardian newspaper in mid-2012, while the Brotherhood did come to dominate the Syrian National Council, a body formed outside Syria, the Brotherhood appears to be more popular among exiles than in the uprising population inside Syria. "Activists from various parts of Syria have told me that, prior to the uprising last year, the country had almost zero Brotherhood presence." "At least 70%" of Syria's population – non-Sunnis (Muslim and Christian), Kurds, and tribal groups "have been outside" the Brotherhood's influence "in the past", and Hassan believes will remain so in the future.

The Syrian Brotherhood harshly condemned Iranian political intervention in Bahrain. This condemnation was formulated "politely," without any obvious insulting references to Shi'a. However, the effort failed.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement declaring Jihad against Russia obligatory (Fard 'ayn) upon all who are able to carry weapons after the Russian military intervention in Syria. They reiterated the Russian Orthodox Church's call of the operation as a Holy War.

Personalities

 * Mohammad Walid – current Brotherhood leader
 * Mohammad Farouk Tayfour – deputy leader, vice president of the Syrian National Council
 * Mohammad Hatem al-Tabshi – current head of Shura Council
 * Molham al-Droubi – member of the Brotherhood's leadership and sits on the Syrian National Council's foreign affairs committee.
 * Muhammad Surur – former member, died in 2016
 * Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfeh – former Brotherhood leader

General leaders
Supreme guides or General leaders (G.L.) of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria have been:

 * Founder & first General leader (1945–1961): Mustafa al-Siba'i مُصطَفى السِّبَاعِي
 * 2nd G.L. (1961–1973): Issam al-Attar عصام العطار
 * 3rd G.L. (1973–1976): Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda عبد الفتاح أبو غدة
 * 4th G.L. (1976–1981): Adnan Saad al-Din عدنان سعد الدين
 * 5th G.L. (1981–1985): Hassan Howeidi حسن هويدي
 * 6th G.L. (1985–1985): Munir Ghadban منير الغضبان
 * 7th G.L. (1985–1986): Adib Gaja أديب الجاجي
 * 8th G.L. (1986–1991): Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda عبد الفتاح أبو غدة
 * 9th G.L. (1991–1996): Hassan Howeidi حسن هويدي
 * 10th G.L. (1996–2010): Ali Sadreddine Al-Bayanouni علي صدر الدين البيانوني
 * 11th G.L. (2010–2014): Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfeh محمد رياض خالد الشقفة
 * 12th G.L. & current leader (2014–present): Mohammad Walid محمد حكمت وليد

title: Muslim Brotherhood in Syria


text:
History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization that was founded in Ismailia, Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in March 1928 as an Islamist religious, political, and social movement. The group spread to other Muslim countries but has its largest, or one of its largest, organizations in Egypt, where for many years it has been the largest, best-organized, and most disciplined political opposition force, despite a succession of government crackdowns in 1948, 1954, 1965 after plots, or alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered. Following the 2011 Revolution the group was legalized, and in April 2011 it launched a civic political party called the Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) to contest elections, including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first democratically elected president. One year later, however, following massive demonstrations, Morsi was overthrown by the military and arrested. As of 2014, the organization has been declared a terrorist group by Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and is once again suffering a severe crackdown.

1928–1938
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, along with six workers of the Suez Canal Company. Al-Banna was a schoolteacher, to promote implementing traditional, religious, Islamic sharia law into government and a social regression based on an Islamic ethos of altruism and civic duty, in opposition to what he saw as political and social injustice and to British imperial rule. The organization initially focused on educational and charitable work, but quickly grew to become a major political force as well, by championing the cause of disenfranchised classes, playing a prominent role in the Egyptian nationalist movement, and promoting a conception of Islam that attempted to restore broken links between tradition and modernity.

1939–1954
On December 28, 1948, Egypt's prime minister, Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha, was assassinated by Brotherhood member and veterinary student Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan, in what is thought to have been retaliation for the government crackdown. A month and half later Al-Banna himself was killed in Cairo by men believed to be government agents and/or supporters of the murdered premier. Al-Banna was succeeded as head of the Brotherhood by Hassan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, a former judge.

In 1952, members of the Muslim Brotherhood are accused of taking part in arson that destroyed some "750 buildings" in downtown Cairo — mainly night clubs, theatres, hotels, and restaurants frequented by British and other foreigners — "that marked the end of the liberal, progressive, cosmopolitan" Egypt.

The Brotherhood supported the military coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952, but the junta was unwilling to share power or lift martial law and clashed with the Brotherhood.

1954–1982
After the attempted assassination of then-president Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, in 1954, a member of the secret apparatus was accused by the authorities of being the perpetrator of the attempt. Nasser then abolished the Brotherhood and imprisoned and punished thousands of its members.

Many members of the Brotherhood were held for years in prisons and concentration camps, where they were sometimes tortured, during Nasser's rule. In 1964 there was a minor thaw when writer Sayyid Qutb was released from prison only to be arrested again along with his brother Muhammad in August 1965, when he was accused of being part of a plot to overthrow the state—to assassinate the President and other Egyptian officials and personalities —and subjected to what some consider a show trial. The trial culminated in a death sentence for Qutb and six other members of the Muslim Brotherhood and on 29 August 1966, he was executed by hanging.

The CIA funnelled support to the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Nasser era, the reason being “the Brotherhood’s commendable capability to overthrow Nasser.”

Qutb became the Brotherhood's most influential thinker. He argued that Muslim society was no longer Islamic and must be transformed by an Islamic vanguard through violent revolution. To restore Islam from modern jahiliyya, Muslim states must be overthrown. While Qutb's ideology became very popular elsewhere, in Egypt the Brotherhood's leadership distanced itself from his revolutionary ideology, adhering instead to a nonviolent reformist strategy, to which it has remained ever since.

Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, became president of Egypt in 1970 and gradually released imprisoned Brothers and enlisted their help against leftist groups. The organisation was tolerated to an extent, but remained technically illegal and subject to periodic crackdowns. Eventually the Brotherhood was key in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

In the 1970s, a large student Islamic activist movement took shape, independently from the Brotherhood. Sadat himself became the enemy of the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups after signing a peace agreement with Israel in 1979, and was assassinated by a violent Islamist group Tanzim al-Jihad on October 6, 1981.

1982–2005
In the 1980s, during Hosni Mubarak's presidency, many of the student Islamist activists joined the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood dominated the professional and student associations of Egypt and was famous for its network of social services in neighborhoods and villages. In order to quell the Brotherhood's renewed influence, the government again resorted to repressive measures starting in 1992. Despite mass arrests, police harassment and an essentially closed political system, Brotherhood candidates have made strong showings in several parliamentary elections.

Over the next ten years the Brotherhood made repeated calls for a more democratic political system. In 1997 Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhur told journalist Khalid Daoud that he thought Egypt's Coptic Christians and Orthodox Jews should pay the long-abandoned jizya poll tax, levied on non-Muslims in exchange for protection from the state, rationalized by the fact that non-Muslims are exempt from military service while it is compulsory for Muslims. He went on to say, "we do not mind having Christians members in the People's Assembly...the top officials, especially in the army, should be Muslims since we are a Muslim country ... This is necessary because when a Christian country attacks the Muslim country and the army has Christian elements, they can facilitate our defeat by the enemy." According to The Guardian newspaper, the proposal caused an "uproar" among Egypt's six million Coptic Christians and "the movement later backtracked."

In 2000, 15 MB deputies were elected to the Egyptian parliament. A book detailing the record of the MB deputies in the 2000-2005 Egyptian parliament (The Brothers in the 2000-2005 Parliament) found its parliamentary leader Hamdy Hassan working vigorously to fight cultural expression the Brotherhood felt was unIslamic and blasphemous, from literature to beauty contests. Hassan accused the Minister of Culture (Farouk Hosny) of leading what Hassan called the `current US-led war against Islamic culture and identity`. Another Brotherhood MP (Gamal Heshmat) took credit for forcing culture minister Hosni to ban the publication of three novels on the ground they promoted blasphemy and unacceptable sexual practices.

2005–2010
In 2005, the Brotherhood participated in pro-democracy demonstrations with the Kifaya movement. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood's candidates could only stand as independents under the emergency law, but identified themselves by campaigning under the most famous of their slogans - 'Islam Is the Solution'. They won 88 seats (20% of the total) to form the largest opposition bloc despite many violations of the electoral process. Meanwhile, the legally approved opposition parties won only 14 seats.

"More than 1,000 Brothers were arrested before the vote's second and third rounds, and police blocked Brotherhood supporters from entering the polls in some districts, according to independent organizations monitoring the election. Brotherhood leaders also accused the government of changing the final count to lead to a victory for the ruling party candidate in seven districts, a concern echoed by independent monitors. More than 100 Egyptian judges signed a statement condemning 'aggression and acts of thuggery by supporters of the ruling party against the judges while...police forces stood idle."

During and after the election the Brethren launched what some have called a "charm offensive." Its leadership talked about its `responsibility to lead reform and change in Egypt.` It addressed the `Coptic issue` stating that `conditions` for Coptic Christians (Copts) would be better `under the Brotherhood group`, and Copts would be "full citizens, not ahl-dhimma," and insinuated that the Brethren would do away with Egypt's decade's old church building-permit system that Coptic Christians felt was discriminatory. Internationally the Brethren launched an English-language website and some of the MB's leaders participated in an Initiative to `Re-Introduc[e] the Brotherhood to the West `, "listing and addressing many `Western misconceptions about the Brotherhood.`" An article was written for The Guardian newspaper under the title `No need to be afraid of us`; and another for American Jewish newspaper The Forward.

This campaign, however, was a direct threat to the Egyptian government and its position as an indispensable ally of the west in its fight against radical Islamist ideologues "bent on the Islamization of society and permanent conflict with the West." The government responded by not only continuing to arrest the Brotherhood's leaders and squeeze its finances, but introduced an amendment of Article 1 of the Egyptian constitution. The amendment would ("in theory") have had the effect of "allowing women, and Christians, to run for any position, including the presidency," by defining Egypt as `a state of citizenship` and remove the reference to Islam as `the religion of the state.` When challenged to vote for the new version of the article, the Brotherhood's members of parliament walked out of the legislative chamber.

The party has also reportedly been weakened by "missteps" that have alienated "many Egyptians" and reportedly played into the government's hands. In December 2006 masked Brotherhood students at Cairo's Al Azhar University staged a militia-style march, which included the "wearing of uniforms, displaying the phrase, 'We Will be Steadfast', and drills involving martial arts. This betrayed the group's intent to plan for the creation of militia structures, and a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'", according to journalist Jameel Theyabi. Others agreed it was reminiscent of the group's violent past and public outcry ensued.

According to one observer: "after a number of conciliatory engagements and interactions with the West", the Brotherhood,

"retreated into its comfort zone of inflammatory rhetoric intended for local consumption: all suicide bombers are `martyrs`; `Israel` regularly became the Jews`; even its theological discourse became more confrontational and oriented to social conservatism."

Two years later the Egyptian government amended the constitution, prohibiting independent candidates from running for Parliament, these being the only candidates the Brotherhood could field. It also arrested thousands of its members, many of whom were tried in military courts. The state delayed local council elections from 2006 to 2008, disqualifying most MB candidates. The MB boycotted the election. The government incarcerated thousands of rank-and-file MB members in a wave of arrests and military trials, the harshest such security clampdown on the Brotherhood "in decades."

All but one of the Brotherhood candidates lost their seats in the 2010 election marred by massive arrests of Brethren and polling place observers. The reaction of a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman to the election was: "We lost seats and a much deserved representation in the parliament. But we won people's love and support and a media battle that exposed [irregularities in] the elections."

2011 Revolution and Morsi Presidency
Following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood was legalized and emerged as "the most powerful group" and the "most cohesive political movement" in Egypt with "an unparalleled ability to mobilize its followers". Its newly formed political party—the Freedom and Justice Party—won almost half the seats in the 2011–12 parliamentary election (far more than any other party), and its presidential candidate Mohammed Morsi won the 2012 presidential election. However within a year there were mass protests against his rule and he was overthrown by the military.

In the January–February 2011 uprising itself, the Brotherhood remained "on the sidelines", despite having much to gain from a freer political environment, and the breaking off of some activist splinter groups from the Brotherhood. (Sources in the Brotherhood maintain state security forces threatened to arrest supreme guide Mohammed Badie if any Brethren participated.)

On 30 April 2011, it launched a new party called the Freedom and Justice Party. The party rejected "the candidacy of women or Copts for Egypt's presidency", although it did not oppose their taking cabinet positions. The party won 235 (including 22 allies) out of 498 seats in the 2011–12 Egyptian parliamentary election, almost double the next biggest vote-getting party.

In the first couple of years after the revolution, there was both cooperation and tension between the Brotherhood and (secular oriented) military. The Brotherhood supported the constitutional referendum in March which was also supported by the Egyptian army and opposed by Egyptian liberals, causing some Egyptians to speculate about deal between the military and the MB. The Brotherhood has denied reports of secret meetings with the ruling SCAF as "pure lies and imagination." There was further criticism of the military after Brotherhood silence in the midst of violent clashes between revolutionaries and the military in late 2011. The refusal of the Muslim Brotherhood to join protests against military rule is said to have stopped the "second revolution". With regard to the continuance of thousands of secretive military trials, Human Rights Watch criticised the Brotherhood and other Islamists for only noticing what happened to their fellow Islamists, "and not to the thousands of civilians standing military trial or sent to military jails". Egyptian author Ezzedine C. Fishere wrote:

"The Brotherhood, led by the old and the hardliners, has managed to alienate its revolutionary and democratic partners and to scare important segments of society, especially women and Christians. Neither the Brotherhood nor the generals showed willingness to share power and both were keen on marginalising the revolutionary and democratic forces. It is as if they were clearing the stage for their eventual showdown."

In mid-June 2012, the SCAF dissolved the parliament dominated by the Brotherhood and other Islamists.

Despite earlier remarks by Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie that the Brotherhood would not "field a candidate for presidency" as victory and the position of a member of the Brotherhood "at the helm of power" might give a foreign power (Israel or the US) a pretext to attack Egypt, a former high level Brotherhood official ran for president in 2012 presidential election. Mohammed Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafiq, a former military officer and prime minister of Mubarak, in the run off. Not waiting for the official result, the Brotherhood declared their candidate the victor and filled Tahrir Square with demonstrators both in opposition to broad powers issued by the military that preclude the latter's subordination to a civilian government, and in fear that SCAF would announce Shafiq the winner of the election and new president. Tensions abated when Morsi was officially declared the election winner on 24 June.

During the one year Morsi served as president serious public opposition developed within months. In late November 2012 Morsi 'temporarily' granted himself unlimited powers on the ground that he would "protect" the nation from the power structure left over from the Mubarak-era and the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts. He also put a draft constitution to a referendum that opponents complained was "an Islamist coup." These issues brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets in the 2012 Egyptian protests.

Other complaints included the prosecutions of journalists, the unleashing of pro-Brotherhood gangs on nonviolent demonstrators; the continuation of military trials; and new laws that permitted detention without judicial review for up to 30 days, According to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), an independent organization, under Morsi "the Muslim Brotherhood is laying the foundations for a new police state by exceeding the Mubarak regime's mechanisms to suppress civil society." Persecution of minorities by Islamic radicals was ignored by Morsi. Two cases being the April 2013 firing on a funeral of Coptic Christians who had themselves been killed in sectarian attacks in the days before, and the June 2013 lynching in public view of four Shiites by (Sunni) Islamists

By April 2013, according to the Associated Press,

"Egypt has become increasingly divided between two camps, with President Mohammed Morsi and Islamist allies on one side and an opposition made up of moderate Muslims, Christians and liberals on the other, a schism essentially over the country's political future after decades of dictatorship. Opponents accuse Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to monopolize power, while Morsi's allies say the opposition is trying to destabilize the country to derail the elected leadership."

Adding to the unrest were severe fuel shortages and electricity outages—which evidence suggests were orchestrated by Mubarak-era Egyptian elites.

In late April, the Tamarod (rebellion) movement was founded to campaign to collect signatures calling for Morsi to step down. On 29 June, it announced it had collected more than 22 million signatures. A day later somewhere between 17 and 33 million Egyptian protesters demonstrated across Egypt urging Morsi to step down A lesser number demonstrated in support of him.

2013 Egyptian removal of Morsi
On 3 July, the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, announced President Mohamed Morsi removal from power, suspension of the constitution, and new presidential and Shura Council elections. The crackdown that followed has been called more damaging to "the Brotherhood's core organization" than any "in eight decades".

On 14 August, the government declared a month-long state of emergency beginning at 16:00, and the military commenced raids to remove camps of Brotherhood supporters from sit-ins being held throughout the country. Violence escalated rapidly lasting several days and led to the deaths of 638 people—595 civilians and 43 police officers. Some 4000 were injured. In retaliation Brotherhood supporters looted and burned police stations and dozens of churches. By 19 August, al Jazeera reported that "most" of the Brotherhood's leaders were in custody. On that day Supreme Leader (Mohammed Badie) was arrested, crossing a "red line", as even Hosni Mubarak had never arrested him. Other high-profile members of the Brotherhood (including Khairat El-Shater, and Saad al-Katatni ) were arrested or ordered arrested.

On 23 September, a court ordered the group outlawed and its assets seized. Two days later security forces shuttered the main office of the newspaper of the Freedom and Justice Party, and confiscated its equipment.

General leaders
Supreme guides or General leaders (G.L.) of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have been:
 * Founder and first General Leader (G.L.): (1928–1949) Hassan al-Banna حسن البنا
 * 2nd G.L.: (1949–1972) Hassan al-Hudaybi حسن الهضيبي
 * 3rd G.L.: (1972–1986) Umar al-Tilmisani عمر التلمساني
 * 4th G.L.: (1986–1996) Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr محمد حامد أبو النصر
 * 5th G.L.: (1996–2002) Mustafa Mashhur مصطفى مشهور
 * 6th G.L.: (2002–2004) Ma'mun al-Hudaybi مأمون الهضيبي
 * 7th G.L.: (2004–2010) Mohammed Mahdi Akef محمد مهدي عاكف
 * 8th G.L.: (16 January 2010) Mohammed Badie محمد بديع


text:
Mediated reference theory

A mediated reference theory (also indirect reference theory) is any semantic theory that posits that words refer to something in the external world, but insists that there is more to the meaning of a name than simply the object to which it refers. It thus stands opposed to direct reference theory. Gottlob Frege is a well-known advocate of mediated reference theories. Similar theories were widely held in the middle of the twentieth century by philosophers such as Peter Strawson and John Searle.

Saul Kripke, a proponent of direct reference theory, in his Naming and Necessity dubbed mediated reference theory the Frege–Russell view and criticized it. Subsequent scholarship refuted the claim that Bertrand Russell's views on reference theory were the same as Frege's, since Russell was also a proponent of direct reference theory.

title: Mediated reference theory