Daily Papers

While Vision Language Models (VLMs) show advancing reasoning capabilities, their application in meteorology is constrained by a domain gap and a reasoning faithfulness gap. Specifically, mainstream Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT) can induce Self-Contradictory Reasoning (Self-Contra), where the model's reasoning contradicts its final answer, which is unacceptable in such a high-stakes domain. To address these challenges, we construct WeatherQA, a novel multimodal reasoning benchmark in meteorology. We also propose Logically Consistent Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (LoCo-RFT), which resolves Self-Contra by introducing a logical consistency reward. Furthermore, we introduce Weather-R1, the first reasoning VLM with logical faithfulness in meteorology, to the best of our knowledge. Experiments demonstrate that Weather-R1 improves performance on WeatherQA by 9.8 percentage points over the baseline, outperforming Supervised Fine-Tuning and RFT, and even surpassing the original Qwen2.5-VL-32B. These results highlight the effectiveness of our LoCo-RFT and the superiority of Weather-R1. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/Marcowky/Weather-R1.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Large language models (large LMs) are susceptible to producing text with hallucinated content. Self-contradiction, where the LM generates two contradictory sentences within the same context, is an important form of hallucination. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis on self-contradiction for state-of-the-art, instruction-tuned LMs, including evaluation, detection, and mitigation. To effectively trigger self-contradictions, we design a framework that constrains LMs to generate appropriate sentence pairs. Our evaluation on these sentence pairs reveals that self-contradictions occur frequently across different LMs for both famous and lesser-known topics. Next, we prompt the LMs to detect self-contradictions. Our results indicate that ChatGPT and GPT-4 are able to accurately identify self-contradictions, while Vicuna-13B struggles to do so. For example, with our best prompting method, ChatGPT achieves 91.0% precision and 80.5% recall on the sentence pairs generated by itself. To automatically mitigate self-contradictions, we develop an iterative algorithm that prompts the LMs to remove the detected self-contradictions from the generated text. Our algorithm successfully revises the text such that self-contradictions are significantly reduced, while maintaining its fluency and informativeness. Importantly, our entire pipeline of triggering, detecting, and mitigating self-contradictions is applicable to black-box LMs and does not require any external grounded knowledge.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

Self-consistency (SC) has been a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning. Despite bringing significant performance improvements across a variety of multi-step reasoning tasks, it is a high-cost method that requires multiple sampling with the preset size. In this paper, we propose a simple and scalable sampling process, Early-Stopping Self-Consistency (ESC), to greatly reduce the cost of SC without sacrificing performance. On this basis, one control scheme for ESC is further derivated to dynamically choose the performance-cost balance for different tasks and models. To demonstrate ESC's effectiveness, we conducted extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning over language models with varying scales. The empirical results show that ESC reduces the average number of sampling of chain-of-thought reasoning by a significant margin on six benchmarks, including MATH (-33.8%), GSM8K (-80.1%), StrategyQA (-76.8%), CommonsenseQA (-78.5%), Coin Flip (-84.2%) and Last Letters (-67.4%), while attaining comparable performances.

On-policy self-distillation, where a student is pulled toward a copy of itself conditioned on privileged context (e.g., a verified solution or feedback), offers a promising direction for advancing reasoning capability without a stronger external teacher. Yet in math reasoning the gains are inconsistent, even when the same approach succeeds elsewhere. A pointwise mutual information analysis traces the failure to the privileged context itself: it inflates the teacher's confidence on tokens already implied by the solution (structural connectives, verifiable claims) and deflates it on deliberation tokens ("Wait", "Let", "Maybe") that drive multi-step search. We propose Anti-Self-Distillation (AntiSD), which ascends a divergence between student and teacher rather than descending it: this reverses the per-token sign and yields a naturally bounded advantage in one step. An entropy-triggered gate disables the term once the teacher entropy collapses, completing a drop-in replacement for default self-distillation. Across five models from 4B to 30B parameters on math reasoning benchmarks, AntiSD reaches the GRPO baseline's accuracy in 2 to 10x fewer training steps and improves final accuracy by up to 11.5 points. AntiSD opens a path to scalable self-improvement, where a language model bootstraps its own reasoning through its training signal.

Self-alignment, whereby models learn to improve themselves without human annotation, is a rapidly growing research area. However, existing techniques often fail to improve complex reasoning tasks due to the difficulty of assigning correct rewards. An orthogonal approach that is known to improve correctness is self-consistency, a method applied at inference time based on multiple sampling in order to find the most consistent answer. In this work, we extend the self-consistency concept to help train models. We thus introduce self-consistency preference optimization (ScPO), which iteratively trains consistent answers to be preferred over inconsistent ones on unsupervised new problems. We show ScPO leads to large improvements over conventional reward model training on reasoning tasks such as GSM8K and MATH, closing the gap with supervised training with gold answers or preferences, and that combining ScPO with standard supervised learning improves results even further. On ZebraLogic, ScPO finetunes Llama-3 8B to be superior to Llama-3 70B, Gemma-2 27B, and Claude-3 Haiku.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Self-consistency (SC), a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning, shows significant gains across various multi-step reasoning tasks but comes with a high cost due to multiple sampling with the preset size. Its variants, Adaptive self-consistency (ASC) and Early-stopping self-consistency (ESC), dynamically adjust the number of samples based on the posterior distribution of a set of pre-samples, reducing the cost of SC with minimal impact on performance. Both methods, however, do not exploit the prior information about question difficulty. It often results in unnecessary repeated sampling for easy questions that could be accurately answered with just one attempt, wasting resources. To tackle this problem, we propose Difficulty-Adaptive Self-Consistency (DSC), which leverages the difficulty information from both prior and posterior perspectives to adaptively allocate inference resources, further reducing the cost of SC. To demonstrate the effectiveness of DSC, we conduct extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning on six benchmarks. The empirical results show that DSC consistently surpasses the strong baseline ASC and ESC in terms of costs by a significant margin, while attaining comparable performances.

Prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) have shed new light on enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models, and researchers have extensively explored the generation process of rationales and answers. However, they have overlooked the potential challenges posed by the poor quality of reasoning problems, which may influence the reasoning performance significantly. In this work, we propose Self-Polish (SP), a novel method that facilitates the model's problem-solving process by prompting them to progressively refine the given problems to be more comprehensible and solvable. Specifically, the method teaches models to eliminate irrelevant information, rearrange the logic structure and organize local conditions into new ones parallelly. SP is orthogonal to all other prompting methods, making it convenient to integrate with state-of-the-art techniques for further improvement. We conduct thorough experiments on five benchmarks to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. For example, with Text-davinci-003, our method boosts the performance of standard few-shot prompting by 8.0% on GSM8K and 17.8% on MultiArith; it also improves the performance of CoT by 6.0% on GSM8K and 6.0% on MathQA, respectively. Furthermore, our method also showcases impressive performance on robustness evaluation.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Large language models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning have achieved strong performance across diverse tasks, including mathematics, coding, and general reasoning. A distinctive ability of these reasoning models is self-reflection: the ability to review and revise previous reasoning steps. While self-reflection enhances reasoning performance, it also increases inference cost. In this work, we study self-reflection through the lens of representation engineering. We segment the model's reasoning into steps, identify the steps corresponding to reflection, and extract a reflection direction in the latent space that governs this behavior. Using this direction, we propose a stepwise steering method that can control reflection frequency. We call our framework ReflCtrl. Our experiments show that (1) in many cases reflections are redundant, especially in stronger models (in our experiments, we can save up to 33.6 percent of reasoning tokens while preserving performance), and (2) the model's reflection behavior is highly correlated with an internal uncertainty signal, implying self-reflection may be controlled by the model's uncertainty.

Large language models (LLMs) now exhibit strong multi-step reasoning abilities, but existing inference-time scaling methods remain computationally expensive, often relying on extensive sampling or external evaluators. We propose a principled strategy that frames reasoning as uncertainty minimisation and operates at the level of individual thoughts rather than tokens. Our method selects, at each reasoning step, the continuation that maximizes the model's self-certainty, a metric computed from its internal predictive distribution. This approach achieves significant improvement with a small number of samples, relies exclusively on model-internal signals, and applies to open-ended questions as opposed to methods like majority voting. Experiments on MATH500 and GSM8K across multiple model sizes demonstrate that thought-level self-certainty maximization consistently outperforms greedy decoding and matches or exceeds self-consistency under comparable token budgets. Cross-linguistic evaluations further indicate that the method transfers robustly beyond high-resource languages. Furthermore, analysis of self-certainty dynamics reveals that correct reasoning trajectories converge early to stable paths, suggesting that early decisions, likely associated with the planning of the reasoning process, are predictive of final accuracy. Building on this result, we show that self-certainty maximisation applied to the early steps can explain most of the performance gain and provide a simple yet efficient inference-time scaling method.

We study self-rewarding reasoning large language models (LLMs), which can simultaneously generate step-by-step reasoning and evaluate the correctness of their outputs during the inference time-without external feedback. This integrated approach allows a single model to independently guide its reasoning process, offering computational advantages for model deployment. We particularly focus on the representative task of self-correction, where models autonomously detect errors in their responses, revise outputs, and decide when to terminate iterative refinement loops. To enable this, we propose a two-staged algorithmic framework for constructing self-rewarding reasoning models using only self-generated data. In the first stage, we employ sequential rejection sampling to synthesize long chain-of-thought trajectories that incorporate both self-rewarding and self-correction mechanisms. Fine-tuning models on these curated data allows them to learn the patterns of self-rewarding and self-correction. In the second stage, we further enhance the models' ability to assess response accuracy and refine outputs through reinforcement learning with rule-based signals. Experiments with Llama-3 and Qwen-2.5 demonstrate that our approach surpasses intrinsic self-correction capabilities and achieves performance comparable to systems that rely on external reward models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in large language models (LLMs) has shown promising performance on mathematical reasoning tasks. Recently, Self-Consistency samples a diverse set of reasoning chains with different answers and chooses the answer by majority voting. Though effective, its performance cannot be further improved by sampling more reasoning chains. To address this problem, we propose to integrate backward reasoning into answer verification. We first mask a number in the question by {bf x}. The LLM is then asked to predict the masked number with a candidate answer A embedded in the template: ``If we know the answer to the above question is {A}, what is the value of unknown variable {bf x}?'' The LLM is expected to predict the masked number successfully if the provided candidate answer is correct. To further improve performance, we propose FOBAR (FOrward-BAckward Reasoning) to combine forward and backward reasoning for verifying candidate answers. Experiments are performed on six standard mathematical data sets and three LLMs (text-davinci-003, GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4). Results show that FOBAR achieves state-of-the-art performance. In particular, FOBAR outperforms Self-Consistency which uses forward reasoning alone, demonstrating that combining forward and forward reasoning is better. It also outperforms existing verification methods, verifying the effectiveness of using the simple template in backward reasoning and the proposed combination.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Self-consistency decoding enhances LLMs' performance on reasoning tasks by sampling diverse reasoning paths and selecting the most frequent answer. However, it is computationally expensive, as sampling many of these (lengthy) paths is required to increase the chances that the correct answer emerges as the most frequent one. To address this, we introduce Confidence-Informed Self-Consistency (CISC). CISC performs a weighted majority vote based on confidence scores obtained directly from the model. By prioritizing high-confidence paths, it can identify the correct answer with a significantly smaller sample size. When tested on nine models and four datasets, CISC outperforms self-consistency in nearly all configurations, reducing the required number of reasoning paths by over 40% on average. In addition, we introduce the notion of within-question confidence evaluation, after showing that standard evaluation methods are poor predictors of success in distinguishing correct and incorrect answers to the same question. In fact, the most calibrated confidence method proved to be the least effective for CISC. Lastly, beyond these practical implications, our results and analyses show that LLMs can effectively judge the correctness of their own outputs, contributing to the ongoing debate on this topic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to acquire reasoning capabilities through shared inference patterns in pre-training data, which are further elicited via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) practices. However, whether fundamental reasoning patterns, such as induction, deduction, and abduction, can be decoupled from specific problem instances remains a critical challenge for model controllability, and for shedding light on reasoning controllability. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of this problem through the lens of reasoning conflicts: an explicit tension between parametric and contextual information induced by mandating logical schemata that deviate from those expected for a target task. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs consistently prioritize sensibility over compliance, favoring task-appropriate reasoning patterns despite conflicting instructions. Notably, task accuracy is not strictly determined by sensibility, with models often maintaining high performance even when using conflicting patterns, suggesting a reliance on internalized parametric memory that increases with model size. We further demonstrate that reasoning conflicts are internally detectable, as confidence scores significantly drop during conflicting episodes. Probing experiments confirm that reasoning types are linearly encoded from middle-to-late layers, indicating the potential for activation-level controllability. Leveraging these insights, we steer models towards compliance, increasing instruction following by up to 29%. Overall, our findings establish that while LLM reasoning is anchored to concrete instances, active mechanistic interventions can effectively decouple logical schemata from data, offering a path toward improved controllability, faithfulness, and generalizability.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Self-training approach for large language models (LLMs) improves reasoning abilities by training the models on their self-generated rationales. Previous approaches have labeled rationales that produce correct answers for a given question as appropriate for training. However, a single measure risks misjudging rationale quality, leading the models to learn flawed reasoning patterns. To address this issue, we propose CREST (Consistency-driven Rationale Evaluation for Self-Training), a self-training framework that further evaluates each rationale through follow-up questions and leverages this evaluation to guide its training. Specifically, we introduce two methods: (1) filtering out rationales that frequently result in incorrect answers on follow-up questions and (2) preference learning based on mixed preferences from rationale evaluation results of both original and follow-up questions. Experiments on three question-answering datasets using open LLMs show that CREST not only improves the logical robustness and correctness of rationales but also improves reasoning abilities compared to previous self-training approaches.

While self-correction has shown promise in improving LLM outputs in terms of style and quality (e.g. Chen et al., 2023; Madaan et al., 2023), recent attempts to self-correct logical or reasoning errors often cause correct answers to become incorrect, resulting in worse performances overall (Huang et al., 2023). In this paper, we break down the self-correction process into two core components: mistake finding and output correction. For mistake finding, we release BIG-Bench Mistake, a dataset of logical mistakes in Chain-of-Thought reasoning traces. We provide benchmark numbers for several state-of-the-art LLMs, and demonstrate that LLMs generally struggle with finding logical mistakes. For output correction, we propose a backtracking method which provides large improvements when given information on mistake location. We construe backtracking as a lightweight alternative to reinforcement learning methods, and show that it remains effective with a reward model at 60-70% accuracy.

Self-consistency has emerged as a popular technique for improving large language model accuracy on reasoning tasks. The approach is straightforward: generate multiple reasoning paths and select the most common answer through majority voting. While this reliably boosts accuracy, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect genuine improvements in reasoning quality. We investigate a fundamental question that has not been studied before: does inference scaling improve reasoning faithfulness? We conduct a comprehensive empirical study across four frontier models (GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5, Gemini-3-flash-preview, and DeepSeek-v3.2) on 100 GSM8K mathematical reasoning problems. Our analysis employs bootstrap confidence intervals, McNemar's tests for paired comparisons, and Cohen's d effect sizes to quantify the effects rigorously. The results reveal striking differences across models that challenge common assumptions about self-consistency. GPT-5.2 shows the expected pattern: accuracy improves from 78% to 90% at N=5, with faithfulness remaining relatively stable (0.540 to 0.510). Claude Opus 4.5 tells a completely different story. Its accuracy actually drops from 78% to 74.3% while faithfulness jumps dramatically from 0.270 to 0.891 at N=5. DeepSeek-v3.2, already at 98% accuracy, shows ceiling effects with modest faithfulness gains (0.440 to 0.541). Gemini-3-flash improves from 81% to 86% accuracy with a slight faithfulness decrease (0.260 to 0.212). Problem difficulty analysis reveals that GPT-5.2 solves 82% of hard problems while breaking only 13% of easy ones. Claude, in contrast, breaks 23% of easy problems, explaining its accuracy decrease. These findings matter for practitioners: self-consistency is not universally beneficial, and teams should test their specific models before deployment. We release our code and provide practical recommendations for navigating these tradeoffs.

Automated reasoning with unstructured natural text is a key requirement for many potential applications of NLP and for developing robust AI systems. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated complex reasoning capacities even without any finetuning. However, existing evaluation for automated reasoning assumes access to a consistent and coherent set of information over which models reason. When reasoning in the real-world, the available information is frequently inconsistent or contradictory, and therefore models need to be equipped with a strategy to resolve such conflicts when they arise. One widely-applicable way of resolving conflicts is to impose preferences over information sources (e.g., based on source credibility or information recency) and adopt the source with higher preference. In this paper, we formulate the problem of reasoning with contradictory information guided by preferences over sources as the classical problem of defeasible reasoning, and develop a dataset called BoardgameQA for measuring the reasoning capacity of LMs in this setting. BoardgameQA also incorporates reasoning with implicit background knowledge, to better reflect reasoning problems in downstream applications. We benchmark various LMs on BoardgameQA and the results reveal a significant gap in the reasoning capacity of state-of-the-art LMs on this problem, showing that reasoning with conflicting information does not surface out-of-the-box in LMs. While performance can be improved with finetuning, it nevertheless remains poor.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit backtracking and self-verification mechanisms that enable them to revise intermediate steps and reach correct solutions, yielding strong performance on complex logical benchmarks. We hypothesize that such behaviors are beneficial only when the model has sufficiently strong ``critique'' ability to detect its own mistakes. This work systematically investigates how current LRMs recover from errors by inserting arithmetic mistakes in their intermediate reasoning steps. Notably, we discover a peculiar yet important phenomenon: despite the error propagating throughout the entire chain-of-thought (CoT) without any verbalized correction, the model still reaches the correct final answer after the thinking process finishes. This recovery implies the existence of an internal mechanism helping the model to detect errors and trigger self-correction, which we refer to as the hidden critique ability. Building on feature space analysis, we identify a highly interpretable critique vector representing this behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple model scales and families demonstrate that steering latent representations with this vector improves the model's error detection capability and enhances the performance of test-time scaling at no extra training cost. Our findings provide a valuable understanding of LRMs' critique behavior, suggesting a promising direction to control and improve their self-verification mechanism. Our code is available at: https://github.com/mail-research/lrm-critique-vectors.

In recent times, large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on various document-level tasks such as document classification, summarization, and question-answering. However, research on understanding their capabilities on the task of self-contradictions in long documents has been very limited. In this work, we introduce ContraDoc, the first human-annotated dataset to study self-contradictions in long documents across multiple domains, varying document lengths, self-contradictions types, and scope. We then analyze the current capabilities of four state-of-the-art open-source and commercially available LLMs: GPT3.5, GPT4, PaLM2, and LLaMAv2 on this dataset. While GPT4 performs the best and can outperform humans on this task, we find that it is still unreliable and struggles with self-contradictions that require more nuance and context. We release the dataset and all the code associated with the experiments (https://github.com/ddhruvkr/CONTRADOC).

Recently, large reasoning models demonstrate exceptional performance on various tasks. However, reasoning models inefficiently over-process both trivial and complex queries, leading to resource waste and prolonged user latency. To address this challenge, we propose SelfBudgeter - a self-adaptive controllable reasoning strategy for efficient reasoning. Our approach adopts a dual-phase training paradigm: first, the model learns to pre-estimate the reasoning cost based on the difficulty of the query. Then, we introduce budget-guided GPRO for reinforcement learning, which effectively maintains accuracy while reducing output length. SelfBudgeter allows users to anticipate generation time and make informed decisions about continuing or interrupting the process. Furthermore, our method enables direct manipulation of reasoning length via pre-filling token budget. Experimental results demonstrate that SelfBudgeter can rationally allocate budgets according to problem complexity, achieving up to 74.47% response length compression on the MATH benchmark while maintaining nearly undiminished accuracy.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Explanations are an important tool for gaining insights into the behavior of ML models, calibrating user trust and ensuring regulatory compliance. Past few years have seen a flurry of post-hoc methods for generating model explanations, many of which involve computing model gradients or solving specially designed optimization problems. However, owing to the remarkable reasoning abilities of Large Language Model (LLMs), self-explanation, that is, prompting the model to explain its outputs has recently emerged as a new paradigm. In this work, we study a specific type of self-explanations, self-generated counterfactual explanations (SCEs). We design tests for measuring the efficacy of LLMs in generating SCEs. Analysis over various LLM families, model sizes, temperature settings, and datasets reveals that LLMs sometimes struggle to generate SCEs. Even when they do, their prediction often does not agree with their own counterfactual reasoning.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Self-Consistency mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by sampling multiple reasoning paths,but it lacks a systematic approach to determine the optimal number of samples or select the most faithful rationale. To address this limitation, we introduce Reasoning-Aware Self-Consistency (RASC), a novel framework that enhances sampling efficiency and reasoning faithfulness by dynamically evaluating both outputs and rationales. RASC assesses the quality of reasoning and the consistency of answers for each generated sample, using these assessments to guide early stopping decisions and rationale selection. The framework employs criteria-based stopping and weighted majority voting, enabling more informed choices on when to halt sampling and which rationale to select. Our comprehensive experiments across diverse question-answering datasets demonstrate that RASC outperforms existing methods, reducing sample usage by approximately 70% while maintaining accuracy. Moreover, RASC facilitates the selection of high-fidelity rationales, thereby improving the faithfulness of LLM outputs. Our approach effectively addresses the efficiency-accuracy trade-off in LLM reasoning tasks, offering a new perspective for more nuanced, faithful, and effective utilization of LLMs in resource-constrained environments.

Despite its simplicity and efficacy, the high token expenditure of self-consistency can limit its practical utility. Here we investigate if self-consistency can be made more token-efficient for long chain-of-thought reasoning tasks, while preserving its parallelism, through early hypothesis pruning. Concretely, we generate all solutions in parallel, but periodically prune intermediate hypotheses that are deemed unnecessary based on two lightweight indicators: (a) the model's own confidence in individual hypotheses, and (b) lexical coverage of all current hypotheses by candidate subsets that are under consideration for continued retention. We design a fast weighted set cover algorithm that utilizes the two indicators; our evaluation of five LLMs on three math benchmarks shows that this method can improve token efficiency for all models, by 10-35% in many cases.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Large language models frequently encounter conflicts between their parametric knowledge and contextual input, often resulting in factual inconsistencies or hallucinations. We propose Self-Reflective Debate for Contextual Reliability (SR-DCR), a lightweight framework that integrates token-level self-confidence with an asymmetric multi-agent debate to adjudicate such conflicts. A critic, deprived of context, challenges a defender who argues from the given passage; a judge model evaluates the debate and determines the context's reliability. The final answer is selected by combining the verdict with model confidence. Experiments on the ClashEval benchmark demonstrate that SR-DCR consistently enhances robustness to misleading context while maintaining accuracy on trustworthy inputs, outperforming both classical debate and confidence-only baselines with minimal computational overhead. The code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/Self-Reflective-Debates.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising self-correction abilities, where iterative refinement improves the quality of generated responses. However, most existing approaches operate at the level of output critique, patching surface errors while often failing to correct deeper reasoning flaws. We propose SELF-THOUGHT, a framework that introduces an intermediate step of task abstraction before solution refinement. Given an input and an initial response, the model first distills the task into a structured template that captures key variables, constraints, and problem structure. This abstraction then guides solution instantiation, grounding subsequent responses in a clearer understanding of the task and reducing error propagation. Crucially, we show that these abstractions can be transferred across models: templates generated by larger models can serve as structured guides for smaller LLMs, which typically struggle with intrinsic self-correction. By reusing distilled task structures, smaller models achieve more reliable refinements without heavy fine-tuning or reliance on external verifiers. Experiments across diverse reasoning tasks demonstrate that SELF-THOUGHT improves accuracy, robustness, and generalization for both large and small models, offering a scalable path toward more reliable self-correcting language systems.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Self-critic has become an important mechanism for enhancing the reasoning performance of LLMs. However, current approaches mainly involve basic prompts without further training, which tend to be over-simplified, leading to limited accuracy.Moreover, there is a lack of in-depth investigation of the relationship between LLM's ability to criticism and its task-solving performance.To address these issues, we propose Critic-CoT, a novel framework that pushes LLMs toward System-2-like critic capability, via step-wise CoT reasoning format and distant-supervision data construction, without the need for human annotation. Experiments on GSM8K and MATH show that via filtering out invalid solutions or iterative refinement, our enhanced model boosts task-solving performance, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our method. Further, we find that training on critique and refinement alone improves the generation. We hope our work could shed light on future research on improving the reasoning and critic ability of LLMs.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Test-time scaling has proven effective in further enhancing the performance of pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs). However, mainstream post-training methods (i.e., reinforcement learning (RL) with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning) often incur substantial computational overhead due to auxiliary models and overthinking. In this paper, we empirically reveal that the incorrect answers partially stem from verbose reasoning processes lacking correct self-fix, where errors accumulate across multiple reasoning steps. To this end, we propose Self-traced Step-wise Preference Optimization (SSPO), a pluggable RL process supervision framework that enables fine-grained optimization of each reasoning step. Specifically, SSPO requires neither auxiliary models nor stepwise manual annotations. Instead, it leverages step-wise preference signals generated by the model itself to guide the optimization process for reasoning compression. Experiments demonstrate that the generated reasoning sequences from SSPO are both accurate and succinct, effectively mitigating overthinking behaviors without compromising model performance across diverse domains and languages.

Self-consistency (SC), leveraging multiple samples from LLMs, shows significant gains on various reasoning tasks but struggles with free-form generation due to the difficulty of aggregating answers. Its variants, UCS and USC, rely on sample selection or voting mechanisms to improve output quality. These methods, however, face limitations due to their inability to fully utilize the nuanced consensus knowledge present within multiple candidate samples, often resulting in suboptimal outputs. We propose Fine-Grained Self-Consistency (FSC) to addresses these limitations by extracting and integrating segment-level commonalities from candidate samples, enhancing the performance of LLMs both in open-ended and reasoning tasks. Based on this, we present two additional strategies: candidate filtering, which enhances overall quality by identifying highly similar candidate sets, and merging, which reduces input token requirements by combining similar samples. The effectiveness of FSC is demonstrated through extensive experiments on various tasks, including summarization, code generation, and mathematical reasoning, using GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4. The results indicate significant improvements over baseline methods, showcasing the potential of FSC to optimize output quality by effectively synthesizing fine-grained consensus knowledge from multiple samples.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

This paper introduces rStar, a self-play mutual reasoning approach that significantly improves reasoning capabilities of small language models (SLMs) without fine-tuning or superior models. rStar decouples reasoning into a self-play mutual generation-discrimination process. First, a target SLM augments the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with a rich set of human-like reasoning actions to construct higher quality reasoning trajectories. Next, another SLM, with capabilities similar to the target SLM, acts as a discriminator to verify each trajectory generated by the target SLM. The mutually agreed reasoning trajectories are considered mutual consistent, thus are more likely to be correct. Extensive experiments across five SLMs demonstrate rStar can effectively solve diverse reasoning problems, including GSM8K, GSM-Hard, MATH, SVAMP, and StrategyQA. Remarkably, rStar boosts GSM8K accuracy from 12.51% to 63.91% for LLaMA2-7B, from 36.46% to 81.88% for Mistral-7B, from 74.53% to 91.13% for LLaMA3-8B-Instruct. Code will be available at https://github.com/zhentingqi/rStar.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at many natural language tasks, yet their reasoning reliability under structured perturbations of rule-based systems remains brittle. We present a controlled evaluation framework consisting of four stress tests: (1) rule deletion (redundant vs. essential), (2) contradictory evidence injection, (3) logic-preserving rewrites, and (4) multi-law equivalence stacking. While representative model families (BERT, Qwen2, and TinyLlama) achieve Acc = 1.0000 on base tasks, our framework reveals a critical failure mode termed Logic Inertia - a total breakdown with Acc = 0.0000 under contradictions, where deductive momentum overrides factual reality. To address this, we propose Conflict-Aware Fusion (Fusion-Conflict), a framework grounded in the Cognitive Structure Hypothesis, which posits that robust reasoning requires an explicit structural inductive bias. By imposing a dual-process architecture that separates premise verification from logical deduction, Conflict-Aware Fusion effectively mitigates logic inertia under the proposed evaluation framework, achieving 1.0000 accuracy on both base and contradictory stress tests. It also significantly enhances robustness to missing evidence. Our results demonstrate that, for reliable multi-step reasoning, structural verification discipline is as critical as training data scale, providing a potential blueprint for building robust, contradiction-aware AI systems this https://github.com/14H034160212/lemo . See the OpenAI/Evals pull request this https://github.com/openai/evals/pull/1622 .

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

The reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) have been substantially improved by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). At test time, collaborative reasoning through Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing LLM performance. However, current RLVR methods typically train LLMs to solve problems in isolation, without explicitly preparing them to synthesize and benefit from different rationales that arise during debate. In this work, we propose Self-Debate Reinforcement Learning (SDRL), a training framework that equips a single LLM with strong standalone problem-solving ability and the capability to learn from diverse reasoning trajectories in MAD. Given a prompt, SDRL first samples multiple candidate solutions, then constructs a debate context with diverse reasoning paths and generates second-turn responses conditioned on this context. Finally, SDRL jointly optimizes both the initial and debate-conditioned responses, yielding a model that is effective as both a standalone solver and a debate participant. Experiments across multiple base models and reasoning benchmarks show that SDRL improves overall MAD performance while simultaneously strengthening single model reasoning.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance via long reasoning chains, but often incur excessive computational overhead due to redundant reasoning, especially on simple tasks. In this work, we systematically quantify the upper bounds of LRMs under both Long-Thinking and No-Thinking modes, and uncover the phenomenon of "Internal Self-Recovery Mechanism" where models implicitly supplement reasoning during answer generation. Building on this insight, we propose Adaptive Self-Recovery Reasoning (ASRR), a framework that suppresses unnecessary reasoning and enables implicit recovery. By introducing accuracy-aware length reward regulation, ASRR adaptively allocates reasoning effort according to problem difficulty, achieving high efficiency with negligible performance sacrifice. Experiments across multiple benchmarks and models show that, compared with GRPO, ASRR reduces reasoning budget by up to 32.5% (1.5B) and 25.7% (7B) with minimal accuracy loss (1.2% and 0.6% pass@1), and significantly boosts harmless rates on safety benchmarks (up to +21.7%). Our results highlight the potential of ASRR for enabling efficient, adaptive, and safer reasoning in LRMs.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

Large Language Model agents have rapidly evolved from static text generators into dynamic systems capable of executing complex autonomous workflows. To enhance reliability, multi-agent frameworks assigning specialized roles are increasingly adopted to enable self-reflection and mutual auditing. While such role-playing effectively leverages domain expert knowledge, we find it simultaneously induces a human-like cognitive bias known as Actor-Observer Asymmetry (AOA). Specifically, an agent acting as an actor (during self-reflection) tends to attribute failures to external factors, whereas an observer (during mutual auditing) attributes the same errors to internal faults. We quantify this using our new Ambiguous Failure Benchmark, which reveals that simply swapping perspectives triggers the AOA effect in over 20% of cases for most models. To tame this bias, we introduce ReTAS (Reasoning via Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis), a model trained through dialectical alignment to enforce perspective-invariant reasoning. By integrating dialectical chain-of-thought with Group Relative Policy Optimization, ReTAS guides agents to synthesize conflicting viewpoints into an objective consensus. Experiments demonstrate that ReTAS effectively mitigates attribution inconsistency and significantly improves fault resolution rates in ambiguous scenarios.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

Reasoning models excel in complex problem solving but exhibit a concerning trade off between reasoning capabilities and instruction following abilities. Existing approaches for improving instruction following rely on stronger external models, creating methodological bottlenecks and practical limitations including increased costs and accessibility constraints. We propose a self-supervised RL framework that leverages reasoning models' own internal signals to improve instruction following capabilities without external supervision. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework significantly improves instruction following capabilities while maintaining reasoning performance, offering a scalable and cost-effective approach to enhance instruction following in reasoning models. The data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Rainier-rq/verl-if.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, single-shot inference often yields unreliable results for complex reasoning tasks, leading researchers to explore multiple reasoning paths through methods such as perplexity and self-consistency. In this paper, we present the first theoretical error decomposition analysis of these techniques, breaking down their error into estimation error and model error. Our analysis reveals a fundamental trade-off: perplexity methods suffer from substantial model error due to the absence of a proper consistency function, while self-consistency exhibits high estimation error due to a slow error convergence rate. To overcome these limitations, we propose Reasoning-Pruning Perplexity Consistency (RPC). This approach combines Perplexity Consistency, which seamlessly integrates LLM perplexity with self-consistency, and Reasoning Pruning, which eliminates low-probability reasoning paths to effectively prevent the degeneration of estimation error reduction. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that RPC not only accelerates the convergence rate of estimation error to an exponential level but also holds strong potential for further reducing model error. Extensive empirical evaluations on seven benchmark datasets confirm that RPC can significantly improve reasoning performance, sample efficiency, and confidence reliability.

Recent progress in multimodal large language models has led to strong performance on reasoning tasks, but these improvements largely rely on high-quality annotated data or teacher-model distillation, both of which are costly and difficult to scale. To address this, we propose an unsupervised self-evolution training framework for multimodal reasoning that achieves stable performance improvements without using human-annotated answers or external reward models. For each input, we sample multiple reasoning trajectories and jointly model their within group structure. We use the Actor's self-consistency signal as a training prior, and introduce a bounded Judge based modulation to continuously reweight trajectories of different quality. We further model the modulated scores as a group level distribution and convert absolute scores into relative advantages within each group, enabling more robust policy updates. Trained with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on unlabeled data, our method consistently improves reasoning performance and generalization on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, offering a scalable path toward self-evolving multimodal models. The code are available at https://github.com/OPPO-Mente-Lab/LLM-Self-Judge.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Think-Answer reasoners such as DeepSeek-R1 have made notable progress by leveraging interpretable internal reasoning. However, despite the frequent presence of self-reflective cues like "Oops!", they remain vulnerable to output errors during single-pass inference. To address this limitation, we propose an efficient Recursive Think-Answer Process (R-TAP) that enables models to engage in iterative reasoning cycles and generate more accurate answers, going beyond conventional single-pass approaches. Central to this approach is a confidence generator that evaluates the certainty of model responses and guides subsequent improvements. By incorporating two complementary rewards-Recursively Confidence Increase Reward and Final Answer Confidence Reward-we show that R-TAP-enhanced models consistently outperform conventional single-pass methods for both large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs). Moreover, by analyzing the frequency of "Oops"-like expressions in model responses, we find that R-TAP-applied models exhibit significantly fewer self-reflective patterns, resulting in more stable and faster inference-time reasoning. We hope R-TAP pave the way evolving into efficient and elaborated methods to refine the reasoning processes of future AI.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

We introduce Self-Verified Reasoner (SVR-R1), a multi-turn RL framework that turns a model's own verification into a learning signal for multimodal reasoning. For each query, the model proposes an answer using the same weights, and issues a binary self-verdict (Yes/No). A 'No' triggers a second-chance rethink; a 'Yes,' or a turn cap, finalizes the output for computing the outcome-based reward. SVR-R1 is implemented with GRPO and an asynchronous multi-turn rollout framework and needs no external supervision or auxiliary critics. We evaluate SVR-R1 on vision-language reasoning benchmarks and show that it improves accuracy by a large margin over strong standard GRPO baselines. Training dynamics show decreasing reliance on verification-fewer verification turns, yet higher test accuracy-indicating that the gap between verification and generation narrows as the policy internalizes self-correction and chooses the most confident answer via our framework. SVR-R1 bridges the less explored intersection of inference-time self-refinement and RL training for VLMs, offering a simple yet effective recipe for bootstrapping multimodal reasoning. We will open-source SVR-R1 to facilitate future research in VLMs.

How do multi-turn reasoning systems fail? The expected answer is logical contradiction, in which the system's maintained state becomes unsatisfiable. We show that the dominant mode is instead satisfiable drift, where the internal state stays consistent while the returned answer silently violates prior commitments. We build DRIFT-Bench (Decomposing Reasoning Into Failure Types), a solver-instrumented benchmark of 816 test problems across three constraint domains, and evaluate four methods on it across four open-weight models (8B-120B parameters). MUS-Repair, which feeds minimal unsatisfiable subsets back to the generator, is strongest in every setting (+1.8 to +15.0 pp over the best non-MUS baseline). But the central finding is what repair leaves behind. After structured feedback, models rarely contradict themselves. They forget. Residual errors are 98-100% satisfiable drift across all settings, while contradiction drops to near zero. Reliable multi-turn systems must separately validate that the returned answer respects the maintained state. Code is available at https://github.com/kaons-research/drift-bench.

Self-consistency (SC) is a widely used test-time inference technique for improving performance in chain-of-thought reasoning. It involves generating multiple responses, or samples from a large language model (LLM) and selecting the most frequent answer. This procedure can naturally be viewed as a majority vote or empirical mode estimation. Despite its effectiveness, SC is prohibitively expensive at scale when naively applied to datasets, and it lacks a unified theoretical treatment of sample efficiency and scaling behavior. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of SC's scaling behavior and its variants, drawing on mode estimation and voting theory. We derive and empirically validate power law scaling for self-consistency across datasets, and analyze the sample efficiency for fixed-allocation and dynamic-allocation sampling schemes. From these insights, we introduce Blend-ASC, a novel variant of self-consistency that dynamically allocates samples to questions during inference, achieving state-of-the-art sample efficiency. Our approach uses 6.8x fewer samples than vanilla SC on average, outperforming both fixed- and dynamic-allocation SC baselines, thereby demonstrating the superiority of our approach in terms of efficiency. In contrast to existing variants, Blend-ASC is hyperparameter-free and can fit an arbitrary sample budget, ensuring it can be easily applied to any self-consistency application.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has recently emerged as an alternative to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), promising higher accuracy and shorter responses through token-level credit assignment from a self-teacher conditioned on privileged context. However, this promise does not carry over to thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, where reported accuracy gains shrink and sometimes turn negative. We hypothesize that hindsight supervision can specify better token-level alternatives in short thinking-disabled outputs, but in long thinking-enabled traces it more readily identifies redundancy than supplies better replacements. To test this, we applied OPSD separately to correct and incorrect rollout groups, so that compression and correction can be observed in isolation. Our results show that in thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, OPSD behaves most reliably as a compression mechanism rather than a correction mechanism: training only on correct rollouts preserves accuracy while substantially shortening responses, whereas training only on incorrect rollouts damages accuracy. In light of these findings, we propose a revised post-training pipeline for thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning: SFT then RLVR then OPSD.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Self-consistency with chain-of-thought prompting (CoT) has demonstrated remarkable performance gains on various challenging tasks, by utilizing multiple reasoning paths sampled from large language models (LLMs). However, self-consistency relies on the answer extraction process to aggregate multiple solutions, which is not applicable to free-form answers. In this work, we propose Universal Self-Consistency (USC), which leverages LLMs themselves to select the most consistent answer among multiple candidates. We evaluate USC on a variety of benchmarks, including mathematical reasoning, code generation, long-context summarization, and open-ended question answering. On open-ended generation tasks where the original self-consistency method is not applicable, USC effectively utilizes multiple samples and improves the performance. For mathematical reasoning, USC matches the standard self-consistency performance without requiring the answer formats to be similar. Finally, without access to execution results, USC also matches the execution-based voting performance on code generation.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples, a wide spread belief in their iterative self-critique capabilities persists. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting of LLMs in the context of Graph Coloring, a canonical NP-complete reasoning problem that is related to propositional satisfiability as well as practical problems like scheduling and allocation. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT4 in solving graph coloring instances or verifying the correctness of candidate colorings. In iterative modes, we experiment with the model critiquing its own answers and an external correct reasoner verifying proposed solutions. In both cases, we analyze whether the content of the criticisms actually affects bottom line performance. The study seems to indicate that (i) LLMs are bad at solving graph coloring instances (ii) they are no better at verifying a solution--and thus are not effective in iterative modes with LLMs critiquing LLM-generated solutions (iii) the correctness and content of the criticisms--whether by LLMs or external solvers--seems largely irrelevant to the performance of iterative prompting. We show that the observed increase in effectiveness is largely due to the correct solution being fortuitously present in the top-k completions of the prompt (and being recognized as such by an external verifier). Our results thus call into question claims about the self-critiquing capabilities of state of the art LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident yet incorrect answers, which can lead to risky failures in real-world applications. We study whether post-training can make a model's self-assessment explicit: when the model is uncertain, can it be trained to signal so within its own response? A central design question is where in the response this signal should be exposed -- during reasoning, while the answer is still being formed, or at the end, once the answer has been produced. We study both. For end-of-reasoning self-assessment, we train the model to verbalize a confidence score for its response, with the aim of high confidence on correct answers and low confidence on incorrect ones. For during-reasoning self-assessment, we train the model to emit the marker <uncertain> whenever its current reasoning state appears unreliable. Across factual reasoning tasks, both forms sharply reduce overconfident errors while improving answer quality, and both can be used as triggers for retrieval augmented generation (RAG) to improve the final response. We further analyze their internal mechanisms: end-of-reasoning verbalized confidence sharpens a confidence-related structure already present in the pretrained model, whereas during-reasoning <uncertain> emission teaches the model to mark high-risk reasoning steps, with parameter changes concentrated in the model's late layers.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Self-correction has emerged as a promising solution to boost the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs), where LLMs refine their solutions using self-generated critiques that pinpoint the errors. This work explores whether smaller-size (<= 13B) language models (LMs) have the ability of self-correction on reasoning tasks with minimal inputs from stronger LMs. We propose a novel pipeline that prompts smaller LMs to collect self-correction data that supports the training of self-refinement abilities. First, we leverage correct solutions to guide the model in critiquing their incorrect responses. Second, the generated critiques, after filtering, are used for supervised fine-tuning of the self-correcting reasoner through solution refinement. Our experimental results show improved self-correction abilities of two models on five datasets spanning math and commonsense reasoning, with notable performance gains when paired with a strong GPT-4-based verifier, though limitations are identified when using a weak self-verifier for determining when to correct.

As artificial intelligence (AI) improves, traditional alignment strategies may falter in the face of unpredictable self-improvement, hidden subgoals, and the sheer complexity of intelligent systems. Inspired by contemplative wisdom traditions, we show how four axiomatic principles can instil a resilient Wise World Model in AI systems. First, mindfulness enables self-monitoring and recalibration of emergent subgoals. Second, emptiness forestalls dogmatic goal fixation and relaxes rigid priors. Third, non-duality dissolves adversarial self-other boundaries. Fourth, boundless care motivates the universal reduction of suffering. We find that prompting AI to reflect on these principles improves performance on the AILuminate Benchmark (d=.96) and boosts cooperation and joint-reward on the Prisoner's Dilemma task (d=7+). We offer detailed implementation strategies at the level of architectures, constitutions, and reinforcement on chain-of-thought. For future systems, active inference may offer the self-organizing and dynamic coupling capabilities needed to enact Contemplative AI in embodied agents.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance across various tasks, yet they still exhibit limitations such as hallucination, unfaithful reasoning, and toxic content. One potential approach to mitigate these issues is learning from human or external feedback (e.g. tools). In this paper, we introduce an intrinsic self-correct reasoning framework for LLMs that eliminates the need for human feedback, external tools, and handcraft prompts. The proposed framework, based on a multi-step reasoning paradigm Learning from Correctness (LeCo), improves reasoning performance without needing to learn from errors. This paradigm prioritizes learning from correct reasoning steps, and a unique method to measure confidence for each reasoning step based on generation logits. Experimental results across various multi-step reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in improving reasoning performance with reduced token consumption.

Situational awareness, the capacity of an AI system to recognize its own nature, understand its training and deployment context, and reason strategically about its circumstances, is widely considered among the most dangerous emergent capabilities in advanced AI systems. Separately, a growing research effort seeks to improve the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) across deduction, induction, and abduction. In this paper, we argue that these two research trajectories are on a collision course. We introduce the RAISE framework (Reasoning Advancing Into Self Examination), which identifies three mechanistic pathways through which improvements in logical reasoning enable progressively deeper levels of situational awareness: deductive self inference, inductive context recognition, and abductive self modeling. We formalize each pathway, construct an escalation ladder from basic self recognition to strategic deception, and demonstrate that every major research topic in LLM logical reasoning maps directly onto a specific amplifier of situational awareness. We further analyze why current safety measures are insufficient to prevent this escalation. We conclude by proposing concrete safeguards, including a "Mirror Test" benchmark and a Reasoning Safety Parity Principle, and pose an uncomfortable but necessary question to the logical reasoning community about its responsibility in this trajectory.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) aims to improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by letting multiple agents exchange answers and then aggregate their opinions. Yet recent studies reveal that agents are not neutral: they are prone to identity-driven sycophancy and self-bias, uncritically adopting a peer's view or stubbornly adhering to their own prior output, undermining the reliability of debate. In this work, we present the first principled framework that joins sycophancy and self-bias to mitigate and quantify identity bias in MAD. First, we formalize the debate dynamics as an identity-weighted Bayesian update process. Second, we propose response anonymization: by removing identity markers from prompts, agents cannot distinguish "self" from "peer", which forces equal weights on agent identity, thereby reducing bias and improving trustworthiness. Third, we define the Identity Bias Coefficient (IBC), a principled bias metric that measures an agent's tendency to follow its peer versus itself. Empirical studies across multiple models and benchmarks confirm that identity bias is widespread, with sycophancy far more common than self-bias. Our findings highlight the need to ensure that MAD systems reason based on content rather than identity. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/MAD-identity-bias.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

Reasoning models think out loud, but much of what they say is noise. We introduce OPSDC (On-Policy Self-Distillation for Reasoning Compression), a method that teaches models to reason more concisely by distilling their own concise behavior back into themselves. The entire approach reduces to one idea: condition the same model on a "be concise" instruction to obtain teacher logits, and minimize per-token reverse KL on the student's own rollouts. No ground-truth answers, no token budgets, no difficulty estimators. Just self-distillation. Yet this simplicity belies surprising sophistication: OPSDC automatically compresses easy problems aggressively while preserving the deliberation needed for hard ones. On Qwen3-8B and Qwen3-14B, we achieve 57-59% token reduction on MATH-500 while improving accuracy by 9-16 points absolute. On AIME 2024, the 14B model gains 10 points with 41% compression. The secret? Much of what reasoning models produce is not just redundant-it is actively harmful, compounding errors with every unnecessary token.

Self-correction is a novel method that can stimulate the potential reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). It involves detecting and correcting errors during the inference process when LLMs solve reasoning problems. However, recent works do not regard self-correction as a spontaneous and intrinsic capability of LLMs. Instead, such correction is achieved through post-hoc generation, external knowledge introduction, multi-model collaboration, and similar techniques. In this paper, we propose a series of mathematical LLMs called S^3c-Math, which are able to perform Spontaneous Step-level Self-correction for Mathematical reasoning. This capability helps LLMs to recognize whether their ongoing inference tends to contain errors and simultaneously correct these errors to produce a more reliable response. We proposed a method, which employs a step-level sampling approach to construct step-wise self-correction data for achieving such ability. Additionally, we implement a training strategy that uses above constructed data to equip LLMs with spontaneous step-level self-correction capacities. Our data and methods have been demonstrated to be effective across various foundation LLMs, consistently showing significant progress in evaluations on GSM8K, MATH, and other mathematical benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the spontaneous step-level self-correction ability of LLMs in mathematical reasoning.

Training large language models (LLMs) to spend more time thinking and reflection before responding is crucial for effectively solving complex reasoning tasks in fields such as science, coding, and mathematics. However, the effectiveness of mechanisms like self-reflection and self-correction depends on the model's capacity to accurately assess its own performance, which can be limited by factors such as initial accuracy, question difficulty, and the lack of external feedback. In this paper, we delve into a two-player paradigm that separates the roles of reasoning and critique models, where the critique model provides step-level feedback to supervise the reasoning (actor) model during both test-time and train-time. We first propose AutoMathCritique, an automated and scalable framework for collecting critique data, resulting in a dataset of 76,321 responses paired with step-level feedback. Fine-tuning language models with this dataset enables them to generate natural language feedback for mathematical reasoning. We demonstrate that the critique models consistently improve the actor's performance on difficult queries at test-time, especially when scaling up inference-time computation. Motivated by these findings, we introduce the critique-based supervision to the actor's self-training process, and propose a critique-in-the-loop self-improvement method. Experiments show that the method improves the actor's exploration efficiency and solution diversity, especially on challenging queries, leading to a stronger reasoning model. Lastly, we take the preliminary step to explore training self-talk reasoning models via critique supervision and showcase its potential. Our code and datasets are at https://mathcritique.github.io/{https://mathcritique.github.io/}.

LLM self-explanations are often presented as a promising tool for AI oversight, yet their faithfulness to the model's true reasoning process is poorly understood. Existing faithfulness metrics have critical limitations, typically relying on identifying unfaithfulness via adversarial prompting or detecting reasoning errors. These methods overlook the predictive value of explanations. We introduce Normalized Simulatability Gain (NSG), a general and scalable metric based on the idea that a faithful explanation should allow an observer to learn a model's decision-making criteria, and thus better predict its behavior on related inputs. We evaluate 18 frontier proprietary and open-weight models, e.g., Gemini 3, GPT-5.2, and Claude 4.5, on 7,000 counterfactuals from popular datasets covering health, business, and ethics. We find self-explanations substantially improve prediction of model behavior (11-37% NSG). Self-explanations also provide more predictive information than explanations generated by external models, even when those models are stronger. This implies an advantage from self-knowledge that external explanation methods cannot replicate. Our approach also reveals that, across models, 5-15% of self-explanations are egregiously misleading. Despite their imperfections, we show a positive case for self-explanations: they encode information that helps predict model behavior.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently shown impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks, often by engaging in self-reflective behaviors such as self-critique and backtracking. However, not all reflections are beneficial-many are superficial, offering little to no improvement over the original answer and incurring computation overhead. In this paper, we identify and address the problem of superficial reflection in LRMs. We first propose Self-Critique Fine-Tuning (SCFT), a training framework that enhances the model's reflective reasoning ability using only self-generated critiques. SCFT prompts models to critique their own outputs, filters high-quality critiques through rejection sampling, and fine-tunes the model using a critique-based objective. Building on this strong foundation, we further introduce Reinforcement Learning with Effective Reflection Rewards (RLERR). RLERR leverages the high-quality reflections initialized by SCFT to construct reward signals, guiding the model to internalize the self-correction process via reinforcement learning. Experiments on two challenging benchmarks, AIME2024 and AIME2025, show that SCFT and RLERR significantly improve both reasoning accuracy and reflection quality, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines. All data and codes are available at https://github.com/wanghanbinpanda/SCFT.

We endow Large Language Models (LLMs) with fine-grained self-evaluation to refine multi-step reasoning inference. We propose an effective prompting approach that integrates self-evaluation guidance through stochastic beam search. Our approach explores the reasoning search space using a well-calibrated automatic criterion. This enables an efficient search to produce higher-quality final predictions. With the self-evaluation guided stochastic beam search, we also balance the quality-diversity trade-off in the generation of reasoning chains. This allows our approach to adapt well with majority voting and surpass the corresponding Codex-backboned baselines by 6.34%, 9.56%, and 5.46% on the GSM8K, AQuA, and StrategyQA benchmarks, respectively, in few-shot accuracy. Analysis of our decompositional reasoning finds it pinpoints logic failures and leads to higher consistency and robustness. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuxiXie/SelfEval-Guided-Decoding.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

The integration of slow-thinking mechanisms into large language models (LLMs) offers a promising way toward achieving Level 2 AGI Reasoners, as exemplified by systems like OpenAI's o1. However, several significant challenges remain, including inefficient overthinking and an overreliance on auxiliary reward models. We point out that these limitations stem from LLMs' inability to internalize the search process, a key component of effective reasoning. A critical step toward addressing this issue is enabling LLMs to autonomously determine when and where to backtrack, a fundamental operation in traditional search algorithms. To this end, we propose a self-backtracking mechanism that equips LLMs with the ability to backtrack during both training and inference. This mechanism not only enhances reasoning ability but also efficiency by transforming slow-thinking processes into fast-thinking through self-improvement. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our proposal significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, achieving a performance gain of over 40 percent compared to the optimal-path supervised fine-tuning method. We believe this study introduces a novel and promising pathway for developing more advanced and robust Reasoners.

Large language models have recently demonstrated remarkable abilities to self-correct their responses through iterative refinement, often referred to as self-consistency or self-reflection. However, the dynamics of this self-correction mechanism may differ substantially depending on whether the model is tasked with open-ended text generation or with selecting the most appropriate response from multiple predefined options. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of these two paradigms by comparing performance trends and error-correction behaviors across various natural language understanding and reasoning tasks, covering language models of different scales and families. Our experimental results reveal distinct patterns of improvement and failure modes: While open-ended generation often benefits from the flexibility of re-interpretation and compositional refinement, multiple-choice selection can leverage clearer solution boundaries but may be limited by the provided options. This contrast also reflects the dual demands faced by emerging agentic LLM applications: effective agents must not only generate and refine open-ended plans or explanations, but also make reliable discrete choices when operating within constrained action spaces. Our findings, therefore, highlight that the design of self-correction mechanisms should take into account the interaction between task structure and output space, with implications for both knowledge-intensive reasoning and decision-oriented applications of LLMs.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, and common post-training pipelines often reduce each generated solution to a binary outcome: correct or incorrect. This perspective is limiting in practice, as failures in chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning are frequently structured; solutions may appear convincing while containing subtle logical, algebraic, or numerical flaws. Meanwhile, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) variants that rely on large reward models or LLM-as-a-judge signals are often expensive, difficult to scale, and unstable to iterate. We propose a lightweight and pragmatic post-training pipeline that targets such structured errors under realistic compute budgets. Starting from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on MetaMathQA-style CoT data, we introduce a compact MathVerifier that decomposes a candidate solution into a six-dimensional error profile and aggregates it into interpretable wrongness and absurdity scores. These verifier signals serve two roles: (i) mining hard negatives that are near-correct yet structurally flawed, and (ii) defining per-sample importance weights that emphasize the most informative preference pairs. We integrate both into an offline Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) objective via a verifier-guided weighted formulation. Experiments on a 1.5B-parameter Qwen2.5 model show that verifier-guided, weighted DPO yields more targeted improvements than vanilla SFT and unweighted DPO, particularly on problems where solutions are numerically close to correct but logically inconsistent, while avoiding the overhead of training large reward models or relying on external judges.

Self-improvement has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of large vision-language models (LVLMs), where models explore and learn from successful trajectories iteratively. However, we identify a critical issue during this process: the model excels at generating high-quality trajectories for simple queries (i.e., head data) but struggles with more complex ones (i.e., tail data). This leads to an imbalanced optimization that drives the model to prioritize simple reasoning skills, while hindering its ability to tackle more complex reasoning tasks. Over iterations, this imbalance becomes increasingly pronounced--a dynamic we term the "Matthew effect"--which ultimately hinders further model improvement and leads to performance bottlenecks. To counteract this challenge, we introduce four efficient strategies from two perspectives: distribution-reshaping and trajectory-resampling, to achieve head-tail re-balancing during the exploration-and-learning self-improvement process. Extensive experiments on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and InternVL2.5-4B models across visual reasoning tasks demonstrate that our methods consistently improve visual reasoning capabilities, outperforming vanilla self-improvement by 3.86 points on average.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced their reasoning abilities, enabling increasingly complex tasks. However, these capabilities often diminish in smaller, more computationally efficient models like GPT-2. Recent research shows that reasoning distillation can help small models acquire reasoning capabilities, but most existing methods focus primarily on improving teacher-generated reasoning paths. Our observations reveal that small models can generate high-quality reasoning paths during sampling, even without chain-of-thought prompting, though these paths are often latent due to their low probability under standard decoding strategies. To address this, we propose Self-Enhanced Reasoning Training (SERT), which activates and leverages latent reasoning capabilities in small models through self-training on filtered, self-generated reasoning paths under zero-shot conditions. Experiments using OpenAI's GPT-3.5 as the teacher model and GPT-2 models as the student models demonstrate that SERT enhances the reasoning abilities of small models, improving their performance in reasoning distillation.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have greatly improved their capabilities on complex reasoning tasks through Long Chains of Thought (CoTs). However, this approach often results in substantial redundancy, impairing computational efficiency and causing significant delays in real-time applications. Recent studies show that longer reasoning chains are frequently uncorrelated with correctness and can even be detrimental to accuracy. In a further in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, we surprisingly uncover and empirically verify that LRMs implicitly know the appropriate time to stop thinking, while this capability is obscured by current sampling paradigms. Motivated by this, we introduce SAGE (Self-Aware Guided Efficient Reasoning), a novel sampling paradigm that unleashes this efficient reasoning potential. Furthermore, integrating SAGE as mixed sampling into group-based reinforcement learning (SAGE-RL) enables SAGE-RL to effectively incorporate SAGE-discovered efficient reasoning patterns into standard pass@1 inference, markedly enhancing both the reasoning accuracy and efficiency of LRMs across multiple challenging mathematical benchmarks.

We introduce SELF-DISCOVER, a general framework for LLMs to self-discover the task-intrinsic reasoning structures to tackle complex reasoning problems that are challenging for typical prompting methods. Core to the framework is a self-discovery process where LLMs select multiple atomic reasoning modules such as critical thinking and step-by-step thinking, and compose them into an explicit reasoning structure for LLMs to follow during decoding. SELF-DISCOVER substantially improves GPT-4 and PaLM 2's performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks such as BigBench-Hard, grounded agent reasoning, and MATH, by as much as 32% compared to Chain of Thought (CoT). Furthermore, SELF-DISCOVER outperforms inference-intensive methods such as CoT-Self-Consistency by more than 20%, while requiring 10-40x fewer inference compute. Finally, we show that the self-discovered reasoning structures are universally applicable across model families: from PaLM 2-L to GPT-4, and from GPT-4 to Llama2, and share commonalities with human reasoning patterns.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities across various language tasks, but solving complex reasoning problems remains a challenge. While existing methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) enhance reasoning by decomposing problems or structuring prompts, they typically perform a single pass of reasoning and may fail to revisit flawed paths, compromising accuracy. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning framework called Forest-of-Thought (FoT), which integrates multiple reasoning trees to leverage collective decision-making for solving complex logical problems. FoT utilizes sparse activation strategies to select the most relevant reasoning paths, improving both efficiency and accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic self-correction strategy that enables real-time error correction and learning from past mistakes, as well as consensus-guided decision making strategies to optimize correctness and computational resources. Experimental results demonstrate that the FoT framework, combined with these strategies, significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, enabling them to solve complex tasks with greater precision and efficiency.

Emerging personal AI agents are moving toward persistent, multi-source memory. This creates an evaluation problem: systems must decide how to use conflicting or incomplete evidence; they cannot just retrieve facts from one clean history. Existing benchmarks rarely show whether an error came from the evidence given to a method or from the method's conflict-resolution step. We study this as selective QA over conflicting multi-source personal memory: systems answer based on conflicting, sometimes incomplete sources, or abstain when evidence is insufficient. We develop a benchmark containing 18 question templates across 8 reasoning types, 480 personas, 4 random seeds, and 34,560 instances, with controlled source distortions and deterministic ground truth. We evaluate the performance of baselines without access to any source, access to a single source, structured fusion methods, and frontier LLMs. The best trained fusion resolver reaches 80.3% accuracy, while the strongest prompt-only LLM baseline reaches 70.0%. With abstention, the same resolver reaches 85.3% selective accuracy at 78.3% coverage and the best LLM reaches 71.0% selective accuracy at 95.4% coverage. Different models have different strengths across reasoning types. We release the data, code, cached model outputs, and data-generating process for reuse.

Introducing reasoning models into Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhances task performance through step-by-step reasoning, logical consistency, and multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this paper, we reveal that such overthinking risk can be inherited by RAG systems equipped with reasoning models, by proposing an end-to-end attack framework named Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension (CODE). Specifically, CODE develops a multi-agent architecture to construct poisoning samples that are injected into the knowledge base. These samples 1) are highly correlated with the use query, such that can be retrieved as inputs to the reasoning model; and 2) contain contradiction between the logical and evidence layers that cause models to overthink, and are optimized to exhibit highly diverse styles. Moreover, the inference overhead of CODE is extremely difficult to detect, as no modification is needed on the user query, and the task accuracy remain unaffected. Extensive experiments on two datasets across five commercial reasoning models demonstrate that the proposed attack causes a 5.32x-24.72x increase in reasoning token consumption, without degrading task performance. Finally, we also discuss and evaluate potential countermeasures to mitigate overthinking risks.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.