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Right-wing paramilitarism in Colombia

Right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia (paramilitares de derecha) are paramilitary groups acting in opposition to revolutionary Marxist–Leninist guerrilla forces and their allies among the civilian population. These right-wing paramilitary groups control a large majority of the illegal drug trade of cocaine and other substances. The Colombian National Centre for Historical Memory has estimated that between 1981 and 2012 paramilitary groups have caused 38.4% of the civilian deaths, while the Guerillas are responsible for 16.8%, 10.1% by the Colombian Security Forces and 27.7% by non-identified armed groups, although the chief prosecutor of the ICC would contradict these numbers.

The first paramilitary groups were organized by the Colombian military following recommendations made by U.S. military counterinsurgency advisers who were sent to Colombia during the Cold War to combat leftist political activists and armed guerrilla groups. The development of more modern paramilitary groups has also involved elite landowners, drug traffickers, members of the security forces, politicians, civilians, and multinational corporations. Paramilitary violence today is principally targeted towards supposed left-wing insurgents and their supporters.

Plan Lazo
In October 1959, the United States sent a "Special Survey Team", composed of counterinsurgency experts, to investigate Colombia's internal security situation. This was due to the increased prevalence of armed communist groups in rural Colombia which formed during and after La Violencia. In February 1962, a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special Warfare team, headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough, visited Colombia for a second survey.

In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a paramilitary force to commit sabotage and terrorist acts against communists:

"A concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.'"

The new counter-insurgency policy was instituted as Plan Lazo in 1962 and called for both military operations and civic action programs in violent areas. Following Yarborough's recommendations, the Colombian military recruited civilians into paramilitary "civil defense" groups which worked alongside the military in its counter-insurgency campaign, as well as in civilian intelligence networks to gather information on guerrilla activity. Among other policy recommendations, the US team advised that "in order to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aid given for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature." It was not until the early part of the 1980s that the Colombian government attempted to move away from the counterinsurgency strategy represented by Plan Lazo and Yarborough's 1962 recommendations.

Law 48 of 1968
The first legal framework for the training of civilians by military or police forces for security purposes was formally established by the Colombian presidential decree 3398 of 1965, issued during a state of siege, which defined the defense of the nation as requiring "the organization and tasking of all of the residents of the country and its natural resources...to guarantee National Independence and institutional stability." This decree temporarily allowed the formation of private security forces used to protect large landowners, cattle ranchers, and government officials.

Decree 3398 was later succeeded by Law 48 of 1968, a piece of permanent legislation that gave the Colombian executive the power to establish civil patrols by decree and allowed the Defense Ministry to supply their members with military-grade weaponry. Human Rights Watch has pointed out that "although few civil patrols were ever formally created by the president, the military frequently cited Law 48 as the legal foundation for their support for all paramilitaries."

A series of Colombian military manuals from the 1960s encouraged the creation of paramilitary organizations to help fight guerrillas. In 1969, the Reglamento de EJC 3-10, Reservado, de 1969 ("EJC-3 Order, Restricted, 1969") stated that the armed forces should organize "self-defense committees" which were defined as "military-type organizations made up of civilian personnel in the combat zone, which are trained and equipped to undertake operations against guerrilla groups that threaten an area or to operate in coordination with combat troops". These committees were to maintain contact with local military officers, keeping a high level awareness about any suspicious communist action in their communities, in particular those of suspected "guerrilla supporters". The manual also allowed military personnel to dress in civilian clothes when necessary to infiltrate areas of suspected guerrilla influence and for civilian helpers to travel alongside military units. Separately, in order to help gain the trust of local citizens, the military was advised to participate in the daily activities of the community where and when applicable.

Triple A
Between 1978 and 1979, an alleged far-right paramilitary organization known as the American Anti-Communist Alliance (also AAA or Triple A) started a terror campaign against Colombian communists, which included bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. It was later revealed that the organization had direct links to the Colombian National Army. Contemporary accusations and declassified U.S. Embassy documents have linked the creation and operation to the "Charry Solano" Battalion of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence (BINCI) that employed the Triple A name as a covert name.

The rise of paramilitaries
In the late 1970s, the illegal cocaine trade took off and became a major source of profit. By 1982, cocaine surpassed coffee as a national export, making up 30% of all Colombian exports. Many members of the new class of wealthy drug barons began purchasing enormous quantities of land for a number of reasons: in order to launder their drug money and to gain social status among the traditional Colombian elite. By the late 1980s, drug traffickers were the largest landholders in Colombia and wielded immense political power. They raised private armies to fight off guerrillas who were trying to either redistribute their lands to local peasants, kidnap members of their family, or extract the gramaje tax that was commonly levied on landed elites.

Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS)
Between the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982, members of the Medellín Cartel, the Colombian military, the U.S.-based corporation Texas Petroleum, the Colombian legislature, small industrialists, and wealthy cattle ranchers came together in a series of meetings in Puerto Boyacá, and formed a paramilitary organization known as Muerte a Secuestradores ("Death to Kidnappers", MAS). They formed this organization to defend their economic interests, to fight against the guerrillas, and to provide protection for local elites from kidnappings and extortion. By 1983, Colombian internal affairs had registered 240 political killings by MAS death squads—mostly community leaders, elected officials, and farmers.

Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM)
The following year, the Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio ("Association of Middle Magdalena Ranchers and Farmers", ACDEGAM) was created to handle both the logistics and the public relations of the organization and to provide a legal front for various paramilitary groups. ACDEGAM worked to promote anti-labor policies and threatened anyone involved with organizing for labor or peasants' rights. The threats were backed by the MAS, which would come in and attack or assassinate anyone who was suspected of being a "subversive". ACDEGAM also built schools whose stated purpose was the creation of a "patriotic and anti-Communist" educational environment, built roads, bridges, and health clinics. Paramilitary recruiting, weapons storage, communications, propaganda, and medical services were all run out of ACDEGAM headquarters.

By the mid-1980s, ACDEGAM and MAS had experienced significant growth. In 1985, the powerful drug traffickers Pablo Escobar, Jorge Luis Ochoa, and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha began funneling large amounts of cash into the organization to pay for weaponry, equipment and training. Funding for social projects was cut and put towards strengthening the MAS. Modern battle rifles such as the IMI Galil, HK G3, FN FAL, and AKM were purchased from the military and INDUMIL through drug-funded private sales. The organization had computers and ran a communications center that worked in coordination with the state telecommunications office. They had thirty pilots and an assortment of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. U.S., Israeli, British and Australian military instructors were hired to teach at paramilitary training centers. According to the report by the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad ("DAS", Colombia's Administrative Security Department), between December 1987 and May 1988, Rodríguez Gacha hired Israeli and British mercenaries to train teams of assassins at remote training camps in Colombia. Yair Klein, a retired Israeli lieutenant colonel, acknowledged having led a team of instructors in Puerto Boyacá in early 1988.

Movimiento de Restauración Nacional (MORENA)
By the end of the 1980s, the MAS had a significant presence in 8 of Colombia's 32 departments—Antioquia, Boyacá, Caquetá, Córdoba, Cundinamarca, Meta, Putumayo, and Santander. During this period, a stated goal of the groups was to kill members of the Patriotic Union or any political groups that opposed drug trafficking. At the same time, they began to intensively involve themselves in municipal, regional, and national politics. In August 1989, the Movimiento de Restauración Nacional ("Movement of National Restoration", MORENA) was formed by members of ACDEGAM.

Critics of the MORENA experiment either saw it as an attempt at legitimizing paramilitarism and its abuses, as an extension of ACDEGAM, or as a copycat of El Salvador's ARENA.

The Castaño family and the ACCU
In the late 1970s, the FARC-EP began gathering intelligence on Don Jesús Castaño. A wealthy rancher in Segovia, Antioquia, far-right conservative, and influential local politician, Don Jesús was considered an ideal target for kidnapping. The Don was kidnapped in 1981, and ultimately died while in captivity.

Don Jesús had several sons. The oldest of these, Fidel, had accumulated a fortune illegally smuggling emeralds, robbing, and trafficking cocaine and marijuana. By the 1980s, Fidel had become one of the most powerful mafia capos in the world, and had purchased large tracts of lands in northern Colombia. By 1988, he and his younger brother Carlos purchased over 1.2 million hectares of land in Antioquia, Córdoba, and Chocó.

As a teenager, Carlos Castaño had worked as an informant for the Colombian army's Bomboná battalion, which had strong links to MAS death squads. He later worked as an assassin for the MAS, and was supplied with weapons by army officers. In 1983, Carlos went to Tel Aviv, Israel where he spent a year taking courses in paramilitary and counterinsurgency tactics.

Los Tangueros
While Carlos was in Israel, Fidel hired a group of over 100 armed men, which began to terrorize the local populace. The thugs became known as Los Tangueros by the villagers after the name of the Castaño ranch, Las Tangas, where they were based. In 1983, under orders from Fidel, a group of men went through the villages near Segovia, where his father had been held, and killed every man, woman, and child living on the river nearby. They pulled babies out of their mothers arms and shot them, nailing one baby to a plank. They impaled a man on a bamboo pole, and hacked a woman to pieces with a machete. By the time they were done, 22 people were dead.

By the late 1980s, numerous cattle ranchers in Córdoba were now supporting Fidel Castaño. Many of them had been forced to pay increasing amounts of extortion money to the EPL and other Communist guerrillas under the threat of kidnapping or having their ranches burned and their animals killed. Widespread local mobilizations against the central government's peace initiatives, the guerrillas, and political movements thought to have their consent or approval, were organized under the leadership of the Colombian military and Fidel's group. Between 1988 and 1990, Colombian press sources reported almost 200 political murders and 400 suspected political assassinations in the region and official government figures suggested that a total of 1,200 of them took place in Córdoba during the period. Left-wing politicians received anonymous death threats and were frequently interrogated in army bases by the 11th Brigade.

Foundation for the Peace of Córdoba
In 1990, Fidel Castaño offered to disband his paramilitary forces if the EPL agreed to demobilize. Having previously faced the combined pressure of Los Tangueros and the Colombian military, the guerrillas demobilized over 2,000 illegal combatants and founded the Hope, Peace, and Liberty party. Fidel surrendered some weapons to government authorities and created the Fundación por la Paz de Córdoba (Foundation for the Peace of Córdoba) which provided money, land, cattle and other support to hundreds of former EPL combatants. Electoral alliances between the new party, the AD/M19, and local right-wing politicians were established.

After the demobilization, the Communist FARC-EP expanded its activities in Córdoba and clashes between them, a dissident EPL faction, and the demobilized guerrillas—some of which formed armed "popular commands"—led to almost 200 murders of former fighters and continued violence. Carlos Castaño claimed that this was the reason he decided to reactivate his family's private army.

Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Uraba (ACCU)
In 1994, Carlos took control of Los Tangueros, which officially changed their name to the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Uraba ("Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá", ACCU). The ACCU began working with regional military forces, such as the Bomboná battalion, to crush the guerrillas, and murder or intimidate anyone suspected of supporting them. The ACCU helped military commanders by providing intelligence regarding local guerrilla activities. The ACCU began networking with other paramilitary groups such as the MAS, and began to take over large areas of northern Colombia, which was the principal transnational shipping point for illegal drugs.

Anti-Paramilitary Decrees of 1989
In 1987, government statistics revealed that paramilitaries had been responsible for more civilian deaths than guerrillas deaths. Two years later, in 1989, the Colombian government under the administration of Virgilio Barco (1986–1990), passed a series of decrees that promised to reduce paramilitary violence.

The first of the decrees, Decree 813, called for the creation of a commission to oversee the government's anti-paramilitary efforts. The commission was to include the Ministers of Government, Justice, and National Defense, along with the chiefs of the Army, National Police, and DAS. The commission was supposed to plan ways to cut down on paramilitary violence and oversee the execution of these plans. However, most of the people in the commission had either openly voiced support for the paramilitaries or headed agencies with very strong ties to paramilitary groups, and the commission rarely met over the following decade.

The second decree, Decree 814, established a 1,000 member anti-paramilitary police force that was made up of active-duty officers from the National Police. The police force was mostly assigned to raiding drug laboratories and the offices of drug trafficking organizations, rather than confronting the paramilitaries directly.

The third decree, Decree 815, suspended the Armed Forces's privilege to distribute weapons to armed civilian groups (a power which had been granted under Law 48 in 1968), and required any new armed civilian groups to be approved by the President and Ministers of Defense and Government. However, the government did not outlaw the already existing paramilitary groups or require that they be re-certified through the more stringent new standards.

In 1989, the administration issued Decree 1194 which outlawed "the armed groups, misnamed paramilitary groups, that have been formed into death squads, bands of hired assassins, self-defense groups, or groups that carry out their own justice" after the murder of two judges and ten government investigators at La Rochela, Santander. The decree established criminal penalties for both civilians and members of the armed forces involved in the promotion, financing, training and membership of said groups.

Armed Forces Directive No. 200-05/91
In 1990, the United States formed a team that included representatives of the U.S. Embassy's Military Group, U.S. Southern Command, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to give advice on the reshaping of several of the Colombian military's local intelligence networks, ostensibly to aid the Colombian military in counter-narcotics efforts. Advice was also solicited from the British and Israeli military intelligence, but the U.S. proposals were ultimately selected by the Colombian military.

The result of these meetings was Armed Forces Directive 200-05/91, issued by the Colombian Defense Ministry in May 1991. The order itself made no mention of drugs or counter-narcotics operations at all, but instead focused exclusively on creating covert intelligence networks to combat the insurgency.

Controversy Surrounding Directive
Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that these intelligence networks subsequently laid the groundwork for continuing an illegal, covert partnership between the military and paramilitaries. HRW argued that the restructuring process solidified linkages between members of the Colombian military and civilian members of paramilitary groups, by incorporating them into several of the local intelligence networks and by cooperating with their activities. In effect, HRW believed that this further consolidated a "secret network that relied on paramilitaries not only for intelligence, but to carry out murder".

HRW argued that this situation allowed the Colombian government and military to plausibly deny links or responsibility for paramilitary human rights abuses. HRW stated that the military intelligence networks created by the U.S. reorganization appeared to have dramatically increased violence, stating that the "recommendations were given despite the fact that some of the U.S. officials who collaborated with the team knew of the Colombian military's record of human rights abuses and its ongoing relations with paramilitaries".

HRW stated that while "not all paramilitaries are intimate partners with the military", the existing partnership between paramilitaries and the Colombian military was "a sophisticated mechanism--in part supported by years of advice, training, weaponry, and official silence by the United States--that allows the Colombian military to fight a dirty war and Colombian officialdom to deny it."

As an example of increased violence and "dirty war" tactics, HRW cited a partnership between the Colombian Navy and the MAS, in Barrancabermeja where: "In partnership with MAS, the navy intelligence network set up in Barrancabermeja adopted as its goal not only the elimination of anyone perceived as supporting the guerrillas, but also members of the political opposition, journalists, trade unionists, and human rights workers, particularly if they investigated or criticized their terror tactics."

Perseguidos Por Pablo Escobar (Los Pepes)
In 1992 Pablo Escobar escaped from his luxury prison, La Catedral. Shortly after, the Calí Cartel, dissidents within the Medellín Cartel, and the MAS worked together to create a new paramilitary organization known as Perseguidos Por Pablo Escobar ("People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar", Los Pepes) with the purpose of tracking down and killing Pablo Escobar and his associates. The organization was led by Fidel Castaño. The Calí Cartel provided $50 million to pay for weapons, informants, and assassins, with the hopes that they could wipe out their primary rival in the cocaine business. Members of both Colombian and U.S. government agencies (including the DEA, CIA and State Department) provided intelligence to Los Pepes.

Pablo Escobar complained about how the government targeted the Medellín Cartel, but did not go after paramilitaries or members of the Calí Cartel, saying: "Los Pepes have their torture chambers in Fidel Castaño's house [ in Medellín ], located ... near the country club ... There they torture trade unionists and lawyers. No one has searched their house or confiscated their assets ... The government offers rewards for the leaders of the Medellín Cartel and for the leaders of the guerrillas, but doesn't offer rewards for the leaders of the paramilitaries, nor for those of the Calí Cartel, authors of various car bombs in the city of Medellín."

Servicios Especiales De Vigilancia y Seguriadad Privada (CONVIVIR)
During the 1990s, the FARC-EP and other guerrilla groups experienced significant growth and achieved a series of military successes against government forces, increasing the amount of territory under their control. The administration of President Ernesto Samper (1994–1998) carried out ineffective operations against the insurgency and attempted to enter into peace negotiations. Colombian military commanders resisted Samper's offer of a demilitarized zone in La Uribe, Meta Department meant to hold these talks. The FARC-EP leadership expressed initial interest in the administration's plan, but ultimately refused to accept any preconditions. The Samper administration was also seriously undermined it in the eyes of the guerillas after the scandal concerning the receipt of over $6 million in campaign from the Cali Cartel.

In 1994, Decree 356 of Colombia's Ministry of Defense authorized the creation of legal paramilitary groups known as Servicios Especiales De Vigilancia y Seguriadad Privada ("Special vigilance and private security services"), also known as CONVIVIR groups. The CONVIVIR groups were intended to maintain control over high risk areas where guerrillas did not have a strong presence after having been expelled and where there was no need for a large military force or illegal paramilitary presence anymore. Many illegal paramilitary groups transitioned into legal CONVIVIR groups after this. These CONVIVIR groups worked alongside both the Colombian military and illegal paramilitary groups in counterinsurgency operations.

The governor of Antioquia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez—who would later become President of Colombia—was one of the primary proponents of the CONVIVIR program. Statistics regarding the exact number of CONVIVIR groups differ and have been considered hard to obtain. Estimates indicate that, by the late 1990s, from 414 to over 500 of these groups had been created, with their membership ranging from 10,000 to 120,000. Uribe's department of Antioquia had some 65 CONVIVIR groups, one of the highest figures in the country.

Amnesty International claims that the CONVIVIR groups committed numerous human rights abuses against civilians, working in coordination with the Colombian government and paramilitaries. In 1998, Human Rights Watch stated that "we have received credible information that indicated that the CONVIVIR groups of the Middle Magdalena and of the southern Cesar regions were directed by known paramilitaries and had threatened to assassinate Colombians that were considered as guerrilla sympathizers or which rejected joining the cooperative groups".

In November 1997, due to mounting concerns over human rights violations committed by CONVIVIR groups and the relations between illegal paramilitaries and CONVIVIR, the Constitutional Court of Colombia stated that the issue of military weaponry to civilians and specifically to CONVIVIR groups was unconstitutional, and that CONVIVIR members could no longer be used to gather intelligence information. Many of the CONVIVIR groups simply joined up with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).

By the end of the decade, there had been a tenfold increase in the number of Colombian paramilitaries.

The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)
In April 1997, the creation of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) or AUC was announced, formally inaugurating what has been termed by analysts as the "second generation" of paramilitarism. It is considered to be the result of Carlos Castaño's efforts to achieve a measure of unity between most of the other paramilitary forces in the country. Several paramilitary groups did not join, but the AUC itself claimed to represent about 90% of existing forces at the time. Castaño's ACCU formally became the core of the new umbrella organization, while the other heads of paramilitary groups kept their own leadership positions, becoming part of a federated High Command of the AUC. It has been considered by observers that the FARC's advances as part of a 1996 to 1998 offensive eased the process of this formal paramilitary unification.

As a response, the AUC engaged in a renewed series of massacres and assassinations, often with the passive or active aid of elements of the Colombian government's security forces, according to human rights organizations.

2003-2006 demobilization process
In July 2003, the Uribe administration began formal negotiations with the AUC with the stated aim of seeking its demobilization. Law 975 of 2005, also known as the "Justice and Peace" law, was approved by the Colombian Congress and constituted the main legal framework applicable to those paramilitaries who had committed serious crimes. The legislation gave AUC combatants broad concessions, such as allowing paramilitaries to keep profits made from criminal activities during their time in the AUC, limiting sentences to a maximum of 8 years which could be served on private farms instead of in prisons, and not obliging them to dismantle their power structures.

Under the Colombian government's interpretation of Law 782 of 2002 and Decree 128 of 2003, the majority of the paramilitaries who submitted to the process were pardoned through the cessation of judicial procedures for charges related to their membership in the group. Only 3,700 of the paramilitaries applied for "Justice and Peace" benefits.

The demobilization process was heavily criticized by national and international human rights organizations as well as by international entities, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the OAS, citing its non-compliance with international standards on the rights of victims to seek justice and reparation and granting impunity to human rights violators. Colombian congresswoman Gina Parody claimed that Law 975 gave "benefits to people who have committed the worst crimes"

On May 18, 2006, the Constitutional Court of Colombia reviewed Law 975 of 2005, modifying and striking down several of its original articles and correcting some of the problems critics had identified. The revision requires full confessions, turning over illegally acquired assets, provides that reduced sentences may be revoked for lying and removes time limits on investigations. The Court also ruled against the option for paramilitaries to serve their sentences outside of prison or to deduct time spent during negotiations.

In 2007 and 2008, paramilitary commanders provided useful information to prosecutors about their activities and associates. However, of some 1,800 individuals who began confessing their crimes to prosecutors in 2005, just 5 had completed their hearings by 2009. A limited number of assets worth an estimated US$5 million had been surrendered to the official reparations fund, but procedures for the return of stolen land to its original owners remained stagnant and paramilitary leaders extradited to the United States mostly ceased collaborations with authorities.

Serious flaws during the demobilization phase, such as the Colombian government's failure to interrogate and verify the identities of those involved in the process, allowed many paramilitaries to remain active, form new successor groups, and continue to engage in human rights violations.

In September 2006, Amnesty International said: "Media reports suggest that over 30,000 paramilitaries have demobilized. However, paramilitaries in supposedly demobilized areas continue to operate, often under new names, and to commit violations. There is also strong evidence of continued links between paramilitaries and the security forces. There were also fears that government policies designed to reintegrate members of illegal armed groups into civilian life risked 'recycling' them into the conflict."

In February 2010, Human Rights Watch said: "The successor groups, though different in important respects from the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia [...] have taken on many of the same roles, often with some of the same personnel, in some cases with the same counterinsurgency objectives of the AUC [...] It is clear that many paramilitary combatants did in fact go through the demobilization process and abandoned their groups for good. However, there is substantial evidence that many others who participated in the demobilization process were stand-ins rather than paramilitaries, and that portions of the groups remained active. There is also evidence that members of the groups who supposedly demobilized continued engaging in illegal activities."

A 2010 United Nations report stated that: "The vast majority of paramilitaries responsible for human rights violations were demobilized without investigation, and many were effectively granted amnesties. Today, the failure in accountability is clear from the dramatic rise in killings by illegal armed groups composed largely of former paramilitaries."

A December 2014 International Crisis Group report stated that: "...Demobilisation remained partial, as some stayed outside the process or went on to rearm, strongly contributing to the emergence of successor groups known as New Illegal Armed Groups (NAIGs). Their number has fallen from 32 in 2006 to three, but they still muster some 3,000 members often concentrated in regions with a strong paramilitary legacy such as Uraba, the Eastern Plains, the south-western departments or the Caribbean coast."

Reintegration of ex-paramilitary fighters
Since 2006, the Office of the High Counselor for Reintegration (ACR) has been in charge of the reintegration policy for demobilized AUC members. The ACR assists ex-combatants with education, vocational training, grants for micro-businesses, psychosocial support, healthcare and a monthly stipend dependent on the ex-combatants’ participation to reintegration activities. Of the 31,671 demobilized members of the AUC, 20,267 were actively participating in the reintegration program by the end of 2009. The others were either involved in the process of Justice and Peace, imprisoned due to infractions after their demobilization, dead, or had left the program for unknown reasons.

Post-AUC successor criminal groups
New paramilitary groups and related drug trafficking gangs that have continued operating after the AUC demobilization process are referred to as bandas criminales (BACRIM) or criminal gangs by the Colombian government. According to the Colombian National Police, these groups had 3,749 members by July 2010, while the NGO Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz estimated 6,000 active combatants.. Others estimate their ranks may include up to 10,000 people.

Until 2011 Colombia remained the world's largest cocaine producer, and since 2003, Human Rights Watch stated that according to their Colombian intelligence sources, "40 percent of the country's total cocaine exports" were controlled by these paramilitaries. In 2011 an independent investigation, made by the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, estimated that 50% of all Colombian cocaine was controlled by the same BACRIM groups.

In the early 2010s, the Black Eagles, Los Rastrojos, Los Urabeños, Los Paisas, Los Machos, Renacer, Los Gaitanistas, Nueva Generación, Bloque Meta, Libertadores del Vichada, the ERPAC, and The Office of Envigado comprised the dominant criminal and paramilitary organizations.

There were originally over 30 BACRIM, but by late 2017, the number had been reduced to a handful as smaller groups have been absorbed by more powerful networks or dismantled by the security forces, leaving only Los Urabeños with a national presence.

These successor groups are often made up of mid-level paramilitary commanders and criminal structures that either did not demobilize in the first place or were re-activated after the demobilizations had concluded. Many demobilized paramilitaries received recruitment offers, were threatened into joining the new organizations, or have simultaneously rearmed and remained in government reintegration programs. New recruits have also come from traditional areas for paramilitary recruitment.

BACRIMs continue to be involved in the drug trade, commit widespread human rights abuses, engage in forced displacement, and undermine democratic legitimacy in other ways—both in collusion with and opposition to FARC-EP guerrillas. Their targets have included human rights defenders, labor unionists and victims of the former AUC. Members of government security forces have also been accused of tolerating their growth.

Human rights violations
The right-wing paramilitaries have been blamed for many of the human rights violations during the Colombian conflict, particularly killings of civilians. In 2022, the Truth Commission for Colombia concluded that paramilitaries were responsible for 45% of all killings and 52% of forced disappearances. During some years of the conflict the paramilitaries and state agents were responsible for approximately 73 to 85% of all political murders in Colombia. Many of these killings occur in massacres in rural areas, with the paramilitaries claiming they are eliminating alleged supporters of the guerrilla movements. Paramilitaries also engage in the use of child soldiers and sexual violence against civilians, along with kidnappings for extortion purposes.

Paramilitary violence is overwhelmingly targeted towards peasants, unionists, teachers, human rights workers, journalists and liberal / left wing political activists.

Paramilitary abuses in Colombia are often classified as atrocities due to the brutality of their methods, including the torture, rape, incineration, decapitation and mutilation with chainsaws or machetes of dozens of their victims at a time, affecting civilians, women and children.

Paramilitary forces in Colombia have additionally been charged with the illegal recruitment of children into the armed ranks. Though this is an offense punishable by national law, the prosecution rate for these crimes is less than 2% as of 2008.

Many of these abuses have occurred with the knowledge and support of the Colombian security forces. A 1998 Human Rights Watch report stated: "... where paramilitaries have a pronounced presence, the army fails to move against them and tolerates their activity, including egregious violations of international humanitarian law; provides some paramilitary groups with intelligence used to carry out operations; and in other cases actively promotes and coordinates with paramilitary units, including joint maneuvers in which atrocities are the frequent result. ... In areas where paramilitaries are present, some police officers have been directly implicated in joint army-paramilitary actions or have supplied information to paramilitaries for their death lists. Police have also stood by while paramilitaries selected and killed their victims. On many occasions, police have publicly described whole communities as guerrillas or sympathetic to them and have withdrawn police protection, a violation of their responsibility under Colombian law to protect civilians from harm. Instead of reinforcing the police after guerrilla attacks, police commanders have withdrawn officers, thus encouraging or allowing paramilitaries to move in unimpeded and kill civilians."

A 1999-human rights report from the U.S. State Department said: "At times the security forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses; in some instances, individual members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups by passing them through roadblocks, sharing intelligence, and providing them with ammunition. Paramilitary forces find a ready support base within the military and police, as well as local civilian elites in many areas." In 2006, Amnesty International reported that: "The security forces have tried to improve their human rights image by letting their paramilitary allies commit human rights violations and then denying that the paramilitaries are operating with their acquiescence, support or sometimes direct coordination."

Massacres
Hundreds of massacres have been perpetrated by paramilitary groups in Colombia.

Mapiripan Massacre
In Mapiripán, Meta Department, an estimated 30 people were killed between July 14 to 20 1997. At least 100 heavily armed AUC members arrived in the town searching for people who were suspected leftist guerrilla supporters. They went from house to house referring to a list of names that had been prepared by informants earlier.

Civilians were taken to the town center where they were tortured by paramilitaries before being killed. After torturing their victims, the paramilitaries decapitated people with chainsaws, hung people from meat hooks, hacked people with machetes, cut people's throats and carved their bodies, and then threw their corpses into the nearby Guaviare River.

The local judge of Mapiripan, Leonardo Ivan Cortes, called the police and the army eight times during the 5-day massacre, but they did not arrive until the AUC paramilitaries had left. In March 1999, Colombian prosecutors accused Colonel Lino Sánchez of planning the massacre with Carlos Castaño. Sánchez was the operations chief of the Colombian Army's 12th Brigade. He had received special training by U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers on Barrancón Island on the Guaviare River. The training was finished very close to the time of the massacre. The evidence showed that the paramilitaries landed unhampered at the San Jose del Guaviare airport, which was heavily guarded by military personnel.

Alto Naya massacre
Another massacre took place at Alto Naya, Cauca department on April 12, 2001, in which an estimated 40-130 civilians were killed and thousands displaced. Approximately 100 paramilitaries from the Frente Calima ("Calima Front") participated in the killings.

The first victim was a 17-year-old girl named Gladys Ipia whose head and hands were cut off with a chain saw. Next, six people were shot while eating at a local restaurant. Another man was chopped into pieces and burned. A woman had her abdomen ripped open with a chainsaw. An indigenous leader named Cayetano Cruz, was cut in half with a chainsaw. The paramilitaries lined up the villagers in the middle of the town, and asked people if they knew any guerrillas. If they answered "no", they were hacked to death with machetes. Many of the bodies were dismembered, and strewn piecemeal around the area, making it difficult to gain an accurate body count and identify victims. Between 4,000 and 6,000 people were displaced as they fled the area during and following the violence.

Despite repeated warnings over the preceding two weeks that such an attack was about to occur, the Colombian military refused to provide protection for the villagers. And although the massacre went on for more than three days, the nearby Third Brigade did not show up until after it was over. Yet, when the FARC attempted to take over a town, in neighboring Nariño, the military responded within three hours. Some of the villagers traveled to the Colombian Army's Third Brigade an hour away. The Cauca People's Defender, Victor Javier Melendez, notified the military that a massacre was occurring on the morning of April 13. He received no response. The Colombian Public Advocate's office stated: "it is inexplicable how approximately 500 paramilitaries could carry out an operation of this type without being challenged in any way, especially since the area that these men entered is only twenty minutes from the village of Timba, where a base operated by the Colombian Army is located and has been staffed since March 30 of this year."

Betoyes Massacre
Another massacre took place in Betoyes, Arauca department in early May 2003. Several people belonging to the indigenous Guahibo community were killed and over 300 people fled. Three girls, aged 11, 12, and 15, were raped. Another 16-year-old pregnant mother, Omaira Fernández was raped, and then had her womb cut open and the fetus ripped out which they then hacked up with a machete. They then dumped the bodies into the river. An Amnesty International reported on June 4, 2003, that the Colombian army's 18th Brigade's "Navos Pardo Battalion" fully supported the AUC in carrying out the massacre: "... in Betoyes in January 2003, witnesses said that the AUC armband of one attacker slipped to reveal the words 'Navos Pardo Battalion' printed on the uniform beneath."

Forced displacement
More than 5 million people out of Colombia's total population of approximately 40 million have been internally displaced since 1985, making it the country with the second highest internally displaced population in the world after Sudan. Over 3 million people have been displaced after President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002, with over 300,000 displaced in 2005 alone.

Paramilitary groups have been held responsible for the largest portion of displacement. In the years 2000 and 2001, paramilitaries were blamed for 48 percent and 53 percent of forced displacement, respectively. The displacement is not only a side-effect of the civil conflict, but also a deliberate policy to remove people from their territories, so that the land can be taken by wealthy elites, multinational corporations, and criminal syndicates, as well as to attack the civilian support base for the guerrillas.

Social cleansing
Paramilitary groups, often with the support of local merchants, the Colombian military, and local police, have engaged in extensive "social cleansing" operations against homeless people, drug addicts, orphaned children, and other people they deem socially "undesirable". In 1993 alone, at least 2,190 street children were murdered, many of whom were killed by agents of the state. An estimated 5 people per day fell victim to social cleansing operations in 1995.

Drug trade
The downfall of the Medellín and Cali Cartels in the 1990s created an opening for paramilitary groups, which controlled northern Colombia (the key transnational smuggling route), to take over the international cocaine trade.

In 2001. Colombian government sources estimated that at least 40% of all cocaine exports from Colombia were controlled by far-right paramilitary groups, while only 2.5% were controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Chiquita Brands International
From 1997 to 2004, Chiquita Brands International gave over $1.7 million to the AUC, over $825,000 of which was given after the U.S. State Department had listed the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Families of some of the victims filed a class-action lawsuit, Doe v. Chiquita Brands International in 2007. The indictment alleges that the payments "were reviewed and approved by senior executives of the corporation" and that by no later than September 2000, they were aware "that the AUC was a violent, paramilitary organization". Separate charges were also filed alleging that in 2001, using a Colombian port owned and operated by Banadex (a subsidiary of Chiquita), the company transported 3,400 AK-47 rifles and 4 million rounds of ammunition, which were destined for the AUC. Mario Iguarán, Colombia's attorney general in 2007, said that he would seek extradition for several Chiquita executives as part of the weapons smuggling investigation. Lawyers from the U.S. Department of Justice learned of Chiquita's relationship with the AUC in 2003. They told Chiquita executives that the payments were illegal and ordered them to stop. After receiving the order, Chiquita made at least 19 more payments. Chiquita representatives said that they were only financing terrorist organizations "in good faith", for the protection of their employees. To date, none of the Chiquita executives have been indicted for terrorism, however the company did receive a fine of $25 million. The plea deal was negotiated by Eric Holder, who was then an attorney with the law firm Covington & Burling, which represented Chiquita Brands.

Drummond Coal
In the late 1980s, Alabama-based Drummond Coal began to expand into new markets, due to the deregulation of global capital. As part of this expansion, they purchased the Pribbenow coal mine in Colombia, as well as a Caribbean port to ship the coal. They increased production at the mine by 20 million tons annually, turning it into one of the largest coal-mining operations in the world. It made up the largest share of Drummond's $1.7 billion in annual revenues.

Since it started operating in the early 1990s, Drummond's 215-mile railway has been repeatedly attacked by the FARC-EP. There is evidence that right-wing paramilitaries were hired by Drummond to guard the rail lines. In 2001, union activists working at Drummond's Colombian operations began receiving frequent death threats. In February of that year, AUC paramilitaries broke into the home of union organizer Cándido Méndez and killed him in front of his family. This was followed by a series of killings in March.

The Coca-Cola Company
In July 2001 four lawsuits were filed against The Coca-Cola Company by the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the United Steel Workers of America on behalf of Sinaltrainal (a union representing food and beverage workers in Colombia), five individuals who had been tortured or unlawfully detained for union activities, and the estate of murdered union activist Isidro Gil. The plaintiffs alleged that Coca-Cola bottlers "contracted with or otherwise directed paramilitary security forces that utilized extreme violence and murdered, tortured, unlawfully detained, or otherwise silenced trade union leaders." Coca-Cola does not deny that the murders and attacks on unionists took place at their bottling facilities, nor did they deny that the paramilitaries responsible for the killings were being paid by the bottlers, but they claimed that they could not be held liable because they are not in direct control of the bottling plants. In March 2001, district judge Jose E. Martinez decided in Miami that Coca-Cola could not be held liable, claiming they did not directly control the bottling plants, but allowed the case against the bottling companies to proceed forward.

Political activities
The Colombian parapolitics scandal or parapolítica in Spanish (a combination of the words paramilitar and política) refers to the 2006–present Colombian congressional scandal in which several congressmen and other politicians have been indicted for colluding with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary group which is responsible for killing thousands of Colombian civilians. In February 2007, Colombian Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo suggested another term, "parauribismo", indicating that the scandal was mainly affecting officials or political allies of President Álvaro Uribe's administration. By April 17, 2012, 139 members of Congress were under investigation. Five governors and 32 lawmakers, including Mario Uribe Escobar, President Uribe's cousin and former President of Congress, were convicted.

Government/NGO Reports

 * "Body count mentalities": Colombia's "False Positives" Scandal, Declassified, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 266, National Security Archive, January 7, 2009
 * Paramilitaries as Proxies: Declassified evidence on the Colombian army's anti-guerrilla "allies", National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 166, National Security Archive, October 16, 2005
 * Documents Implicate Colombian Government in Chiquita Terror Scandal: Company's Paramilitary Payoffs made through Military's 'Convivir', National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 217, National Security Archive, March 29, 2007 (see also: Más sospechas de nexos entre 'paras' y militares revelan reportes de la CIA y Embajada de E.U. )
 * The Truth about Triple-A: U.S. Document Implicates Current, Former Colombian Army Commanders in Terror Operation, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 223, National Security Archive, July 1, 2007
 * Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: "Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web", National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 243, National Security Archive, February 17, 2008
 * Conspiracy of Silence?: Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 287, National Security Archive, September 24, 2009
 * The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río: Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General's Reliance on Death Squads, "Systematic" Support of Paramilitaries "Pivotal to his Military Success", National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327, National Security Archive, September 29, 2010
 * Trujillo Declassified: Documenting Colombia's 'tragedy without end', National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 259, National Security Archive, October 5, 2008
 * Volume III: Conditioning Security Assistance in War in Colombia: Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S. Colombia Policy, 1988-2002: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 69, National Security Archive, May 3, 2002
 * Kim Cragan, Bruce Hoffman; "Arms Trafficking and Colombia". RAND Corporation, 2003
 * The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links, Human Rights Watch, February 2000
 * The "Sixth Division": Military-paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia, Human Rights Watch, September 2001
 * Breaking the Grip?: Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia, Human Rights Watch, November 17, 2008
 * Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia, Human Rights Watch, February 2010
 * Colombia: Fear and Intimidation: The dangers of human rights work, Amnesty International, September 2006
 * Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization?, Amnesty International, August 31, 2005
 * Amnesty International, "Colombia: Barrancabermeja: A city under siege", 1 May 1999
 * "The Other Half of the Truth: Searching for Truth, Justice, and Reparations for Colombia's Victims of Paramilitary Violence", Latin American Working Group, June 2008
 * "The Wrong Road", Latin American Working Group, July 2003
 * Colombia 2005 Report, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Spanish and English)

News / magazines

 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)
 * (Original in Spanish: Oil-Palm Plantations on Afro-Colombian Lands: An Exchange | Dollars & Sense)

Movies

 * Impunity-The Film – Film about the AUC
 * Little Voices (Pequeñas Voces) – An animated movie about the vision of children in the war in Colombia.

title: Right-wing paramilitarism in Colombia


text:
Izutsu

Izutsu (井筒) is a classic Noh play written by Zeami, the dominant figure in the early history of Noh theatre.

Izutsu is based on an old story, Tsutsu-Izutsu (筒井筒), from the Ise monogatari, a 10th-century collection of stories, many of which are based on stories about the romantic encounters of a "certain man", traditionally identified as the poet Ariwara no Narihira.

Tsutsu-Izutsu
A boy and a girl knew each other from early childhood. They were good friends and one of their games was to see who was taller by measuring each other against the local well. As they grew older, they began to feel more self-conscious in each other's company and they drifted apart, although they continued to love each other.

The girl's parents offered to find her a husband, but she declined as she still had feelings for the boy.

The boy eventually composes a tanka:

 * 筒井筒　井筒にかけし　まろがたけ　生いにけらしな　妹見ざる間に
 * The wooden frame [of the well]... I was shorter than the frame [when we last compared our heights], but I have outgrown it in your absence.

The girl replies:

 * くらべこし　ふりわけ髪も　肩過ぎぬ　君ならずして　誰かあぐべき
 * We compared the lengths of our hair also, but my hair has grown past my shoulders. If not you, who will be there to tie it up for me?

So it was that they were married.

However, the man later fell in love with another woman, who lived behind Mount Tatsuta and he took to making visits to this woman's house. After many visits, the affair could no longer be kept a secret; but his wife made no protest. He concluded that his wife had herself fallen in love with another man.

One stormy night, he was just setting out on one of these visits, when he decided to turn back to find out the identity of his wife's lover. Peeping into the house, he saw that his wife was all alone. Unaware that he was watching, she was applying her make-up and composing a tanka:

 * 風吹けば　おきつ白波　龍田山　夜半にや君が　一人越ゆらん
 * The sea near Mount Tatsuta becomes rough when the wind is so gusty. That my husband should be climbing Tatsuta on such a stormy night! [I'm anxious about my husband.]

He realised then how much he was loved and never went back to the other woman.

Izutsu
A priest is visiting the famous temples of Nara. On his way to Hatsuse, he stops at Ariwara Temple and recognises the locale as Isonokami, where Narihira and Ki no Aritsune's daughter lived long ago.

A village woman arrives to tend a grave in the garden. She draws offertory water from a wooden-framed well and, as he watches her, the priest becomes intrigued. He asks her why she is tending the grave and she says there is a story behind the place. She begins to tell the story Tsutsu-Izutsu from the Ise Monogatari.

When she has finished the story, the village woman looks at the priest and says she is the wife in the old 10th century story. She disappears. He has seen her ghost. The priest asks a village man about the place and hears the story more plainly. The villager suggests that, as a priest, he could offer a prayer to her soul. So he decides to settle down for the night on a bed of moss in the garden. She comes to him again in a dream. This time she is wearing her husband's cap and gown over her kimono. She dances and sings about how much she loves her husband and how much she yearns for him. She looks into the well that they had stood beside as children and sees his reflection. She then cries and disappears.

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

title: Izutsu


text:
Cicurug

Cicurug is a sub-district of Sukabumi regency in West Java, Indonesia. It is situated between Bogor and Sukabumi, located approximately 100 km south of Jakarta. Cicurug is surrounded by Mount Salak and Mount Gede. Cicurug can be reached by buses plying these routes: Jakarta-Sukabumi, Bogor-Pelabuhan Ratu and Bogor-Sukabumi.

Cicurug is infamous for its appalling traffic jams, especially over holiday weekends. Radical solutions proposed by local environmental experts are expected to improve matters.

title: Cicurug


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Shari Evelyn Kendall

 * The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or on a Votes for Undeletion nomination).  No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was DELETE. Linuxbeak | Talk 21:44, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Shari Evelyn Kendall
Unless all professors get a page at WP, this one has done nothing of note, except for working with "the famous Deborah Tannen". Perhaps Tannen should have an article; I see nothing here meriting this one. paul klenk talk 04:26, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Additional comment by paul klenk talk: A publication of Kendall's has been added to the article. All professors publish papers and whatnot; this does nothing to establish her notability.

 * Comment. This is a pretty new page, so I'd be inclined to wait little while for better info to be added.  That said, I did a publications search and only came up with one article (info added to wiki page), unless someone can verify that it is a particularly important paper I'm inclined to agree with the nominator. Crypticfirefly 04:51, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. If we see some more examples of the "many articles and books" I might reconsider, but at the moment certainly NN.--inksT 05:57, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. Does not pass the average professor test. Gamaliel 05:59, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. Deborah Tannen does have an article, but she wrote a best-selling book.  Shari Kendall has two books in preparation, none published yet (see her CV (.doc)).  In the unlikely event this article is kept, move to Shari Kendall, since she doesn't use her middle name professionally.  --Metropolitan90 06:52, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete Hasn't published anything notable I'm aware, though I would happily change my vote, if something was shown to the contrary. Side note:  imo, bio article names with full (with middle) name are best unless they're very famous, to avoid future mistaken links from people who wikify every name in a list, without checking if it matches.  --rob 08:44, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Keep. It might be a little premature for an article, but once two titles on Oxford University Press are released, that reaches notability.  The article is sloppy, no question, and needs cleanup. Lulu of the Lotus-Eaters 16:47, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete. Vivian Darkbloom 21:38, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Keep, two forthcoming titles on Oxford University Press indicate contribution to the sum of human knowledge. Kappa 22:44, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Keep, Page needs some improvment but it won't get it if it is deleted. Also, I agree especially with Kappa. Bryce 00:09, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete nn proffesor --JAranda | yeah 00:16, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Keep an actual professor, with published work. Trollderella 00:35, 11 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete. Social scientist publish monographs, that's part of their job. No indication that hers will be well-received. Pilatus 14:51, 11 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete, college prof with one published book and 2 forthcoming books is not notable in my estimation. Until those books are released and at least one of them is a notable work, I don't see justification for a wiki article.--Isotope23 13:36, 12 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete per Pilatus--mere book contract alone is largely meaningless. Some OUP books have print runs well under 1000. Chick Bowen 23:04, 13 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete as per Isotope23 -- red stucco 08:38, 14 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Delete. All professors are published somewhere. -R. fiend 16:26, 14 October 2005 (UTC)
 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in an undeletion request). No further edits should be made to this page.


text:
Yukimi Daifuku

Yukimi Daifuku (Japanese: 雪見だいふく "snow-viewing daifuku") is a brand of mochi ice cream manufactured by Lotte. It was also released in Japan in October 1981. It consists of a ball of vanilla ice cream wrapped in a thin layer of mochi. Lotte originally created Watabōshi (Japanese: わたぼうし "cotton hat or capped with snow"), a bite-size ice cream wrapped in a thin layer of marshmallow in 1980. Marshmallow was quickly replaced by mochi because it was more popular in Japan and the company perfected a technology to keep mochi soft at freezing temperature in 1981.

It comes in three sizes: a carton containing two pieces of ice cream, with a plastic pick for eating it; a "mini yukimi daifuku" box with nine smaller ice creams that contain 9 spoons; and "yukimi daifuku petit three colour box" (雪見だいふくプチ3色 Yukimi Daifuku Puchi San-iro) containing three kinds, a green tea ice cream, a chocolate ice cream, and a vanilla ice cream. Many people favour the Vanilla, known for its sweet taste.

Aside from its regular vanilla flavor, there is also strawberry milk, triple chocolate raw, tokachi azuki, and raw chocolate.

The regular Yukimi daifuku, strawberry milk, and triple chocolate raw comes in a packaging of two pieces (47 mL each). The tokachi azuki and raw chocolate flavour comes in the same packaging as the mini box. They contain nine pieces with 30 mL in each.

In the hanami (cherry blossom viewing) season, a seasonal variety with strawberry ice cream is sold.

Yukimi is a seasonal activity in Japan, similar to hanami, consisting of watching snow falling. The name is a play upon tsukimi daifuku (月見大福, "moon-viewing daifuku"), the sweets traditionally eaten while viewing the Moon.

title: Yukimi Daifuku


text:
Westfield railway station

Westfield railway station was a station of the Auckland railway network in New Zealand. The station closed to all services on 12 March 2017, following an announcement by Auckland Transport on 17 January 2017, because fewer than 330 passengers used it daily and it required a costly upgrade.

The station was 640 metres south of Westfield Junction, where the Eastern and Southern Lines converge. It therefore served both lines. It had an island platform layout and was reached from a pedestrian overbridge at the end of Portage Road. The overbridge also spanned the adjacent Westfield marshalling yards and gives access to KiwiRail's operations centre and locomotive facility.

History
Westfield station was opened during the expansion of Auckland's suburban railway network; on June 1875 for goods and on 29 August 1887 for passengers. The original station building was just a wooden shelter on the platform. Mount Richmond Domain is nearby. The new station gave access to a shallow bay on Manukau Harbour, which became a popular picnic spot. In 1904 the station was at the western end of Portage Road, Otahuhu; which marks the narrowest point of the Auckland isthmus.

Westfield became a junction station between the North Island Main Trunk and the North Auckland Line when the Westfield deviation (Eastern Line) was completed in 1930. The station building was replaced with a newer shelter in the 1960s, whilst the adjacent Westfield Marshalling Yards were being built.

Both the platform and the footbridge were demolished in 2021.

Locomotive dump
During the 1920s, obsolete locomotives were often dumped in areas where the railway line was subject to erosion or soft ground, the value of scrap iron being minimal at the time. Unlike locomotives dumped at other sites, such as Branxholme, Omoto and Oamaru, where the locomotives remained for decades, the locomotives at Westfield were retrieved and sold for scrap.

Other locomotive dumps

 * Bealey River
 * Branxholme
 * Mōkihinui River
 * Oamaru
 * Omoto
 * Waimakariri River

Westfield marshalling yard
This facility, built in the 1960s on reclaimed land brought together the freight train marshalling and sorting from several other yards in the Auckland area. Prior to its opening, freight trains were made up at either Auckland or Otahuhu stations. The traffic offices in other stations in the Auckland area were centred at Westfield during the 1970s and 1980s. The locomotive and wagon repair facilities saw steam-era engine sheds and servicing facilities at Auckland, Otahuhu, Papakura, Helensville and Mercer all close as well as the 1950s-era Parnell Diesel Depot.

The Westfield marshalling yard is used by the Te Huia Auckland-Hamilton train to hold empty trains during the day.

Industrial sidings
Westfield grew over time as a freight station. Sidings once served Kempthorne Prosser's fertiliser works, Westfield Freezing Works and Auckland City Abattoir. Modern day sidings serve various transport companies, as well as the Southdown Freight Terminal and Metroport.

Patronage
During its latter period of service, the station had one of the lowest patronages of stations on the Auckland network, in part due to the decrepit nature of its facilities and its remote location, far from any main centres. The shelter structure was in poor condition, yet still provided some protection from the driving wind and rain which comes off the Manukau Harbour. In April 2010, the shelter was torn down and replaced with shelters formerly used at the temporary Newmarket stations.

Future
A future Third Main Line is envisaged as part of the Wiri to Quay Park project announced in 2017, which is to start in 2020 and be completed in 2024.

It is expected to ease congestion on Auckland rail lines, improve rail freight access from the Port of Auckland to the Westfield yards and allow more frequent passenger and freight services. The new line would be between Westfield and Wiri or Wiri and Papakura.

title: Westfield railway station


text:
User talk:Thompsa

Comparison of file systems
The Comparison of file systems article is primarily about on-disk (or on-wire) formats, as the footnotes should make extremely clear. The on-disk format of UFS (both 1 and 2) does not directly represent either MAC labels or ACLs; both are implemented as a software feature of some implementations on top of extended attributes—which is exactly what that specific footnote says. 121a0012 04:27, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

title: User talk:Thompsa


text: User talk:65.219.130.8

title: User talk:65.219.130.8


text:
Talk:Hui (Māori assembly)

Untitled
Hawaiian? How can it be 'from the Hawaiian' if it's Maori?

(Clearly it's possible that the same word is used in a similar sense in both languages, but both are descended from a comman ancestor, not either from the other)

Delete it?
'Hui' comes from a Polynesian word meaning 'unite, come together' and happens to be identical in Māori and Hawaiian. But what is the point of this article? Why not incorporate this into the article Māori. Kahuroa 13:27, 2 January 2006 (UTC).

External links modified
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title: Talk:Hui (Māori assembly)


text:
Supper at Emmaus (disambiguation)

Supper at Emmaus is an event in the Gospel of Luke.

Supper at Emmaus is also the name of several works of art:

 * Supper at Emmaus, a woodcut by Albrecht Dürer in his 1511 Small Passion series
 * Supper at Emmaus (Pontormo), a 1525 painting by Pontormo in the Uffizi
 * Supper at Emmaus (Moretto), a c. 1526 painting by Moretto da Brescia in the Pinacoteca Tosio Martinengo, Brescia
 * Supper at Emmaus (Titian), a c. 1531 painting by Titian in the Louvre
 * Supper at Emmaus (Titian), a c. 1530–1534 painting by Titian; also a c. 1545 painting by Titian's studio
 * Supper at Emmaus (Veronese), a c. 1559–1560 painting by Paolo Veronese
 * Supper at Emmaus (Caravaggio, London), a 1601 painting by Caravaggio in the National Gallery, London
 * Supper at Emmaus (Caravaggio, Milan), a 1606 painting by Caravaggio in the Pinacoteca di Brera, Milan
 * Supper at Emmaus (Rembrandt, Musee Jacquemart-Andre), a c. 1626 painting by Rembrandt in the Musee Jacquemart-Andre, Paris
 * Supper at Emmaus (Stom, Grenoble), a 17th century painting by Matthias Stom in the Grenoble Museum
 * Supper at Emmaus (Rembrandt, Louvre), a 1648 painting by Rembrandt in the Louvre
 * Supper at Emmaus, a 1654 etching by Rembrandt in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
 * A 1937 forgery by Han van Meegeren in the style of Johannes Vermeer

title: Supper at Emmaus (disambiguation)


text:
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Society of the Pacifica House

 * The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or on a Votes for Undeletion nomination).  No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was Delete Jtkiefer  T - 18:36, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Pacifica_House

 * This article is a hoax. The history of the organization, that is, created from two debating societies, does not square with the university's protrayal of the demise of those societies.  According to the University: "The Franklin Society was organized in 1824, a year when such a large class entered that the two existing literary debating societies, the Philermenian Society and the United Brothers Society could not accommodate enough of the entering students. The membership was also augmented by the acceptance of honorary membership by Henry Clay, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and other notable personages. Ten years after its establishment, in 1834, the Franklin Society was dissolved, its library of several hundred volumes was turned over to the College Library, and in 1847 its members were elected in equal proportions into the two older societies." Furthermore, the organization is largely unmentioned today.  One reference was made in the Brown Daily Herald, but the College Hill Independant article, mentioned in this article, cannot be located.  If a more precise reference could be provided, that would be helpful.  While a search of the University records finds the society mentioned ONCE among university documents, that reference is questionable, and I am currently awaiting replies from those authors.  Finally, a whois search reveals that the "official" website is registered to "Joe Pacifica" with a fake phone number. Micahross 04:30, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * If this article does not represent reality, delete it. Anthony Appleyard 05:42, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * Even if the article does represent reality, delete it anyway. See this report from the College Curriculum Council which discusses a report issued by Pacifica House on grade inflation.  Nevertheless, a student organization which exists at only a single school is generally non-notable, and this one appears to have problems with verifiability of information about it, too. --Metropolitan90 06:44, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * I managed to find that very article. Rereading my post I find it was somewhat ambiguous.  There is ONE mention in a paper and ONE in among university documents.  I am trying to track down the origin of the hoax now, but few people are being helpful.  I was directed to a member of the organization, but have yet to hear from him.  I think someone created an organization to write a position paper for the university. Micahross 08:48, 10 October 2005 (UTC)
 * It's mentioned in the Skull and Bones article. Not sure if it's real. I don't think it should be deleted if it is.
 * Pacifica House is definitely real. It has multiple mentions in the Brown Daily Herald, has its website, and is mentioned here in several other entries here. Seriously, it is a secret society...probably shouldn't have tons of references, considering it's...well...secret. Definitely shouldn't be deleted
 * Comment: If there's no consensus on whether this is a hoax, maybe the discussion should go to the article's talk page and it should stick around until there's a good answer. Friday (talk) 06:45, 12 October 2005 (UTC)
 * I have been able to get a copy of the publication cited by the Brown link. However, there are difficulties verifying both "Pacifica House Trust" and "Brunensis, Ltd."  The "official" site is registered to the former, but the latter holds the copyright.  Neither is registered as a charitable trust with the IRS.  However, this would not be necessary if the trust had no tax ramifications.  If the trust accepts charitable donations, this is a tax ramification.  There have been a total of TWO mentions of Pacifica House by The Brown Daily Herald.  Moreover the university archivist has never heard of the organization, but they could provide me with the papers of the Franklin Society.  If Pacifica House had evolved from that organization, I would suspect that they would have kept their minutes and acceptances of honorary membership -- one of these was an 1824 letter by Thomas Jefferson and another was a letter by Horace Greenleaf Whittier.  (Sadly, the signatures have been removed.)  Those are valuable.  On the other hand, I have found one alumnus who claims to be a member of Pacifica House. Finally a careful reading of their website has revealed an oddity: on the history page, a picture of the "charter" appears.  (http://www.pacificahouse.org/images/Charter.JPG)  This is not a charter -- the text reads: "Providence, May 16:  Sir -- Pardon a stranger for occupying a moment of that time which I know to be inestimably precious.  I must beg to offer you my sincere thanks for your last proclamation as the chief magistrate of the nation.  You call upon all your fellow citizens to render unto God thanksgiving for his recent mercies and to offer to him (sic) as individuals and societies ... prayer ...  He will ... our ... efforts with security, which he alone can ..."  This a letter, not a charter.  Frankly, the matter is out of my hands.  I can only provide a finite amount of evidence that this is a hoax.  I am also a little reluctant to take unsigned avowals of the legitimacy of Pacifica House seriously.  Micah Ross 09:05, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Interesting. It may well be that we can't determine for sure the status of this without doing our own "original research".  This is a problem with verifying people or organizations by their own websites.  Friday (talk) 16:03, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Delete for lack of verifiability and significance. If we can't tell whether it's real, it's probably not encyclopedic anyway.  Friday (talk) 16:05, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

 * Thanks for all your work on this one, BTW. I'm inclined to agree with your assessment.  Friday (talk) 17:40, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

 * I can't verify how legitimate the information on this site is, but I can verify that the Pacifica House group exists. I don't know details about the organization, but I do know that it's members regularly meet and it is an invite-only society.

 * Delete--inherently unverifiable even on the extreme offchance that it's true, as Micahross's efforts (thanks for that) demonstrate.

 * (First post from 66.31.44.201) Pacifica House does exist, whether all the information on the Wiki page is true is unverifiable. The question now is: should a Wiki page containing information, much of it unverifiable, on a given entity be deleted on the basis of lack of confirmation?  Highly unlikely this group is the creation of just one person--if so then it's an expensive way to be vain--registering the website, etc., and making sure the campus newspaper mentioned the group--but it seems plausible a lot of the "historical" information is just lost in time.  Histories have a way of sounding better with every telling.  "Deletion" as the ultimate price of unverifiability would implicate a lot of Wiki's pages.  but why don't we just edit the actual Wiki page and tell everyone that all this stuff is highly unreliable and not to drink the kool-aid?
 * (Second post from 66.31.44.201) Theoretically ALL secret societies on Wiki are unverifiable.  duh.  they're secret.  but seriously, there are a couple options here.  the first is to delete the hell out of this page.  if Wiki does this, then so too shoudl be considered every other collegiate secret society.  or else we should start conducting research to _verify_ their claims, and if they cannot be verified, delete them, or at least information we don't know for sure: skull and bones claims a long list of alumni, can we verify this?  the other option is to let it alone.  maybe.  the third option is to put a disclaimer like the skulls have now--the article has info that can't be verified.  there are a lot of suspicious bits of info on this wiki page that can't be confirmed and that is a FACT.  but let's be objective and apply the same principles here to other college society pages.  there's far too much vanity.

 * Okay, it seems people have taken an interest in what I have written. Fine.  Let's cover a few bases.  I can understand the removal of a personal name, but the removal of my research and evidence is fraudulent.  (Be forewarned -- this history function of the talk page is a powerful tool.) Also, if you choose to remove a personal name, why not just replace it with a string of Xs?  Also, I asked earlier for the sake of clarity that people sign their contributions.  Two separate contributions from the same IP does not a consensus make.  On 12 October, 2005 I had written  "Well, I followed up the information returned from the whois search. It was registered with eNom, Inc. and is hosted at ixwebhosting.com. It is worth noting that www.pacificahouse.info was registered by XXXX X. XXX for the organization "Pacifica House." This is the ONLY person I have met who claims to be a member of the organization. pacificahouse.info is hosted by ixwebhosting.com. Frankly, I'm saying "mystery solved" on this one. The thing never existed beyond XXX X. XXX, who probably authored the article. I suspect he also stopped by here to defend it. Micahross 12:42, 12 October 2005 (UTC)"  I really hate an intent to defraud.  Deleting the fruit of my research has made this personal.  Moreover, there are some things about Skull and Bones that can be verified: they have a building, people can -- and have -- watched who goes in and out.  For many years they had a page in the yearbook at Yale.  Their trust is registered, The Russell Trust, was registered with the IRS (although I think they may have changed the name by now.)  In several unsigned posts, it has been stated that Pacifica House indeed exists.  In some ways, this is true.  The Secret Protocols of the Elders of Zion also exists.  I have a copy of it.  By the same token, the "member(s)" of Pacifica House are probably limited to those here who defend this hoax. --Micahross 14:15, 14 October 2005 (UTC)

 * This is basically a debate between TWO people--"Micahross" and some anonymous poster! Why anyone in the world should care about "Pacifica House" and whether 100% of its information is verifiable escapes this user.  Why anybody has accumulated this much information about such collegiate organizations that have no relevance outside their institutions is also puzzling.  In any case: to the WIKI board: if you delete this website, please do not delete it because of one rather long-winded individual who claims that he cannot make unsecret a secretive organization.  But if you let it alone, do not leave it be because the benefit of the doubt.  It seems we need some rigor in verifying claims here, but this includes claims of people who have come into a website with an agenda, as well as claims of organizations that seem extraordinarily hard to make concrete.  Can somebody else besides "Micahross" and "unknown poster" step forward with information?  We are hesistant in believing one person on either side.

 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in an undeletion request). No further edits should be made to this page.


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The science building at Wilson with the baseball field in the foreground. Taken from the corner of Park Avenue and 7th Street in Long Beach, CA.

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Talk:Right-wing paramilitarism in Colombia

neutrality issue
It previously referred to Don Castano as dying while in "custody" of FARC, after he was kidnapped..."Custody" implies that somebody was in legitimate control of some authorities/agents of the state. He was kidnapped by rebels/bandits/insurgents/guerillas. He died while in "captivity" not "custody." For example the Lindbergh baby did not die while in "custody" of his kidnapper, but rather while in "captivity." The use of the term "custody" is not a neutral term, it suggests the kidnappers had legitimate authority to abduct him. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2602:306:38C5:6BC0:AC01:C9AF:1EA7:439E (talk) 02:59, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

The POV on this is Left leaning and needs to be fixed...most of the cites used are outdated as with the Colombian Peace Process now is showing that the FARC and other Communist insurgents were responsible for far more extra-judicial killings...I do not have time to fix this less than undergraduate "paper"...but it needs to have a be even handed...the FARC and other Communist groups are mentioned like they are saints... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 214.3.17.38 (talk) 00:23, 15 January 2021 (UTC)

Untitled
User Juancarlos2004 please edit this article. Thanks October 09, 2005
 * Hello there...rather late, but that's what I'm trying to do right now. The article, in my opinion, needs a lot of clean up, reducing POV bias, and additional sourcing, among other things. Juancarlos2004 00:11, 1 December 2005 (UTC)
 * There is an article by the Colombian Air Force about the disarming of one of the first paramilitary groups created in Colombia. There is a little bit of history there. Most of these first paramilitary groups were trained by an alleged Israeli mercenary called Jair Klein. The information provided by the FAC site could complement what has alrady been said here.--tequendamia 17:11, 10 February 2007 (UTC)
 * This UN article has interesting information about the formation of paramilitary groups in Colombia.--tequendamia 17:22, 10 February 2007 (UTC)

Paramilitarism in Colombia article on guerrilla category
The paramilitarism movement born against the guerrilla expantion. I erased the category that present the paramilitarism movement as guerrilla group. I speak in spanish and have an intermediate english level. Although I have some problems to write in english, I could get practice more with Wikipedia. Julkan (talk) 03:41, 31 December 2007 (UTC)

Different CONVIVIR figures
I'm a bit sleepy right now...but with respect to the recent edits, I've seen different figures from at least two sources. One of them is the [IInter-American Commission on Human Rightsts]], which in 1999 stated this:

''321. Las estadísticas en relación con el número exacto de grupos e integrantes de las CONVIVIR son difíciles de obtener y dependen de qué grupo de seguridad privada sea tomado, o no, como CONVIVIR. Sin embargo, varias fuentes indican que existen aproximadamente 414 asociaciones de CONVIVIR. El Presidente de la Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de CONVIVIR, Carlos Alberto Díaz, indicó a la prensa en diciembre de 1997 que él creía que las CONVIVIR tenían más de 120,000 miembros.(151)''

Quick translation:

''321. Statistics related to the exact number of CONVIVIR groups and members are hard to obtain and depend on which kinds of private security groups are or aren't considered to be CONVIVIR. However, several sources indicate that there are approximately 414 CONVIVIR associations. The President of the National Federation of CONVIVIR Associations, Carlos Alberto Díaz, indicated to the press in December, 1997 that he thought the CONVIVIR groups had more than 120,000 members.(151)''

In addition, page 104 of Mauricio Romero's ''Paramilitares y autodefensas. 1982-2003'' reiterates the 414 total and adds a chart with the number of CONVIVIR groups per Department, citing 1997 data from the Superintendence of Vigilance and Private Security, which is as follows:

Santander: 106 Cundinamarca: 83 Antioquia: 65 Boyacá: 64 Córdoba: 19 Caldas: 12 Cesar: 8 Meta: 8 Other: 49 Total: 414

Romero has written extensively on paramilitarism and parapolitics. See here:

I believe this discrepancy must be addressed or, at the very least, the original sources for each numerical estimate should be made clear in the article's main text. Having said that, I'll come back to this after getting some sleep. Juancarlos2004 (talk) 07:15, 23 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, I agree that we should make it clear that exact figures are not known or agreed upon. Due to the large number of sources making estimates, however ,I'd say that what is most reasonable would be to be brief in the text of the article and simply include a range of estimates, citing the sources we derived the range from. I don't think we should clutter the body of the text with extensive discussion of who made what estimates, etc. per WP:UNDUE, because it's not relevant enough to the topic at hand to warrant extensive discussion here. However in the article for CONVIVIR, I think such an in-text discussion would be very welcome and beneficial. As far as Romero, he clearly looks like an expert on the subject. If you've got anything in particular you'd like to include, I don't personally see a problem with it. -- Jrtayloriv (talk) 07:30, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

It is untrue that the Paramilitaries were responsible for 70 to 80% of political murders...the ICC themselves investigated and found not basis to indict anyone...those who were found guilty were put in Colombian jails or sent to the US...I am a Latin Americanist and the introduction sounds more like cheerleading for the Leftist groups than academic research...the FARC is responsible for many more deaths, kidnappings and massacres than the paramilitaries...Dr. Russell Ramsey in his book Essays on Latin American Security poses that many of the massacres and deaths blamed on the Colombian military and the paramilitary were the FARC dressed as these combatants...this is collaborated in the book by former FARC member "Johnny" In Hell...clean this up, it is un-academic... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 137.95.1.11 (talk) 16:01, 22 October 2015 (UTC)

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