Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019, originating as Soph.io (2020), advanced as iKuhn (2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch in 2025.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems have emerged as powerful architectures for complex task decomposition and collaborative problem-solving. However, their long-term behavioral stability remains largely unexamined. This study introduces the concept of agent drift, defined as the progressive degradation of agent behavior, decision quality, and inter-agent coherence over extended interaction sequences. We present a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding drift phenomena, proposing three distinct manifestations: semantic drift (progressive deviation from original intent), coordination drift (breakdown in multi-agent consensus mechanisms), and behavioral drift (emergence of unintended strategies). We introduce the Agent Stability Index (ASI), a novel composite metric framework for quantifying drift across twelve dimensions, including response consistency, tool usage patterns, reasoning pathway stability, and inter-agent agreement rates. Through simulation-based analysis and theoretical modeling, we demonstrate how unchecked agent drift can lead to substantial reductions in task completion accuracy and increased human intervention requirements. We propose three mitigation strategies: episodic memory consolidation, drift-aware routing protocols, and adaptive behavioral anchoring. Theoretical analysis suggests these approaches can significantly reduce drift-related errors while maintaining system throughput. This work establishes a foundational methodology for monitoring, measuring, and mitigating agent drift in production agentic AI systems, with direct implications for enterprise deployment reliability and AI safety research.

Longitudinal modelling of Alzheimer's disease progression is clinically useful only if it can describe not just the most likely next diagnosis, but how a patient may evolve over time and how reliable that forecast is. Most deep learning approaches reduce this problem to single-step classification, treating cognitively normal, mild cognitive impairment, and dementia as flat categories while providing limited insight into how uncertainty accumulates across future visits. We propose a probabilistic framework that combines ordinal diagnosis prediction, multi-horizon trajectory generation, and decomposed uncertainty estimation. A Temporal Fusion Transformer encoder is adapted with a CORAL ordinal output layer, asymmetric loss weighting, and converter oversampling to respect disease-stage ordering and improve sensitivity to MCI-to-dementia transitions. Conditioned on the learned patient-context representation, an autoregressive Mixture Density Network generates five-year probabilistic trajectories for diagnosis state, CDR Sum of Boxes, MMSE orientation, and hippocampal volume. On ADNI, the model outperforms linear, recurrent, and transformer baselines for next-visit diagnosis prediction, with the strongest gains on MCI-versus-dementia discrimination. Generated trajectories achieve near-nominal 90% credible interval coverage, widening uncertainty across the forecast horizon, and biomarker dynamics consistent with expected Alzheimer's disease progression. We further separate aleatoric from epistemic uncertainty using analytic mixture variance and a five-member bootstrap ensemble, which provides the strongest encoder diversity and output-level epistemic signal. Epistemic uncertainty is higher for rare progression archetypes, MCI and dementia patients, and under external evaluation on OASIS-3, where it increases alongside prediction error.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

Hybrid reasoning systems that combine learned components with model-based inference are increasingly deployed in tool-augmented decision loops, yet their runtime behavior under partial observability and sustained evidence mismatch remains poorly understood. In practice, failures often arise as gradual divergence of internal reasoning dynamics rather than as isolated prediction errors. This work studies runtime stability in hybrid reasoning systems from a Kalman-inspired perspective. We model reasoning as a stochastic inference process driven by an internal innovation signal and introduce cognitive drift as a measurable runtime phenomenon. Stability is defined in terms of detectability, bounded divergence, and recoverability rather than task-level correctness. We propose a runtime stability framework that monitors innovation statistics, detects emerging instability, and triggers recovery-aware control mechanisms. Experiments on multi-step, tool-augmented reasoning tasks demonstrate reliable instability detection prior to task failure and show that recovery, when feasible, re-establishes bounded internal behavior within finite time. These results emphasize runtime stability as a system-level requirement for reliable reasoning under uncertainty.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are converging towards a singular Artificial Hivemind, where shared Nature (pre-training priors) result in a profound collapse of distributional diversity, limiting the distinct perspectives necessary for creative exploration and scientific discovery. To address this, we propose to equip models with inference-time Nurture (individualized epistemic trajectories) using Epistemic Evolution paradigm, progressing through explore, internalize, and express. We instantiate this via PRISM (Pluralistic Reasoning via In-context Structure Modeling), a model-agnostic system that augments LLM with dynamic On-the-fly Epistemic Graphs. On three creativity benchmarks, PRISM achieves state-of-the-art novelty and significantly expands distributional diversity. Moreover, we evaluate the real-world utility via a challenging rare-disease diagnosis benchmark. Results demonstrate that PRISM successfully uncovers correct long-tail diagnoses that standard LLM miss, confirming that its divergence stems from meaningful exploration rather than incoherent noise. Overall, this work establishes a new paradigm for Pluralistic AI, moving beyond monolithic consensus toward a diverse ecosystem of unique cognitive individuals capable of collective, multi-perspective discovery.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Enabling large language models to achieve stable self-improvement without external expert supervision remains a central challenge in complex reasoning tasks. Existing self-distillation and reinforcement learning methods lack explicit mechanisms for tracking problem-level learning progress and adapting optimization strategies accordingly. Consequently, training may over-optimize easy problems, receive weak supervision from hard problems, and fail to sufficiently explore borderline cases. To resolve these issues, we propose DRIFT, an online self-evolution policy optimization framework for large language models. DRIFT regulates the model's self-improvement process through the joint use of Difficulty Routing and Rhythm Gating. The former identifies the model's learning state at the problem level and dynamically allocates self-distillation and reinforcement learning signals, while the latter refines policy updates at the token level, concentrating exploration on critical reasoning positions. By further incorporating a success buffer and a two-stage curriculum learning strategy, DRIFT preserves high-quality historical experience while progressively guiding the model from reliable behavior acquisition toward stable policy evolution. Evaluated across five benchmarks and three model scales, DRIFT surpasses the peak performance of both GRPO and SDPO across all evaluated metrics. On the average score over the five benchmarks, DRIFT achieves 79.5%, outperforming GRPO by 9.5% and SDPO by 7.5%, establishing a new state-of-the-art result. Notably, on ToolUse, DRIFT reaches an accuracy of 79.2%, improving over GRPO by 13.5% and SDPO by 10.7%, setting a new state-of-the-art and substantially outperforming all concurrent methods.

AI systems can now cheaply generate plausible scientific artifacts such as papers, reviews, and surveys. This creates a risk of epistemic pollution in our scientific systems, where unreliable but plausible-looking artifacts can accumulate faster than the system can filter them out. The problem is structural: the epistemic infrastructure of science was calibrated to a world where producing a plausible artifact required substantial expertise, labor, and time, so generation cost itself served as a rough filter; AI weakens that filter without comparably lowering verification cost. We argue that AI-era science should treat this as an engineering problem: redesigning epistemic infrastructure to rebalance the costs of generation and verification. The current paper-centered system makes verification expensive: papers compress long-context scientific logic into prose, forcing reviewers, human or AI, to reconstruct underlying argument structure before they can evaluate it. As one step in this direction, we propose blueprints as preliminary epistemic infrastructure: structured, decomposed research artifacts that represent claims, evidence, assumptions, and definitions as typed graph components. Blueprints are designed to trade an upfront generation cost for cheaper, more local, more distributed verification downstream. We have instantiated the proposal in a proof-of-concept prototype.

Non-stationarity of an underlying data generating process that leads to distributional changes over time is a key characteristic of Data Streams. This phenomenon, commonly referred to as Concept Drift, has been intensively studied, and Concept Drift Detectors have been established as a class of methods for detecting such changes (drifts). For the most part, Drift Detectors compare regions (windows) of the data stream and detect drift if those windows are sufficiently dissimilar. In this work, we introduce the Window Dilemma, an observation that perceived drift is a product of windowing and not necessarily the underlying data generating process. Additionally, we highlight that drift detection is ill-posed, primarily because verification of drift events are implausible in practice. We demonstrate these contributions first by an illustrative example, followed by empirical comparisons of drift detectors against a variety of alternative adaptation strategies. Our main finding is that traditional batch learning techniques often perform better than their drift-aware counterparts further bringing into question the purpose of detectors in Stream Classification.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to abandon their initial stance to conform to user pushback. While prior research largely attributes this behavior to sycophancy learned during reinforcement learning from human feedback, we hypothesize that conformity is also driven by a model's epistemic uncertainty at inference time. In this paper, we introduce MUSE, a two-stage evaluation framework to disentangle the mechanisms driving LLM conformity. Specifically, MUSE maps a model's epistemic uncertainty in responding to a query against its likelihood to yield to user pushback in a subsequent turn. We demonstrate that the mechanisms driving conformity extend beyond sycophancy alone. Specifically, we characterize two distinct factors that jointly drive conformity: sycophantic conformity, where a model aligns with user pushback even with absolute certainty in its initial response, and uncertainty-driven conformity, where a model's likelihood for conformity increases alongside its uncertainty. Furthermore, we conduct ablation studies to demonstrate that both sycophantic conformity and uncertainty-driven conformity grow with 1) the LLM's perceived expertise of the user and 2) the plausibility of the user's suggestions. More broadly, MUSE informs more targeted intervention strategies by distinguishing alignment-induced sycophancy and training-corpora-driven uncertainty.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

In continual learning, many classifiers use softmax function to learn confidence. However, numerous studies have pointed out its inability to accurately determine confidence distributions for outliers, often referred to as epistemic uncertainty. This inherent limitation also curtails the accurate decisions for selecting what to forget and keep in previously trained confidence distributions over continual learning process. To address the issue, we revisit the effects of masking softmax function. While this method is both simple and prevalent in literature, its implication for retaining confidence distribution during continual learning, also known as stability, has been under-investigated. In this paper, we revisit the impact of softmax masking, and introduce a methodology to utilize its confidence preservation effects. In class- and task-incremental learning benchmarks with and without memory replay, our approach significantly increases stability while maintaining sufficiently large plasticity. In the end, our methodology shows better overall performance than state-of-the-art methods, particularly in the use with zero or small memory. This lays a simple and effective foundation of strongly stable replay-based continual learning.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

How do multi-turn reasoning systems fail? The expected answer is logical contradiction, in which the system's maintained state becomes unsatisfiable. We show that the dominant mode is instead satisfiable drift, where the internal state stays consistent while the returned answer silently violates prior commitments. We build DRIFT-Bench (Decomposing Reasoning Into Failure Types), a solver-instrumented benchmark of 816 test problems across three constraint domains, and evaluate four methods on it across four open-weight models (8B-120B parameters). MUS-Repair, which feeds minimal unsatisfiable subsets back to the generator, is strongest in every setting (+1.8 to +15.0 pp over the best non-MUS baseline). But the central finding is what repair leaves behind. After structured feedback, models rarely contradict themselves. They forget. Residual errors are 98-100% satisfiable drift across all settings, while contradiction drops to near zero. Reliable multi-turn systems must separately validate that the returned answer respects the maintained state. Code is available at https://github.com/kaons-research/drift-bench.

Real-world datasets often exhibit temporal dynamics characterized by evolving data distributions. Disregarding this phenomenon, commonly referred to as concept drift, can significantly diminish a model's predictive accuracy. Furthermore, the presence of hyperparameters in online models exacerbates this issue. These parameters are typically fixed and cannot be dynamically adjusted by the user in response to the evolving data distribution. Gaussian Process (GP) models offer powerful non-parametric regression capabilities with uncertainty quantification, making them ideal for modeling complex data relationships in an online setting. However, conventional online GP methods face several critical limitations, including a lack of drift-awareness, reliance on fixed hyperparameters, vulnerability to data snooping, absence of a principled decay mechanism, and memory inefficiencies. In response, we propose DAO-GP (Drift-Aware Online Gaussian Process), a novel, fully adaptive, hyperparameter-free, decayed, and sparse non-linear regression model. DAO-GP features a built-in drift detection and adaptation mechanism that dynamically adjusts model behavior based on the severity of drift. Extensive empirical evaluations confirm DAO-GP's robustness across stationary conditions, diverse drift types (abrupt, incremental, gradual), and varied data characteristics. Analyses demonstrate its dynamic adaptation, efficient in-memory and decay-based management, and evolving inducing points. Compared with state-of-the-art parametric and non-parametric models, DAO-GP consistently achieves superior or competitive performance, establishing it as a drift-resilient solution for online non-linear regression.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

In federated learning (FL), the data distribution of each client may change over time, introducing both temporal and spatial data heterogeneity, known as concept drift. Data heterogeneity arises from three drift sources: real drift (a shift in the conditional distribution P(y|x)), virtual drift (a shift in the input distribution P(x)), and label drift (a shift in the label distribution P(y)). However, most existing FL methods addressing concept drift primarily focus on real drift. When clients experience virtual or label drift, these methods often fail to selectively retain useful historical knowledge, leading to catastrophic forgetting. A key challenge lies in distinguishing different sources of drift, as they require distinct adaptation strategies: real drift calls for discarding outdated data, while virtual or label drift benefits from retaining historical data. Without explicitly identifying the drift sources, a general adaptation strategy is suboptimal and may harm generalization. To address this challenge, we propose FedDAA, a dynamic clustered FL framework designed to adapt to multi-source concept drift while preserving valuable historical knowledge. Specifically, FedDAA integrates three modules: a cluster number determination module to find the optimal number of clusters; a real drift detection module to distinguish real drift from virtual/label drift; and a concept drift adaptation module to adapt to new data while retaining useful historical information. We provide theoretical convergence guarantees, and experiments show that FedDAA achieves 7.84% to 8.52% accuracy improvements over state-of-the-art methods on Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Large language models are prone to hallucinating factually incorrect statements. A key source of these errors is exposure to new factual information through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which can increase hallucinations w.r.t. knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we explore whether SFT-induced hallucinations can be mitigated using established tools from the continual learning literature, since they arise as a by-product of knowledge degradation during training. We propose a self-distillation-based SFT method that facilitates effective factual learning while minimizing hallucinations w.r.t. pre-existing knowledge by regularizing output-distribution drift. We also show that, in settings where new knowledge acquisition is unnecessary, suppressing factual plasticity by freezing parameter groups, can preserve task performance while reducing hallucinations. Lastly, we investigate the mechanism behind SFT-induced hallucinations through three hypotheses: capacity limitations, behavior cloning, and localized interference. Our experiments show that a main driver is interference among overlapping semantic representations, and that self-distillation succeeds by mitigating this interference.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at single-turn tasks such as instruction following and summarization, yet real-world deployments require sustained multi-turn interactions where user goals and conversational context persist and evolve. A recurring challenge in this setting is context drift: the gradual divergence of a model's outputs from goal-consistent behavior across turns. Unlike single-turn errors, drift unfolds temporally and is poorly captured by static evaluation metrics. In this work, we present a study of context drift in multi-turn interactions and propose a simple dynamical framework to interpret its behavior. We formalize drift as the turn-wise KL divergence between the token-level predictive distributions of the test model and a goal-consistent reference model, and propose a recurrence model that interprets its evolution as a bounded stochastic process with restoring forces and controllable interventions. We instantiate this framework in both synthetic long-horizon rewriting tasks and realistic user-agent simulations such as in tau-Bench, measuring drift for several open-weight LLMs that are used as user simulators. Our experiments consistently reveal stable, noise-limited equilibria rather than runaway degradation, and demonstrate that simple reminder interventions reliably reduce divergence in line with theoretical predictions. Together, these results suggest that multi-turn drift can be understood as a controllable equilibrium phenomenon rather than as inevitable decay, providing a foundation for studying and mitigating context drift in extended interactions.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

To operate robustly in open-world environments, autonomous agents should be able to infer the behavior of unfamiliar systems through interaction alone, even in the absence of documentation. However, existing tool-use benchmarks expose semantic tool schemas in static environments, allowing agents to rely on prior knowledge rather than autonomous discovery. To address this limitation, we introduce ScrambleToolBench, an interactive terminal benchmark designed to isolate behavioral reasoning. By removing semantic cues and enforcing a continuous task curriculum, the benchmark requires agents to uncover hidden tool behaviors entirely through trial-and-error interaction. The benchmark further introduces dynamic challenges, including mapping drift, stochastic action failures, and temporal execution windows, to evaluate whether agents can revise and adapt their hypotheses as the environment changes. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art language models reveals that successful initial discovery does not translate into robust adaptation. When faced with structural changes such as mapping drift, agents fail to use deductive strategies such as cycle tracing, and instead exhibit belief inertia or fall back to exhaustive search. Increasing test-time reasoning only amplifies this expensive brute-force search rather than enabling deductive recovery. While equipping agents with persistent memory reduces compounding errors, they remain unable to efficiently infer structural changes, highlighting a gap in current agent reasoning.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Data drift is the change in model input data that is one of the key factors leading to machine learning models performance degradation over time. Monitoring drift helps detecting these issues and preventing their harmful consequences. Meaningful drift interpretation is a fundamental step towards effective re-training of the model. In this study we propose an end-to-end framework for reliable model-agnostic change-point detection and interpretation in large task-oriented dialog systems, proven effective in multiple customer deployments. We evaluate our approach and demonstrate its benefits with a novel variant of intent classification training dataset, simulating customer requests to a dialog system. We make the data publicly available.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Time series forecasting always faces the challenge of concept drift, where data distributions evolve over time, leading to a decline in forecast model performance. Existing solutions are based on online learning, which continually organize recent time series observations as new training samples and update model parameters according to the forecasting feedback on recent data. However, they overlook a critical issue: obtaining ground-truth future values of each sample should be delayed until after the forecast horizon. This delay creates a temporal gap between the training samples and the test sample. Our empirical analysis reveals that the gap can introduce concept drift, causing forecast models to adapt to outdated concepts. In this paper, we present Proceed, a novel proactive model adaptation framework for online time series forecasting. Proceed first estimates the concept drift between the recently used training samples and the current test sample. It then employs an adaptation generator to efficiently translate the estimated drift into parameter adjustments, proactively adapting the model to the test sample. To enhance the generalization capability of the framework, Proceed is trained on synthetic diverse concept drifts. Extensive experiments on five real-world datasets across various forecast models demonstrate that Proceed brings more performance improvements than the state-of-the-art online learning methods, significantly facilitating forecast models' resilience against concept drifts. Code is available at https://github.com/SJTU-DMTai/OnlineTSF.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

The integration of extensive, dynamic knowledge into Large Language Models (LLMs) remains a significant challenge due to the inherent entanglement of factual data and reasoning patterns. Existing solutions, ranging from non-parametric Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to parametric knowledge editing, are often constrained in practice by finite context windows, retriever noise, or the risk of catastrophic forgetting. In this paper, we propose DRIFT, a novel dual-model architecture designed to explicitly decouple knowledge extraction from the reasoning process. Unlike static prompt compression, DRIFT employs a lightweight knowledge model to dynamically compress document chunks into implicit fact tokens conditioned on the query. These dense representations are projected into the reasoning model's embedding space, replacing raw, redundant text while maintaining inference accuracy. Extensive experiments show that DRIFT significantly improves performance on long-context tasks, outperforming strong baselines among comparably sized models. Our approach provides a scalable and efficient paradigm for extending the effective context window and reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/Lancelot-Xie/DRIFT.

Local prediction-error-based curiosity rewards focus on the current transition without considering the world model's cumulative prediction error across all visited transitions. We introduce Curiosity-Critic, which grounds its intrinsic reward in the improvement of this cumulative objective, and show that it reduces to a tractable per-step form: the difference between the current prediction error and the asymptotic error baseline of the current state transition. We estimate this baseline online with a learned critic co-trained alongside the world model; regressing a single scalar, the critic converges well before the world model saturates, redirecting exploration toward learnable transitions without oracle knowledge of the noise floor. The reward is higher for learnable transitions and collapses toward the baseline for stochastic ones, effectively separating epistemic (reducible) from aleatoric (irreducible) prediction error online. Prior prediction-error curiosity formulations, from Schmidhuber (1991) to learned-feature-space variants, emerge as special cases corresponding to specific approximations of this baseline. Experiments on a stochastic grid world show that Curiosity-Critic outperforms prediction-error and visitation-count baselines in convergence speed and final world model accuracy.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are rapidly advancing, yet their reasoning ability often lags behind that of strong text-only counterparts. Existing methods to bridge this gap rely on supervised fine-tuning over large-scale multimodal reasoning data or reinforcement learning, both of which are resource-intensive. A promising alternative is model merging, which interpolates parameters between reasoning-enhanced LLMs and multimodal variants. However, our analysis shows that naive merging is not always a "free lunch": its effectiveness varies drastically across model families, with some (e.g., LLaVA, Idefics) benefiting while others (e.g., Qwen) suffer performance degradation. To address this, we propose Directional Reasoning Injection for Fine-Tuning (DRIFT) MLLMs, a lightweight method that transfers reasoning knowledge in the gradient space, without destabilizing multimodal alignment. DRIFT precomputes a reasoning prior as the parameter-space difference between reasoning and multimodal variants, then uses it to bias gradients during multimodal fine-tuning. This approach preserves the simplicity of standard supervised fine-tuning pipelines while enabling efficient reasoning transfer. Extensive experiments on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, including MathVista and MathVerse, demonstrate that DRIFT consistently improves reasoning performance over naive merging and supervised fine-tuning, while matching or surpassing training-heavy methods at a fraction of the cost.

The change in data distribution over time, also known as concept drift, poses a significant challenge to the reliability of online learning methods. Existing methods typically require model retraining or drift detection, both of which demand high computational costs and are often unsuitable for real-time applications. To address these limitations, a lightweight, fast and efficient random vector functional-link network termed Lite-RVFL is proposed, capable of adapting to concept drift without drift detection and retraining. Lite-RVFL introduces a novel objective function that assigns weights exponentially increasing to new samples, thereby emphasizing recent data and enabling timely adaptation. Theoretical analysis confirms the feasibility of this objective function for drift adaptation, and an efficient incremental update rule is derived. Experimental results on a real-world safety assessment task validate the efficiency, effectiveness in adapting to drift, and potential to capture temporal patterns of Lite-RVFL. The source code is available at https://github.com/songqiaohu/Lite-RVFL.

Large language models are increasingly deployed in multi-turn interactive settings where users or environments can iteratively provide lightweight feedback. Unfortunately, optimizing such behavior presents a sharp dilemma in practice: online reinforcement learning is able to effectively address multi-turn dynamics but is prohibitively expensive due to the cost of generating full correction trajectories at every update, whereas offline supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is efficient but suffers from distribution shift and behavioral collapse. To this end, we novelly propose DRIFT (Decoupled Rollouts and Importance-Weighted Fine-Tuning), a framework that operationalizes the theoretical insight that the KL-regularized RL objective is equivalent to importance-weighted supervised learning. DRIFT decouples rollout from optimization by sampling offline interaction trajectories from a fixed reference policy, deriving return-based importance weights, and optimizing the policy via weighted SFT on the resulting dataset. Empirically, we demonstrate that DRIFT matches or exceeds the performance of multi-turn reinforcement learning baselines while maintaining the training efficiency and simplicity of standard supervised fine-tuning. Code is available at https://github.com/2020-qqtcg/DRIFT.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

In-context learning enables transformers to adapt to new tasks from a few examples at inference time, while grokking highlights that this generalization can emerge abruptly only after prolonged training. We study task generalization and grokking in in-context learning using a Bayesian perspective, asking what enables the delayed transition from memorization to generalization. Concretely, we consider modular arithmetic tasks in which a transformer must infer a latent linear function solely from in-context examples and analyze how predictive uncertainty evolves during training. We combine approximate Bayesian techniques to estimate the posterior distribution and we study how uncertainty behaves across training and under changes in task diversity, context length, and context noise. We find that epistemic uncertainty collapses sharply when the model groks, making uncertainty a practical label-free diagnostic of generalization in transformers. Additionally, we provide theoretical support with a simplified Bayesian linear model, showing that asymptotically both delayed generalization and uncertainty peaks arise from the same underlying spectral mechanism, which links grokking time to uncertainty dynamics.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

AI systems can increasingly automate scientific workflows, but the reasoning that links prior evidence, generated ideas, experiments and final claims often remains implicit inside model inference. Here we introduce Xcientist, a research harness that externalizes research synthesis and experimental validation into inspectable, contract-governed processes. Xcientist organizes literature evidence, idea states, implementation plans, ablation records and repair traces as persistent research artifacts, so that generated mechanisms can be grounded, executed, tested and revised without losing their evidential basis. We identify claim drift as a failure mode of automated research, where runnable artifacts no longer support the mechanism originally claimed. Across training-free memory systems, graph-structured traffic forecasting and multi-scale physics-informed neural networks, Xcientist preserves traceable trajectories from problem formulation to mechanism design, validation and bounded revision. These results suggest that AI scientists should be evaluated not only by their final artifacts, but by whether their synthesis and validation processes remain attributable, inspectable and scientifically accountable.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Multimodal learning systems often struggle in non-stationary environments due to concept drift, where changing data distributions can degrade performance. Modality-specific drifts and the lack of mechanisms for continuous, stable adaptation compound this challenge. This paper introduces LS-OGD, a novel adaptive control framework for robust multimodal learning in the presence of concept drift. LS-OGD uses an online controller that dynamically adjusts the model's learning rate and the fusion weights between different data modalities in response to detected drift and evolving prediction errors. We prove that under bounded drift conditions, the LS-OGD system's prediction error is uniformly ultimately bounded and converges to zero if the drift ceases. Additionally, we demonstrate that the adaptive fusion strategy effectively isolates and mitigates the impact of severe modality-specific drift, thereby ensuring system resilience and fault tolerance. These theoretical guarantees establish a principled foundation for developing reliable and continuously adapting multimodal learning systems.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Safe deployment of graph neural networks (GNNs) under distribution shift requires models to provide accurate confidence indicators (CI). However, while it is well-known in computer vision that CI quality diminishes under distribution shift, this behavior remains understudied for GNNs. Hence, we begin with a case study on CI calibration under controlled structural and feature distribution shifts and demonstrate that increased expressivity or model size do not always lead to improved CI performance. Consequently, we instead advocate for the use of epistemic uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods to modulate CIs. To this end, we propose G-DeltaUQ, a new single model UQ method that extends the recently proposed stochastic centering framework to support structured data and partial stochasticity. Evaluated across covariate, concept, and graph size shifts, G-DeltaUQ not only outperforms several popular UQ methods in obtaining calibrated CIs, but also outperforms alternatives when CIs are used for generalization gap prediction or OOD detection. Overall, our work not only introduces a new, flexible GNN UQ method, but also provides novel insights into GNN CIs on safety-critical tasks.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Reasoning language models frequently overthink: generating extended chains of behaviors such as hedging, approach abandonment, and self contradiction that consume tokens without improving answers. We show that these behaviors are not merely a consequence of length; even when controlling for response length, incorrect traces exhibit higher rates of unproductive self-reflection than correct ones. Addressing this requires identifying where self-reflection helps vs hurts, but obtaining these step-level annotations is costly. We observe that intermediate answer commitments within reasoning traces can provide a cheap proxy: by comparing each final answer candidate in the trace to the ground truth, we can determine whether subsequent reflection is productive without any additional supervision. Building on this insight, we propose DASH (Drift Aware advantage SHaping), which assigns segment-level credit based on whether each reasoning segment leads toward or away from correctness. On competition-level math benchmarks, DASH achieves the highest accuracy where overthinking is prevalent (Average Accuracy: 59.45% vs. 58.1% Dr.GRPO vs. 56.95% GRPO) while reducing overthinking behaviors and achieving more productive self-correction than baselines.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

We study the problem of nonepisodic reinforcement learning (RL) for nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system dynamics are unknown and the RL agent has to learn from a single trajectory, i.e., without resets. We propose Nonepisodic Optimistic RL (NeoRL), an approach based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. NeoRL uses well-calibrated probabilistic models and plans optimistically w.r.t. the epistemic uncertainty about the unknown dynamics. Under continuity and bounded energy assumptions on the system, we provide a first-of-its-kind regret bound of O(Gamma_T T) for general nonlinear systems with Gaussian process dynamics. We compare NeoRL to other baselines on several deep RL environments and empirically demonstrate that NeoRL achieves the optimal average cost while incurring the least regret.

Video reasoning, the task of enabling machines to infer from dynamic visual content through multi-step logic, is crucial for advanced AI. While the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) mechanism has enhanced reasoning in text-based tasks, its application to video understanding remains underexplored. This paper presents a systematic analysis revealing that CoT often degrades performance in video reasoning, generating verbose but misleading internal monologues, and leading to hallucinated visual details and overridden correct intuitions - a phenomenon we term "visual thinking drift". We explain this drift through a Bayesian lens, positing that CoT traces often diverge from actual visual evidence, instead amplifying internal biases or language priors, causing models to storytell rather than engage in grounded reasoning. To counteract this, we introduce Visual Evidence Reward (VER), a novel reinforcement learning framework that explicitly rewards the generation of reasoning traces that are verifiably grounded in visual evidence. Comprehensive evaluation across 10 diverse video understanding benchmarks demonstrates that our Video-VER consistently achieves top performance. Our work sheds light on the distinct challenges of video-centric reasoning and encourages the development of AI that robustly grounds its inferences in visual evidence - for large multimodal models that not only "think before answering", but also "see while thinking".

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Diffusion models do not recover semantic structure uniformly over time. Instead, samples transition from semantic ambiguity to class commitment within a narrow regime. Recent theoretical work attributes this transition to dynamical instabilities along class-separating directions, but practical methods to detect and exploit these windows in trained models are still limited. We show that tracking the class-conditional entropy of a latent semantic variable given the noisy state provides a reliable signature of these transition regimes. By restricting the entropy to semantic partitions, the entropy can furthermore resolve semantic decisions at different levels of abstraction. We analyze this behavior in high-dimensional Gaussian mixture models and show that the entropy rate concentrates on the same logarithmic time scale as the speciation symmetry-breaking instability previously identified in variance-preserving diffusion. We validate our method on EDM2-XS and Stable Diffusion 1.5, where class-conditional entropy consistently isolates the noise regimes critical for semantic structure formation. Finally, we use our framework to quantify how guidance redistributes semantic information over time. Together, these results connect information-theoretic and statistical physics perspectives on diffusion and provide a principled basis for time-localized control.

Generative AI (GenAI) has rapidly entered education, yet its user experience is often explained through adoption-oriented constructs such as usefulness, ease of use, and engagement. We argue that these constructs are no longer sufficient because systems such as ChatGPT do not merely support learning tasks but also participate in knowledge construction. Existing theories cannot explain why GenAI frequently produces experiences characterized by negotiated authority, redistributed cognition, and accountability tension. To address this gap, this paper develops the Human--AI Epistemic Partnership Theory (HAEPT), explaining the GenAI user experience as a form of epistemic partnership that features a dynamic negotiation of three interlocking contracts: epistemic, agency, and accountability. We argue that findings on trust, over-reliance, academic integrity, teacher caution, and relational interaction about GenAI can be reinterpreted as tensions within these contracts rather than as isolated issues. Instead of holding a single, stable view of GenAI, users adjust how they relate to it over time through calibration cycles. These repeated interactions account for why trust and skepticism often coexist and for how partnership modes describe recurrent configurations of human--AI collaboration across tasks. To demonstrate the usefulness of HAEPT, we applied it to analyze the UX of collaborative learning with AI speakers and AI-facilitated scientific argumentation, illustrating different contract configurations.

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

Knowledge augmentation has significantly enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks. However, existing methods typically operate on the simplistic premise that model performance equates with internal knowledge, overlooking the knowledge-confidence gaps that lead to overconfident errors or uncertain truths. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel meta-cognitive framework for reliable knowledge augmentation via differentiated intervention and alignment. Our approach leverages internal cognitive signals to partition the knowledge space into mastered, confused, and missing regions, guiding targeted knowledge expansion. Furthermore, we introduce a cognitive consistency mechanism to synchronize subjective certainty with objective accuracy, ensuring calibrated knowledge boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the our framework consistently outperforms strong baselines, validating its rationality in not only enhancing knowledge capabilities but also fostering cognitive behaviors that better distinguish knowns from unknowns. All codes are available at https://github.com/AI9Stars/Know-More-Know-Clearer.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Eliciting information to reduce uncertainty about a latent entity is a critical task in many application domains, e.g., assessing individual student learning outcomes, diagnosing underlying diseases, or learning user preferences. Though natural language is a powerful medium for this purpose, large language models (LLMs) and existing fine-tuning algorithms lack mechanisms for strategically gathering information to refine their own understanding of the latent entity. To harness the generalization power and world knowledge of LLMs in developing effective information-gathering strategies, we propose an adaptive elicitation framework that actively reduces uncertainty on the latent entity. Since probabilistic modeling of an abstract latent entity is difficult, our framework adopts a predictive view of uncertainty, using a meta-learned language model to simulate future observations and enable scalable uncertainty quantification over complex natural language. Through autoregressive forward simulation, our model quantifies how new questions reduce epistemic uncertainty, enabling the development of sophisticated information-gathering strategies to choose the most informative next queries. In experiments on the 20 questions game, dynamic opinion polling, and adaptive student assessment, our method consistently outperforms baselines in identifying critical unknowns and improving downstream predictions, illustrating the promise of strategic information gathering in natural language settings.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with complex, long-horizon reasoning due to instability caused by their frozen policy assumption. Current test-time scaling methods treat execution feedback merely as an external signal for filtering or rewriting trajectories, without internalizing it to improve the underlying reasoning strategy. Inspired by Popper's epistemology of "conjectures and refutations," we argue that intelligence requires real-time evolution of the model's policy through learning from failed attempts. We introduce Policy of Thoughts (PoT), a framework that recasts reasoning as a within-instance online optimization process. PoT first generates diverse candidate solutions via an efficient exploration mechanism, then uses Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to update a transient LoRA adapter based on execution feedback. This closed-loop design enables dynamic, instance-specific refinement of the model's reasoning priors. Experiments show that PoT dramatically boosts performance: a 4B model achieves 49.71% accuracy on LiveCodeBench, outperforming GPT-4o and DeepSeek-V3 despite being over 50 smaller.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

This paper uncovers a critical yet overlooked phenomenon in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs): detrimental concept drift within chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning during non-stationary reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), where reasoning token distributions evolve unpredictably, thereby introducing significant biases in final predictions. To address this, we are pioneers in establishing the theoretical bridge between concept drift theory and RFT processes by formalizing CoT's autoregressive token streams as non-stationary distributions undergoing arbitrary temporal shifts. Leveraging this framework, we propose a novel counterfact-aware RFT that systematically decouples beneficial distribution adaptation from harmful concept drift through concept graph-empowered LLM experts generating counterfactual reasoning trajectories. Our solution, Counterfactual Preference Optimization (CPO), enables stable RFT in non-stationary environments, particularly within the medical domain, through custom-tuning of counterfactual-aware preference alignment. Extensive experiments demonstrate our superior performance of robustness, generalization and coordination within RFT. Besides, we also contributed a large-scale dataset CXR-CounterFact (CCF), comprising 320,416 meticulously curated counterfactual reasoning trajectories derived from MIMIC-CXR. Our code and data are public.

Sequential recommendation increasingly employs latent multi-step reasoning to enhance test-time computation. Despite empirical gains, existing approaches largely drive intermediate reasoning states via target-dominant objectives without imposing explicit feasibility constraints. This results in latent drift, where reasoning trajectories deviate into implausible regions. We argue that effective recommendation reasoning should instead be viewed as navigation on a collaborative manifold rather than free-form latent refinement. To this end, we propose ManCAR (Manifold-Constrained Adaptive Reasoning), a principled framework that grounds reasoning within the topology of a global interaction graph. ManCAR constructs a local intent prior from the collaborative neighborhood of a user's recent actions, represented as a distribution over the item simplex. During training, the model progressively aligns its latent predictive distribution with this prior, forcing the reasoning trajectory to remain within the valid manifold. At test time, reasoning proceeds adaptively until the predictive distribution stabilizes, avoiding over-refinement. We provide a variational interpretation of ManCAR to theoretically validate its drift-prevention and adaptive test-time stopping mechanisms. Experiments on seven benchmarks demonstrate that ManCAR consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving up to a 46.88% relative improvement w.r.t. NDCG@10. Our code is available at https://github.com/FuCongResearchSquad/ManCAR.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Continual learning promises a language model that keeps acquiring knowledge after training, with each new fact written into its weights. Whether weight writes can support accumulation remains undecided. We follow invented facts written into Qwen3 models from creation through sequences of twenty to one hundred later writes, using held-out questions of five types, with the original model given the fact in its prompt as the reference. Across these experiments, the breadth of the training data determines the kind of knowledge created. Bare-statement training produces recitation, while diverse restatements reduce the recitation-to-use gap from 27.4 to 5.4 points without showing the model a conclusion. This difference carries into later writes: after twenty sequential writes, bare-statement facts retain 1% accuracy while facts written from broad study data retain 46%. We also find that facts can be behaviourally forgotten without being erased. Forgotten facts keep most of the log-probability added by their write, and under bare-statement training 70% of wrong answers about them contain the most recently written fact. The same writes barely degrade the model's use of facts in context, and a forgotten study fact supplied in the prompt recovers to 77-80% on its questions. These results describe knowledge that is stored but question-keyed: later writes redirect the questions that reached it. Damage to unrelated abilities tracks KL divergence from the original model, and the later writes cause interference regardless of how the earlier fact was stored. Broad data can create usable knowledge, and a frozen reference can preserve capability, but no intervention we tested, including those built on accurate local measurements of each write, keeps earlier facts reachable. When facts must be composed or survive later writes, the reliable channel is context rather than the weights.

Off-policy actor-critic methods in reinforcement learning train a critic with temporal-difference updates and use it as a learning signal for the policy (actor). This design typically achieves higher sample efficiency than purely on-policy methods. However, critic networks tend to overestimate value estimates systematically. This is often addressed by introducing a pessimistic bias based on uncertainty estimates. Current methods employ ensembling to quantify the critic's epistemic uncertainty-uncertainty due to limited data and model ambiguity-to scale pessimistic updates. In this work, we propose a new algorithm called Stochastic Actor-Critic (STAC) that incorporates temporal (one-step) aleatoric uncertainty-uncertainty arising from stochastic transitions, rewards, and policy-induced variability in Bellman targets-to scale pessimistic bias in temporal-difference updates, rather than relying on epistemic uncertainty. STAC uses a single distributional critic network to model the temporal return uncertainty, and applies dropout to both the critic and actor networks for regularization. Our results show that pessimism based on a distributional critic alone suffices to mitigate overestimation, and naturally leads to risk-averse behavior in stochastic environments. Introducing dropout further improves training stability and performance by means of regularization. With this design, STAC achieves improved computational efficiency using a single distributional critic network.

Individual agents in multi-agent (MA) systems often lack robustness, tending to blindly conform to misleading peers. We show this weakness stems from both sycophancy and inadequate ability to evaluate peer reliability. To address this, we first formalize the learning problem of history-aware reference, introducing the historical interactions of peers as additional input, so that agents can estimate peer reliability and learn from trustworthy peers when uncertain. This shifts the task from evaluating peer reasoning quality to estimating peer reliability based on interaction history. We then develop Epistemic Context Learning (ECL): a reasoning framework that conditions predictions on explicitly-built peer profiles from history. We further optimize ECL by reinforcement learning using auxiliary rewards. Our experiments reveal that our ECL enables small models like Qwen 3-4B to outperform a history-agnostic baseline 8x its size (Qwen 3-30B) by accurately identifying reliable peers. ECL also boosts frontier models to near-perfect (100%) performance. We show that ECL generalizes well to various MA configurations and we find that trust is modeled well by LLMs, revealing a strong correlation in trust modeling accuracy and final answer quality.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

A set of novel approaches for estimating epistemic uncertainty in deep neural networks with a single forward pass has recently emerged as a valid alternative to Bayesian Neural Networks. On the premise of informative representations, these deterministic uncertainty methods (DUMs) achieve strong performance on detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) data while adding negligible computational costs at inference time. However, it remains unclear whether DUMs are well calibrated and can seamlessly scale to real-world applications - both prerequisites for their practical deployment. To this end, we first provide a taxonomy of DUMs, and evaluate their calibration under continuous distributional shifts. Then, we extend them to semantic segmentation. We find that, while DUMs scale to realistic vision tasks and perform well on OOD detection, the practicality of current methods is undermined by poor calibration under distributional shifts.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) gives agents access to accumulated knowledge, but has no model of time. When a fact changes (e.g., a function is renamed or API restructured), RAG retrieves both the stale and current value with near-identical embedding similarity. The agent then either abstains or serves the superseded fact. We show this is a structural problem: on a calibrated dataset, cosine similarity distinguishes a contradicted fact from a duplicated one with AUROC 0.59 (near chance), as contradictions are often more embedding-similar to the original than rephrased duplicates. We present MemStrata, a retrieval memory maintaining temporal validity. It stores facts like RAG, preserving static recall, but when a fact's value is contradicted, a deterministic (subject, relation, object) supersession rule retires the stale value in a bi-temporal ledger - with no similarity threshold and no LLM call. Across six benchmarks run locally with a 7B model, MemStrata ties RAG on static knowledge and reaches 0.95-1.00 accuracy on evolving knowledge (where RAG reaches 0.20-0.47). The central result is the stale-fact-error rate: when required to answer, RAG serves superseded values 15-40% of the time; MemStrata drives this to ~0%, a failure class RAG cannot avoid. MemStrata achieves this at retrieval latency (~2.1s) versus ~16-18s for LLM-reranking baselines. We release the harness, datasets, and a marker-free evaluation protocol for memory under knowledge evolution.

Neural NLP models are often miscalibrated, assigning high confidence to incorrect predictions, which undermines selective prediction and high-stakes deployment. Post-hoc calibration methods adjust output probabilities but leave internal computation unchanged, while ensemble and Bayesian approaches improve uncertainty at substantial training or storage cost. We propose UAT-LITE, an inference-time framework that makes self-attention uncertainty-aware using approximate Bayesian inference via Monte Carlo dropout in pretrained transformer classifiers. Token-level epistemic uncertainty is estimated from stochastic forward passes and used to modulate self-attention during contextualization, without modifying pretrained weights or training objectives. We additionally introduce a layerwise variance decomposition to diagnose how predictive uncertainty accumulates across transformer depth. Across the SQuAD 2.0 answerability, MNLI, and SST-2, UAT-LITE reduces Expected Calibration Error by approximately 20% on average relative to a fine-tuned BERT-base baseline while preserving task accuracy, and improves selective prediction and robustness under distribution shift.

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Forecasting the future anatomy of slow-evolving neurodegenerative diseases could enable earlier, more targeted intervention and improve clinical trial design, but it remains challenging because true progression signals are subtle in longitudinal MRI. In this low-signal regime, transferring modern generative sequence models directly is unreliable: training is dominated by stable baseline anatomy and confounded by dense, sample-specific nuisance variation. We first provide a theoretical analysis that explains these failures through two modes. Identity collapse occurs when optimization is driven toward reproducing the current anatomy, which prevents the model from learning faint temporal change. The continuous interpolation trap arises when standard smooth networks cannot separate localized biological drift from pervasive noise, which leads to spurious changes that diffuse across the volume. To address both issues, we propose Latent Drift, a progressive generative framework that learns change in a compressed semantic representation rather than synthesizing full-resolution anatomy. This design removes pixel-level identity from the prediction target and concentrates model capacity on progression-relevant dynamics. We further apply Finite Scalar Quantization to the learned change representation, which suppresses small, high-frequency nuisance fluctuations while preserving consistent structural drift. Experiments on longitudinal 3D brain MRI show that Latent Drift improves patient-specific neuro-forecasting over diffusion and autoregressive transformer baselines across generative fidelity and clinically relevant evaluation metrics. Project page: https://cutepkq.github.io/latent-drift{https://cutepkq.github.io/latent-drift}.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

Large language model (LLM) post-training enhances latent skills, unlocks value alignment, improves performance, and enables domain adaptation. Unfortunately, post-training is known to induce forgetting, especially in the ubiquitous use-case of leveraging third-party pre-trained models, which is typically understood as a loss of parametric or factual knowledge. We argue that this accuracy-centric view is insufficient for modern foundation models and instead define forgetting as systematic model drift that degrades behavior and user experience. In this context, we introduce CapTrack, a capability-centric framework for analyzing forgetting in LLMs that combines a behavioral taxonomy with an evaluation suite built on established benchmarks and targeted adaptations. Using CapTrack, we conduct a large-scale empirical study across post-training algorithms, domains, and model families, including models up to 80B parameters. We find that forgetting extends beyond parametric knowledge, with pronounced drift in robustness and default behaviors. Instruction fine-tuning induces the strongest relative drift, while preference optimization is more conservative and can partially recover lost capabilities. Differences across model families persist, and no universal mitigation emerges.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

LLMs operating in dynamic real-world contexts often encounter knowledge that evolves continuously or emerges incrementally. To remain accurate and effective, models must adapt to newly arriving information on the fly. We introduce Online Adaptation to Continual Knowledge Streams(OAKS) to evaluate this capability, establishing a benchmark for online adaptation over streaming, continually updating knowledge. Specifically, the benchmark is structured as a sequence of fine-grained context chunks where facts change dynamically across time intervals. OAKS comprises two datasets: OAKS-BABI and OAKS-Novel, where individual facts evolve multiple times across context chunks. These datasets include dense annotations to measure whether models track changes accurately. Evaluating 14 models with varied inference approaches, we observe significant limitations in current methodologies. Both state-of-the-art models and agentic memory systems fail to adapt robustly on OAKS, demonstrating delays in state-tracking and susceptibility to distraction within streaming environments.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

As LLMs increasingly mediate the political information citizens rely on, there is still no standardized way to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary informational properties such as clarity, noise, and consistency. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs on the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down under absent, vague, or contradictory information, while flattening the intensity of political language. These failures are likely driven by party priors, influenced by party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

This paper introduces a continuous-time stochastic dynamical framework for understanding how large language models (LLMs) may self-amplify latent biases or toxicity through their own chain-of-thought reasoning. The model posits an instantaneous "severity" variable x(t) in [0,1] evolving under a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a drift term μ(x) and diffusion σ(x). Crucially, such a process can be consistently analyzed via the Fokker--Planck approach if each incremental step behaves nearly Markovian in severity space. The analysis investigates critical phenomena, showing that certain parameter regimes create phase transitions from subcritical (self-correcting) to supercritical (runaway severity). The paper derives stationary distributions, first-passage times to harmful thresholds, and scaling laws near critical points. Finally, it highlights implications for agents and extended LLM reasoning models: in principle, these equations might serve as a basis for formal verification of whether a model remains stable or propagates bias over repeated inferences.

Offline reinforcement learning requires improving a policy from fixed data while avoiding out-of-distribution actions with unreliable value estimates. Diffusion and flow policies handle this trade-off by modeling the behavior distribution to regularize the RL objective, but they require iterative denoising, solver integrations, and in more efficient variants, distillation or other approximations at inference. We propose DriftQL, which combines a drift-based behavioral regularizer with critic-driven policy improvement. The value signal biases the policy toward high-value regions of the data support, while attraction and repulsion together keep generated actions near the data and prevent collapse onto a single mode. DriftQL is implemented as a single network with a unified training objective and generates actions in a single forward pass. On D4RL and OGBench, DriftQL consistently outperforms diffusion and flow methods, advancing the state of the art. Under degraded data quality, where the baselines visibly struggle, DriftQL remains close to its clean-data performance, positioning it as a promising alternative to diffusion and flow-based methods while maintaining the simplicity and efficiency of deterministic approaches. Project page: https://driftql.github.io/

Deep-research agents solve tasks through long trajectories of search, tool use, evidence inspection, and answer synthesis. Evaluation based on final answers shows whether an agent succeeds, but not which parts of the trajectory make the answer unreliable. We study span-level error localization for deep-research agents. We collect 2,790 real trajectories from two agent frameworks, three backbone models, and three benchmarks, convert raw logs into semantic spans, and annotate harmful error spans through LLM-assisted expert review. From these annotations, we build TELBench, a 1,000-instance benchmark for identifying error spans among normal exploration, failed searches, tentative hypotheses, and harmless noise. We further propose DRIFT, a claim-centric auditing framework that tracks agent claims, checks their support in trajectory evidence, and marks spans where unsupported or conflicting claims affect the answer path. Experiments across model families and auditing frameworks show that DRIFT improves span-level error localization and first-error accuracy by up to 30 percentage points. Our work provides a process-level view of reliability in deep-research agents.

Diffusion models are a class of generative models that learn to synthesize samples by inverting a diffusion process that gradually maps data into noise. While these models have enjoyed great success recently, a full theoretical understanding of their observed properties is still lacking, in particular, their weak sensitivity to the choice of noise family and the role of adequate scheduling of noise levels for good synthesis. By identifying a correspondence between diffusion models and a well-known paradigm in cognitive science known as serial reproduction, whereby human agents iteratively observe and reproduce stimuli from memory, we show how the aforementioned properties of diffusion models can be explained as a natural consequence of this correspondence. We then complement our theoretical analysis with simulations that exhibit these key features. Our work highlights how classic paradigms in cognitive science can shed light on state-of-the-art machine learning problems.

Pretraining on human corpus and then finetuning in a simulator has become a standard pipeline for training a goal-oriented dialogue agent. Nevertheless, as soon as the agents are finetuned to maximize task completion, they suffer from the so-called language drift phenomenon: they slowly lose syntactic and semantic properties of language as they only focus on solving the task. In this paper, we propose a generic approach to counter language drift called Seeded iterated learning (SIL). We periodically refine a pretrained student agent by imitating data sampled from a newly generated teacher agent. At each time step, the teacher is created by copying the student agent, before being finetuned to maximize task completion. SIL does not require external syntactic constraint nor semantic knowledge, making it a valuable task-agnostic finetuning protocol. We evaluate SIL in a toy-setting Lewis Game, and then scale it up to the translation game with natural language. In both settings, SIL helps counter language drift as well as it improves the task completion compared to baselines.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Large foundation models trained on extensive datasets demonstrate strong zero-shot capabilities in various domains. To replicate their success when data and model size are constrained, knowledge distillation has become an established tool for transferring knowledge from foundation models to small student networks. However, the effectiveness of distillation is critically limited by the available training data. This work addresses the common practical issue of covariate shift in knowledge distillation, where spurious features appear during training but not at test time. We ask the question: when these spurious features are unknown, yet a robust teacher is available, is it possible for a student to also become robust to them? We address this problem by introducing a novel diffusion-based data augmentation strategy that generates images by maximizing the disagreement between the teacher and the student, effectively creating challenging samples that the student struggles with. Experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly improves worst group and mean group accuracy on CelebA and SpuCo Birds as well as the spurious mAUC on spurious ImageNet under covariate shift, outperforming state-of-the-art diffusion-based data augmentation baselines

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is vital for trustworthy deep learning, yet existing methods are either computationally intensive, such as Bayesian or ensemble methods, or provide only partial, task-specific estimates, such as single-forward-pass techniques. In this paper, we propose a post-hoc single-forward-pass framework that jointly captures aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty without modifying or retraining pretrained models. Our method applies Split-Point Analysis (SPA) to decompose predictive residuals into upper and lower subsets, computing Mean Absolute Residuals (MARs) on each side. We prove that, under ideal conditions, the total MAR equals the harmonic mean of subset MARs; deviations define a novel Self-consistency Discrepancy Score (SDS) for fine-grained epistemic estimation across regression and classification. For regression, side-specific quantile regression yields prediction intervals with improved empirical coverage, which are further calibrated via SDS. For classification, when calibration data are available, we apply SPA-based calibration identities to adjust the softmax outputs and then compute predictive entropy on these calibrated probabilities. Extensive experiments on diverse regression and classification benchmarks demonstrate that our framework matches or exceeds several state-of-the-art UQ methods while incurring minimal overhead. Our source code is available at https://github.com/zzz0527/SPC-UQ.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) show remarkable capabilities, their unreliability remains a critical barrier to deployment in high-stakes domains. This survey charts a functional evolution in addressing this challenge: the evolution of uncertainty from a passive diagnostic metric to an active control signal guiding real-time model behavior. We demonstrate how uncertainty is leveraged as an active control signal across three frontiers: in advanced reasoning to optimize computation and trigger self-correction; in autonomous agents to govern metacognitive decisions about tool use and information seeking; and in reinforcement learning to mitigate reward hacking and enable self-improvement via intrinsic rewards. By grounding these advancements in emerging theoretical frameworks like Bayesian methods and Conformal Prediction, we provide a unified perspective on this transformative trend. This survey provides a comprehensive overview, critical analysis, and practical design patterns, arguing that mastering the new trend of uncertainty is essential for building the next generation of scalable, reliable, and trustworthy AI.

Although AI agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in long-horizon reasoning, their reliability is severely hampered by the ``Spiral of Hallucination,'' where early epistemic errors propagate irreversibly. Existing methods face a dilemma: uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods typically act as passive sensors, only diagnosing risks without addressing them, while self-reflection mechanisms suffer from continuous or aimless corrections. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified Dual-Process Agentic UQ (AUQ) framework that transforms verbalized uncertainty into active, bi-directional control signals. Our architecture comprises two complementary mechanisms: System 1 (Uncertainty-Aware Memory, UAM), which implicitly propagates verbalized confidence and semantic explanations to prevent blind decision-making; and System 2 (Uncertainty-Aware Reflection, UAR), which utilizes these explanations as rational cues to trigger targeted inference-time resolution only when necessary. This enables the agent to balance efficient execution and deep deliberation dynamically. Extensive experiments on closed-loop benchmarks and open-ended deep research tasks demonstrate that our training-free approach achieves superior performance and trajectory-level calibration. We believe this principled framework AUQ represents a significant step towards reliable agents.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.