Daily Papers

Historically, artificial intelligence has drawn much inspiration from neuroscience to fuel advances in the field. However, current progress in reinforcement learning is largely focused on benchmark problems that fail to capture many of the aspects that are of interest in neuroscience today. We illustrate this point by extending a T-maze task from neuroscience for use with reinforcement learning algorithms, and show that state-of-the-art algorithms are not capable of solving this problem. Finally, we point out where insights from neuroscience could help explain some of the issues encountered.

Real-world robotic agents must act under partial observability and long horizons, where key cues may appear long before they affect decision making. However, most modern approaches rely solely on instantaneous information, without incorporating insights from the past. Standard recurrent or transformer models struggle with retaining and leveraging long-term dependencies: context windows truncate history, while naive memory extensions fail under scale and sparsity. We propose ELMUR (External Layer Memory with Update/Rewrite), a transformer architecture with structured external memory. Each layer maintains memory embeddings, interacts with them via bidirectional cross-attention, and updates them through an Least Recently Used (LRU) memory module using replacement or convex blending. ELMUR extends effective horizons up to 100,000 times beyond the attention window and achieves a 100% success rate on a synthetic T-Maze task with corridors up to one million steps. In POPGym, it outperforms baselines on more than half of the tasks. On MIKASA-Robo sparse-reward manipulation tasks with visual observations, it nearly doubles the performance of strong baselines. These results demonstrate that structured, layer-local external memory offers a simple and scalable approach to decision making under partial observability.

Modern vision models have achieved remarkable success in benchmarks where local features provide critical information about the target. There is now a growing interest in solving tasks that require more global reasoning, where local features offer no significant information. These tasks are reminiscent of the connectivity tasks discussed by Minsky and Papert in 1969, which exposed the limitations of the perceptron model and contributed to the first AI winter. In this paper, we revisit such tasks by introducing four global visual benchmarks involving path findings and mazes. We show that: (1) although today's large vision models largely surpass the expressivity limitations of the early models, they still struggle with the learning efficiency; we put forward the "globality degree" notion to understand this limitation; (2) we then demonstrate that the picture changes and global reasoning becomes feasible with the introduction of "visual scratchpads"; similarly to the text scratchpads and chain-of-thoughts used in language models, visual scratchpads help break down global tasks into simpler ones; (3) we finally show that some scratchpads are better than others, in particular, "inductive scratchpads" that take steps relying on less information afford better out-of-distribution generalization and succeed for smaller model sizes.

Transformer models underpin many recent advances in practical machine learning applications, yet understanding their internal behavior continues to elude researchers. Given the size and complexity of these models, forming a comprehensive picture of their inner workings remains a significant challenge. To this end, we set out to understand small transformer models in a more tractable setting: that of solving mazes. In this work, we focus on the abstractions formed by these models and find evidence for the consistent emergence of structured internal representations of maze topology and valid paths. We demonstrate this by showing that the residual stream of only a single token can be linearly decoded to faithfully reconstruct the entire maze. We also find that the learned embeddings of individual tokens have spatial structure. Furthermore, we take steps towards deciphering the circuity of path-following by identifying attention heads (dubbed adjacency heads), which are implicated in finding valid subsequent tokens.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

Despite their remarkable success in language modeling, transformers trained to predict the next token in a sequence struggle with long-term planning. This limitation is particularly evident in tasks requiring foresight to plan multiple steps ahead such as maze navigation. The standard next single token prediction objective, however, offers no explicit mechanism to predict multiple steps ahead - or revisit the path taken so far. Consequently, in this work we study whether explicitly predicting multiple steps ahead (and backwards) can improve transformers' maze navigation. We train parameter-matched transformers from scratch, under identical settings, to navigate mazes of varying types and sizes with standard next token prediction and MLM-U, an objective explicitly predicting multiple steps ahead and backwards. We find that MLM-U considerably improves transformers' ability to navigate mazes compared to standard next token prediction across maze types and complexities. We also find MLM-U training is 4x more sample efficient and converges 2x faster in terms of GPU training hours relative to next token training. Finally, for more complex mazes we find MLM-U benefits from scaling to larger transformers. Remarkably, we find transformers trained with MLM-U outperform larger transformers trained with next token prediction using additional supervision from A* search traces. We hope these findings underscore the promise of learning objectives to advance transformers' capacity for long-term planning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in language processing, yet they often struggle with tasks requiring genuine visual spatial reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a novel two-stage training framework designed to equip standard LLMs with visual reasoning abilities for maze navigation. First, we leverage Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) on a curated dataset of tokenized maze representations to teach the model to predict step-by-step movement commands. Next, we apply Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)-a technique used in DeepSeekR1-with a carefully crafted reward function to refine the model's sequential decision-making and encourage emergent chain-of-thought behaviors. Experimental results on synthetically generated mazes show that while a baseline model fails to navigate the maze, the SFT-trained model achieves 86% accuracy, and further GRPO fine-tuning boosts accuracy to 93%. Qualitative analyses reveal that GRPO fosters more robust and self-corrective reasoning, highlighting the potential of our approach to bridge the gap between language models and visual spatial tasks. These findings offer promising implications for applications in robotics, autonomous navigation, and other domains that require integrated visual and sequential reasoning.

When studying unconstrained behaviour and allowing mice to leave their cage to navigate a complex labyrinth, the mice exhibit foraging behaviour in the labyrinth searching for rewards, returning to their home cage now and then, e.g. to drink. Surprisingly, when executing such a ``home run'', the mice do not follow the exact reverse path, in fact, the entry path and home path have very little overlap. Recent work proposed a hierarchical active inference model for navigation, where the low level model makes inferences about hidden states and poses that explain sensory inputs, whereas the high level model makes inferences about moving between locations, effectively building a map of the environment. However, using this ``map'' for planning, only allows the agent to find trajectories that it previously explored, far from the observed mice's behaviour. In this paper, we explore ways of incorporating before-unvisited paths in the planning algorithm, by using the low level generative model to imagine potential, yet undiscovered paths. We demonstrate a proof of concept in a grid-world environment, showing how an agent can accurately predict a new, shorter path in the map leading to its starting point, using a generative model learnt from pixel-based observations.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning and generalization at the expense of degrading memorized knowledge. We challenge this narrative by observing that RL-enhanced models consistently outperform their base and supervised fine-tuned (SFT) counterparts on pure knowledge recall tasks, particularly those requiring traversal of hierarchical, structured knowledge (e.g., medical codes). We hypothesize these gains stem not from newly acquired data, but from improved procedural skills in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. To support this hypothesis, we show that structured prompting, which explicitly guides SFTed models through hierarchical traversal, recovers most of the performance gap (reducing 24pp to 7pp on MedConceptsQA for DeepSeek-V3/R1). We further find that while prompting improves final-answer accuracy, RL-enhanced models retain superior ability to recall correct procedural paths on deep-retrieval tasks. Finally our layer-wise internal activation analysis reveals that while factual representations (e.g., activations for the statement "code 57.95 refers to urinary infection") maintain high cosine similarity between SFT and RL models, query representations (e.g., "what is code 57.95") diverge noticeably, indicating that RL primarily transforms how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have effectively improved their reasoning abilities, particularly on mathematical and logical problems that have verifiable answers, through techniques such as supervised finetuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). Prior research indicates that RL effectively internalizes search strategies, enabling long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, with backtracking emerging naturally as a learned capability. However, the precise benefits of backtracking, specifically, how significantly it contributes to reasoning improvements and the optimal extent of its use, remain poorly understood. In this work, we systematically investigate the dynamics between SFT and RL on eight reasoning tasks: Countdown, Sudoku, Arc 1D, Geometry, Color Cube Rotation, List Functions, Zebra Puzzles, and Self Reference. Our findings highlight that short CoT sequences used in SFT as a warm-up do have moderate contribution to RL training, compared with cold-start RL; however such contribution diminishes when tasks become increasingly difficult. Motivated by this observation, we construct synthetic datasets varying systematically in the number of backtracking steps and conduct controlled experiments to isolate the influence of either the correctness (content) or the structure (i.e., backtrack frequency). We find that (1) longer CoT with backtracks generally induce better and more stable RL training, (2) more challenging problems with larger search space tend to need higher numbers of backtracks during the SFT stage. Additionally, we demonstrate through experiments on distilled data that RL training is largely unaffected by the correctness of long CoT sequences, suggesting that RL prioritizes structural patterns over content correctness. Collectively, our results offer practical insights into designing optimal training strategies to effectively scale reasoning in LLMs.

How do multimodal models solve visual spatial tasks -- through genuine planning, or through brute-force search in token space? We introduce MazeBench, a benchmark of 110 procedurally generated maze images across nine controlled groups, and evaluate 16 model configurations from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Alibaba. GPT-5.4 solves 91\% and Gemini 3.1 Pro 79\%, but these scores are misleading: models typically translate images into text grids and then enumerate paths step by step, consuming 1,710--22,818 tokens per solve for a task humans do quickly. Without added reasoning budgets, all configurations score only 2--12\%; on 20times20 ultra-hard mazes, they hit token limits and fail. Qualitative traces reveal a common two-stage strategy: image-to-grid translation followed by token-level search, effectively BFS in prose. A text-grid ablation shows Claude Sonnet 4.6 rising from 6\% on images to 80\% when given the correct grid, isolating weak visual extraction from downstream search. When explicitly instructed not to construct a grid or perform graph search, models still revert to the same enumeration strategy. MazeBench therefore shows that high accuracy on visual planning tasks does not imply human-like spatial understanding.

We introduce CheeseBench, a benchmark that evaluates large language models (LLMs) on nine classical behavioral neuroscience paradigms (Morris water maze, Barnes maze, T-maze, radial arm maze, star maze, operant chamber, shuttle box, conditioned place preference, and delayed non-match to sample), spanning six cognitive dimensions. Each task is grounded in peer-reviewed rodent protocols with approximate animal baselines. The agent receives a unified system prompt with no task-specific instructions and must discover goals purely from ASCII text observations and reward signals, much like a rodent placed into an unfamiliar apparatus. We evaluate six open-weight LLMs (3B to 72B parameters) on text-based ASCII renderings and compare against both a random baseline and a graph-based reinforcement learning agent. Our best model (Qwen2.5-VL-7B) reaches 52.6% average success on ASCII input, compared to 32.1% for random agents and 78.9% for approximate rodent baselines. We find that (1) scaling beyond 7B yields diminishing returns, (2) longer context history degrades performance, (3) chain-of-thought prompting hurts rather than helps, and (4) a vision-language architecture provides an advantage at 7B but hurts at 32B. Because the same model's performance ranges from 20% to 57% depending on interface parameters alone, these results characterize the agent-plus-interface system, not the model in isolation. Under this unified zero-shot ASCII protocol, current open-weight LLM agents remain well below approximate rodent reference values, particularly on tasks requiring spatial navigation and within-trial state tracking.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Not yet. We present SPACE, a benchmark that systematically evaluates spatial cognition in frontier models. Our benchmark builds on decades of research in cognitive science. It evaluates large-scale mapping abilities that are brought to bear when an organism traverses physical environments, smaller-scale reasoning about object shapes and layouts, and cognitive infrastructure such as spatial attention and memory. For many tasks, we instantiate parallel presentations via text and images, allowing us to benchmark both large language models and large multimodal models. Results suggest that contemporary frontier models fall short of the spatial intelligence of animals, performing near chance level on a number of classic tests of animal cognition.

Skillful mobile operation in three-dimensional environments is a primary topic of study in Artificial Intelligence. The past two years have seen a surge of creative work on navigation. This creative output has produced a plethora of sometimes incompatible task definitions and evaluation protocols. To coordinate ongoing and future research in this area, we have convened a working group to study empirical methodology in navigation research. The present document summarizes the consensus recommendations of this working group. We discuss different problem statements and the role of generalization, present evaluation measures, and provide standard scenarios that can be used for benchmarking.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

We study the problem of jointly reasoning about language and vision through a navigation and spatial reasoning task. We introduce the Touchdown task and dataset, where an agent must first follow navigation instructions in a real-life visual urban environment, and then identify a location described in natural language to find a hidden object at the goal position. The data contains 9,326 examples of English instructions and spatial descriptions paired with demonstrations. Empirical analysis shows the data presents an open challenge to existing methods, and qualitative linguistic analysis shows that the data displays richer use of spatial reasoning compared to related resources.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

Animals ranging from rats to humans can demonstrate cognitive map capabilities. We evolved weights in a biologically plausible recurrent neural network (RNN) using an evolutionary algorithm to replicate the behavior and neural activity observed in rats during a spatial and working memory task in a triple T-maze. The rat was simulated in the Webots robot simulator and used vision, distance and accelerometer sensors to navigate a virtual maze. After evolving weights from sensory inputs to the RNN, within the RNN, and from the RNN to the robot's motors, the Webots agent successfully navigated the space to reach all four reward arms with minimal repeats before time-out. Our current findings suggest that it is the RNN dynamics that are key to performance, and that performance is not dependent on any one sensory type, which suggests that neurons in the RNN are performing mixed selectivity and conjunctive coding. Moreover, the RNN activity resembles spatial information and trajectory-dependent coding observed in the hippocampus. Collectively, the evolved RNN exhibits navigation skills, spatial memory, and working memory. Our method demonstrates how the dynamic activity in evolved RNNs can capture interesting and complex cognitive behavior and may be used to create RNN controllers for robotic applications.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from text generators into powerful problem solvers. Yet, many open tasks demand critical thinking, multi-source, and verifiable outputs, which are beyond single-shot prompting or standard retrieval-augmented generation. Recently, numerous studies have explored Deep Research (DR), which aims to combine the reasoning capabilities of LLMs with external tools, such as search engines, thereby empowering LLMs to act as research agents capable of completing complex, open-ended tasks. This survey presents a comprehensive and systematic overview of deep research systems, including a clear roadmap, foundational components, practical implementation techniques, important challenges, and future directions. Specifically, our main contributions are as follows: (i) we formalize a three-stage roadmap and distinguish deep research from related paradigms; (ii) we introduce four key components: query planning, information acquisition, memory management, and answer generation, each paired with fine-grained sub-taxonomies; (iii) we summarize optimization techniques, including prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and agentic reinforcement learning; and (iv) we consolidate evaluation criteria and open challenges, aiming to guide and facilitate future development. As the field of deep research continues to evolve rapidly, we are committed to continuously updating this survey to reflect the latest progress in this area.

While Transformers have enabled tremendous progress in various application settings, such architectures still lag behind traditional symbolic planners for solving complex decision making tasks. In this work, we demonstrate how to train Transformers to solve complex planning tasks and present Searchformer, a Transformer model that optimally solves previously unseen Sokoban puzzles 93.7% of the time, while using up to 26.8% fewer search steps than standard A^* search. Searchformer is an encoder-decoder Transformer model trained to predict the search dynamics of A^*. This model is then fine-tuned via expert iterations to perform fewer search steps than A^* search while still generating an optimal plan. In our training method, A^*'s search dynamics are expressed as a token sequence outlining when task states are added and removed into the search tree during symbolic planning. In our ablation studies on maze navigation, we find that Searchformer significantly outperforms baselines that predict the optimal plan directly with a 5-10times smaller model size and a 10times smaller training dataset. We also demonstrate how Searchformer scales to larger and more complex decision making tasks like Sokoban with improved percentage of solved tasks and shortened search dynamics.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

One of the long-term challenges of robotics is to enable robots to interact with humans in the visual world via natural language, as humans are visual animals that communicate through language. Overcoming this challenge requires the ability to perform a wide variety of complex tasks in response to multifarious instructions from humans. In the hope that it might drive progress towards more flexible and powerful human interactions with robots, we propose a dataset of varied and complex robot tasks, described in natural language, in terms of objects visible in a large set of real images. Given an instruction, success requires navigating through a previously-unseen environment to identify an object. This represents a practical challenge, but one that closely reflects one of the core visual problems in robotics. Several state-of-the-art vision-and-language navigation, and referring-expression models are tested to verify the difficulty of this new task, but none of them show promising results because there are many fundamental differences between our task and previous ones. A novel Interactive Navigator-Pointer model is also proposed that provides a strong baseline on the task. The proposed model especially achieves the best performance on the unseen test split, but still leaves substantial room for improvement compared to the human performance.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

To act in the world, robots rely on a representation of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a cup of coffee, a robot must consider movement efficiency and cup orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act for and with people, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. their representations must be aligned with humans'. In this survey, we pose that current reward and imitation learning approaches suffer from representation misalignment, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of robot performance in the world, it is critical that we explicitly focus our efforts on aligning learned task representations with humans, in addition to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. To do so, we mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current robot learning methods within this formalism. We conclude the survey by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks, raising expectations for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). This position paper argues that integrating explicit memory is the cornerstone for advancing LLMs toward AGI. The key reason is that the underlying learning mechanism of LLMs is highly analogous to human implicit memory. However, higher-order cognitive functions necessary for AGI, such as long-term strategic planning, metacognition, and symbolic reasoning, heavily rely on hippocampal explicit memory and cannot arise solely from implicit statistical learning. Drawing on findings from neuroscience, I advance this perspective and complement it with computational requirements for artificial explicit memory systems, hoping to foster further research and lay the groundwork for explicit memory integration.

Recent studies in interpretability have explored the inner workings of transformer models trained on tasks across various domains, often discovering that these networks naturally develop highly structured representations. When such representations comprehensively reflect the task domain's structure, they are commonly referred to as "World Models" (WMs). In this work, we identify WMs in transformers trained on maze-solving tasks. By using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and analyzing attention patterns, we examine the construction of WMs and demonstrate consistency between SAE feature-based and circuit-based analyses. By subsequently intervening on isolated features to confirm their causal role, we find that it is easier to activate features than to suppress them. Furthermore, we find that models can reason about mazes involving more simultaneously active features than they encountered during training; however, when these same mazes (with greater numbers of connections) are provided to models via input tokens instead, the models fail. Finally, we demonstrate that positional encoding schemes appear to influence how World Models are structured within the model's residual stream.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

We develop information geometric techniques to understand the representations learned by deep networks when they are trained on different tasks using supervised, meta-, semi-supervised and contrastive learning. We shed light on the following phenomena that relate to the structure of the space of tasks: (1) the manifold of probabilistic models trained on different tasks using different representation learning methods is effectively low-dimensional; (2) supervised learning on one task results in a surprising amount of progress even on seemingly dissimilar tasks; progress on other tasks is larger if the training task has diverse classes; (3) the structure of the space of tasks indicated by our analysis is consistent with parts of the Wordnet phylogenetic tree; (4) episodic meta-learning algorithms and supervised learning traverse different trajectories during training but they fit similar models eventually; (5) contrastive and semi-supervised learning methods traverse trajectories similar to those of supervised learning. We use classification tasks constructed from the CIFAR-10 and Imagenet datasets to study these phenomena.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex decision-making and tool-use tasks, yet their ability to generalize across varying environments remains a under-examined concern. Current evaluation paradigms predominantly rely on trajectory-based metrics that measure task success, while failing to assess whether agents possess a grounded, transferable model of the environment. To address this gap, we propose Task-to-Quiz (T2Q), a deterministic and automated evaluation paradigm designed to decouple task execution from world-state understanding. We instantiate this paradigm in T2QBench, a suite comprising 30 environments and 1,967 grounded QA pairs across multiple difficulty levels. Our extensive experiments reveal that task success is often a poor proxy for environment understanding, and that current memory machanism can not effectively help agents acquire a grounded model of the environment. These findings identify proactive exploration and fine-grained state representation as primary bottlenecks, offering a robust foundation for developing more generalizable autonomous agents.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

The ability to achieve long-term goals is a key challenge in the current development of large language models (LLMs). To address this, pre-trained LLMs can be fine-tuned with reinforcement learning (RL) to explore solutions that optimize a given goal. However, exploration with LLMs is difficult, as a balance has to be struck between discovering new solutions and staying close enough to the pre-trained model, so as not to degrade basic capabilities. This is typically controlled with a Kullback-Leibler (KL) penalty. In this paper, we investigate the exploration dynamics of a small language model on a simple arithmetic task. We show how varying degrees of pre-training influence exploration and demonstrate the importance of "critical tokens" which have a dramatic impact on the final outcome. Consequently, we introduce a simple modification to the KL penalty that favors exploration on critical tokens, increasing the efficiency of the RL fine-tuning stage.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing tasks, yet they struggle with planning tasks requiring multi-step simulations. Inspired by human cognitive processes, this paper investigates the optimal planning power of language models that can construct a cognitive map of a given environment. Our experiments demonstrate that cognitive map significantly enhances the performance of both optimal and reachable planning generation ability in the Gridworld path planning task. We observe that our method showcases two key characteristics similar to human cognition: generalization of its planning ability to extrapolated environments and rapid adaptation with limited training data. We hope our findings in the Gridworld task provide insights into modeling human cognitive processes in language models, potentially leading to the development of more advanced and robust systems that better resemble human cognition.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Recent methods for embodied instruction following are typically trained end-to-end using imitation learning. This often requires the use of expert trajectories and low-level language instructions. Such approaches assume that neural states will integrate multimodal semantics to perform state tracking, building spatial memory, exploration, and long-term planning. In contrast, we propose a modular method with structured representations that (1) builds a semantic map of the scene and (2) performs exploration with a semantic search policy, to achieve the natural language goal. Our modular method achieves SOTA performance (24.46 %) with a substantial (8.17 % absolute) gap from previous work while using less data by eschewing both expert trajectories and low-level instructions. Leveraging low-level language, however, can further increase our performance (26.49 %). Our findings suggest that an explicit spatial memory and a semantic search policy can provide a stronger and more general representation for state-tracking and guidance, even in the absence of expert trajectories or low-level instructions.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

We study how different Chain-of-Thought (CoT) designs affect the acquisition of the generalizable visual reasoning ability in vision-language models (VLMs). While CoT data, especially long or visual CoT such as "think with image", has been widely used to supervise intermediate reasoning, it remains unclear why specific CoT designs help and which ones truly support generalizable reasoning. To systematically evaluate this, we focus on a controlled maze-solving benchmark where reasoning rules are fully visual, difficulty can be tuned by grid size, and all the intermediate steps can be automatically generated. Using Qwen2.5-VL-7B under a standard SFT-then-RL pipeline, we compare three representative CoT formats: Language CoT, Grounding CoT (with spatial coordinate trajectories), and Visual CoT (with image manipulations). Our experiments reveal that visual and longer CoT mainly accelerate convergence but do not lift the final performance ceiling; concise CoT containing only essential grounding steps outperforms longer traces; and, strikingly, CoT retaining only the minimal grounding results generalizes best across different maze sizes. We further validate these insights on other vision-centric tasks. These findings highlight a "short is long" effect and provide practical guidance for constructing more generalizable SFT datasets for visual reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Previous work has shown correlations between the hidden states of large language models and fMRI brain responses, on language tasks. These correlations have been taken as evidence of the representational similarity of these models and brain states. This study tests whether these previous results are robust to several possible concerns. Specifically this study shows: (i) that the previous results are still found after dimensionality reduction, and thus are not attributable to the curse of dimensionality; (ii) that previous results are confirmed when using new measures of similarity; (iii) that correlations between brain representations and those from models are specific to models trained on human language; and (iv) that the results are dependent on the presence of positional encoding in the models. These results confirm and strengthen the results of previous research and contribute to the debate on the biological plausibility and interpretability of state-of-the-art large language models.

Learning from human feedback has gained traction in fields like robotics and natural language processing in recent years. While prior works mostly rely on human feedback in the form of comparisons, language is a preferable modality that provides more informative insights into user preferences. In this work, we aim to incorporate comparative language feedback to iteratively improve robot trajectories and to learn reward functions that encode human preferences. To achieve this goal, we learn a shared latent space that integrates trajectory data and language feedback, and subsequently leverage the learned latent space to improve trajectories and learn human preferences. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate comparative language feedback into reward learning. Our simulation experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the learned latent space and the success of our learning algorithms. We also conduct human subject studies that show our reward learning algorithm achieves a 23.9% higher subjective score on average and is 11.3% more time-efficient compared to preference-based reward learning, underscoring the superior performance of our method. Our website is at https://liralab.usc.edu/comparative-language-feedback/

We present TACIT (Transformation-Aware Capturing of Implicit Thought), a diffusion-based transformer for interpretable visual reasoning. Unlike language-based reasoning systems, TACIT operates entirely in pixel space using rectified flow, enabling direct visualization of the reasoning process at each inference step. We demonstrate the approach on maze-solving, where the model learns to transform images of unsolved mazes into solutions. Key results on 1 million synthetic maze pairs include: - 192x reduction in training loss over 100 epochs - 22.7x improvement in L2 distance to ground truth - Only 10 Euler steps required (vs. 100-1000 for typical diffusion models) Quantitative analysis reveals a striking phase transition phenomenon: the solution remains invisible for 68% of the transformation (zero recall), then emerges abruptly at t=0.70 within just 2% of the process. Most remarkably, 100% of samples exhibit simultaneous emergence across all spatial regions, ruling out sequential path construction and providing evidence for holistic rather than algorithmic reasoning. This "eureka moment" pattern -- long incubation followed by sudden crystallization -- parallels insight phenomena in human cognition. The pixel-space design with noise-free flow matching provides a foundation for understanding how neural networks develop implicit reasoning strategies that operate below and before language.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Memory serves as the pivotal nexus bridging past and future, providing both humans and AI systems with invaluable concepts and experience to navigate complex tasks. Recent research on autonomous agents has increasingly focused on designing efficient memory workflows by drawing on cognitive neuroscience. However, constrained by interdisciplinary barriers, existing works struggle to assimilate the essence of human memory mechanisms. To bridge this gap, we systematically synthesizes interdisciplinary knowledge of memory, connecting insights from cognitive neuroscience with LLM-driven agents. Specifically, we first elucidate the definition and function of memory along a progressive trajectory from cognitive neuroscience through LLMs to agents. We then provide a comparative analysis of memory taxonomy, storage mechanisms, and the complete management lifecycle from both biological and artificial perspectives. Subsequently, we review the mainstream benchmarks for evaluating agent memory. Additionally, we explore memory security from dual perspectives of attack and defense. Finally, we envision future research directions, with a focus on multimodal memory systems and skill acquisition.

Causal language modeling using the Transformer architecture has yielded remarkable capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) over the last few years. However, the extent to which fundamental search and reasoning capabilities emerged within LLMs remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this work, we study if causal language modeling can learn a complex task such as solving Sudoku puzzles. To solve a Sudoku, the model is first required to search over all empty cells of the puzzle to decide on a cell to fill and then apply an appropriate strategy to fill the decided cell. Sometimes, the application of a strategy only results in thinning down the possible values in a cell rather than concluding the exact value of the cell. In such cases, multiple strategies are applied one after the other to fill a single cell. We observe that Transformer models trained on this synthetic task can indeed learn to solve Sudokus (our model solves 94.21% of the puzzles fully correctly) when trained on a logical sequence of steps taken by a solver. We find that training Transformers with the logical sequence of steps is necessary and without such training, they fail to learn Sudoku. We also extend our analysis to Zebra puzzles (known as Einstein puzzles) and show that the model solves 92.04 % of the puzzles fully correctly. In addition, we study the internal representations of the trained Transformer and find that through linear probing, we can decode information about the set of possible values in any given cell from them, pointing to the presence of a strong reasoning engine implicit in the Transformer weights.

Despite their stellar performance on a wide range of tasks, including in-context tasks only revealed during inference, vanilla transformers and variants trained for next-token predictions (a) do not learn an explicit world model of their environment which can be flexibly queried and (b) cannot be used for planning or navigation. In this paper, we consider partially observed environments (POEs), where an agent receives perceptually aliased observations as it navigates, which makes path planning hard. We introduce a transformer with (multiple) discrete bottleneck(s), TDB, whose latent codes learn a compressed representation of the history of observations and actions. After training a TDB to predict the future observation(s) given the history, we extract interpretable cognitive maps of the environment from its active bottleneck(s) indices. These maps are then paired with an external solver to solve (constrained) path planning problems. First, we show that a TDB trained on POEs (a) retains the near perfect predictive performance of a vanilla transformer or an LSTM while (b) solving shortest path problems exponentially faster. Second, a TDB extracts interpretable representations from text datasets, while reaching higher in-context accuracy than vanilla sequence models. Finally, in new POEs, a TDB (a) reaches near-perfect in-context accuracy, (b) learns accurate in-context cognitive maps (c) solves in-context path planning problems.

Language-guided human following is an important capability for embodied agents, but existing benchmarks typically assume that the target person is visible at the start of an episode. This setting simplifies the problem and overlooks a more realistic requirement: an agent often needs to first find a language-described target and then persistently follow that target in a dynamic environment. While recent work has started to study human search, existing settings are typically evaluated in task-specific scenarios and often rely on stronger prior knowledge of the environment. Moreover, they usually treat searching and following as separate tasks and still lack a unified benchmark for systematic evaluation. To address these limitations, we introduce the Unified Embodied Seeking and Following Benchmark (UESF-Bench), a large-scale and diverse benchmark for embodied human seeking and following. The benchmark requires agents to handle semantic-guided exploration, reliable behavior switching and recovery, and delayed identity grounding. To this end, we propose SeekFollow-VLA, a vision-language-action framework with a task-driven routing mechanism for latent phase inference and transition modeling between seeking and following. Experimental results show that SeekFollow-VLA achieves clear improvements over both single-head and dual-head baselines across single-person and multi-person environments, establishing a baseline for unified embodied seek-and-follow.

This paper surveys research in the rapidly growing field of enhancing large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL), a technique that enables LLMs to improve their performance by receiving feedback in the form of rewards based on the quality of their outputs, allowing them to generate more accurate, coherent, and contextually appropriate responses. In this work, we make a systematic review of the most up-to-date state of knowledge on RL-enhanced LLMs, attempting to consolidate and analyze the rapidly growing research in this field, helping researchers understand the current challenges and advancements. Specifically, we (1) detail the basics of RL; (2) introduce popular RL-enhanced LLMs; (3) review researches on two widely-used reward model-based RL techniques: Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF); and (4) explore Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), a set of methods that bypass the reward model to directly use human preference data for aligning LLM outputs with human expectations. We will also point out current challenges and deficiencies of existing methods and suggest some avenues for further improvements. Project page of this work can be found at: https://github.com/ShuheWang1998/Reinforcement-Learning-Enhanced-LLMs-A-Survey.

Current AI systems achieve impressive performance on many tasks, yet they lack core attributes of biological intelligence, including rapid, continual learning, representations grounded in sensorimotor interactions, and structured knowledge that enables efficient generalization. Neuroscience theory suggests that mammals evolved flexible intelligence through the replication of a semi-independent, sensorimotor module, a functional unit known as a cortical column. To address the disparity between biological and artificial intelligence, thousand-brains systems were proposed as a means of mirroring the architecture of cortical columns and their interactions. In the current work, we evaluate the unique properties of Monty, the first implementation of a thousand-brains system. We focus on 3D object perception, and in particular, the combined task of object recognition and pose estimation. Utilizing the YCB dataset of household objects, we first assess Monty's use of sensorimotor learning to build structured representations, finding that these enable robust generalization. These representations include an emphasis on classifying objects by their global shape, as well as a natural ability to detect object symmetries. We then explore Monty's use of model-free and model-based policies to enable rapid inference by supporting principled movements. We find that such policies complement Monty's modular architecture, a design that can accommodate communication between modules to further accelerate inference speed via a novel `voting' algorithm. Finally, we examine Monty's use of associative, Hebbian-like binding to enable rapid, continual, and computationally efficient learning, properties that compare favorably to current deep learning architectures. While Monty is still in a nascent stage of development, these findings support thousand-brains systems as a powerful and promising new approach to AI.

Most existing spatial reasoning benchmarks focus on static or globally observable environments, failing to capture the challenges of long-horizon reasoning and memory utilization under partial observability and dynamic changes. We introduce two dynamic spatial benchmarks, locally observable maze navigation and match-2 elimination that systematically evaluate models' abilities in spatial understanding and adaptive planning when local perception, environment feedback, and global objectives are tightly coupled. Each action triggers structural changes in the environment, requiring continuous update of cognition and strategy. We further propose a subjective experience-based memory mechanism for cross-task experience transfer and validation. Experiments show that our benchmarks reveal key limitations of mainstream models in dynamic spatial reasoning and long-term memory, providing a comprehensive platform for future methodological advances. Our code and data are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/EvoEmpirBench-143C/.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

Visual-Interleaved Chain-of-Thought (VI-CoT) enables MLLMs to continually update their understanding and decisions based on step-wise intermediate visual states (IVS), much like a human would, which demonstrates impressive success in various tasks, thereby leading to emerged advancements in related benchmarks. Despite promising progress, current benchmarks provide models with relatively fixed IVS, rather than free-style IVS, whch might forcibly distort the original thinking trajectories, failing to evaluate their intrinsic reasoning capabilities. More importantly, existing benchmarks neglect to systematically explore the impact factors that IVS would impart to untamed reasoning performance. To tackle above gaps, we introduce a specialized benchmark termed ViC-Bench, consisting of four representive tasks: maze navigation, jigsaw puzzle, embodied long-horizon planning, and complex counting, where each task has dedicated free-style IVS generation pipeline supporting function calls. To systematically examine VI-CoT capability, we propose a thorough evaluation suite incorporating a progressive three-stage strategy with targeted new metrics. Besides, we establish Incremental Prompting Information Injection (IPII) strategy to ablatively explore the prompting factors for VI-CoT. We extensively conduct evaluations for 18 advanced MLLMs, revealing key insights into their VI-CoT capability. Our proposed benchmark is publicly open at Huggingface.

We investigate the extent to which contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) can engage in exploration, a core capability in reinforcement learning and decision making. We focus on native performance of existing LLMs, without training interventions. We deploy LLMs as agents in simple multi-armed bandit environments, specifying the environment description and interaction history entirely in-context, i.e., within the LLM prompt. We experiment with GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama2, using a variety of prompt designs, and find that the models do not robustly engage in exploration without substantial interventions: i) Across all of our experiments, only one configuration resulted in satisfactory exploratory behavior: GPT-4 with chain-of-thought reasoning and an externally summarized interaction history, presented as sufficient statistics; ii) All other configurations did not result in robust exploratory behavior, including those with chain-of-thought reasoning but unsummarized history. Although these findings can be interpreted positively, they suggest that external summarization -- which may not be possible in more complex settings -- is important for obtaining desirable behavior from LLM agents. We conclude that non-trivial algorithmic interventions, such as fine-tuning or dataset curation, may be required to empower LLM-based decision making agents in complex settings.

Existing Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown the potential of reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance the complex reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models~(LLMs). While they achieve remarkable performance on challenging tasks such as mathematics and coding, they often rely on their internal knowledge to solve problems, which can be inadequate for time-sensitive or knowledge-intensive questions, leading to inaccuracies and hallucinations. To address this, we propose R1-Searcher, a novel two-stage outcome-based RL approach designed to enhance the search capabilities of LLMs. This method allows LLMs to autonomously invoke external search systems to access additional knowledge during the reasoning process. Our framework relies exclusively on RL, without requiring process rewards or distillation for a cold start. % effectively generalizing to out-of-domain datasets and supporting both Base and Instruct models. Our experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous strong RAG methods, even when compared to the closed-source GPT-4o-mini.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

The exploration of whether agents can align with their environment without relying on human-labeled data presents an intriguing research topic. Drawing inspiration from the alignment process observed in intelligent organisms, where declarative memory plays a pivotal role in summarizing past experiences, we propose a novel learning framework. The agents adeptly distill insights from past experiences, refining and updating existing notes to enhance their performance in the environment. This entire process transpires within the memory components and is implemented through natural language, so we character this framework as In-memory Learning. We also delve into the key features of benchmarks designed to evaluate the self-improvement process. Through systematic experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide insights into this problem.

When reading, we often have specific information that interests us in a text. For example, you might be reading this paper because you are curious about LLMs for eye movements in reading, the experimental design, or perhaps you only care about the question ``but does it work?''. More broadly, in daily life, people approach texts with any number of text-specific goals that guide their reading behavior. In this work, we ask, for the first time, whether open-ended reading goals can be automatically decoded from eye movements in reading. To address this question, we introduce goal classification and goal reconstruction tasks and evaluation frameworks, and use large-scale eye tracking for reading data in English with hundreds of text-specific information seeking tasks. We develop and compare several discriminative and generative multimodal LLMs that combine eye movements and text for goal classification and goal reconstruction. Our experiments show considerable success on both tasks, suggesting that LLMs can extract valuable information about the readers' text-specific goals from eye movements.

Video diffusion models exhibit emergent reasoning capabilities like solving mazes and puzzles, yet little is understood about how they reason during generation. We take a first step towards understanding this and study the internal planning dynamics of video models using 2D maze solving as a controlled testbed. Our investigations reveal two findings. Our first finding is early plan commitment: video diffusion models commit to a high-level motion plan within the first few denoising steps, after which further denoising alters visual details but not the underlying trajectory. Our second finding is that path length, not obstacle density, is the dominant predictor of maze difficulty, with a sharp failure threshold at 12 steps. This means video models can only reason over long mazes by chaining together multiple sequential generations. To demonstrate the practical benefits of our findings, we introduce Chaining with Early Planning, or ChEaP, which only spends compute on seeds with promising early plans and chains them together to tackle complex mazes. This improves accuracy from 7% to 67% on long-horizon mazes and by 2.5x overall on hard tasks in Frozen Lake and VR-Bench across Wan2.2-14B and HunyuanVideo-1.5. Our analysis reveals that current video models possess deeper reasoning capabilities than previously recognized, which can be elicited more reliably with better inference-time scaling.

The last decade has seen a significant increase of interest in deep learning research, with many public successes that have demonstrated its potential. As such, these systems are now being incorporated into commercial products. With this comes an additional challenge: how can we build AI systems that solve tasks where there is not a crisp, well-defined specification? While multiple solutions have been proposed, in this competition we focus on one in particular: learning from human feedback. Rather than training AI systems using a predefined reward function or using a labeled dataset with a predefined set of categories, we instead train the AI system using a learning signal derived from some form of human feedback, which can evolve over time as the understanding of the task changes, or as the capabilities of the AI system improve. The MineRL BASALT competition aims to spur forward research on this important class of techniques. We design a suite of four tasks in Minecraft for which we expect it will be hard to write down hardcoded reward functions. These tasks are defined by a paragraph of natural language: for example, "create a waterfall and take a scenic picture of it", with additional clarifying details. Participants must train a separate agent for each task, using any method they want. Agents are then evaluated by humans who have read the task description. To help participants get started, we provide a dataset of human demonstrations on each of the four tasks, as well as an imitation learning baseline that leverages these demonstrations. Our hope is that this competition will improve our ability to build AI systems that do what their designers intend them to do, even when the intent cannot be easily formalized. Besides allowing AI to solve more tasks, this can also enable more effective regulation of AI systems, as well as making progress on the value alignment problem.

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of skills and directed exploration emerging from a simple RL algorithm long before any successful trials are observed. For example, in a manipulation task, the agent is given a single observation of the goal state and learns skills, first for moving its end-effector, then for pushing the block, and finally for picking up and placing the block. These skills emerge before the agent has ever successfully placed the block at the goal location and without the aid of any reward functions, demonstrations, or manually-specified distance metrics. Once the agent has learned to reach the goal state reliably, exploration is reduced. Implementing our method involves a simple modification of prior work and does not require density estimates, ensembles, or any additional hyperparameters. Intuitively, the proposed method seems like it should be terrible at exploration, and we lack a clear theoretical understanding of why it works so effectively, though our experiments provide some hints.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

We investigate the potential of large language models (LLMs) to serve as efficient simulators for agentic search tasks in reinforcement learning (RL), thereby reducing dependence on costly interactions with external search engines. To this end, we first quantify the intrinsic search capability of LLMs via structured prompting and repeated sampling, which we term Self-Search. Our results reveal that LLMs exhibit strong scaling behavior with respect to the inference budget, achieving high pass@k on question-answering benchmarks, including the challenging BrowseComp task. Building on these observations, we introduce Self-Search RL (SSRL), which enhances LLMs' Self-Search capability through format-based and rule-based rewards. SSRL enables models to iteratively refine their knowledge utilization internally, without requiring access to external tools. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SSRL-trained policy models provide a cost-effective and stable environment for search-driven RL training, reducing reliance on external search engines and facilitating robust sim-to-real transfer. We draw the following conclusions: 1) LLMs possess world knowledge that can be effectively elicited to achieve high performance; 2) SSRL demonstrates the potential of leveraging internal knowledge to reduce hallucination; 3) SSRL-trained models integrate seamlessly with external search engines without additional effort. Our findings highlight the potential of LLMs to support more scalable RL agent training.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Recent studies show that LLM hidden states encode reward-related information, such as answer correctness and model confidence. However, existing approaches typically fit black-box probes on the full hidden states, offering little insight into how this information is structured across neurons. In this paper, we show that reward-related information is concentrated in a sparse subset of neurons. Using simple probing, we identify two types of neurons: value neurons, whose activations predict state value, and dopamine neurons, whose activations encode step-level temporal difference (TD) errors. Together, these neurons form a sparse reward subsystem within LLM hidden states. These names are drawn by analogy with neuroscience, where value neurons and dopamine neurons in the biological reward subsystem also encode value and reward prediction errors, respectively. We demonstrate that value neurons are robust and transferable across diverse datasets and models, and provide causal evidence that they encode reward-related information. Finally, we show applications of the reward subsystem: value neurons serve as effective predictors of model confidence, and dopamine neurons can function as a process reward model (PRM) to guide inference-time search.

We propose NEURONA, a neuro-symbolic framework for fMRI decoding and concept grounding in neural activity. Leveraging image- and video-based fMRI question-answering datasets, NEURONA learns to decode interacting concepts from visual stimuli based on patterns of fMRI responses, integrating symbolic reasoning and compositional execution with fMRI grounding across brain regions. We demonstrate that incorporating structural priors (e.g., compositional predicate-argument dependencies between concepts) into the decoding process significantly improves both decoding accuracy over precise queries, and notably, generalization to unseen queries at test time. With NEURONA, we highlight neuro-symbolic frameworks as promising tools for understanding neural activity.

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.

We investigate the extent to which an LLM's hidden-state geometry can be recovered from its behavior in psycholinguistic experiments. Across eight instruction-tuned transformer models, we run two experimental paradigms -- similarity-based forced choice and free association -- over a shared 5,000-word vocabulary, collecting 17.5M+ trials to build behavior-based similarity matrices. Using representational similarity analysis, we compare behavioral geometries to layerwise hidden-state similarity and benchmark against FastText, BERT, and cross-model consensus. We find that forced-choice behavior aligns substantially more with hidden-state geometry than free association. In a held-out-words regression, behavioral similarity (especially forced choice) predicts unseen hidden-state similarities beyond lexical baselines and cross-model consensus, indicating that behavior-only measurements retain recoverable information about internal semantic geometry. Finally, we discuss implications for the ability of behavioral tasks to uncover hidden cognitive states.

Memory is the process of encoding, storing, and retrieving information, allowing humans to retain experiences, knowledge, skills, and facts over time, and serving as the foundation for growth and effective interaction with the world. It plays a crucial role in shaping our identity, making decisions, learning from past experiences, building relationships, and adapting to changes. In the era of large language models (LLMs), memory refers to the ability of an AI system to retain, recall, and use information from past interactions to improve future responses and interactions. Although previous research and reviews have provided detailed descriptions of memory mechanisms, there is still a lack of a systematic review that summarizes and analyzes the relationship between the memory of LLM-driven AI systems and human memory, as well as how we can be inspired by human memory to construct more powerful memory systems. To achieve this, in this paper, we propose a comprehensive survey on the memory of LLM-driven AI systems. In particular, we first conduct a detailed analysis of the categories of human memory and relate them to the memory of AI systems. Second, we systematically organize existing memory-related work and propose a categorization method based on three dimensions (object, form, and time) and eight quadrants. Finally, we illustrate some open problems regarding the memory of current AI systems and outline possible future directions for memory in the era of large language models.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

Recent advances in fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) have shown promising improvements in complex reasoning tasks, particularly when paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. However, these successes have been largely demonstrated on large-scale models with billions of parameters, where a strong pretraining foundation ensures effective initial exploration. In contrast, RL remains challenging for tiny LLMs with 1 billion parameters or fewer because they lack the necessary pretraining strength to explore effectively, often leading to suboptimal reasoning patterns. This work introduces a novel intrinsic motivation approach that leverages episodic memory to address this challenge, improving tiny LLMs in CoT reasoning tasks. Inspired by human memory-driven learning, our method leverages successful reasoning patterns stored in memory while allowing for controlled exploration to generate novel responses. Intrinsic rewards are computed efficiently using a kNN-based episodic memory, allowing the model to discover new reasoning strategies while quickly adapting to effective past solutions. Experiments on fine-tuning GSM8K and AI-MO datasets demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances smaller LLMs' sample efficiency and generalization capability, making RL-based reasoning improvements more accessible in low-resource settings.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Contemporary GUI agents, while increasingly capable due to advances in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), often operate with a critical limitation: they treat each task in isolation, lacking a mechanism to systematically learn from past successes. This digital ''amnesia'' results in sub-optimal performance, repeated errors, and poor generalization to novel challenges. To bridge this gap, we introduce EchoTrail-GUI, a novel framework designed to mimic human-like experiential learning by equipping agents with a dynamic, accessible memory. Our framework operates in three distinct stages. First, during Experience Exploration, an agent autonomously interacts with GUI environments to build a curated database of successful task trajectories, validated by a reward model. Crucially, the entire knowledge base construction is thus fully automated, requiring no human supervision. Second, in the Memory Injection stage, upon receiving a new task, our system efficiently retrieves the most relevant past trajectories to serve as actionable ''memories''. Finally, during GUI Task Inference, these memories are injected as in-context guidance to inform the agent's reasoning and decision-making process. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on benchmarks including Android World and AndroidLab. The results show that EchoTrail-GUI significantly improves the task success rate and operational efficiency of baseline agents, validating the power of structured memory in creating more robust and intelligent GUI automation.

Transformer architectures have revolutionized artificial intelligence (AI) through their attention mechanisms, yet the computational principles underlying their success remain opaque. We present a novel theoretical framework that reinterprets the core computation of attention as Pavlovian conditioning. Our model finds a direct mathematical analogue in linear attention, which simplifies the analysis of the underlying associative process. We demonstrate that attention's queries, keys, and values can be mapped to the three elements of classical conditioning: test stimuli that probe associations, conditional stimuli (CS) that serve as retrieval cues, and unconditional stimuli (US) that contain response information. Through this lens, we suggest that each attention operation constructs a transient associative memory via a Hebbian rule, where CS-US pairs form dynamic associations that test stimuli can later retrieve. Our framework yields several theoretical insights grounded in this linearized model: (1) a capacity theorem showing that attention heads can store O(d_k) associations before interference degrades retrieval; (2) an error propagation analysis revealing fundamental architectural trade-offs of balancing model depth, width, and head redundancy to maintain reliability; and (3) an understanding of how biologically plausible learning rules could enhance transformer architectures. By establishing this deep connection, we suggest that the success of modern AI may stem not from architectural novelty alone, but from implementing computational principles that biology optimized over millions of years of evolution.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

In this paper, I introduce the retrieval problem, a simple reasoning task that can be solved only by transformers with a minimum number of layers. The task has an adjustable difficulty that can further increase the required number of layers to any arbitrary value. I demonstrate that large language models can solve the task under different prompting formulations without any fine-tuning. To understand how transformers solve the retrieval problem, I train several transformers on a minimal formulation. I find that successful learning occurs only under the presence of an implicit curriculum. I uncover the learned mechanisms by studying the attention maps in the trained transformers. I also study the training process, uncovering that attention heads always emerge in a specific sequence.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

The academic field of learning instruction-guided visual navigation can be generally categorized into high-level category-specific search and low-level language-guided navigation, depending on the granularity of language instruction, in which the former emphasizes the exploration process, while the latter concentrates on following detailed textual commands. Despite the differing focuses of these tasks, the underlying requirements of interpreting instructions, comprehending the surroundings, and inferring action decisions remain consistent. This paper consolidates diverse navigation tasks into a unified and generic framework -- we investigate the core difficulties of sharing general knowledge and exploiting task-specific capabilities in learning navigation and propose a novel State-Adaptive Mixture of Experts (SAME) model that effectively enables an agent to infer decisions based on different-granularity language and dynamic observations. Powered by SAME, we present a versatile agent capable of addressing seven navigation tasks simultaneously that outperforms or achieves highly comparable performance to task-specific agents.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

We introduce "Method Actors" as a mental model for guiding LLM prompt engineering and prompt architecture. Under this mental model, LLMs should be thought of as actors; prompts as scripts and cues; and LLM responses as performances. We apply this mental model to the task of improving LLM performance at playing Connections, a New York Times word puzzle game that prior research identified as a challenging benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning. Our experiments with GPT-4o show that a "Method Actors" approach can significantly improve LLM performance over both a vanilla and "Chain of Thoughts" approach. A vanilla approach solves 27% of Connections puzzles in our dataset and a "Chain of Thoughts" approach solves 41% of puzzles, whereas our strongest "Method Actor" approach solves 86% of puzzles. We also test OpenAI's newest model designed specifically for complex reasoning tasks, o1-preview. When asked to solve a puzzle all at once, o1-preview solves 79% of Connections puzzles in our dataset, and when allowed to build puzzle solutions one guess at a time over multiple API calls, o1-preview solves 100% of the puzzles. Incorporating a "Method Actor" prompt architecture increases the percentage of puzzles that o1-preview solves perfectly from 76% to 87%.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of Llama-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context prior taking over in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Working memory (WM), a fundamental cognitive process facilitating the temporary storage, integration, manipulation, and retrieval of information, plays a vital role in reasoning and decision-making tasks. Robust benchmark datasets that capture the multifaceted nature of WM are crucial for the effective development and evaluation of AI WM models. Here, we introduce a comprehensive Working Memory (WorM) benchmark dataset for this purpose. WorM comprises 10 tasks and a total of 1 million trials, assessing 4 functionalities, 3 domains, and 11 behavioral and neural characteristics of WM. We jointly trained and tested state-of-the-art recurrent neural networks and transformers on all these tasks. We also include human behavioral benchmarks as an upper bound for comparison. Our results suggest that AI models replicate some characteristics of WM in the brain, most notably primacy and recency effects, and neural clusters and correlates specialized for different domains and functionalities of WM. In the experiments, we also reveal some limitations in existing models to approximate human behavior. This dataset serves as a valuable resource for communities in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and AI, offering a standardized framework to compare and enhance WM models, investigate WM's neural underpinnings, and develop WM models with human-like capabilities. Our source code and data are available at https://github.com/ZhangLab-DeepNeuroCogLab/WorM.

Understanding how machine learning models respond to distributional shifts is a key research challenge. Mazes serve as an excellent testbed due to varied generation algorithms offering a nuanced platform to simulate both subtle and pronounced distributional shifts. To enable systematic investigations of model behavior on out-of-distribution data, we present maze-dataset, a comprehensive library for generating, processing, and visualizing datasets consisting of maze-solving tasks. With this library, researchers can easily create datasets, having extensive control over the generation algorithm used, the parameters fed to the algorithm of choice, and the filters that generated mazes must satisfy. Furthermore, it supports multiple output formats, including rasterized and text-based, catering to convolutional neural networks and autoregressive transformer models. These formats, along with tools for visualizing and converting between them, ensure versatility and adaptability in research applications.

Building agents with large language models (LLMs) for computer control is a burgeoning research area, where the agent receives computer states and performs actions to complete complex tasks. Previous computer agents have demonstrated the benefits of in-context learning (ICL); however, their performance is hindered by several issues. First, the limited context length of LLMs and complex computer states restrict the number of exemplars, as a single webpage can consume the entire context. Second, the exemplars in current methods, such as high-level plans and multi-choice questions, cannot represent complete trajectories, leading to suboptimal performance in long-horizon tasks. Third, existing computer agents rely on task-specific exemplars and overlook the similarity among tasks, resulting in poor generalization to novel tasks. To address these challenges, we introduce Synapse, a computer agent featuring three key components: i) state abstraction, which filters out task-irrelevant information from raw states, allowing more exemplars within the limited context, ii) trajectory-as-exemplar prompting, which prompts the LLM with complete trajectories of the abstracted states and actions to improve multi-step decision-making, and iii) exemplar memory, which stores the embeddings of exemplars and retrieves them via similarity search for generalization to novel tasks. We evaluate Synapse on MiniWoB++, a standard task suite, and Mind2Web, a real-world website benchmark. In MiniWoB++, Synapse achieves a 99.2% average success rate (a 10% relative improvement) across 64 tasks using demonstrations from only 48 tasks. Notably, Synapse is the first ICL method to solve the book-flight task in MiniWoB++. Synapse also exhibits a 56% relative improvement in average step success rate over the previous state-of-the-art prompting scheme in Mind2Web.

We explore how iterative revising a chain of thoughts with the help of information retrieval significantly improves large language models' reasoning and generation ability in long-horizon generation tasks, while hugely mitigating hallucination. In particular, the proposed method -- *retrieval-augmented thoughts* (RAT) -- revises each thought step one by one with retrieved information relevant to the task query, the current and the past thought steps, after the initial zero-shot CoT is generated. Applying RAT to GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and CodeLLaMA-7b substantially improves their performances on various long-horizon generation tasks; on average of relatively increasing rating scores by 13.63% on code generation, 16.96% on mathematical reasoning, 19.2% on creative writing, and 42.78% on embodied task planning. The demo page can be found at https://craftjarvis.github.io/RAT

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

This short note is written for rapid communication of long context training and to share the idea of how to train it with low memory usage. In the note, we generalize the attention algorithm and neural network of Generative Pre-Trained Transformers and reinterpret it in Path integral formalism. First, the role of the transformer is understood as the time evolution of the token state and second, it is suggested that the all key-token states in the same time as the query-token can attend to the attention with the query token states. As a result of the repetitive time evolution, it is discussed that the token states in the past sequence meats the token states in the present sequence so that the attention between separated sequences becomes possible for maintaining infinite contextual information just by using low memory for limited size of sequence. For the experiment, the 12 input token window size was taken and one GPU with 24GB memory was used for the pre-training. It was confirmed that more than 150 length context is preserved. The sampling result of the training, the code and the other details will be included in the revised version of this note later.

With the rapid development of Large Vision Language Models, the focus of Graphical User Interface (GUI) agent tasks shifts from single-screen tasks to complex screen navigation challenges. However, real-world GUI environments, such as PC software and mobile Apps, are often complex and proprietary, making it difficult to obtain the comprehensive environment information needed for agent training and evaluation. This limitation hinders systematic investigation and benchmarking of agent navigation capabilities. To address this limitation, we introduce GUI Exploration Lab, a simulation environment engine for GUI agent navigation research that enables flexible definition and composition of screens, icons, and navigation graphs, while providing full access to environment information for comprehensive agent training and evaluation. Through extensive experiments, we find that supervised fine-tuning enables effective memorization of fundamental knowledge, serving as a crucial foundation for subsequent training. Building on this, single-turn reinforcement learning further enhances generalization to unseen scenarios. Finally, multi-turn reinforcement learning encourages the development of exploration strategies through interactive trial and error, leading to further improvements in screen navigation performance. We validate our methods on both static and interactive benchmarks, demonstrating that our findings generalize effectively to real-world scenarios. These findings demonstrate the advantages of reinforcement learning approaches in GUI navigation and offer practical guidance for building more capable and generalizable GUI agents.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have outperformed human experts in predicting the results of neuroscience experiments (Luo et al., 2024). What is the basis for this performance? One possibility is that statistical patterns in that specific scientific literature, as opposed to emergent reasoning abilities arising from broader training, underlie LLMs' performance. To evaluate this possibility, we trained (next word prediction) a relatively small 124M-parameter GPT-2 model on 1.3 billion tokens of domain-specific knowledge. Despite being orders of magnitude smaller than larger LLMs trained on trillions of tokens, small models achieved expert-level performance in predicting neuroscience results. Small models trained on the neuroscience literature succeeded when they were trained from scratch using a tokenizer specifically trained on neuroscience text or when the neuroscience literature was used to finetune a pretrained GPT-2. Our results indicate that expert-level performance may be attained by even small LLMs through domain-specific, auto-regressive training approaches.

Over the past year, the development of large language models (LLMs) has brought spatial intelligence into focus, with much attention on vision-based embodied intelligence. However, spatial intelligence spans a broader range of disciplines and scales, from navigation and urban planning to remote sensing and earth science. What are the differences and connections between spatial intelligence across these fields? In this paper, we first review human spatial cognition and its implications for spatial intelligence in LLMs. We then examine spatial memory, knowledge representations, and abstract reasoning in LLMs, highlighting their roles and connections. Finally, we analyze spatial intelligence across scales -- from embodied to urban and global levels -- following a framework that progresses from spatial memory and understanding to spatial reasoning and intelligence. Through this survey, we aim to provide insights into interdisciplinary spatial intelligence research and inspire future studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities across various domains, with recent advancements in challenging reasoning tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, solving reasoning tasks often requires long decoding chains (of thoughts), which incur O(N) time and memory consumption, where N is the chain length. To mitigate O(N) time and memory consumption, existing sparsity-based algorithms propose retaining only the most critical token's intermediate data (i.e., key-value cache) and discarding the rest. However, these existing algorithms struggle with the ``impossible trinity'' of accuracy, time, and memory. For example, the state-of-the-art algorithm, Quest, achieves high accuracy with O(L) time but O(N) memory (L is the cache budget, L ll N). To address this issue, in this paper, we identify a new attention pattern during the decode stage of reasoning tasks, where milestone tokens (analogous to lemmas in mathematical proofs) emerge, are utilized, and then become unimportant afterward. Based on this pattern, we propose a new algorithm named RaaS that identifies and retains milestone tokens only until they are no longer needed, achieving high accuracy with O(L) time and O(L) memory complexity.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities on not just language tasks, but also various tasks that are not linguistic in nature, such as logical reasoning and social inference. In the human brain, neuroscience has identified a core language system that selectively and causally supports language processing. We here ask whether similar specialization for language emerges in LLMs. We identify language-selective units within 18 popular LLMs, using the same localization approach that is used in neuroscience. We then establish the causal role of these units by demonstrating that ablating LLM language-selective units -- but not random units -- leads to drastic deficits in language tasks. Correspondingly, language-selective LLM units are more aligned to brain recordings from the human language system than random units. Finally, we investigate whether our localization method extends to other cognitive domains: while we find specialized networks in some LLMs for reasoning and social capabilities, there are substantial differences among models. These findings provide functional and causal evidence for specialization in large language models, and highlight parallels with the functional organization in the brain.

Artificial intelligence has made great strides in the last decade but still falls short of the human brain, the best-known example of intelligence. Not much is known of the neural processes that allow the brain to make the leap to achieve so much from so little beyond its ability to create knowledge structures that can be flexibly and dynamically combined, recombined, and applied in new and novel ways. This paper proposes a mathematical approach using graph theory and spectral graph theory, to hypothesize how to constrain these neural clusters of information based on eigen-relationships. This same hypothesis is hierarchically applied to scale up from the smallest to the largest clusters of knowledge that eventually lead to model building and reasoning.

We describe a robotic learning system for autonomous exploration and navigation in diverse, open-world environments. At the core of our method is a learned latent variable model of distances and actions, along with a non-parametric topological memory of images. We use an information bottleneck to regularize the learned policy, giving us (i) a compact visual representation of goals, (ii) improved generalization capabilities, and (iii) a mechanism for sampling feasible goals for exploration. Trained on a large offline dataset of prior experience, the model acquires a representation of visual goals that is robust to task-irrelevant distractors. We demonstrate our method on a mobile ground robot in open-world exploration scenarios. Given an image of a goal that is up to 80 meters away, our method leverages its representation to explore and discover the goal in under 20 minutes, even amidst previously-unseen obstacles and weather conditions. Please check out the project website for videos of our experiments and information about the real-world dataset used at https://sites.google.com/view/recon-robot.