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Ten-Day War

The Ten-Day War (desetdnevna vojna), or the Slovenian War of Independence (slovenska osamosvojitvena vojna), was a brief armed conflict that followed Slovenia's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. It was fought between the Slovenian Territorial Defence together with Slovene Police and the Yugoslav People's Army (or JNA). It lasted from 27 June 1991 until 7 July 1991, when the Brioni Accords were signed.

It was the second of the Yugoslav Wars to start in 1991, following the Croatian War of Independence, and by far the shortest of the conflicts with fewest overall casualties. The war was brief because the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA, dominated by Serbo-Montenegrins, although still made up of all the nationalities of Yugoslavia) did not want to waste resources on this campaign. Slovenia was considered "ethnically homogeneous" and therefore of no interest to the Yugoslav government. The military was preoccupied with the fighting in Croatia, where the Serbo-Montenegrin majority in Yugoslavia had greater territorial interests. In the BBC documentary The Death of Yugoslavia, which used archival footage, Slobodan Milošević, President of Serbia, is recorded stating that "I was against using the Yugoslav Army in Slovenia." while Borisav Jović, President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, stated that: "With Slovenia out of the way, we could dictate the terms to the Croats."

Background
Following the death of Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito in 1980, underlying political, ethnic, religious, and economic tensions within Yugoslavia surfaced. In 1989 Slobodan Milošević, Chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia since 1986, became President of Serbia, the largest and most populous of the six Yugoslav republics. As Milošević moved to consolidate power by centralizing the state, the governments of the other republics sought to loosen the central grip on power by devolving as much constitutional power as possible to each of the republics and autonomous provinces. A series of disagreements among delegates persisted until four of the six republics each made the decision to gain independence from Yugoslavia. Supported by Germany and the Vatican, Slovenia was among those republics aiming for independence.

The first action in defence of Slovenian independence that united both the opposition and democratized communist establishment in Slovenia was, however, carried out by the Slovene police forces, in an action named Action North in 1989. In April 1990, Slovenia held its first democratic multi-party elections, won by the DEMOS coalition.

Preparations for war
On 23 December 1990, Slovenia held a referendum, which passed with 88.5% of overall electorate supporting independence (94.8% of votes cast), with a turnout of 93.3%. The Slovenian government was well aware that the federal government in Belgrade might seek to use military force to quash Slovenia's move towards independence. Immediately after the Slovenian elections, the Yugoslav People's Army announced a new defence doctrine that would apply across the country. The Tito-era doctrine of "General People's Defence", in which each republic maintained a territorial defence (TO), was to be replaced by a centrally directed system of defence. The republics would lose their role in defence matters, and their TOs would be disarmed and subordinated to the JNA's headquarters in Belgrade.

The Slovenian government resisted these moves and successfully ensured that the majority of Slovenian Territorial Defence equipment was kept out of the hands of the JNA. It also declared in a constitutional amendment passed on 28 September 1990 that its TO would be under the sole command of the Slovenian government. At the same time, the Slovenian government set up a secret alternative command structure, known as the Manoeuvre Structures of National Protection (Manevrska struktura narodne zaščite, or MSNZ). This was an existing but antiquated institution, unique to Slovenia, which was intended to enable the republic to form an ad hoc defence structure, akin to a home guard. It was of negligible importance prior to 1990, with antiquated weapons and few members. However, the DEMOS-led government realised that the MSNZ could be adapted to provide a parallel organisation to the TO that would be entirely in the hands of the Slovenian government.

When the JNA tried to take control of the Slovenian Territorial Defence, the TO's command structure was simply replaced by that of the parallel MSNZ. Between May and October 1990, some 21,000 Slovenian Territorial Defence and police personnel were secretly mobilised into the MSNZ command structure, of which the federal government was wholly unaware. The Slovenian government also undertook detailed planning of a military campaign against the JNA, which resulted in the production of an operational and tactical plan by November 1990 – over seven months before the conflict actually began.

The Slovenes were aware that they would not be able to deter the JNA's forces for an extended period of time. Under Defence Minister Janez Janša, they adopted a strategy based on an asymmetric warfare approach. TO units would carry out a guerrilla campaign, using anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft missiles to ambush the JNA's units. Tank columns could be trapped by destroying the lead and rear vehicles in favourable terrain – for instance, on a narrow mountain road where room for manoeuvre was limited – enabling the rest to be dealt with more easily. In preparation for this, the Slovenian government covertly bought lightweight missile systems from foreign suppliers, notably the SA-7 Grail (Strela) anti-aircraft missile and the German-designed Armbrust anti-tank system. Hit-and-run and delaying tactics were to be preferred and frontal clashes were to be avoided since in such situations the JNA's superior firepower would have been very difficult to overcome.

Conflict
Slovenia and Croatia passed their acts of independence on 25 June 1991. This "advance" on the date of independence was a critical element of the Slovenian plan to gain an early advantage in the expected conflict. The Slovenian government fully expected the Yugoslav military to respond with force on the day of the declaration of independence or shortly afterwards. By secretly advancing the date by 24 hours, the Slovenians caught the Yugoslav government off guard, which had set 26 June as the date for its move.

Although the Yugoslav army was adamantly opposed to Slovenian independence, it was divided about what to do. The JNA Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Blagoje Adžić, advocated a large-scale military operation to remove the Slovenian government and bring "healthy forces" to power in the republic. His political superior, the Yugoslav defence minister, General of the Army Veljko Kadijević, insisted on a more cautious approach – essentially a show of force that would convince the Slovenian government to back down on its declaration of independence. After some debate, Kadijević got his way.

It is unclear how much the civilian members of the Yugoslav government were involved in the decision to resort to force in Slovenia. Ante Marković, the president of the Federal Executive Council (equivalent to prime minister) is reported to have said that the federal government had not been informed of the Army's actions.

26 June 1991
On the morning of 26 June, units of the Yugoslav People's Army's 13th Corps left their barracks in Rijeka, Croatia, to move towards Slovenia's borders with Italy. The move immediately led to a strong reaction from local Slovenians, who organized spontaneous barricades and demonstrations against the JNA's actions. There had been no fighting yet, and both sides appeared to have an unofficial policy of not being the first to open fire.

By this time, the Slovenian government had already put into action its plan to seize control of the republic's border posts and the international airport at Brnik. The personnel manning the border posts were, in most cases, already Slovenians, so the Slovenian take-over mostly simply amounted to changing of uniforms and insignia, without any fighting. This was undertaken, in the words of Janez Janša, to "establish our sovereignty in the key triangle, border-customs-air control". It also had important practical effects. The border crossings were a major source of revenue. In addition, by taking control of the borders, the Slovenians were able to establish defensive positions against an expected JNA attack. This meant that the JNA would have to fire the first shot. It was fired on 27 June at 14:30 in Divača by an officer of the JNA.

27 June 1991
Further JNA troop movements took place in the early hours of 27 June. A unit of the JNA's 306th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, based in Karlovac, Croatia, crossed the Slovenian border at Metlika. A few hours later, a column of tanks and armoured personnel carriers of the JNA 1st Armoured Brigade left their barracks at Vrhnika near the Slovenian capital Ljubljana, heading for the airport at Brnik. They arrived a few hours later and took control of the facilities. As the JNA was the federal army, its forces were customarily deployed in various places within the federal republics including Slovenia. To the east, JNA units left Maribor heading for the nearby border crossing at Šentilj and the border town of Dravograd further west. The Yugoslav Air Force aircraft dropped leaflets over various parts of Slovenia bearing the messages "We invite you to peace and cooperation!" and "All resistance will be crushed."

In the early hours of 27 June the Slovenian leadership was told of the movements of the JNA. The military leadership of the Fifth Military District, which included Slovenia, was in telephone contact with Slovenian president Milan Kučan, telling him that the troops' mission was limited to taking over the border crossings and airport. A meeting of the Slovene presidency was hastily convened at which Kučan and the rest of the members decided on armed resistance.

The Slovenian government had received warnings that the JNA would use helicopters to ferry special forces troops to strategic locations. It issued a warning to the JNA's 5th Military Command District in Zagreb that if helicopters continued to be used they would be shot down. The warning was disregarded by the JNA leadership, which still believed that the Slovenians would back down rather than fight. This was, however, a disastrous miscalculation. In the afternoon of 27 June, the Slovenian TO (Slovenian Territorial Defence) shot down two JNA helicopters with SA-7 missiles, one of them a Gazelle over Rožna Dolina, Ljubljana, killing the occupants, one of whom, Toni Mrlak, was a Slovenian pilot, as the JNA's forces consisted of nationals from all the republics. It was later discovered that the Gazelle which Mrlak had been flying was unarmed, and was carrying only bread for the Yugoslav soldiers.

The Slovenian Territorial Defence also took up positions around JNA barracks in various locations, effectively besieging them, and launched a series of attacks on JNA forces across Slovenia. At Brnik, a Slovenian TO unit attacked the JNA troops holding the airport, and at Trzin a firefight developed in which four JNA soldiers and one Slovenian TO soldier (Edvard Peperko) were killed and the remainder of the JNA unit was forced to surrender. Attacks were also launched by Slovenian TO units on JNA tank columns at Pesnica, Ormož and Koseze near Ilirska Bistrica. A tank column from the JNA's 32nd Mechanised Brigade, advancing from Varaždin in Croatia, was blocked at Ormož near the Slovenian border and found itself unable to break through a Slovenian barricade.

Despite the confusion and fighting, the JNA nonetheless successfully accomplished much of its military mission. By midnight on 27 June it had captured all of the crossings along the Italian border, all but three crossings on the Austrian border and several of the new crossing points established along Slovenia's border with Croatia. However, many of its units were still stuck in vulnerable positions across Slovenia.

28 June 1991

During the night of 27–28 June, Slovenian TO units were ordered to undertake a general offensive against the JNA. The Slovenian defence ministry ordered:

"At all locations where RS (Republic of Slovenia) armed forces (Slovenian Territorial Defence) have the tactical advantage, offensive actions against enemy units and facilities will be carried out. The enemy will be summoned to surrender, the shortest deadline possible for surrender given and action taken using all available weapons. While in action, any necessary arrangements will be made to evacuate and protect the civilians."

Additional fighting took place throughout the day. The JNA tank column that had been attacked at Pesnica the previous day was blocked by impromptu barricades of Slovenian trucks at Štrihovec, a few kilometres short of the border with Austria, where it again came under attack by Slovenian TO personnel and Slovenian police. The SFR Yugoslav Air Force mounted two airstrikes in support of the JNA forces at Strihovec, killing four truck drivers. At Medvedjek in central Slovenia, another JNA tank column came under attack at a truck barricade, where air raids killed six truck drivers.

Heavy fighting broke out at Nova Gorica on the border with Italy, where the Slovenian special forces fired two Armbrust antitank rockets and fired 700 rounds from infantry weapons. Slovene troops destroyed two JNA T-55 tanks and captured an additional three, plus a BTS-1 military engineering vehicle. Three JNA soldiers were killed and 16 wounded, among them the commander of the armoured column, and 98 surrendered. A number of wounded were admitted to Gorizia's hospital after crossing the Italian border. Some sources claim that this was the decisive battle of the war.

The border crossing at Holmec was captured by Slovenian TO forces. Two Slovenian and three JNA soldiers were killed, and 45 JNA soldiers captured. The JNA barracks at Bukovje Mansion in Bukovje near Dravograd were attacked by Slovenian TO units and a JNA weapons depot at Borovnica fell to the Slovenian TO, significantly improving the Slovenians' supply of weapons. The Yugoslav Air Force carried out attacks at a number of locations across the country, most notably at Brnik Airport, where two journalists from Austria and Germany (Nikolas Vogel and Norbert Werner) were killed and four Adria Airways airliners were seriously damaged. The Yugoslav Air Force also attacked the Slovenian TO military headquarters at Kočevska Reka and flew sorties against radio and television transmitters at Krim, Kum, Trdina Peak, and Nanos in an attempt to silence the Slovenian government broadcasts.

By the end of the day, the JNA still held many of its positions but was rapidly losing ground. JNA was beginning to experience problems with desertions – many Slovenian members of the JNA quit their units or simply changed sides - and both the troops on the ground and the leadership in Belgrade appeared to have little idea of what to do next.

29 June 1991
The outbreak of the war galvanised diplomatic efforts by the European Community to find an end to the crisis. Three EC foreign ministers met with Slovenian and Yugoslav government representatives in Zagreb during the night of 28–29 June and agreed on a ceasefire plan, but this was not put into practice. In the morning, the Slovenians achieved several significant military successes. The JNA troops at Ljubljana Airport near Brnik surrendered to Slovenian TO forces, who had surrounded the facility overnight.

In the north, several JNA tanks were captured near Strihovec and later reorganised into a TO tank company. JNA special forces attempted a maritime landing at Hrvatini but were ambushed and repulsed by the Slovenians, suffering two dead and three wounded. The JNA-held border crossings at Vrtojba and Šentilj also fell to the Slovenian TO, who seized the federal troops' weapons and tanks, providing a much-needed boost to their arsenal.

The JNA issued an ultimatum to Slovenia, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities by 09:00 on 30 June. In response, the Slovenian Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a peaceful solution to the crisis that did not jeopardise Slovenian independence, and rejected the JNA ultimatum.

30 June 1991
Skirmishing continued in several places during the day. Separatist forces seized the strategic Karawanks Tunnel under the Alps on the border with Austria and captured nine JNA tanks near Nova Gorica, on the border with Italy. The entire JNA garrison at Dravograd – 16 officers and 400 men, plus equipment – surrendered, and the garrisons at Tolmin and Bovec also fell to the Slovenians. The weapons captured from the garrisons were quickly re-issued to the Slovenian forces.

1 July 1991
More skirmishes took place, with Slovenian TO forces taking over a JNA facility at Nova Vas, south of Ljubljana. The JNA's ammunition dump at Črni Vrh caught fire and was destroyed in a massive explosion, damaging much of the town. However, the Slovenians successfully captured depots at Pečovnik, Bukovžlak, and Zaloška Gorica, taking possession of some 70 truckloads of ammunition and explosives.

The JNA 306th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment's column retreated from its exposed position at Medvedjek and headed into the Krakovo Forest (Krakovski gozd) near the Croatian border. It ran into a blockade near the town of Krško and was surrounded by Slovenian forces, but refused to surrender, probably hoping for help from a relief column.

In the meantime, the JNA's leadership sought permission to change the tempo of its operations. Defence Minister Veljko Kadijević informed the Yugoslav cabinet that the JNA's first plan – a limited operation to secure Slovenia's border crossings – had failed, and that it was time to put into operation the backup plan of a full-scale invasion and imposition of military rule in Slovenia. However, the collective presidency – headed at the time by Serbia's Borisav Jović – refused to authorise such an operation. The JNA Chief of Staff, General Blagoje Adžić, was furious and publicly denounced "the federal organs [which] continually hampered us, demanding negotiations while they [the Slovenians] were attacking us with all means."

2 July 1991
The heaviest fighting of the war to date took place during 2 July. The Domžale radio transmitter was attacked at 10:37 UTC (11:37 local time) and heavily damaged by two JNA MiG-21 planes. During the rest of the day there were a number of major set-backs for the JNA. The JNA convoy in the Krakovo Forest came under sustained attack from TO units, forcing it to surrender. Units from the JNA's Fourth Armoured Brigade attempted to move up from Jastrebarsko in Croatia but were beaten back near the border town of Bregana. The Slovenian TO mounted successful attacks on border crossings at Šentilj, Gornja Radgona, Fernetiči and Gorjansko, overrunning them and taking a number of JNA troops prisoner. A protracted engagement between JNA and Slovenian TO forces took place during the afternoon and evening at Dravograd, and a number of JNA facilities around the country fell to Slovenian forces.

At 21:00, the Slovenian presidency announced a unilateral ceasefire. However, this was rejected by the JNA leadership, which vowed to "take control" and crush Slovenian resistance.

3 July 1991
A large JNA armoured convoy set off from Belgrade on the morning of 3 July, ostensibly to go to Slovenia. It never arrived; according to the official account, this was due to mechanical breakdowns.

Fighting continued in Slovenia, with a JNA relief force heading for the Gornja Radgona border crossing being halted near Radenci. JNA forces at the Kog border crossing were also attacked by TO units. In the evening, the JNA agreed to a ceasefire and a withdrawal to barracks. In a separate incident not far from Radenci, in the village of Hrastje–Mota, a Yugoslav Mi-8 helicopter developed mechanical problems and was forced to land. The helicopter was seized by the Slovene military, but was deemed not suitable for the newly created air force and handed back to Belgrade on 13 August.

4–6 July 1991
With a ceasefire now in force, the two sides disengaged. Slovenian forces took control of all of the country's border crossings, and JNA units were allowed to withdraw peacefully to barracks and to cross the border to Croatia.

7 July 1991 and afterwards
The Ten-Day War was formally ended with the Brioni Accord, signed on the Croatian Brijuni Islands. Slovenian and Croatian independence were agreed to. The terms were distinctly favourable to Slovenia; it was agreed that Slovenia and Croatia would postpone their independence for three months—which in practical terms had little real impact—and the Slovenian police and armed forces (Slovenian Territorial Defence) were recognised as sovereign on their territory.

It was agreed that all Yugoslav military units would leave Slovenia, with the Yugoslav government setting a deadline of the end of October to complete the process. The Slovenian government insisted that the withdrawal should proceed on its terms; the JNA was not allowed to take much of its heavy weaponry and equipment, which was later either deployed locally or sold to other Yugoslav republics. The withdrawal began about ten days later and was completed by 26 October.

Casualties
Due to the short duration and low intensity of the war, casualties were not high. According to Slovenian estimates, the JNA suffered 44 fatalities and 146 wounded, while the Slovenians had 19 killed and 182 wounded, 6 Slovenian civilians were killed. Twelve foreign nationals were also killed in the conflict, principally journalists and Bulgarian truck drivers who had strayed into the line of fire. 4,692 JNA soldiers and 252 federal police officers were captured by the Slovenian side. According to post-war assessments made by the JNA, its material losses amounted to 31 tanks, 22 armoured personnel carriers, 6 helicopters, 6,787 infantry weapons, 87 artillery pieces and 124 air defence weapons damaged, destroyed or confiscated. Property damage was not heavy, due to the scattered and short-term nature of the fighting.

Ljubljana Airport bombing
In the opening stages of the Ten-Day War, the Yugoslav authorities bombed the airport. Two Austrian journalists were killed, and several commercial aircraft were damaged in the process.

Holmec incident
The border station at Holmec was the location of an alleged war crime perpetrated by Slovenian TO forces on 28 June, and filmed by the Austrian public broadcasting station ORF. Video footage shows a small group of JNA soldiers standing or walking slowly with raised hands, holding up a white sheet in an apparent attempt to surrender. Moments later, gunfire is heard and the soldiers fall or jump to the ground. Neither the origin of the gunfire nor its exact effect are clearly visible on the video segment. Slovene officials maintain that the JNA soldiers jumped for cover and were not hit, and that the matter was thoroughly investigated years ago. However, the incident sparked renewed public debate after the footage was shown on Serbian TV station B92 in 2006, with many claiming that the soldiers were shot and killed by Slovenian TO troops and that Slovenia is trying to cover up the affair.

The fate of the JNA soldiers identified on the footage is disputed. One report claims that the soldiers are still alive, 15 years after the conflict. Other reports identify three young soldiers as victims (Zoran Ješić, Goran Maletić and Antonio Šimunović) and claim that they were killed in the Holmec incident.

Strategic aspects
The actions of Slovenia's forces were largely dictated by the military strategy devised some months before and were tightly integrated with an equally detailed media management plan. An international media centre was established prior to the outbreak of conflict with Jelko Kacin designated to act as information minister and Slovenia's public face to the world. The Slovenian government and media successfully presented the conflict to Western European audiences as a case of a "David versus Goliath" struggle between an emerging democracy and an authoritarian communist state, and the columns of Yugoslav tanks brought to mind the events of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 two years earlier. This won considerable international sympathy and favourable media coverage for the cause of independent Slovenia.

The Slovenians had the advantage of superior morale, compared to their adversaries in the Yugoslav army. Many of the Yugoslav soldiers did not realise they were taking part in a real military operation, rather than an exercise, until they came under attack. They sent only 2000 untried conscripts, which split up into smaller groups. It was a tactical error. The officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins and in many cases ideologically committed to Yugoslav unity. The rank and file troops however were conscripts, many of whom had no strong motivation in fighting against Slovenes. Of the soldiers of the 5th Military District, which was in action in Slovenia, in 1990 30% were Albanians, 20% Croats, 15 to 20% Serbs and Montenegrins, 10% Bosniaks, and 8% Slovenes.

The Slovenians were also well aware that the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević was not particularly concerned about Slovenia's independence, given the lack of any significant Serbian minority in the country. On 30 June, Defence Minister General Kadijević suggested to the Yugoslav federal presidency a massive attack on Slovenia to break down the unexpectedly heavy resistance. But the Serb representative, Borisav Jović, shocked the military establishment by declaring that Serbia did not support further military action against Slovenia. Serbia was at this point more concerned with the situation in Croatia; even before the war had ended, JNA troops were already repositioning themselves for the imminent war in Croatia.

According to the journalist Hermann Tertsch, who covered that war firsthand:

"The weak military deployment of the federal army had only two reasons, the external cosmetic, to claim that Belgrade defended its international borders. And the collection of property from its bases in Slovenia, especially from the borders with Austria and Italy. On the 25th the independence of this ethnically homogeneous republic had been proclaimed, without a religious minority or any Serb legacy. On July 7, having collected properties and documents from the barracks, the Yugoslav army, in reality already pan-Serbian, left a Slovenia that Milosevic and his generals did not give a damn about."

Consequences of the war
For Slovenia, the war marked the decisive defence of its independence in regard to Yugoslavia. It was officially recognised by all European Community member states on 15 January 1992 and joined the United Nations on 22 May.

The war led to a series of major shifts on the Yugoslav side. The JNA eventually lost nearly all of its Slovenian and Croat personnel, becoming an almost entirely Serbian and Montenegrin force. Its poor performance in Slovenia and later in Croatia discredited its leadership – Kadijević resigned as defence minister in January 1992, and Adžić was forced into medical retirement shortly afterwards.

The Slovenian and Croatian governments were urged by the European Commission to freeze their declaration of independence for a period of three months, hoping to ease tension, to which Slovenia and Croatia agreed. Slovenia used the period to consolidate its institutions, deliver some of the most urgent economic reforms and prepare for international recognition of the country.

title: Ten-Day War


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Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Jenny Nunis

 * The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or on a Votes for Undeletion nomination).  No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was Speedied. android 79  00:01, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

Jenny Nunis
Vanity page; no hits on Google, no verfiability. Mel Etitis ( Μελ Ετητης ) 22:17, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete (to keep things clear). --Mel Etitis ( Μελ Ετητης ) 22:17, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Speedy Delete WP:CSD A7, fails WP:MUSIC (AllMusic] has Fluffer listed, but it's the wrong band), WP:VAIN. --Kgf0 23:11, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in an undeletion request). No further edits should be made to this page.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


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Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Brief history of Cuban espionage and related extraterritorial activity

 * The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or on a Votes for Undeletion nomination).  No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was DELETE. Linuxbeak | Talk 19:24, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Brief history of Cuban espionage and related extraterritorial activity
Delete Text essentially duplicates that of both Castro-directed overt and covert operations (which currently subject to an AfD and History of Cuban espionage (which is not). All three were started by the same author.  At most, we need one such article and since I can't imagine anyone will likely type in the name of this article, I'm bringing this one to AfD instead being bold and making it a redirect to History of Cuban espionage. Caerwine 22:18, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete. As per above. --cjllw | TALK  06:33, 11 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. Dito. --Ezeu 00:13, 13 October 2005 (UTC)
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in an undeletion request). No further edits should be made to this page.


text: User talk:198.30.106.13

title: User talk:198.30.106.13


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Financial crisis

A financial crisis is any of a broad variety of situations in which some financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their nominal value. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, many financial crises were associated with banking panics, and many recessions coincided with these panics. Other situations that are often called financial crises include stock market crashes and the bursting of other financial bubbles, currency crises, and sovereign defaults. Financial crises directly result in a loss of paper wealth but do not necessarily result in significant changes in the real economy (for example, the crisis resulting from the famous tulip mania bubble in the 17th century).

Many economists have offered theories about how financial crises develop and how they could be prevented. There is little consensus and financial crises continue to occur from time to time. It is apparent however that a consistent feature of both economic (and other applied finance disciplines) is the obvious inability to predict and avert financial crises. This realization raises the question as to what is known and also capable of being known (i.e. the epistemology) within economics and applied finance. It has been argued that the assumptions of unique, well-defined causal chains being present in economic thinking, models and data, could, in part, explain why financial crises are often inherent and unavoidable.

Banking crisis
When a bank suffers a sudden rush of withdrawals by depositors, this is called a bank run. Since banks lend out most of the cash they receive in deposits (see fractional-reserve banking), it is difficult for them to quickly pay back all deposits if these are suddenly demanded, so a run renders the bank insolvent, causing customers to lose their deposits, to the extent that they are not covered by deposit insurance. An event in which bank runs are widespread is called a systemic banking crisis or banking panic.

Examples of bank runs include the run on the Bank of the United States in 1931 and the run on Northern Rock in 2007. Banking crises generally occur after periods of risky lending and resulting loan defaults.

Currency crisis
A currency crisis, also called a devaluation crisis, is normally considered as part of a financial crisis. Kaminsky et al. (1998), for instance, define currency crises as occurring when a weighted average of monthly percentage depreciations in the exchange rate and monthly percentage declines in exchange reserves exceeds its mean by more than three standard deviations. Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of a currency of at least 25% but it is also defined as at least a 10% increase in the rate of depreciation. In general, a currency crisis can be defined as a situation when the participants in an exchange market come to recognize that a pegged exchange rate is about to fail, causing speculation against the peg that hastens the failure and forces a devaluation.

Speculative bubbles and crashes
A speculative bubble (also called a financial bubble or an economic bubble) exists in the event of large, sustained overpricing of some class of assets. One factor that frequently contributes to a bubble is the presence of buyers who purchase an asset based solely on the expectation that they can later resell it at a higher price, rather than calculating the income it will generate in the future. If there is a bubble, there is also a risk of a crash in asset prices: market participants will go on buying only as long as they expect others to buy, and when many decide to sell the price will fall. However, it is difficult to predict whether an asset's price actually equals its fundamental value, so it is hard to detect bubbles reliably. Some economists insist that bubbles never or almost never occur. Well-known examples of bubbles (or purported bubbles) and crashes in stock prices and other asset prices include the 17th century Dutch tulip mania, the 18th century South Sea Bubble, the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Japanese property bubble of the 1980s, and the crash of the United States housing bubble during 2006–2008. The 2000s sparked a real estate bubble where housing prices were increasing significantly as an asset good.

International financial crisis
When a country that maintains a fixed exchange rate is suddenly forced to devalue its currency due to accruing an unsustainable current account deficit, this is called a currency crisis or balance of payments crisis. When a country fails to pay back its sovereign debt, this is called a sovereign default. While devaluation and default could both be voluntary decisions of the government, they are often perceived to be the involuntary results of a change in investor sentiment that leads to a sudden stop in capital inflows or a sudden increase in capital flight.

Several currencies that formed part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism suffered crises in 1992–93 and were forced to devalue or withdraw from the mechanism. Another round of currency crises took place in Asia in 1997–98. Many Latin American countries defaulted on their debt in the early 1980s. The 1998 Russian financial crisis resulted in a devaluation of the ruble and default on Russian government bonds.

Wider economic crisis
Negative GDP growth lasting two or more quarters is called a recession. An especially prolonged or severe recession may be called a depression, while a long period of slow but not necessarily negative growth is sometimes called economic stagnation.

Some economists argue that many recessions have been caused in large part by financial crises. One important example is the Great Depression, which was preceded in many countries by bank runs and stock market crashes. The subprime mortgage crisis and the bursting of other real estate bubbles around the world also led to recession in the U.S. and a number of other countries in late 2008 and 2009. Some economists argue that financial crises are caused by recessions instead of the other way around, and that even where a financial crisis is the initial shock that sets off a recession, other factors may be more important in prolonging the recession. In particular, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that the initial economic decline associated with the crash of 1929 and the bank panics of the 1930s would not have turned into a prolonged depression if it had not been reinforced by monetary policy mistakes on the part of the Federal Reserve, a position supported by Ben Bernanke.

Strategic complementarities in financial markets
It is often observed that successful investment requires each investor in a financial market to guess what other investors will do. Reflexivity refers to the circular relationships often evident in social systems between cause and effect - and relates to the property of self-referencing in financial markets. George Soros has been a proponent of the reflexivity paradigm surrounding financial crises. Similarly, John Maynard Keynes compared financial markets to a beauty contest game in which each participant tries to predict which model other participants will consider most beautiful.

Furthermore, in many cases, investors have incentives to coordinate their choices. For example, someone who thinks other investors want to heavily buy Japanese yen may expect the yen to rise in value, and therefore has an incentive to buy yen, too. Likewise, a depositor in IndyMac Bank who expects other depositors to withdraw their funds may expect the bank to fail, and therefore has an incentive to withdraw, too. Economists call an incentive to mimic the strategies of others strategic complementarity.

It has been argued that if people or firms have a sufficiently strong incentive to do the same thing they expect others to do, then self-fulfilling prophecies may occur. For example, if investors expect the value of the yen to rise, this may cause its value to rise; if depositors expect a bank to fail this may cause it to fail. Therefore, financial crises are sometimes viewed as a vicious circle in which investors shun some institution or asset because they expect others to do so. Reflexivity poses a challenge to the epistemic norms typically assumed within financial economics and all of empirical finance. The possibility of financial crises being beyond the predictive reach of causality is discussed further within Epistemology of finance.

Leverage
Leverage, which means borrowing to finance investments, is frequently cited as a contributor to financial crises. When a financial institution (or an individual) only invests its own money, it can, in the very worst case, lose its own money. But when it borrows in order to invest more, it can potentially earn more from its investment, but it can also lose more than all it has. Therefore, leverage magnifies the potential returns from investment, but also creates a risk of bankruptcy. Since bankruptcy means that a firm fails to honor all its promised payments to other firms, it may spread financial troubles from one firm to another (see 'Contagion' below).

For example, borrowing to finance investment in the stock market ("margin buying") became increasingly common prior to the Wall Street Crash of 1929.

Asset-liability mismatch
Another factor believed to contribute to financial crises is asset-liability mismatch, a situation in which the risks associated with an institution's debts and assets are not appropriately aligned. For example, commercial banks offer deposit accounts that can be withdrawn at any time, and they use the proceeds to make long-term loans to businesses and homeowners. The mismatch between the banks' short-term liabilities (its deposits) and its long-term assets (its loans) is seen as one of the reasons bank runs occur (when depositors panic and decide to withdraw their funds more quickly than the bank can get back the proceeds of its loans). Likewise, Bear Stearns failed in 2007–08 because it was unable to renew the short-term debt it used to finance long-term investments in mortgage securities.

In an international context, many emerging market governments are unable to sell bonds denominated in their own currencies, and therefore sell bonds denominated in US dollars instead. This generates a mismatch between the currency denomination of their liabilities (their bonds) and their assets (their local tax revenues), so that they run a risk of sovereign default due to fluctuations in exchange rates.

Uncertainty and herd behavior
Many analyses of financial crises emphasize the role of investment mistakes caused by lack of knowledge or the imperfections of human reasoning. Behavioural finance studies errors in economic and quantitative reasoning. Psychologist Torbjorn K A Eliazon has also analyzed failures of economic reasoning in his concept of 'œcopathy'.

Historians, notably Charles P. Kindleberger, have pointed out that crises often follow soon after major financial or technical innovations that present investors with new types of financial opportunities, which he called "displacements" of investors' expectations. Early examples include the South Sea Bubble and Mississippi Bubble of 1720, which occurred when the notion of investment in shares of company stock was itself new and unfamiliar, and the Crash of 1929, which followed the introduction of new electrical and transportation technologies. More recently, many financial crises followed changes in the investment environment brought about by financial deregulation, and the crash of the dot com bubble in 2001 arguably began with "irrational exuberance" about Internet technology.

Unfamiliarity with recent technical and financial innovations may help explain how investors sometimes grossly overestimate asset values. Also, if the first investors in a new class of assets (for example, stock in "dot com" companies) profit from rising asset values as other investors learn about the innovation (in our example, as others learn about the potential of the Internet), then still more others may follow their example, driving the price even higher as they rush to buy in hopes of similar profits. If such "herd behaviour" causes prices to spiral up far above the true value of the assets, a crash may become inevitable. If for any reason the price briefly falls, so that investors realize that further gains are not assured, then the spiral may go into reverse, with price decreases causing a rush of sales, reinforcing the decrease in prices.

Regulatory failures
Governments have attempted to eliminate or mitigate financial crises by regulating the financial sector. One major goal of regulation is transparency: making institutions' financial situations publicly known by requiring regular reporting under standardized accounting procedures. Another goal of regulation is making sure institutions have sufficient assets to meet their contractual obligations, through reserve requirements, capital requirements, and other limits on leverage.

Some financial crises have been blamed on insufficient regulation, and have led to changes in regulation in order to avoid a repeat. For example, the former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, has blamed the financial crisis of 2007–2008 on 'regulatory failure to guard against excessive risk-taking in the financial system, especially in the US'. Likewise, the New York Times singled out the deregulation of credit default swaps as a cause of the crisis.

However, excessive regulation has also been cited as a possible cause of financial crises. In particular, the Basel II Accord has been criticized for requiring banks to increase their capital when risks rise, which might cause them to decrease lending precisely when capital is scarce, potentially aggravating a financial crisis.

International regulatory convergence has been interpreted in terms of regulatory herding, deepening market herding (discussed above) and so increasing systemic risk. From this perspective, maintaining diverse regulatory regimes would be a safeguard.

Fraud has played a role in the collapse of some financial institutions, when companies have attracted depositors with misleading claims about their investment strategies, or have embezzled the resulting income. Examples include Charles Ponzi's scam in early 20th century Boston, the collapse of the MMM investment fund in Russia in 1994, the scams that led to the Albanian Lottery Uprising of 1997, and the collapse of Madoff Investment Securities in 2008.

Many rogue traders that have caused large losses at financial institutions have been accused of acting fraudulently in order to hide their trades. Fraud in mortgage financing has also been cited as one possible cause of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis; government officials stated on 23 September 2008 that the FBI was looking into possible fraud by mortgage financing companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and insurer American International Group. Likewise it has been argued that many financial companies failed in the because their managers failed to carry out their fiduciary duties.

Contagion
Contagion refers to the idea that financial crises may spread from one institution to another, as when a bank run spreads from a few banks to many others, or from one country to another, as when currency crises, sovereign defaults, or stock market crashes spread across countries. When the failure of one particular financial institution threatens the stability of many other institutions, this is called systemic risk.

One widely cited example of contagion was the spread of the Thai crisis in 1997 to other countries like South Korea. However, economists often debate whether observing crises in many countries around the same time is truly caused by contagion from one market to another, or whether it is instead caused by similar underlying problems that would have affected each country individually even in the absence of international linkages.

Interest rate disparity and capital flows
The nineteenth century Banking School theory of crises suggested that crises were caused by flows of investment capital between areas with different rates of interest. Capital could be borrowed in areas with low interest rates and invested in areas of high interest. Using this method a small profit could be made with little or no capital. However, when interest rates changed and the incentive for the flow was removed or reversed sudden changes in capital flows could occur. The subjects of investment might be starved of cash possibly becoming insolvent and creating a credit crunch and the loaning banks would be left with defaulting investors leading to a banking crisis. As Charles Read has pointed out, the modern equivalent of this process involves the Carry Trade, see Carry (investment).

Recessionary effects
Some financial crises have little effect outside of the financial sector, like the Wall Street crash of 1987, but other crises are believed to have played a role in decreasing growth in the rest of the economy. There are many theories why a financial crisis could have a recessionary effect on the rest of the economy. These theoretical ideas include the 'financial accelerator', 'flight to quality' and 'flight to liquidity', and the Kiyotaki-Moore model. Some 'third generation' models of currency crises explore how currency crises and banking crises together can cause recessions.

Austrian theories
Austrian School economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek discussed the business cycle starting with Mises' Theory of Money and Credit, published in 1912.

Marxist theories
Recurrent major depressions in the world economy at the pace of 20 and 50 years have been the subject of studies since Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi (1773–1842) provided the first theory of crisis in a critique of classical political economy's assumption of equilibrium between supply and demand. Developing an economic crisis theory became the central recurring concept throughout Karl Marx's mature work. Marx's law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall borrowed many features of the presentation of John Stuart Mill's discussion Of the Tendency of Profits to a Minimum (Principles of Political Economy Book IV Chapter IV). The theory is a corollary of the Tendency towards the Centralization of Profits.

In a capitalist system, successfully-operating businesses return less money to their workers (in the form of wages) than the value of the goods produced by those workers (i.e. the amount of money the products are sold for). This profit first goes towards covering the initial investment in the business. In the long-run, however, when one considers the combined economic activity of all successfully-operating business, it is clear that less money (in the form of wages) is being returned to the mass of the population (the workers) than is available to them to buy all of these goods being produced. Furthermore, the expansion of businesses in the process of competing for markets leads to an abundance of goods and a general fall in their prices, further exacerbating the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.

The viability of this theory depends upon two main factors: firstly, the degree to which profit is taxed by government and returned to the mass of people in the form of welfare, family benefits and health and education spending; and secondly, the proportion of the population who are workers rather than investors/business owners. Given the extraordinary capital expenditure required to enter modern economic sectors like airline transport, the military industry, or chemical production, these sectors are extremely difficult for new businesses to enter and are being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

Empirical and econometric research continues especially in the world systems theory and in the debate about Nikolai Kondratiev and the so-called 50-years Kondratiev waves. Major figures of world systems theory, like Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, consistently warned about the crash that the world economy is now facing. World systems scholars and Kondratiev cycle researchers always implied that Washington Consensus oriented economists never understood the dangers and perils, which leading industrial nations will be facing and are now facing at the end of the long economic cycle which began after the oil crisis of 1973.

Minsky's theory
Hyman Minsky has proposed a post-Keynesian explanation that is most applicable to a closed economy. He theorized that financial fragility is a typical feature of any capitalist economy. High fragility leads to a higher risk of a financial crisis. To facilitate his analysis, Minsky defines three approaches to financing firms may choose, according to their tolerance of risk. They are hedge finance, speculative finance, and Ponzi finance. Ponzi finance leads to the most fragility.
 * for hedge finance, income flows are expected to meet financial obligations in every period, including both the principal and the interest on loans.
 * for speculative finance, a firm must roll over debt because income flows are expected to only cover interest costs. None of the principal is paid off.
 * for Ponzi finance, expected income flows will not even cover interest cost, so the firm must borrow more or sell off assets simply to service its debt. The hope is that either the market value of assets or income will rise enough to pay off interest and principal.

Financial fragility levels move together with the business cycle. After a recession, firms have lost much financing and choose only hedge, the safest. As the economy grows and expected profits rise, firms tend to believe that they can allow themselves to take on speculative financing. In this case, they know that profits will not cover all the interest all the time. Firms, however, believe that profits will rise and the loans will eventually be repaid without much trouble. More loans lead to more investment, and the economy grows further. Then lenders also start believing that they will get back all the money they lend. Therefore, they are ready to lend to firms without full guarantees of success.

Lenders know that such firms will have problems repaying. Still, they believe these firms will refinance from elsewhere as their expected profits rise. This is Ponzi financing. In this way, the economy has taken on much risky credit. Now it is only a question of time before some big firm actually defaults. Lenders understand the actual risks in the economy and stop giving credit so easily. Refinancing becomes impossible for many, and more firms default. If no new money comes into the economy to allow the refinancing process, a real economic crisis begins. During the recession, firms start to hedge again, and the cycle is closed.

Banking School theory of crises
The Banking School theory of crises describes a continuous cycle driven by varying interest rates. It is based on the work of Thomas Tooke, Thomas Attwood, Henry Thornton, William Jevons and a number of bankers opposed to the Bank Charter Act 1844.

Starting at a time when short-term interest rates are low, frustration builds up among investors who search for a better yield in countries and locations with higher rates, leading to increased capital flows to countries with higher rates. Internally, short-term rates rise above long-term rates causing failures where borrowing at short term rates has been used to invest long-term where the funds cannot be liquidated quickly (a similar mechanism was implicated in the March 2023 failure of SVB Bank). Internationally, arbitrage and the need to stop capital flows, which caused bullion drains in the gold standard of the nineteenth century and drains of foreign capital later, bring interest rates in the low-rate country up to equal those in the country which is the subject of investment.

The capital flows reverse or cease suddenly causing the subject of investment to be starved of funds and the remaining investors (often those who are least knowledgeable) to be left with devalued assets. Bankruptcies, defaults and bank failures follow as rates are pushed high. After the crisis governments push short-term interest rates low again to diminish the cost of servicing government borrowing which has been used to overcome the crisis. Funds build up again looking for investment opportunities and the cycle restarts from the beginning.

Coordination games
Mathematical approaches to modeling financial crises have emphasized that there is often positive feedback between market participants' decisions (see strategic complementarity). Positive feedback implies that there may be dramatic changes in asset values in response to small changes in economic fundamentals. For example, some models of currency crises (including that of Paul Krugman) imply that a fixed exchange rate may be stable for a long period of time, but will collapse suddenly in an avalanche of currency sales in response to a sufficient deterioration of government finances or underlying economic conditions.

According to some theories, positive feedback implies that the economy can have more than one equilibrium. There may be an equilibrium in which market participants invest heavily in asset markets because they expect assets to be valuable. This is the type of argument underlying Diamond and Dybvig's model of bank runs, in which savers withdraw their assets from the bank because they expect others to withdraw too. Likewise, in Obstfeld's model of currency crises, when economic conditions are neither too bad nor too good, there are two possible outcomes: speculators may or may not decide to attack the currency depending on what they expect other speculators to do.

Herding models and learning models
A variety of models have been developed in which asset values may spiral excessively up or down as investors learn from each other. In these models, asset purchases by a few agents encourage others to buy too, not because the true value of the asset increases when many buy (which is called "strategic complementarity"), but because investors come to believe the true asset value is high when they observe others buying.

In "herding" models, it is assumed that investors are fully rational, but only have partial information about the economy. In these models, when a few investors buy some type of asset, this reveals that they have some positive information about that asset, which increases the rational incentive of others to buy the asset too. Even though this is a fully rational decision, it may sometimes lead to mistakenly high asset values (implying, eventually, a crash) since the first investors may, by chance, have been mistaken. Herding models, based on Complexity Science, indicate that it is the internal structure of the market, not external influences, which is primarily responsible for crashes.

In "adaptive learning" or "adaptive expectations" models, investors are assumed to be imperfectly rational, basing their reasoning only on recent experience. In such models, if the price of a given asset rises for some period of time, investors may begin to believe that its price always rises, which increases their tendency to buy and thus drives the price up further. Likewise, observing a few price decreases may give rise to a downward price spiral, so in models of this type, large fluctuations in asset prices may occur. Agent-based models of financial markets often assume investors act on the basis of adaptive learning or adaptive expectations.

Global financial crisis
As the most recent and most damaging financial crisis event, the Global financial crisis, deserves special attention, as its causes, effects, response, and lessons are most applicable to the current financial system.

History
A noted survey of financial crises is This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, by economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, who are regarded as among the foremost historians of financial crises. In this survey, they trace the history of financial crisis back to sovereign defaults – default on public debt, – which were the form of crisis prior to the 18th century and continue, then and now causing private bank failures; crises since the 18th century feature both public debt default and private debt default. Reinhart and Rogoff also class debasement of currency and hyperinflation as being forms of financial crisis, broadly speaking, because they lead to unilateral reduction (repudiation) of debt.

Prior to 19th century
Reinhart and Rogoff trace inflation (to reduce debt) to Dionysius I rule in Syracuse and begin their "eight centuries" in 1258; debasement of currency also occurred under the Roman Empire and Byzantine Empire. A financial crisis in 33 A.D. caused by a contraction of money supply had been recorded by several Roman historians.

Among the earliest crises Reinhart and Rogoff study is the 1340 default of England, due to setbacks in its war with France (the Hundred Years' War; see details). Further early sovereign defaults include seven defaults by the Spanish Empire, four under Philip II, three under his successors.

Other global and national financial mania since the 17th century include:
 * 1637: Bursting of tulip mania in the Netherlands – while tulip mania is popularly reported as an example of a financial crisis, and was a speculative bubble, modern scholarship holds that its broader economic impact was limited to negligible, and that it did not precipitate a financial crisis.
 * 1720: Bursting of South Sea Bubble (Great Britain) and Mississippi Bubble (France) – earliest of modern financial crises; in both cases the company assumed the national debt of the country (80–85% in Great Britain, 100% in France), and thereupon the bubble burst. The resulting crisis of confidence probably had a deep impact on the financial and political development of France.
 * Crisis of 1763 - started in Amsterdam, begun by the collapse of Johann Ernst Gotzkowsky and Leendert Pieter de Neufville's bank, spread to Germany and Scandinavia.
 * Crisis of 1772 – in London and Amsterdam. 20 important banks in London went bankrupt after one banking house defaulted (bankers Neal, James, Fordyce and Down)
 * France's Financial and Debt Crisis (1783–1788)- France severe financial crisis due to the immense debt accrued through the French involvement in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the American Revolution (1775–1783).
 * Panic of 1792 – run on banks in US precipitated by the expansion of credit by the newly formed Bank of the United States
 * Panic of 1796–1797 – British and US credit crisis caused by land speculation bubble

19th century

 * Danish state bankruptcy of 1813
 * Financial Crisis of 1818 - in England caused banks to call in loans and curtail new lending, draining specie out of the U.S.
 * Panic of 1819: pervasive USA economic recession w/ bank failures; culmination of U.S.'s 1st boom-to-bust economic cycle
 * Panic of 1825: pervasive British economic recession in which many British banks failed, & Bank of England nearly failed
 * Panic of 1837: pervasive USA economic recession w/ bank failures; a 5-year depression ensued
 * Panic of 1847: a collapse of British financial markets associated with the end of the 1840s railway boom. Also see Bank Charter Act of 1844
 * Panic of 1857: pervasive USA economic recession w/ bank failures. The world economy was also more interconnected by the 1850s, which also made the Panic of 1857 the first worldwide economic crisis.
 * Panic of 1866: the Overend Gurney crisis (primarily British)
 * Black Friday (1869): aka Gold Panic of 1869
 * Panic of 1873: pervasive USA economic recession w/ bank failures, known then as the 5 year Great Depression & now as the Long Depression
 * Panic of 1884: a panic in the United States centred on New York banks
 * Panic of 1890: aka Baring Crisis; near-failure of a major London bank led to corresponding South American financial crises
 * Panic of 1893: a panic in the United States marked by the collapse of railroad overbuilding and shaky railroad financing which set off a series of bank failures
 * Australian banking crisis of 1893
 * Panic of 1896: an acute economic depression in the United States precipitated by a drop in silver reserves and market concerns on the effects it would have on the gold standard

20th century

 * Panic of 1901: limited to crashing of the New York Stock Exchange
 * Panic of 1907: pervasive USA economic recession w/ bank failures
 * Panic of 1910–1911
 * 1910: Shanghai rubber stock market crisis
 * 1914: The Great Financial Crisis (see Aldrich-Vreeland Act)
 * Wall Street Crash of 1929, followed by the Great Depression: the largest and most important economic depression in the 20th century
 * 1937-1938: an economic downturn that occurred during the Great Depression.
 * 1973: 1973 oil crisis – oil prices soared, causing the 1973–1974 stock market crash
 * Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975: United KingdomPanic of 1884.jpg
 * 1980s: Latin American debt crisis – beginning in Mexico in 1982 with the Mexican Weekend
 * 1980s-1990: Savings and loan crisis
 * Bank stock crisis (Israel 1983)
 * 1987: Black Monday (1987) – the largest one-day percentage decline in stock market history
 * 1988–1992 Norwegian banking crisis
 * 1989–1991:🇺🇸 United States Savings & Loan crisis
 * 1990: Japanese asset price bubble collapsed
 * Early 1990s: Scandinavian banking crisis, Swedish banking crisis, Finnish banking crisis of 1990s
 * Early 1990s recession
 * 1991: 🇮🇳 1991 Indian economic crisis
 * 1992–1993: Black Wednesday – speculative attacks on currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
 * 1994–1995: 🇲🇽 Economic crisis in Mexico – speculative attack and default on Mexican debt
 * 1997–1998: 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – devaluations and banking crises across Asia
 * 1998: 🇷🇺 Russian financial crisis

21st century

 * 2000–2001: 🇹🇷 2001 Turkish economic crisis
 * 2000: Early 2000s recession
 * 1999–2002: 🇦🇷 Argentine economic crisis (1999-2002)
 * 2001: Bursting of dot-com bubble
 * 2007–2008: Global financial crisis of 2007–2008
 * 2008–2011: 🇮🇸 Icelandic financial crisis
 * 2008–2014: 🇪🇸 Spanish financial crisis
 * 2009–2010: European debt crisis
 * 2010–2018: 🇬🇷 Greek government-debt crisis
 * 2013–: 🇻🇪 Ongoing Venezuelan economic crisis
 * 2014: 🇧🇷 2014 Brazilian economic crisis
 * 2014–2016: 🇷🇺 Russian financial crisis
 * 2018–: 🇹🇷 Ongoing Turkish currency and debt crisis
 * 2019–: 🇱🇰 Ongoing Sri Lankan currency and debt crisis
 * 2019–: 🇱🇧 Ongoing Lebanese liquidity crisis
 * 2020: 2020 stock market crash (especially Black Monday and Black Thursday)
 * 2022: 🇷🇺 Russian financial crisis
 * 2022–: 🇵🇰 Ongoing Pakistani currency and debt crisis

General perspectives

 * Walter Bagehot (1873), Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market.
 * Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber (2005), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 ISBN 978-1-4039-3651-6).
 * Gernot Kohler and Emilio José Chaves (Editors) "Globalization: Critical Perspectives" Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers ISBN 1-59033-346-2. With contributions by Samir Amin, Christopher Chase Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein
 * Hyman P. Minsky (1986, 2008), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.
 * Joachim Vogt (2014), Fear, Folly, and Financial Crises – Some Policy Lessons from History, UBS Center Public Papers, Issue 2, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Zurich.
 * Joachim Vogt (2014), Fear, Folly, and Financial Crises – Some Policy Lessons from History, UBS Center Public Papers, Issue 2, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Zurich.
 * Joachim Vogt (2014), Fear, Folly, and Financial Crises – Some Policy Lessons from History, UBS Center Public Papers, Issue 2, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Zurich.

Banking crises

 * Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (2007), Understanding Financial Crises.
 * Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber (2014), Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 * Jean-Charles Rochet (2008), Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation.
 * R. Glenn Hubbard, ed., (1991) Financial Markets and Financial Crises.
 * Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2008), 'Systemic banking crises: a new database'. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 08/224.
 * Thomas Marois (2012), States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK.
 * Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2008), 'Systemic banking crises: a new database'. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 08/224.
 * Thomas Marois (2012), States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK.

Bubbles and crashes

 * Dutton, Roy (2010), Financial Meltdown 2010 (Hardback). Infodial. ISBN 978-0-9556554-3-2
 * Charles Mackay (1841), Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds
 * Didier Sornette (2003), Why Stock Markets Crash, Princeton University Press.
 * Robert J. Shiller (1999, 2006), Irrational Exuberance.
 * Markus Brunnermeier (2008), 'Bubbles', New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed.
 * Douglas French (2009) Early Speculative Bubbles and Increases in the Supply of Money
 * Markus K. Brunnermeier (2001), Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding, Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829698-3.

International financial crises

 * Acocella, N. Di Bartolomeo, G. and Hughes Hallett, A. [2012], ‘Central banks and economic policy after the crisis: what have we learned?’, ch. 5 in: Baker, H.K. and Riddick, L.A. (eds.), ‘Survey of International Finance’, Oxford University Press.
 * Paul Krugman (1995), Currencies and Crises.
 * Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo (2008), 'Currency crisis models', New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed.
 * Maurice Obstfeld (1996), 'Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features'. European Economic Review 40.
 * Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (1998), 'Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks'. American Economic Review 88 (3).
 * Barry Eichengreen (2004), Capital Flows and Crises.
 * Charles Goodhart and P. Delargy (1998), 'Financial crises: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose'. International Finance 1 (2), pp. 261–87.
 * Jean Tirole (2002), Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System.
 * Guillermo Calvo (2005), Emerging Capital Markets in Turmoil: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?
 * Barry Eichengreen (2002), Financial Crises: And What to Do about Them.
 * Charles Calomiris (1998), 'Blueprints for a new global financial architecture'.

The Great Depression and earlier banking crises

 * Murray Rothbard (1962), The Panic of 1819
 * Murray Rothbard (1963), America`s Great Depression.
 * Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1971), A Monetary History of the United States.
 * Ben S. Bernanke (2000), Essays on the Great Depression.
 * Robert F. Bruner (2007), The Panic of 1907. Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm.

Recent international financial crises

 * Barry Eichengreen and Peter Lindert, eds., (1992), The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective.
 * Lessons from the Asian financial crisis / edited by Richard Carney. New York, NY : Routledge, 2009. ISBN 978-0-415-48190-8 (hardback) ISBN 0-415-48190-2 (hardback) ISBN 978-0-203-88477-5 (ebook) ISBN 0-203-88477-9 (ebook)
 * Robertson, Justin, 1972– US-Asia economic relations : a political economy of crisis and the rise of new business actors / Justin Robertson. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2008. ISBN 978-0-415-46951-7 (hbk.) ISBN 978-0-203-89052-3 (ebook)

2007–2012 financial crisis

 * Robert J. Shiller (2008), The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do About It. ISBN 0-691-13929-6.
 * JC Coffee, ‘What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1
 * Markus Brunnermeier (2009), 'Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–2008'. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1), pp. 77–100.
 * Paul Krugman (2008), The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. ISBN 0-393-07101-4.
 * "The myths about the economic crisis, the reformist left and economic democracy" by Takis Fotopoulos, The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, vol 4, no 4, Oct. 2008.
 * United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law. Working families in financial crisis : medical debt and bankruptcy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, 17 July 2007. Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2008. 277 p. : ISBN 978-0-16-081376-4 ISBN 016081376X
 * United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law. Working families in financial crisis : medical debt and bankruptcy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, 17 July 2007. Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2008. 277 p. : ISBN 978-0-16-081376-4 ISBN 016081376X

title: Financial crisis


text: User talk:69.144.161.182

title: User talk:69.144.161.182