id string | standards_body string | spec_clause string | property string | prompt_mode string | prompt string | state_machine string | label string | violated bool | citation string | known_finding string | has_fixed_twin bool | fixed_twin_holds bool | n_state_fields int64 | n_reachable_states int64 | n_transitions int64 | state_fields list | initial_state unknown | transitions list | counterexample list | counterexample_length int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ieee_4way_handshake_krack | IEEE | IEEE 802.11-2020 §12.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i | nonce_never_reused | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 §12.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i
Safety property that must hold: nonce_never_reused
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold ... | State fields (in order): ptk_installed, tx_nonce, nonce_reused
Initial state: {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --InstallPTK_msg3--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'no... | KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE | true | Vanhoef & Piessens, "Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2", ACM CCS 2017; CVE-2017-13077..13088 (KRACK). | Retransmitted/replayed EAPOL-Key msg3 triggers PTK reinstallation, resetting the TX nonce and replay counter -> nonce reuse. | true | true | 3 | 7 | 11 | [
"ptk_installed",
"tx_nonce",
"nonce_reused"
] | {
"ptk_installed": false,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_reused": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"ptk_installed": false,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_reused": false
},
"label": "InstallPTK_msg3",
"to": {
"ptk_installed": true,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_reused": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"ptk_installed": true,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_... | [
{
"label": null,
"state": {
"ptk_installed": false,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_reused": false
}
},
{
"label": "InstallPTK_msg3",
"state": {
"ptk_installed": true,
"tx_nonce": 0,
"nonce_reused": false
}
},
{
"label": "SendEncrypted",
"state": {
... | 4 |
ieee_ft_handshake_802_11r | IEEE | IEEE 802.11-2020 §13 (Fast BSS Transition) | no_data_before_key_confirm | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 §13 (Fast BSS Transition)
Safety property that must hold: no_data_before_key_confirm
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVER... | State fields (in order): authed, confirmed, data
Initial state: {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --FTAuth--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}
{'authed': True, 'confirmed': F... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 4 | 3 | [
"authed",
"confirmed",
"data"
] | {
"authed": false,
"confirmed": false,
"data": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"authed": false,
"confirmed": false,
"data": false
},
"label": "FTAuth",
"to": {
"authed": true,
"confirmed": false,
"data": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"authed": true,
"confirmed": false,
"data": false
},
"label": "Key... | null | 0 |
ieee_mlo_tid_to_link | IEEE | IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (§35) | no_tx_on_inactive_link | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (§35)
Safety property that must hold: no_tx_on_inactive_link
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVER... | State fields (in order): link_active, tid_mapped, tx
Initial state: {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --ActivateLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}
{'link_ac... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 4 | 6 | [
"link_active",
"tid_mapped",
"tx"
] | {
"link_active": false,
"tid_mapped": false,
"tx": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"link_active": false,
"tid_mapped": false,
"tx": false
},
"label": "ActivateLink",
"to": {
"link_active": true,
"tid_mapped": false,
"tx": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"link_active": true,
"tid_mapped": false,
"tx": false
},... | null | 0 |
ieee_block_ack_scoreboard | IEEE | IEEE 802.11-2020 §10.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard) | no_duplicate_delivered | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 §10.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard)
Safety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must... | State fields (in order): expected, dup_delivered
Initial state: {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}
{'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected'... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 2 | 4 | 6 | [
"expected",
"dup_delivered"
] | {
"expected": 0,
"dup_delivered": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"expected": 0,
"dup_delivered": false
},
"label": "RecvNext",
"to": {
"expected": 1,
"dup_delivered": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"expected": 1,
"dup_delivered": false
},
"label": "RecvNext",
"to": {
"expected": 2,
"dup_d... | null | 0 |
ieee_twt_wake_sleep | IEEE | IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (§26.8) | no_delivery_while_asleep | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (§26.8)
Safety property that must hold: no_delivery_while_asleep
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY s... | State fields (in order): awake, delivered_asleep
Initial state: {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}
{'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> ... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 2 | 2 | 5 | [
"awake",
"delivered_asleep"
] | {
"awake": false,
"delivered_asleep": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"awake": false,
"delivered_asleep": false
},
"label": "SPStart",
"to": {
"awake": true,
"delivered_asleep": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"awake": false,
"delivered_asleep": false
},
"label": "SPEnd",
"to": {
"awake": false,
... | null | 0 |
ieee_uapsd_pspoll | IEEE | IEEE 802.11-2020 §11.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save) | no_delivery_without_trigger | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 §11.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save)
Safety property that must hold: no_delivery_without_trigger
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must h... | State fields (in order): buffered, trigger, delivered_no_trigger
Initial state: {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, ... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 4 | 7 | [
"buffered",
"trigger",
"delivered_no_trigger"
] | {
"buffered": false,
"trigger": false,
"delivered_no_trigger": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"buffered": false,
"trigger": false,
"delivered_no_trigger": false
},
"label": "Buffer",
"to": {
"buffered": true,
"trigger": false,
"delivered_no_trigger": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"buffered": false,
"trigger": false,
"deli... | null | 0 |
ieee_sa_query | IEEE | IEEE 802.11-2020 §11.3 / §12 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w) | no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 §11.3 / §12 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w)
Safety property that must hold: no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted
The procedure is given below as a finite state m... | State fields (in order): associated, query_pending, spoof_accepted
Initial state: {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False} --RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery--> {'a... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 2 | 2 | [
"associated",
"query_pending",
"spoof_accepted"
] | {
"associated": true,
"query_pending": false,
"spoof_accepted": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"associated": true,
"query_pending": false,
"spoof_accepted": false
},
"label": "RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery",
"to": {
"associated": true,
"query_pending": true,
"spoof_accepted": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"associated": true,
... | null | 0 |
ieee_fils_auth | IEEE | IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (§12.12) | no_data_before_key | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: IEEE
Specification clause: IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (§12.12)
Safety property that must hold: no_data_before_key
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY st... | State fields (in order): fils_auth, key, data
Initial state: {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False} --FILSAuth--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False}
{'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data':... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 4 | 3 | [
"fils_auth",
"key",
"data"
] | {
"fils_auth": false,
"key": false,
"data": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"fils_auth": false,
"key": false,
"data": false
},
"label": "FILSAuth",
"to": {
"fils_auth": true,
"key": false,
"data": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"fils_auth": true,
"key": false,
"data": false
},
"label": "EstablishK... | null | 0 |
3gpp_rrc_state_machine | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.331 §4.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED) | no_data_in_idle | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.331 §4.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED)
Safety property that must hold: no_data_in_idle
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in ... | State fields (in order): state, data
Initial state: {'state': 0, 'data': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'state': 0, 'data': False} --Connect--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}
{'state': 2, 'data': False} --Suspend--> {'state': 1, 'data': False}
{'state': 2, 'data': False} --Release--> ... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 2 | 4 | 7 | [
"state",
"data"
] | {
"state": 0,
"data": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"state": 0,
"data": false
},
"label": "Connect",
"to": {
"state": 2,
"data": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"state": 2,
"data": false
},
"label": "Suspend",
"to": {
"state": 1,
"data": false
}
},
{
"from": {
... | null | 0 |
3gpp_pdcp_reordering | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.323 §5.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard) | no_duplicate_delivered | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.323 §5.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard)
Safety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must... | State fields (in order): next_count, dup
Initial state: {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'next_count': 0, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}
{'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}
{'nex... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 2 | 4 | 6 | [
"next_count",
"dup"
] | {
"next_count": 0,
"dup": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"next_count": 0,
"dup": false
},
"label": "DeliverInOrder",
"to": {
"next_count": 1,
"dup": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"next_count": 1,
"dup": false
},
"label": "DeliverInOrder",
"to": {
"next_count": 2,
"dup": false
... | null | 0 |
3gpp_rlc_am_retx | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.322 §5.2/§5.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold) | retx_bounded_no_runaway | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.322 §5.2/§5.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold)
Safety property that must hold: retx_bounded_no_runaway
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The prope... | State fields (in order): retx, acked, failed
Initial state: {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}
{'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack-->... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 3 | 11 | 10 | [
"retx",
"acked",
"failed"
] | {
"retx": 0,
"acked": false,
"failed": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"retx": 0,
"acked": false,
"failed": false
},
"label": "Retransmit",
"to": {
"retx": 1,
"acked": false,
"failed": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"retx": 0,
"acked": false,
"failed": false
},
"label": "Ack",
"to": {
... | null | 0 |
3gpp_drx_timers | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers) | awake_when_pdcch_expected | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers)
Safety property that must hold: awake_when_pdcch_expected
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The propert... | State fields (in order): active, pdcch_expected
Initial state: {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}
{'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurati... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 2 | 3 | 6 | [
"active",
"pdcch_expected"
] | {
"active": false,
"pdcch_expected": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"active": false,
"pdcch_expected": false
},
"label": "OnDurationStart",
"to": {
"active": true,
"pdcch_expected": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"active": true,
"pdcch_expected": false
},
"label": "OnDurationStart",
"to": {
"activ... | null | 0 |
3gpp_rach_contention | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.1 (Random access, contention resolution) | no_undetected_collision | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.1 (Random access, contention resolution)
Safety property that must hold: no_undetected_collision
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must... | State fields (in order): preamble, contention, resolved, undetected
Initial state: {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --SendPreamble--> {'pr... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 4 | 4 | 3 | [
"preamble",
"contention",
"resolved",
"undetected"
] | {
"preamble": false,
"contention": false,
"resolved": false,
"undetected": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"preamble": false,
"contention": false,
"resolved": false,
"undetected": false
},
"label": "SendPreamble",
"to": {
"preamble": true,
"contention": false,
"resolved": false,
"undetected": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"preamble": ... | null | 0 |
3gpp_beam_failure_recovery | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.17 / TS 38.213 §6 (Beam failure recovery) | recover_before_rlf | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 §5.17 / TS 38.213 §6 (Beam failure recovery)
Safety property that must hold: recover_before_rlf
The procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hol... | State fields (in order): bf_detected, bfr_sent, recovered, rlf
Initial state: {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --DetectBeamFailure--> {'bf_detected'... | PROVEN_SAFE | false | null | null | false | null | 4 | 4 | 3 | [
"bf_detected",
"bfr_sent",
"recovered",
"rlf"
] | {
"bf_detected": false,
"bfr_sent": false,
"recovered": false,
"rlf": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"bf_detected": false,
"bfr_sent": false,
"recovered": false,
"rlf": false
},
"label": "DetectBeamFailure",
"to": {
"bf_detected": true,
"bfr_sent": false,
"recovered": false,
"rlf": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"bf_detected": tr... | null | 0 |
3gpp_xn_handover_premature_release | 3GPP | 3GPP TS 38.300 §9.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch) | always_one_serving_context | model | You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.
Standards body: 3GPP
Specification clause: 3GPP TS 38.300 §9.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch)
Safety property that must hold: always_one_serving_context
The procedure is given below as a finite state mac... | State fields (in order): source_ctx, target_ctx, path_switched, data_lost
Initial state: {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}
Transitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):
{'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --Prepa... | CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE | true | null | null | true | true | 4 | 6 | 5 | [
"source_ctx",
"target_ctx",
"path_switched",
"data_lost"
] | {
"source_ctx": true,
"target_ctx": false,
"path_switched": false,
"data_lost": false
} | [
{
"from": {
"source_ctx": true,
"target_ctx": false,
"path_switched": false,
"data_lost": false
},
"label": "PrepareTarget",
"to": {
"source_ctx": true,
"target_ctx": true,
"path_switched": false,
"data_lost": false
}
},
{
"from": {
"... | [
{
"label": null,
"state": {
"source_ctx": true,
"target_ctx": false,
"path_switched": false,
"data_lost": false
}
},
{
"label": "PrepareTarget",
"state": {
"source_ctx": true,
"target_ctx": true,
"path_switched": false,
"data_lost": false
}... | 3 |
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