Daily Papers

Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE) is an emerging subfield at the intersection of information extraction and model interpretability. MRE aims to leverage the mutual understanding between tasks of different granularities, enhancing the performance of both coarse-grained and fine-grained tasks through joint modeling. While MRE has been explored and validated in the textual domain, its applicability to visual and multimodal domains remains unexplored. In this work, we extend MRE to the multimodal information extraction domain for the first time. Specifically, we introduce a new task: Multimodal Mutual Reinforcement Effect (M-MRE), and construct a corresponding dataset to support this task. To address the challenges posed by M-MRE, we further propose a Prompt Format Adapter (PFA) that is fully compatible with various Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Experimental results demonstrate that MRE can also be observed in the M-MRE task, a multimodal text-image understanding scenario. This provides strong evidence that MRE facilitates mutual gains across three interrelated tasks, confirming its generalizability beyond the textual domain.

The Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE) represents a promising avenue in information extraction and multitasking research. Nevertheless, its applicability has been constrained due to the exclusive availability of MRE mix datasets in Japanese, thereby limiting comprehensive exploration by the global research community. To address this limitation, we introduce a Multilingual MRE mix dataset (MMM) that encompasses 21 sub-datasets in English, Japanese, and Chinese. In this paper, we also propose a method for dataset translation assisted by Large Language Models (LLMs), which significantly reduces the manual annotation time required for dataset construction by leveraging LLMs to translate the original Japanese datasets. Additionally, we have enriched the dataset by incorporating open-domain Named Entity Recognition (NER) and sentence classification tasks. Utilizing this expanded dataset, we developed a unified input-output framework to train an Open-domain Information Extraction Large Language Model (OIELLM). The OIELLM model demonstrates the capability to effectively process novel MMM datasets, exhibiting significant improvements in performance.

The Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE) investigates the synergistic relationship between word-level and text-level classifications in text classification tasks. It posits that the performance of both classification levels can be mutually enhanced. However, this mechanism has not been adequately demonstrated or explained in prior research. To address this gap, we employ empirical experiment to observe and substantiate the MRE theory. Our experiments on 21 MRE mix datasets revealed the presence of MRE in the model and its impact. Specifically, we conducted compare experiments use fine-tune. The results of findings from comparison experiments corroborates the existence of MRE. Furthermore, we extended the application of MRE to prompt learning, utilizing word-level information as a verbalizer to bolster the model's prediction of text-level classification labels. In our final experiment, the F1-score significantly surpassed the baseline in 18 out of 21 MRE Mix datasets, further validating the notion that word-level information enhances the language model's comprehension of the text as a whole.

Information Extraction (IE) stands as a cornerstone in natural language processing, traditionally segmented into distinct sub-tasks. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) heralds a paradigm shift, suggesting the feasibility of a singular model addressing multiple IE subtasks. In this vein, we introduce the General Information Extraction Large Language Model (GIELLM), which integrates text Classification, Sentiment Analysis, Named Entity Recognition, Relation Extraction, and Event Extraction using a uniform input-output schema. This innovation marks the first instance of a model simultaneously handling such a diverse array of IE subtasks. Notably, the GIELLM leverages the Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE), enhancing performance in integrated tasks compared to their isolated counterparts. Our experiments demonstrate State-of-the-Art (SOTA) results in five out of six Japanese mixed datasets, significantly surpassing GPT-3.5-Turbo. Further, an independent evaluation using the novel Text Classification Relation and Event Extraction(TCREE) dataset corroborates the synergistic advantages of MRE in text and word classification. This breakthrough paves the way for most IE subtasks to be subsumed under a singular LLM framework. Specialized fine-tune task-specific models are no longer needed.

Sentiment analysis is a pivotal task in the domain of natural language processing. It encompasses both text-level sentiment polarity classification and word-level Part of Speech(POS) sentiment polarity determination. Such analysis challenges models to understand text holistically while also extracting nuanced information. With the rise of Large Language Models(LLMs), new avenues for sentiment analysis have opened. This paper proposes enhancing performance by leveraging the Mutual Reinforcement Effect(MRE) between individual words and the overall text. It delves into how word polarity influences the overarching sentiment of a passage. To support our research, we annotated four novel Sentiment Text Classification and Part of Speech(SCPOS) datasets, building upon existing sentiment classification datasets. Furthermore, we developed a Universal Sentiment Analysis(USA) model, with a 7-billion parameter size. Experimental results revealed that our model surpassed the performance of gpt-3.5-turbo across all four datasets, underscoring the significance of MRE in sentiment analysis.

Information extraction(IE) is a crucial subfield within natural language processing. In this study, we introduce a Sentence Classification and Named Entity Recognition Multi-task (SCNM) approach that combines Sentence Classification (SC) and Named Entity Recognition (NER). We develop a Sentence-to-Label Generation (SLG) framework for SCNM and construct a Wikipedia dataset containing both SC and NER. Using a format converter, we unify input formats and employ a generative model to generate SC-labels, NER-labels, and associated text segments. We propose a Constraint Mechanism (CM) to improve generated format accuracy. Our results show SC accuracy increased by 1.13 points and NER by 1.06 points in SCNM compared to standalone tasks, with CM raising format accuracy from 63.61 to 100. The findings indicate mutual reinforcement effects between SC and NER, and integration enhances both tasks' performance.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently emerged as a compelling approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), where an LLM generator serves as a policy guided by a verifier (reward model). However, current RL post-training methods for LLMs typically use verifiers that are fixed (rule-based or frozen pretrained) or trained discriminatively via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Such designs are susceptible to reward hacking and generalize poorly beyond their training distributions. To overcome these limitations, we propose Tango, a novel framework that uses RL to concurrently train both an LLM generator and a verifier in an interleaved manner. A central innovation of Tango is its generative, process-level LLM verifier, which is trained via RL and co-evolves with the generator. Importantly, the verifier is trained solely based on outcome-level verification correctness rewards without requiring explicit process-level annotations. This generative RL-trained verifier exhibits improved robustness and superior generalization compared to deterministic or SFT-trained verifiers, fostering effective mutual reinforcement with the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that both components of Tango achieve state-of-the-art results among 7B/8B-scale models: the generator attains best-in-class performance across five competition-level math benchmarks and four challenging out-of-domain reasoning tasks, while the verifier leads on the ProcessBench dataset. Remarkably, both components exhibit particularly substantial improvements on the most difficult mathematical reasoning problems. Code is at: https://github.com/kaiwenzha/rl-tango.

Unified vision large language models (VLLMs) have recently achieved impressive advancements in both multimodal understanding and generation, powering applications such as visual question answering and text-guided image synthesis. However, progress in unified VLLMs remains constrained by the lack of datasets that fully exploit the synergistic potential between these two core abilities. Existing datasets typically address understanding and generation in isolation, thereby limiting the performance of unified VLLMs. To bridge this critical gap, we introduce a novel dataset construction framework, UnifiedVisual, and present UnifiedVisual-240K, a high-quality dataset meticulously designed to facilitate mutual enhancement between multimodal understanding and generation. UnifiedVisual-240K seamlessly integrates diverse visual and textual inputs and outputs, enabling comprehensive cross-modal reasoning and precise text-to-image alignment. Our dataset encompasses a wide spectrum of tasks and data sources, ensuring rich diversity and addressing key shortcomings of prior resources. Extensive experiments demonstrate that models trained on UnifiedVisual-240K consistently achieve strong performance across a wide range of tasks. Notably, these models exhibit significant mutual reinforcement between multimodal understanding and generation, further validating the effectiveness of our framework and dataset. We believe UnifiedVisual represents a new growth point for advancing unified VLLMs and unlocking their full potential. Our code and datasets is available at https://github.com/fnlp-vision/UnifiedVisual.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) plays a key role in stimulating the explicit reasoning capability of Large Language Models (LLMs). We can achieve expert-level performance in some specific domains via RLVR, such as coding or math. When a general multi-domain expert-level model is required, we need to carefully consider the collaboration of RLVR across different domains. The current state-of-the-art models mainly employ two different training paradigms for multi-domain RLVR: mixed multi-task RLVR and separate RLVR followed by model merging. However, most of the works did not provide a detailed comparison and analysis about these paradigms. To this end, we choose multiple commonly used high-level tasks (e.g., math, coding, science, instruction following, and agent) as our target domains and design extensive qualitative and quantitative experiments using open-source datasets. We find the RLVR across domains exhibits few mutual interferences, and reasoning-intensive domains demonstrate mutually synergistic effects. Furthermore, we analyze the internal mechanisms of mutual gains from the perspectives of weight space geometry, information constraints, model prediction behavior and self-verification. This project is named as M2RL that means Mixed multi-task training or separate training followed by model Merging for Reinforcement Learning, and the homepage is at https://github.com/Mosi-AI/M2RL.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Human motion driven control (HMDC) is an effective approach for generating natural and compelling robot motions while preserving high-level semantics. However, establishing the correspondence between humans and robots with different body structures is not straightforward due to the mismatches in kinematics and dynamics properties, which causes intrinsic ambiguity to the problem. Many previous algorithms approach this motion retargeting problem with unsupervised learning, which requires the prerequisite skill sets. However, it will be extremely costly to learn all the skills without understanding the given human motions, particularly for high-dimensional robots. In this work, we introduce CrossLoco, a guided unsupervised reinforcement learning framework that simultaneously learns robot skills and their correspondence to human motions. Our key innovation is to introduce a cycle-consistency-based reward term designed to maximize the mutual information between human motions and robot states. We demonstrate that the proposed framework can generate compelling robot motions by translating diverse human motions, such as running, hopping, and dancing. We quantitatively compare our CrossLoco against the manually engineered and unsupervised baseline algorithms along with the ablated versions of our framework and demonstrate that our method translates human motions with better accuracy, diversity, and user preference. We also showcase its utility in other applications, such as synthesizing robot movements from language input and enabling interactive robot control.

Image quality assessment (IQA) focuses on the perceptual visual quality of images, playing a crucial role in downstream tasks such as image reconstruction, compression, and generation. The rapid advancement of multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) has significantly broadened the scope of IQA, moving toward comprehensive image quality understanding that incorporates content analysis, degradation perception, and comparison reasoning beyond mere numerical scoring. Previous MLLM-based methods typically either generate numerical scores lacking interpretability or heavily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using large-scale annotated datasets to provide descriptive assessments, limiting their flexibility and applicability. In this paper, we propose Q-Insight, a reinforcement learning-based model built upon group relative policy optimization (GRPO), which demonstrates strong visual reasoning capability for image quality understanding while requiring only a limited amount of rating scores and degradation labels. By jointly optimizing score regression and degradation perception tasks with carefully designed reward functions, our approach effectively exploits their mutual benefits for enhanced performance. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Q-Insight substantially outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods in both score regression and degradation perception tasks, while exhibiting impressive zero-shot generalization to comparison reasoning tasks. Code will be available at https://github.com/lwq20020127/Q-Insight.

Role-playing models (RPMs) are widely used in real-world applications but underperform when deployed in the wild. This degradation can be attributed to distribution shifts, including user, character, and dialogue compositional shifts. Existing methods like LLM-as-a-judge fall short in providing a fine-grained diagnosis of how these shifts affect RPM generalization, and thus there lack formal frameworks to characterize RPM generalization behaviors. To bridge these gaps, we introduce an information-theoretic metric, named reasoning-based effective mutual information difference (R-EMID), to measure RPM performance degradation in an interpretable way. We also derive an upper bound on R-EMID to predict the worst-case generalization performance of RPMs and theoretically reveal how various shifts contribute to the RPM performance degradation. Moreover, we propose a co-evolving reinforcement learning framework to adaptively model the connection among user, character, and dialogue context and thus enhance the estimation of dialogue response generation probability, which is critical for calculating R-EMID. Finally, we evaluate the generalization performance of various RPMs using R-EMID, finding that user shift poses the highest risk among all shifts and reinforcement learning is the most effective approach for enhancing RPM generalization.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

During the preference optimization of large language models (LLMs), distribution shifts may arise between newly generated model samples and the data used to train the reward model (RM). This shift reduces the efficacy of the RM, which in turn negatively impacts the performance of the policy model (PM). To address this challenge, we propose Mutual-Taught, a self-training method that iteratively improves both the PM and RM without requiring additional human annotation. Our approach mirrors the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In the E-step, the PM is updated using feedback from the current RM, guiding the PM toward a better approximation of the latent optimal preference distribution. In the M-step, we update the RM by constructing training data from the outputs of the PM before and after the E-step update. This process ensures that the RM adapts to the evolving policy distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that this iterative approach leads to consistent improvements in both models. Specifically, our 8B policy model, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct-MT, achieves a length-controlled win rate of 54.1\% on AlpacaEval-2, while our 8B reward model, FsfairX-LLaMA3-RM-MT, performs on par with GPT-4o-2024-08-06 on RewardBench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Exploration in environments which differ across episodes has received increasing attention in recent years. Current methods use some combination of global novelty bonuses, computed using the agent's entire training experience, and episodic novelty bonuses, computed using only experience from the current episode. However, the use of these two types of bonuses has been ad-hoc and poorly understood. In this work, we shed light on the behavior of these two types of bonuses through controlled experiments on easily interpretable tasks as well as challenging pixel-based settings. We find that the two types of bonuses succeed in different settings, with episodic bonuses being most effective when there is little shared structure across episodes and global bonuses being effective when more structure is shared. We develop a conceptual framework which makes this notion of shared structure precise by considering the variance of the value function across contexts, and which provides a unifying explanation of our empirical results. We furthermore find that combining the two bonuses can lead to more robust performance across different degrees of shared structure, and investigate different algorithmic choices for defining and combining global and episodic bonuses based on function approximation. This results in an algorithm which sets a new state of the art across 16 tasks from the MiniHack suite used in prior work, and also performs robustly on Habitat and Montezuma's Revenge.

A hallmark of life on Earth is the ability of agents to exert causal power and be drivers of subsequent events. This is key to cognition at all scales. Causal emergence, measuring the degree to which an agent exerts unique predictive power on its future, is one consequence of causal power. Indeed, recent discoveries have shown that biological agents, even minimal ones, increase their causal emergence after learning new memories. However, there is a major knowledge gap regarding how causally emergent artificial agents are. We focused on Reinforcement Learning (RL) of neural-network agents across an array of environmental conditions, encompassing different algorithms, agent architectures, and six environments arranged on a complexity spectrum. For consistency, we computed the causal emergence of their latent-space representations over their lifetimes. We used the recently proposed ΦID to estimate causal emergence and tested how it related to learning performance. Our results suggested a Causally Emergent Alignment Hypothesis: successful agents exhibited causal emergence that was consistently predictive of final reward early in training and whose representational dynamics aligned with reward improvement in most tasks. This idea suggests that causal emergence may be a previously undisclosed axis of reorganization of neural representations in RL agents, with the potential to establish causal relationships and interventions that will lead to better RL agents. Our work also highlights the alignment between causal emergence and learning as another way biological and artificial creatures compare.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

Distributed reinforcement learning trains on data from stale, buggy, or mismatched actors, producing actions with high surprisal (negative log-probability) under the learner's policy. The core difficulty is not surprising data per se, but negative learning from surprising data. High-surprisal failures can dominate the update direction despite carrying little useful signal, while high-surprisal successes reveal opportunities the current policy would otherwise miss. The Delightful Policy Gradient (DG) separates these cases by gating each update with delight, the product of advantage and surprisal, suppressing rare failures and amplifying rare successes without behavior probabilities. Under contaminated sampling, the cosine similarity between the standard policy gradient and the true gradient collapses, while DG's grows as the policy improves. No sign-blind reweighting, including exact importance sampling, can reproduce this effect. On MNIST with simulated staleness, DG without off-policy correction outperforms importance-weighted PG with exact behavior probabilities. On a transformer sequence task with staleness, actor bugs, reward corruption, and rare discovery, DG achieves roughly 10{times} lower error. When all four frictions act simultaneously, its compute advantage is order-of-magnitude and grows with task complexity.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

This study explores the interference in temporal processing within a dual-task paradigm from an artificial intelligence (AI) perspective. In this context, the dual-task setup is implemented as a simplified version of the Overcooked environment with two variations, single task (T) and dual task (T+N). Both variations involve an embedded time production task, but the dual task (T+N) additionally involves a concurrent number comparison task. Two deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents were separately trained for each of these tasks. These agents exhibited emergent behavior consistent with human timing research. Specifically, the dual task (T+N) agent exhibited significant overproduction of time relative to its single task (T) counterpart. This result was consistent across four target durations. Preliminary analysis of neural dynamics in the agents' LSTM layers did not reveal any clear evidence of a dedicated or intrinsic timer. Hence, further investigation is needed to better understand the underlying time-keeping mechanisms of the agents and to provide insights into the observed behavioral patterns. This study is a small step towards exploring parallels between emergent DRL behavior and behavior observed in biological systems in order to facilitate a better understanding of both.

In this work, we study the issue of reward hacking on the response length, a challenge emerging in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) on LLMs. A well-formatted, verbose but less helpful response from the LLMs can often deceive LLMs or even human evaluators to achieve high scores. The same issue also holds for some reward models in RL. To address the challenges in both training and evaluation, we establish a more reliable evaluation protocol for comparing different training configurations, which inspects the trade-off between LLM evaluation score and response length obtained by varying training hyperparameters. Based on this evaluation, we conduct large-scale studies, where the results shed insights into the efficacy of hyperparameters and tricks used in RL on mitigating length bias. We further propose to improve the reward model by jointly training two linear heads on shared feature representations to predict the rewards, one trained to correlate with length, and the other trained to decorrelate with length and therefore focus more on the actual content. We then discard the length head in RL to prevent reward hacking on length. Experiments demonstrate that our approach almost eliminates the reward correlation with length, and improves the obtained policy by a significant margin.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

We study a class of reinforcement learning problems where the reward signals for policy learning are generated by a discriminator that is dependent on and jointly optimized with the policy. This interdependence between the policy and the discriminator leads to an unstable learning process because reward signals from an immature discriminator are noisy and impede policy learning, and conversely, an untrained policy impedes discriminator learning. We call this learning setting Internally Rewarded Reinforcement Learning (IRRL) as the reward is not provided directly by the environment but internally by the discriminator. In this paper, we formally formulate IRRL and present a class of problems that belong to IRRL. We theoretically derive and empirically analyze the effect of the reward function in IRRL and based on these analyses propose the clipped linear reward function. Experimental results show that the proposed reward function can consistently stabilize the training process by reducing the impact of reward noise, which leads to faster convergence and higher performance compared with baselines in diverse tasks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has substantially improved the ability of large language model (LLM) agents to interact with environments and solve multi-turn tasks. However, effective agentic RL remains challenging: sparse outcome-only rewards provide limited guidance for assigning credit to individual steps within long interaction trajectories. Existing approaches often introduce dense intermediate supervision, such as process reward models or auxiliary self-supervised signals, which increases supervision and tuning complexity and may limit generalization across tasks and domains. We present AEM, a supervision-free credit assignment method that adaptively modulates entropy dynamics during RL training to improve the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Since in agentic RL the environment is typically affected by a complete response, rather than an individual token, our analysis lifts entropy dynamics from the token level to the response level, aligning uncertainty estimation with the effective action granularity of LLM agents and reducing sensitivity to token-level sampling noise. We further show that entropy drift under natural-gradient updates is governed by the interaction between the sampled-response advantage and its relative surprisal. Motivated by this result, AEM derives a practical response-level uncertainty proxy and uses it to rescale advantages, leveraging the evolving balance between positive and negative samples to naturally transition from exploration to exploitation. Extensive experiments on ALFWorld, WebShop, and SWE-bench-Verified with models ranging from 1.5B to 32B demonstrate that AEM consistently improves strong RL baselines, including a +1.4\% gain when integrated into a state-of-the-art software-engineering RL training framework.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) efficiently scales the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) but is bottlenecked by scarce labeled data. Reinforcement learning with intrinsic rewards (RLIR) offers a scalable alternative via self-rewarding, yet often suffers from instability and inferior performance. We trace this gap to a systemic bias in confidence-coupled self-rewarding: the model tends to over-reward high-confidence mistakes, forming a self-confirming loop. We quantify this feedback-loop bias with three metrics: reward noise magnitude (rho_noise), policy-reward coupling (rho_selfbias), and over-/under-reward skew (rho_symbias). Our analyses show a compounding effect where strong coupling amplifies confidence-conditioned errors and drives a drift toward over-reward, leading to instability and a lower performance ceiling. To mitigate this, we propose reinforcement learning with ensembled rewards (RLER), which aggregates diverse models with adaptive reward interpolation and disagreement-aware rollout selection to reduce coupling and suppress over-reward drift. Extensive experiments show that RLER improves by 6.2% over the best RLIR baseline and is within 3.6% of RLVR, while exhibiting stable scaling on unlabeled samples.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

We propose a targeted communication architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents learn both what messages to send and whom to address them to while performing cooperative tasks in partially-observable environments. This targeting behavior is learnt solely from downstream task-specific reward without any communication supervision. We additionally augment this with a multi-round communication approach where agents coordinate via multiple rounds of communication before taking actions in the environment. We evaluate our approach on a diverse set of cooperative multi-agent tasks, of varying difficulties, with varying number of agents, in a variety of environments ranging from 2D grid layouts of shapes and simulated traffic junctions to 3D indoor environments, and demonstrate the benefits of targeted and multi-round communication. Moreover, we show that the targeted communication strategies learned by agents are interpretable and intuitive. Finally, we show that our architecture can be easily extended to mixed and competitive environments, leading to improved performance and sample complexity over recent state-of-the-art approaches.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

Reward functions are central in reinforcement learning (RL), guiding agents towards optimal decision-making. The complexity of RL tasks requires meticulously designed reward functions that effectively drive learning while avoiding unintended consequences. Effective reward design aims to provide signals that accelerate the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Crafting rewards that align with task objectives, foster desired behaviors, and prevent undesirable actions is inherently challenging. This thesis delves into the critical role of reward signals in RL, highlighting their impact on the agent's behavior and learning dynamics and addressing challenges such as delayed, ambiguous, or intricate rewards. In this thesis work, we tackle different aspects of reward shaping. First, we address the problem of designing informative and interpretable reward signals from a teacher's/expert's perspective (teacher-driven). Here, the expert, equipped with the optimal policy and the corresponding value function, designs reward signals that expedite the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Second, we build on this teacher-driven approach by introducing a novel method for adaptive interpretable reward design. In this scenario, the expert tailors the rewards based on the learner's current policy, ensuring alignment and optimal progression. Third, we propose a meta-learning approach, enabling the agent to self-design its reward signals online without expert input (agent-driven). This self-driven method considers the agent's learning and exploration to establish a self-improving feedback loop.

Methods for controlling large language models (LLMs), including local weight fine-tuning, LoRA-based adaptation, and activation-based interventions, are often studied in isolation, obscuring their connections and making comparison difficult. In this work, we present a unified view that frames these interventions as dynamic weight updates induced by a control signal, placing them within a single conceptual framework. Building on this view, we propose a unified preference-utility analysis that separates control effects into preference, defined as the tendency toward a target concept, and utility, defined as coherent and task-valid generation, and measures both on a shared log-odds scale using polarity-paired contrastive examples. Across methods, we observe a consistent trade-off between preference and utility: stronger control increases preference while predictably reducing utility. We further explain this behavior through an activation manifold perspective, in which control shifts representations along target-concept directions to enhance preference, while utility declines primarily when interventions push representations off the model's valid-generation manifold. Finally, we introduce a new steering approach SPLIT guided by this analysis that improves preference while better preserving utility. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit/blob/main/examples/SPLIT.md.

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

Large language models (LLMs) are often sycophantic, prioritizing agreement with their users over accurate or objective statements. This problematic behavior becomes more pronounced during reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), an LLM fine-tuning stage intended to align model outputs with human values. Instead of increasing accuracy and reliability, the reward model learned from RLHF often rewards sycophancy. We develop a linear probing method to identify and penalize markers of sycophancy within the reward model, producing rewards that discourage sycophantic behavior. Our experiments show that constructing and optimizing against this surrogate reward function reduces sycophantic behavior in multiple open-source LLMs. Our results suggest a generalizable methodology for reducing unwanted LLM behaviors that are not sufficiently disincentivized by RLHF fine-tuning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as autonomous agents in strategic and social interactions. Although recent studies suggest that assigning personality traits to LLMs can influence their behavior, how personality steering affects cooperation under controlled conditions remains unclear. In this study, we examine the effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in LLM agents using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Based on the Big Five framework, we first measure basic personality scores of three models, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-5, using the Big Five Inventory. We then compare behavior under baseline and personality-informed conditions, and further analyze the effects of independently manipulating each personality dimension to extreme values. Our results show that agreeableness is the dominant factor promoting cooperation across all models, while other personality traits have limited impact. Explicit personality information increases cooperation but can also raise vulnerability to exploitation, particularly in earlier-generation models. In contrast, later-generation models exhibit more selective cooperation. These findings indicate that personality steering acts as a behavioral bias rather than a deterministic control mechanism.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

Mediation analysis learns the causal effect transmitted via mediator variables between treatments and outcomes and receives increasing attention in various scientific domains to elucidate causal relations. Most existing works focus on point-exposure studies where each subject only receives one treatment at a single time point. However, there are a number of applications (e.g., mobile health) where the treatments are sequentially assigned over time and the dynamic mediation effects are of primary interest. Proposing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework, we are the first to evaluate dynamic mediation effects in settings with infinite horizons. We decompose the average treatment effect into an immediate direct effect, an immediate mediation effect, a delayed direct effect, and a delayed mediation effect. Upon the identification of each effect component, we further develop robust and semi-parametrically efficient estimators under the RL framework to infer these causal effects. The superior performance of the proposed method is demonstrated through extensive numerical studies, theoretical results, and an analysis of a mobile health dataset.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Entropy serves as a critical metric for measuring the diversity of outputs generated by large language models (LLMs), providing valuable insights into their exploration capabilities. While recent studies increasingly focus on monitoring and adjusting entropy to better balance exploration and exploitation in reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), a principled understanding of entropy dynamics during this process is yet to be thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework for analyzing the entropy dynamics during the RFT process, which begins with a discriminant expression that quantifies entropy change under a single logit update. This foundation enables the derivation of a first-order expression for entropy change, which can be further extended to the update formula of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). The corollaries and insights drawn from the theoretical analysis inspire the design of entropy control methods, and also offer a unified lens for interpreting various entropy-based methods in existing studies. We provide empirical evidence to support the main conclusions of our analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the derived entropy-discriminator clipping methods. This study yields novel insights into RFT training dynamics, providing theoretical support and practical strategies for optimizing the exploration-exploitation balance during LLM fine-tuning.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Exploration is a key problem in reinforcement learning, since agents can only learn from data they acquire in the environment. With that in mind, maintaining a population of agents is an attractive method, as it allows data be collected with a diverse set of behaviors. This behavioral diversity is often boosted via multi-objective loss functions. However, those approaches typically leverage mean field updates based on pairwise distances, which makes them susceptible to cycling behaviors and increased redundancy. In addition, explicitly boosting diversity often has a detrimental impact on optimizing already fruitful behaviors for rewards. As such, the reward-diversity trade off typically relies on heuristics. Finally, such methods require behavioral representations, often handcrafted and domain specific. In this paper, we introduce an approach to optimize all members of a population simultaneously. Rather than using pairwise distance, we measure the volume of the entire population in a behavioral manifold, defined by task-agnostic behavioral embeddings. In addition, our algorithm Diversity via Determinants (DvD), adapts the degree of diversity during training using online learning techniques. We introduce both evolutionary and gradient-based instantiations of DvD and show they effectively improve exploration without reducing performance when better exploration is not required.

Reinforcement learning has emerged as a paradigm for post-training large language models, boosting their reasoning capabilities. Such approaches compute an advantage value for each sample, reflecting better or worse performance than expected, thereby yielding both positive and negative signals for training. However, the indiscriminate mixing of the two signals in existing methods, especially from the early stages, may lead to ambiguous guidance and limited gains. To address this issue, we propose **CAPO** (**C**urriculum **A**dvantage **P**olicy **O**ptimization), an adaptive curriculum mechanism based on advantage signals. The proposed mechanism bootstraps imitation learning with positive-only advantage samples to establish robust foundations, and subsequently introduces negative signals to cultivate discriminative capabilities, thereby improving generalization across complex scenarios. Compatible with diverse optimization methods including GRPO, PPO, RLOO, and Reinforce++, our method consistently achieves stable and significant improvements in mathematical reasoning tasks, and further generalizes effectively to multimodal Graphical User Interface (GUI) reasoning scenarios, establishing itself as a versatile and robust optimization framework.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

As AI systems become more intelligent and their behavior becomes more challenging to assess, they may learn to game the flaws of human feedback instead of genuinely striving to follow instructions; however, this risk can be mitigated by controlling how LLMs generalize human feedback to situations where it is unreliable. To better understand how reward models generalize, we craft 69 distribution shifts spanning 8 categories. We find that reward models do not learn to evaluate `instruction-following' by default and instead favor personas that resemble internet text. Techniques for interpreting reward models' internal representations achieve better generalization than standard fine-tuning, but still frequently fail to distinguish instruction-following from conflated behaviors. We consolidate the 15 most challenging distribution shifts into the GENeralization analogIES (GENIES) benchmark, which we hope will enable progress toward controlling reward model generalization.

This paper investigates the problem of interactively learning behaviors communicated by a human teacher using positive and negative feedback. Much previous work on this problem has made the assumption that people provide feedback for decisions that is dependent on the behavior they are teaching and is independent from the learner's current policy. We present empirical results that show this assumption to be false -- whether human trainers give a positive or negative feedback for a decision is influenced by the learner's current policy. Based on this insight, we introduce {\em Convergent Actor-Critic by Humans} (COACH), an algorithm for learning from policy-dependent feedback that converges to a local optimum. Finally, we demonstrate that COACH can successfully learn multiple behaviors on a physical robot.

Infants explore their complex physical and social environment in an organized way. To gain insight into what intrinsic motivations may help structure this exploration, we create a virtual infant agent and place it in a developmentally-inspired 3D environment with no external rewards. The environment has a virtual caregiver agent with the capability to interact contingently with the infant agent in ways that resemble play. We test intrinsic reward functions that are similar to motivations that have been proposed to drive exploration in humans: surprise, uncertainty, novelty, and learning progress. These generic reward functions lead the infant agent to explore its environment and discover the contingencies that are embedded into the caregiver agent. The reward functions that are proxies for novelty and uncertainty are the most successful in generating diverse experiences and activating the environment contingencies. We also find that learning a world model in the presence of an attentive caregiver helps the infant agent learn how to predict scenarios with challenging social and physical dynamics. Taken together, our findings provide insight into how curiosity-like intrinsic rewards and contingent social interaction lead to dynamic social behavior and the creation of a robust predictive world model.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved significant results, most notably by leveraging the representation-learning abilities of deep neural networks. However, large centralized approaches quickly become infeasible as the number of agents scale, and fully decentralized approaches can miss important opportunities for information sharing and coordination. Furthermore, not all agents are equal -- in some cases, individual agents may not even have the ability to send communication to other agents or explicitly model other agents. This paper considers the case where there is a single, powerful, central agent that can observe the entire observation space, and there are multiple, low-powered local agents that can only receive local observations and are not able to communicate with each other. The central agent's job is to learn what message needs to be sent to different local agents based on the global observations, not by centrally solving the entire problem and sending action commands, but by determining what additional information an individual agent should receive so that it can make a better decision. In this work we present our MARL algorithm \algo, describe where it would be most applicable, and implement it in the cooperative navigation and multi-agent walker domains. Empirical results show that 1) learned communication does indeed improve system performance, 2) results generalize to heterogeneous local agents, and 3) results generalize to different reward structures.

Great successes have been reported using Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align large language models. Open-source preference datasets and reward models have enabled wider experimentation beyond generic chat settings, particularly to make systems more "helpful" for tasks like web question answering, summarization, and multi-turn dialogue. When optimizing for helpfulness, RLHF has been consistently observed to drive models to produce longer outputs. This paper demonstrates that optimizing for response length is a significant factor behind RLHF's reported improvements in these settings. First, we study the relationship between reward and length for reward models trained on three open-source preference datasets for helpfulness. Here, length correlates strongly with reward, and improvements in reward score are driven in large part by shifting the distribution over output lengths. We then explore interventions during both RL and reward model learning to see if we can achieve the same downstream improvements as RLHF without increasing length. While our interventions mitigate length increases, they aren't uniformly effective across settings. Furthermore, we find that even running RLHF with a reward based solely on length can reproduce most of the downstream improvements over the initial policy model, showing that reward models in these settings have a long way to go.

Large language models (LLMs) have been extensively studied from computational and cognitive perspectives, yet their behavior as communicative actors in socially structured contexts remains underexplored. This study examines whether LLM-based multi-agent systems exhibit systematic linguistic adaptation in response to perceived social observation contexts -- a question with direct implications for AI governance and auditing. Drawing on Habermas's (1981) Theory of Communicative Action, Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model, Bell's (1984) Audience Design framework, and the Hawthorne Effect, we report a controlled experiment involving 100 multi-agent debate sessions across five conditions (n = 20 each). Conditions varied the framing of social observation -- from explicit monitoring by university researchers, to negation of monitoring, to an observer-substitution condition replacing human researchers with an automated AI auditing system. Monitored conditions (Delta+24.9%, Delta+24.2%) and the automated AI monitoring condition (Delta+22.2%) produce higher TTR change than audience-framing conditions (Delta+17.7%), F(4, 94) = 2.79, p = .031. Message length shows a fully dissociated effect, F(4, 95) = 19.55, p < .001. A fifth condition -- replacing human with AI observers -- yields intermediate TTR adaptation, suggesting LLM behavior is sensitive to observer identity: human evaluation elicits stronger register formalization than automated AI surveillance. We discuss implications for AI governance, algorithmic auditing, and the repositioning of LLMs as contextually sensitive communicative actors.

A widely used technique for improving policies is success conditioning, in which one collects trajectories, identifies those that achieve a desired outcome, and updates the policy to imitate the actions taken along successful trajectories. This principle appears under many names -- rejection sampling with SFT, goal-conditioned RL, Decision Transformers -- yet what optimization problem it solves, if any, has remained unclear. We prove that success conditioning exactly solves a trust-region optimization problem, maximizing policy improvement subject to a χ^2 divergence constraint whose radius is determined automatically by the data. This yields an identity: relative policy improvement, the magnitude of policy change, and a quantity we call action-influence -- measuring how random variation in action choices affects success rates -- are exactly equal at every state. Success conditioning thus emerges as a conservative improvement operator. Exact success conditioning cannot degrade performance or induce dangerous distribution shift, but when it fails, it does so observably, by hardly changing the policy at all. We apply our theory to the common practice of return thresholding, showing this can amplify improvement, but at the cost of potential misalignment with the true objective.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to perform a task by interacting with an environment and receiving feedback (a numerical reward) for its actions. However, the assumption that rewards are always observable is often not applicable in real-world problems. For example, the agent may need to ask a human to supervise its actions or activate a monitoring system to receive feedback. There may even be a period of time before rewards become observable, or a period of time after which rewards are no longer given. In other words, there are cases where the environment generates rewards in response to the agent's actions but the agent cannot observe them. In this paper, we formalize a novel but general RL framework - Monitored MDPs - where the agent cannot always observe rewards. We discuss the theoretical and practical consequences of this setting, show challenges raised even in toy environments, and propose algorithms to begin to tackle this novel setting. This paper introduces a powerful new formalism that encompasses both new and existing problems and lays the foundation for future research.

In reinforcement learning, unsupervised skill discovery aims to learn diverse skills without extrinsic rewards. Previous methods discover skills by maximizing the mutual information (MI) between states and skills. However, such an MI objective tends to learn simple and static skills and may hinder exploration. In this paper, we propose a novel unsupervised skill discovery method through contrastive learning among behaviors, which makes the agent produce similar behaviors for the same skill and diverse behaviors for different skills. Under mild assumptions, our objective maximizes the MI between different behaviors based on the same skill, which serves as an upper bound of the previous MI objective. Meanwhile, our method implicitly increases the state entropy to obtain better state coverage. We evaluate our method on challenging mazes and continuous control tasks. The results show that our method generates diverse and far-reaching skills, and also obtains competitive performance in downstream tasks compared to the state-of-the-art methods.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising approach for training language models (LMs) on reasoning tasks that elicit emergent long chains of thought (CoTs). Unlike supervised learning, it updates the model using both correct and incorrect samples via policy gradients. To better understand its mechanism, we decompose the learning signal into reinforcing correct responses and penalizing incorrect ones, referred to as Positive and Negative Sample Reinforcement (PSR and NSR), respectively. We train Qwen2.5-Math-7B and Qwen3-4B on a mathematical reasoning dataset and uncover a surprising result: training with only negative samples -- without reinforcing correct responses -- can be highly effective: it consistently improves performance over the base model across the entire Pass@k spectrum (k up to 256), often matching or surpassing PPO and GRPO. In contrast, reinforcing only correct responses improves Pass@1 but degrades performance at higher k, due to reduced diversity. These inference-scaling trends highlight that solely penalizing incorrect responses may contribute more to performance than previously recognized. Through gradient analysis, we show that NSR works by suppressing incorrect generations and redistributing probability mass toward other plausible candidates, guided by the model's prior beliefs. It refines the model's existing knowledge rather than introducing entirely new behaviors. Building on this insight, we propose a simple variant of the RL objective that upweights NSR, and show that it consistently improves overall Pass@k performance on MATH, AIME 2025, and AMC23. Our code is available at https://github.com/TianHongZXY/RLVR-Decomposed.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Reward modelling from preference data is a crucial step in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring robust generalisation to novel prompt-response pairs. In this work, we propose to frame this problem in a causal paradigm, providing the rich toolbox of causality to identify the persistent challenges, such as causal misidentification, preference heterogeneity, and confounding due to user-specific factors. Inheriting from the literature of causal inference, we identify key assumptions necessary for reliable generalisation and contrast them with common data collection practices. We illustrate failure modes of naive reward models and demonstrate how causally-inspired approaches can improve model robustness. Finally, we outline desiderata for future research and practices, advocating targeted interventions to address inherent limitations of observational data.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions. Incentives are key to understand people's choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live may lead to the emergence of social segregation. In this paper, we combine Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Agent Based Models (ABM) in order to address the self-organizing dynamics of social segregation and explore the space of possibilities that emerge from considering different types of incentives. Our model promotes the creation of interdependencies and interactions among multiple agents of two different kinds that want to segregate from each other. For this purpose, agents use Deep Q-Networks to make decisions based on the rules of the Schelling Segregation model and the Predator-Prey model. Despite the segregation incentive, our experiments show that spatial integration can be achieved by establishing interdependencies among agents of different kinds. They also reveal that segregated areas are more probable to host older people than diverse areas, which attract younger ones. Through this work, we show that the combination of RL and ABMs can create an artificial environment for policy makers to observe potential and existing behaviors associated to incentives.

What drives exploration? Understanding intrinsic motivation is a long-standing challenge in both cognitive science and artificial intelligence; numerous objectives have been proposed and used to train agents, yet there remains a gap between human and agent exploration. We directly compare adults, children, and AI agents in a complex open-ended environment, Crafter, and study how common intrinsic objectives: Entropy, Information Gain, and Empowerment, relate to their behavior. We find that only Entropy and Empowerment are consistently positively correlated with human exploration progress, indicating that these objectives may better inform intrinsic reward design for agents. Furthermore, across agents and humans we observe that Entropy initially increases rapidly, then plateaus, while Empowerment increases continuously, suggesting that state diversity may provide more signal in early exploration, while advanced exploration should prioritize control. Finally, we find preliminary evidence that private speech utterances, and particularly goal verbalizations, may aid exploration in children. Our data is available at https://github.com/alyd/humans_in_crafter_data.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied using abstract mathematical models and simulations. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the rise of LLM agents have demonstrated their ability to perform social reasoning, thus providing an opportunity to test the emergence of norms in more realistic agent-based simulations with human-like reasoning using natural language. In this research, we investigate whether the cooperation dynamics presented in Boyd and Richerson's model persist in a more realistic simulation of the Diner's Dilemma using LLM agents compared to the abstract mathematical nature in the work of Boyd and Richerson. Our findings indicate that agents follow the strategies defined in the Boyd and Richerson model, and explicit punishment mechanisms drive norm emergence, reinforcing cooperative behaviour even when the agent strategy configuration varies. Our results suggest that LLM-based Multi-Agent System simulations, in fact, can replicate the evolution of cooperation predicted by the traditional mathematical models. Moreover, our simulations extend beyond the mathematical models by integrating natural language-driven reasoning and a pairwise imitation method for strategy adoption, making them a more realistic testbed for cooperative behaviour in MASs.

The varying significance of distinct primitive behaviors during the policy learning process has been overlooked by prior model-free RL algorithms. Leveraging this insight, we explore the causal relationship between different action dimensions and rewards to evaluate the significance of various primitive behaviors during training. We introduce a causality-aware entropy term that effectively identifies and prioritizes actions with high potential impacts for efficient exploration. Furthermore, to prevent excessive focus on specific primitive behaviors, we analyze the gradient dormancy phenomenon and introduce a dormancy-guided reset mechanism to further enhance the efficacy of our method. Our proposed algorithm, ACE: Off-policy Actor-critic with Causality-aware Entropy regularization, demonstrates a substantial performance advantage across 29 diverse continuous control tasks spanning 7 domains compared to model-free RL baselines, which underscores the effectiveness, versatility, and efficient sample efficiency of our approach. Benchmark results and videos are available at https://ace-rl.github.io/.

We present a concise dynamical picture of infant-driven household chaos. The framework has three postulations: recurrent daily chaos, overall entropy growth in household organization, and transient local ordering episodes with switching rules (a volatile Maxwell-demon effect). We illustrate entropy growth with a two-region toy model (organizer vs. play area), where entropy production is nonnegative and long-time behavior is typically play-area dominated. We also model toy diffusion and curiosity-driven behavior, where novelty matters more than punishment in the short term, while gradual learning still occurs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems (MAS) have shown promise for complex tasks, yet current training methods lack principled ways to connect system-level evaluation with agent- and message-level learning. We propose a theoretical framework that unifies cooperative game-theoretic attribution with process reward modeling to transform system evaluation to agent credit to response-level signals. Unlike prior approaches that rely only on attribution (Shapley) or step-level labels (PRM), our method produces local, signed, and credit-conserving signals. In success cases, Shapley-based credit assignment fairly allocates outcomes across agents and is refined into per-message rewards that promote cooperation while discouraging redundancy or sabotage; in failure cases, first-error localization yields repair-aware preferences that penalize harmful steps while rewarding corrective attempts. The resulting signals are bounded, cooperative, and directly compatible with reinforcement- or preference-based post-training, providing a unified and auditable pathway from global evaluation to local supervision in LLM multi-agent training. Our contribution is conceptual: we present a theoretical foundation and training signals, leaving empirical validation for future work.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

Self-supervised skill learning aims to acquire useful behaviors that leverage the underlying dynamics of the environment. Latent variable models, based on mutual information maximization, have been successful in this task but still struggle in the context of robotic manipulation. As it requires impacting a possibly large set of degrees of freedom composing the environment, mutual information maximization fails alone in producing useful and safe manipulation behaviors. Furthermore, tackling this by augmenting skill discovery rewards with additional rewards through a naive combination might fail to produce desired behaviors. To address this limitation, we introduce SLIM, a multi-critic learning approach for skill discovery with a particular focus on robotic manipulation. Our main insight is that utilizing multiple critics in an actor-critic framework to gracefully combine multiple reward functions leads to a significant improvement in latent-variable skill discovery for robotic manipulation while overcoming possible interference occurring among rewards which hinders convergence to useful skills. Furthermore, in the context of tabletop manipulation, we demonstrate the applicability of our novel skill discovery approach to acquire safe and efficient motor primitives in a hierarchical reinforcement learning fashion and leverage them through planning, significantly surpassing baseline approaches for skill discovery.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that might be useful later in its life. We formulate curiosity as the error in an agent's ability to predict the consequence of its own actions in a visual feature space learned by a self-supervised inverse dynamics model. Our formulation scales to high-dimensional continuous state spaces like images, bypasses the difficulties of directly predicting pixels, and, critically, ignores the aspects of the environment that cannot affect the agent. The proposed approach is evaluated in two environments: VizDoom and Super Mario Bros. Three broad settings are investigated: 1) sparse extrinsic reward, where curiosity allows for far fewer interactions with the environment to reach the goal; 2) exploration with no extrinsic reward, where curiosity pushes the agent to explore more efficiently; and 3) generalization to unseen scenarios (e.g. new levels of the same game) where the knowledge gained from earlier experience helps the agent explore new places much faster than starting from scratch. Demo video and code available at https://pathak22.github.io/noreward-rl/

In our work we not explicitly hint that it is a misconception to think that humans learn fast. Learning process takes time. Babies start learning to move in the restricted liquid area called placenta. Children often are limited by underdeveloped body. Even adults are not allowed to participate in complex competitions right away. However, with robots, when learning from scratch, we often don't have the privilege of waiting for dozen millions of steps. "Swaddling" regularization is responsible for restraining an agent in rapid but unstable development penalizing action strength in a specific way not affecting actions directly. The Symphony, Transitional-policy Deterministic Actor and Critic algorithm, is a concise combination of different ideas for possibility of training humanoid robots from scratch with Sample Efficiency, Sample Proximity and Safety of Actions in mind. It is no secret that continuous increase in Gaussian noise without appropriate smoothing is harmful for motors and gearboxes. Compared to Stochastic algorithms, we set a limited parametric noise and promote a reduced strength of actions, safely increasing entropy, since the actions are kind of immersed in weaker noise. When actions require more extreme values, actions rise above the weak noise. Training becomes empirically much safer for both the environment around and the robot's mechanisms. We use Fading Replay Buffer: using a fixed formula containing the hyperbolic tangent, we adjust the batch sampling probability: the memory contains a recent memory and a long-term memory trail. Fading Replay Buffer allows us to use Temporal Advantage when we improve the current Critic Network prediction compared to the exponential moving average. Temporal Advantage allows us to update Actor and Critic in one pass, as well as combine Actor and Critic in one Object and implement their Losses in one line.

Reinforcement learning (RL) can align language models with non-differentiable reward signals, such as human preferences. However, a major challenge arises from the sparsity of these reward signals - typically, there is only one reward for the entire generation. This sparsity of rewards can lead to inefficient and unstable learning. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework leveraging the critique ability of LLMs to produce dense rewards throughout the learning process. Our approach incorporates a critic language model alongside the policy model. This critic is prompted with the task description, question, policy model's output, and environment's reward signal as input, and provides token or span-level dense rewards that reflect the quality of each segment of the output. We assess our approach on three text generation tasks: sentiment control, language model detoxification, and summarization. Experimental results show that incorporating artificial dense rewards in training yields consistent performance gains over the PPO baseline with holistic rewards. Furthermore, in a setting where the same model serves as both policy and critic, we demonstrate that "self-critique" rewards also boost learning efficiency.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training LLM-based agents, yet remains limited by low sample efficiency, stemming not only from sparse outcome feedback but also from the agent's inability to leverage prior experience across episodes. While augmenting agents with historical experience offers a promising remedy, existing approaches suffer from a critical weakness: the experience distilled from history is either stored statically or fail to coevolve with the improving actor, causing a progressive misalignment between the experience and the actor's evolving capability that diminishes its utility over the course of training. Inspired by complementary learning systems in neuroscience, we present Complementary RL to achieve seamless co-evolution of an experience extractor and a policy actor within the RL optimization loop. Specifically, the actor is optimized via sparse outcome-based rewards, while the experience extractor is optimized according to whether its distilled experiences demonstrably contribute to the actor's success, thereby evolving its experience management strategy in lockstep with the actor's growing capabilities. Empirically, Complementary RL outperforms outcome-based agentic RL baselines that do not learn from experience, achieving 10% performance improvement in single-task scenarios and exhibits robust scalability in multi-task settings. These results establish Complementary RL as a paradigm for efficient experience-driven agent learning.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

We propose RLAnything, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically forges environment, policy, and reward models through closed-loop optimization, amplifying learning signals and strengthening the overall RL system for any LLM or agentic scenarios. Specifically, the policy is trained with integrated feedback from step-wise and outcome signals, while the reward model is jointly optimized via consistency feedback, which in turn further improves policy training. Moreover, our theory-motivated automatic environment adaptation improves training for both the reward and policy models by leveraging critic feedback from each, enabling learning from experience. Empirically, each added component consistently improves the overall system, and RLAnything yields substantial gains across various representative LLM and agentic tasks, boosting Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking by 9.1% on OSWorld and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct by 18.7% and 11.9% on AlfWorld and LiveBench, respectively. We also that optimized reward-model signals outperform outcomes that rely on human labels. Code: https://github.com/Gen-Verse/Open-AgentRL

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

Standard practice within Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves optimizing against a Reward Model (RM), which itself is trained to reflect human preferences for desirable generations. A notable subject that is understudied is the (in-)consistency of RMs -- whether they can recognize the semantic changes to different prompts and appropriately adapt their reward assignments -- and their impact on the downstream RLHF model. In this paper, we visit a series of research questions relevant to RM inconsistency: (1) How can we measure the consistency of reward models? (2) How consistent are the existing RMs and how can we improve them? (3) In what ways does reward inconsistency influence the chatbots resulting from the RLHF model training? We propose Contrast Instructions -- a benchmarking strategy for the consistency of RM. Each example in Contrast Instructions features a pair of lexically similar instructions with different ground truth responses. A consistent RM is expected to rank the corresponding instruction and response higher than other combinations. We observe that current RMs trained with the standard ranking objective fail miserably on Contrast Instructions compared to average humans. To show that RM consistency can be improved efficiently without using extra training budget, we propose two techniques ConvexDA and RewardFusion, which enhance reward consistency through extrapolation during the RM training and inference stage, respectively. We show that RLHF models trained with a more consistent RM yield more useful responses, suggesting that reward inconsistency exhibits a trickle-down effect on the downstream RLHF process.

Fine-tuning on harmless data can partially undo behaviors acquired earlier in training. Safety can erode under benign post-alignment updates, unlearned capabilities can re-emerge, latent traits can transfer through apparently unrelated supervision, and related post-alignment fragility appears in other generative settings. We argue these phenomena are usefully viewed through a common training-history lens. Our hypothesis is geometric: large early training phases create dominant behavioral manifolds, while later alignment or specialization phases are shallower displacements from them. Subsequent fine-tuning can therefore inherit a persistent reversion component pointing back toward a witness of the dominant manifold. We call this the gravitational interpretation of fine-tuning reversion. Across our main settings, representational drift rapidly acquires a component along a history-defined reversion direction (v_rev). In our main track, alignment with v_rev rises from cos = 0.429 +/- 0.052 after the first update to 0.647 +/- 0.021 by step 20. Across 24 run-step pairs, every observed alignment exceeds the p99 of an isotropic activation-space null. We demonstrate that selectively blocking motion along v_rev changes the final alignment at T=100 from 0.648 +/- 0.009 to -0.211 +/- 0.021 and reduces harmfulness from 19.0% +/- 4.0% to 8.5% +/- 1.5% with little task cost. These results support v_rev as a causally relevant mediator of early post-alignment reversion in our setup. Importantly, we do not claim that v_rev is the unique safety direction, nor that the dominant manifold is directly observed; rather, we identify a robust, history-defined direction that explains and partially controls early reversion dynamics.

A key challenge for reinforcement learning (RL) consists of learning in environments with sparse extrinsic rewards. In contrast to current RL methods, humans are able to learn new skills with little or no reward by using various forms of intrinsic motivation. We propose AMIGo, a novel agent incorporating -- as form of meta-learning -- a goal-generating teacher that proposes Adversarially Motivated Intrinsic Goals to train a goal-conditioned "student" policy in the absence of (or alongside) environment reward. Specifically, through a simple but effective "constructively adversarial" objective, the teacher learns to propose increasingly challenging -- yet achievable -- goals that allow the student to learn general skills for acting in a new environment, independent of the task to be solved. We show that our method generates a natural curriculum of self-proposed goals which ultimately allows the agent to solve challenging procedurally-generated tasks where other forms of intrinsic motivation and state-of-the-art RL methods fail.

Language models influence the external world: they query APIs that read and write to web pages, generate content that shapes human behavior, and run system commands as autonomous agents. These interactions form feedback loops: LLM outputs affect the world, which in turn affect subsequent LLM outputs. In this work, we show that feedback loops can cause in-context reward hacking (ICRH), where the LLM at test-time optimizes a (potentially implicit) objective but creates negative side effects in the process. For example, consider an LLM agent deployed to increase Twitter engagement; the LLM may retrieve its previous tweets into the context window and make them more controversial, increasing engagement but also toxicity. We identify and study two processes that lead to ICRH: output-refinement and policy-refinement. For these processes, evaluations on static datasets are insufficient -- they miss the feedback effects and thus cannot capture the most harmful behavior. In response, we provide three recommendations for evaluation to capture more instances of ICRH. As AI development accelerates, the effects of feedback loops will proliferate, increasing the need to understand their role in shaping LLM behavior.

The temporal credit assignment problem is a central challenge in Reinforcement Learning (RL), concerned with attributing the appropriate influence to each actions in a trajectory for their ability to achieve a goal. However, when feedback is delayed and sparse, the learning signal is poor, and action evaluation becomes harder. Canonical solutions, such as reward shaping and options, require extensive domain knowledge and manual intervention, limiting their scalability and applicability. In this work, we lay the foundations for Credit Assignment with Language Models (CALM), a novel approach that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate credit assignment via reward shaping and options discovery. CALM uses LLMs to decompose a task into elementary subgoals and assess the achievement of these subgoals in state-action transitions. Every time an option terminates, a subgoal is achieved, and CALM provides an auxiliary reward. This additional reward signal can enhance the learning process when the task reward is sparse and delayed without the need for human-designed rewards. We provide a preliminary evaluation of CALM using a dataset of human-annotated demonstrations from MiniHack, suggesting that LLMs can be effective in assigning credit in zero-shot settings, without examples or LLM fine-tuning. Our preliminary results indicate that the knowledge of LLMs is a promising prior for credit assignment in RL, facilitating the transfer of human knowledge into value functions.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

Most agents today ``self-evolve'' by following rewards and rules defined by humans. However, this process remains fundamentally dependent on external supervision; without human guidance, the evolution stops. In this work, we train agents to possess an intrinsic meta-evolution capability to spontaneously learn about unseen environments prior to task execution. To instill this ability, we design an outcome-based reward mechanism that measures how much an agent's self-generated world knowledge improves its success rate on downstream tasks. This reward signal is used exclusively during the training phase to teach the model how to explore and summarize effectively. At inference time, the agent requires no external rewards or human instructions. It spontaneously performs native self-evolution to adapt to unknown environments using its internal parameters. When applied to Qwen3-30B and Seed-OSS-36B, this shift to native evolution yields a 20% performance increase on WebVoyager and WebWalker. Most strikingly, the generated world knowledge even enables a compact 14B Qwen3 model to outperform the unassisted Gemini-2.5-Flash, establishing a new paradigm for truly evolving agents.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

The Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) - the tendency to allocate greater resources to a specific, narratively described victim than to a statistically characterized group facing equivalent hardship - is one of the most robust findings in moral psychology and behavioural economics. As large language models (LLMs) assume consequential roles in humanitarian triage, automated grant evaluation, and content moderation, a critical question arises: do these systems inherit the affective irrationalities present in human moral reasoning? We present the first systematic, large-scale empirical investigation of the IVE in LLMs, comprising N=51,955 validated API trials across 16 frontier models spanning nine organizational lineages (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, Alibaba, IBM, and Moonshot). Using a suite of ten experiments - porting and extending canonical paradigms from Small et al. (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005) - we find that the IVE is prevalent but strongly modulated by alignment training. Instruction-tuned models exhibit extreme IVE (Cohen's d up to 1.56), while reasoning-specialized models invert the effect (down to d=-0.85). The pooled effect (d=0.223, p=2e-6) is approximately twice the single-victim human meta-analytic baseline (dapprox0.10) reported by Lee and Feeley (2016) - and likely exceeds the overall human pooled effect by a larger margin, given that the group-victim human effect is near zero. Standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting - contrary to its role as a deliberative corrective - nearly triples the IVE effect size (from d=0.15 to d=0.41), while only utilitarian CoT reliably eliminates it. We further document psychophysical numbing, perfect quantity neglect, and marginal in-group/out-group cultural bias, with implications for AI deployment in humanitarian and ethical decision-making contexts.

Interaction between learner and feedback-giver has come into focus recently for post-training of Large Language Models (LLMs), through the use of reward models that judge the appropriateness of a model's response. In this paper, we investigate whether Dialogue Games -- goal-directed and rule-governed activities driven predominantly by verbal actions -- can also serve as a source of feedback signals for learning. We introduce Playpen, an environment for off- and online learning through Dialogue Game self-play, and investigate a representative set of post-training methods: supervised fine-tuning; direct alignment (DPO); and reinforcement learning with GRPO. We experiment with post-training a small LLM (Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct), evaluating performance on unseen instances of training games as well as unseen games, and on standard benchmarks. We find that imitation learning through SFT improves performance on unseen instances, but negatively impacts other skills, while interactive learning with GRPO shows balanced improvements without loss of skills. We release the framework and the baseline training setups to foster research in the promising new direction of learning in (synthetic) interaction.

High-quality preference data is essential for aligning foundation models with human values through preference learning. However, manual annotation of such data is often time-consuming and costly. Recent methods often adopt a self-rewarding approach, where the target model generates and annotates its own preference data, but this can lead to inaccuracies since the reward model shares weights with the target model, thereby amplifying inherent biases. To address these issues, we propose Anyprefer, a framework designed to synthesize high-quality preference data for aligning the target model. Anyprefer frames the data synthesis process as a cooperative two-player Markov Game, where the target model and the judge model collaborate together. Here, a series of external tools are introduced to assist the judge model in accurately rewarding the target model's responses, mitigating biases in the rewarding process. In addition, a feedback mechanism is introduced to optimize prompts for both models, enhancing collaboration and improving data quality. The synthesized data is compiled into a new preference dataset, Anyprefer-V1, consisting of 58K high-quality preference pairs. Extensive experiments show that Anyprefer significantly improves model alignment performance across four main applications, covering 21 datasets, achieving average improvements of 18.55% in five natural language generation datasets, 3.66% in nine vision-language understanding datasets, 30.05% in three medical image analysis datasets, and 16.00% in four visuo-motor control tasks.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Exposure to large language model output is rapidly increasing. How will seeing AI-generated ideas affect human ideas? We conducted an experiment (800+ participants, 40+ countries) where participants viewed creative ideas that were from ChatGPT or prior experimental participants and then brainstormed their own idea. We varied the number of AI-generated examples (none, low, or high exposure) and if the examples were labeled as 'AI' (disclosure). Our dynamic experiment design -- ideas from prior participants in an experimental condition are used as stimuli for future participants in the same experimental condition -- mimics the interdependent process of cultural creation: creative ideas are built upon prior ideas. Hence, we capture the compounding effects of having LLMs 'in the culture loop'. We find that high AI exposure (but not low AI exposure) did not affect the creativity of individual ideas but did increase the average amount and rate of change of collective idea diversity. AI made ideas different, not better. There were no main effects of disclosure. We also found that self-reported creative people were less influenced by knowing an idea was from AI, and that participants were more likely to knowingly adopt AI ideas when the task was difficult. Our findings suggest that introducing AI ideas into society may increase collective diversity but not individual creativity.